

JPRS 75777

28 May 1980

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2122

**FBIS**

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

28 May 1980

## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2122

## CONTENTS

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

Action by Both Soviets and Israelis Expected in Arab Region (AL-MUSTAQBAL, 15 Mar 80) .....	1
Palestine Question Complicated by U.S. Policies (Hisham Sharabi; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 22 Mar 80) .....	6
Husayn's, 'Arafat's Positions on Palestine Problem (Nuhad Al-Mashnuq; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 30 Mar 80) .....	14
PLO Leaders Comment on European Initiative (Khalid al-Hasan Interview; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 22 Mar 80) .....	19
Outlook for Gulf States in the 1980's Discussed (Riyadh Najib al-Rayyis; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 29 Mar 80) .	27
Editor Discusses Gulf States' Unity, Neutrality (Riyadh Najib al-Rayyis; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 22 Mar 80)...	32
Military Capabilities of North, South Yemen Compared (Tawfiq Nakhiah Ibrahim; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 17-23 Mar 80) .....	36
Saudi-PDRY Relations Improve After PDRY Foreign Minister's Visit (Riyadh; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 5 Apr 80) .....	39
Jordanian-Palestinian Confederation Favored by France (Antoine 'Abd-al-Masih; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 15 Mar 80)...	43
Relations Between Arab States and France Analyzed (Ahmad Jawad; AL-DUSTUR, 30 Mar 80).....	52

## CONTENTS (Continued)

Syrian Vice Premier Speaks Out on Camp David, Other Issues ( 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam Interview; EL MOUDJAHID, 13 Apr 80).....	63
Arab Information Abroad Discussed (Riyadh Najib al-Rayyis; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 15 Mar 80)...	73
Briefs Saudi Aid for Development	79

## AFGHANISTAN

'Carter's Doctrine' Considered Detrimental to Peace (Firuz Kuh; ANIS, 29 Apr 80) .....	80
Tense Calm Prevails in Kabul (THE MUSLIM, 4 May 80) .....	84
Karmal Hopes for Peace With Neighbors, Denounces Foreign Intervention (Babrak Karmal Interview; AL-SAFIR, 10 Apr 80).....	85
Soviets Install Satellite Communication Station (Sayyah; ANIS, 23 Apr 80) .....	91
Changing Days and Nights of Kabul (THE MUSLIM, 4 May 80) . . . . .	95
Anniversary of Sawr Revolution Commemorated (Editorial; ANIS, 26 Apr 80) .....	96
Mujahideen Kill Many Afghan Soldiers (DAWN, 6 May 80) . . . . .	98
Observance of Religious Rites 'Guaranteed' (D. Tavan; ANIS, 24 Apr 80)... ..	99
Briefs Russian General, Family Gunned Down	104

## ALGERIA

Influx of Foreign Currency Declines, Causes Examined (EL MOUDJAHID, 10 Apr 80) .....	105
Creation of Civil Service Considered (Hamid Aberkane; EL MOUDJAHID, 10 Apr 80).....	112



# CONTENTS (Continued)

## EGYPT

Fahmi Views Normalization as Damaging to Egyptian, Arab Security (Isma'il Fahmi Interview; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 22 Mar 80)	115
Sadat Sticks to His Policies in Face of Growing Opposition (Ghassan Bayram; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 29 Mar 80).....	121
Analysis of Egyptian Opposition (Mahmud al-Maraghi; ROSE AL-YUSUF, 17 Mar 80).. ...	129
Analysis of Freedom of Press in Egypt (Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus Interview; AL-HAWADITH, 14 Mar 80) .....	137

## IRAN

International Finance, Relations With U.S., Arabs Discussed (Ali Reza Nowbari Interview; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 10-16 Mar 80) .....	144
Resistance Front Backs Iran (JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, 15 Apr 80) .....	148
Kurdish Leaders Offer Peaceful Solution (Sheykh Ezzoddin Hoseyni Interview; KEYHAN, 20 Apr 80) .....	150
Briefs Army To Purge Universities	154

## ISRAEL

Prospects of Summit Meeting in Washington Discussed (Editorial; HATZOFEH, 9 Apr 80) .....	155
Motives of Weizman Discussed (HA'ARETZ, 6 Apr 80) .....	157
Sanctions Against Iran Assessed (Editorial; HATZOFEH, 9 Apr 80) .....	161
Iran Situation Seen as Evidence of Deteriorating Society (Editorial; HAMODI'A, 12 Mar 80) .....	163

## CONTENTS (Continued)

Begin Policy on Autonomy and Settlements Seen Unchanging (A. Schweitzer; HA'ARETZ, 28 Mar 80) .....	165
Cabinet Urged To Decide on Steps To Settle Jews in Hebron (Editorial; HATZOFEH, 16 Mar 80) .....	168
Theatrics of Egyptian President (Editorial; HATZOFEH, 11 Apr 80) .....	170
First Anniversary of Peace Treaty Marked by Concern for Future (Editorial; HAMODI'A, 28 Mar 80) .....	172
Europe Seen Moving Into Arab Camp (Editorial HAMODI'A, 12 Mar 80) .....	174
New Split Among Factions in Occupied Territories Assessed (Yehudah Litani; HA'ARETZ, 23 Mar 80).....	176
Political Reasons Seen Behind Relaxation of IDF Reaction to Terrorists (Editorial; HATZOFEH, 11 Apr 80) .....	180
Labor Party Credibility (HA'ARETZ, 9 Apr 80) .....	182
Drop in Foreign Reserves Seen for 1980 (Shlomo Maoz; JERUSALEM POST, 14 Mar 80) .....	186
Despite Farmer Protests, 'Price Support Over,' Budget Chief Declares (David Krivine; JERUSALEM POST, 18 Mar 80) .....	187
Joint FRG-Israel Research Projects (JERUSALEM POST, 17, 19 Mar 80) .....	191
More Nuclear Research, by Ernie Meyer Grants for Weizmann Institute	
Decline in Consumer Price Index Evidence of Inflation Check (Editorial; HATZOFEH, 16 Mar 80) .....	193
New Wage Agreement Praised (Editorial; HAMODI'A, 16 Mar 80) .....	194

## CONTENTS (Continued)

New Papers Appear in Gaza, Jerusalem (JERUSALEM POST, 6, 12 Mar 80) .....	196
First for Gaza, by Gideon Weigert New Arabic Paper, by Ian Black	
London Now Center for Arabic Press (Yoel Dar; JERUSALEM POST, 18 Mar 80) .....	198
Briefs Tourism Income	199
<b>JORDAN</b>	
Panel Discusses Consumer Affairs, Policies (AL-DUSTUR, 9 Apr 80) .....	200
<b>KUWAIT</b>	
Steadfastness Front's Use of Oil Weapons Discussed (Editorial; AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM, 16 Apr 80) .....	211
Amir Discusses Role of Parliament, Educational Policy (AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM, 12 Apr 80) ..	213
Moderate Use of Electricity, Water Urged (Editorial; AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM, 27 Mar 80) .....	216
<b>LEBANON</b>	
New Alignments in Lebanese Politics Discussed (Ghassan Bayram; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 5 Apr 80) .....	217
Amal Movement Affairs Discussed (AL-SAFIR, 5 Apr 80) .....	221
Plans for Inter-Arab Economic Cooperation Discussed (Arlette al-Nawwar, Vivian Saliba; AL-'AMAL, 12 Mar 80) .....	225
Representative Lahhud Defines Recommended Defense Policy (AL-NIDA', 12 Mar 80) .....	234
Draft Rent Law Condemned (AL-NIDA', 2 Apr 80) ..	238

## CONTENTS (Continued)

Agricultural Projects Approved (AL-NIDA', 12 Mar 80) .....	244
<b>MOROCCO</b>	
UMT National Council Reaffirms Workers' Demands (L'AVANT-GARDE, 22 Mar 80) .....	247
French Labor Delegation Visits, Meets With UMT Leaders (L'AVANT-GARDE, 15 Mar 80) .....	250
Commissions To Investigate Meknes, Kenitra Prisoners Established (Editorial; AL BAYANE, 27 Mar 80) .....	251
Ali Yata Interview for 'AFRICA' Magazine (Ali Yata Interview; AL BAYANE, 28 Mar 80) ..	252
<b>PERSIAN GULF AREA</b>	
Gulf States Form Weapons Manufacturing Group (AL-MUSTAQBAL, 22 Mar 80) ....	257
Britain, France Compete To Sell Arms to Gulf States (AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 17-23 Mar 80)....	260
<b>SAUDI ARABIA</b>	
Saudi Official Explains Decision Not To Renew U.S. Base (AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 7-13 Apr 80) .....	262
Saudis Reject Alliances, Reemphasize Palestinian Issue (Sulyaman Nimr; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 1 Mar 80) .....	268
Saudis Call for Positive Steps To Solve Palestinian Problem (Sulayman Nimr; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 15 Mar 80) .....	273
Current Weaponry, Future Arms Acquisitions Surveyed (Tawfiq Naklah Ibrahim; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 3-9 Mar 80) .....	277
Future of Petroleum Minister Seen as Uncertain (Mustafa Karkuti; AL-SAFIR, 2 Mar 80) ....	281
Briefs Saudi-Iranian Relations	283



CONTENTS (Continued)

SUDAN

Editorial Criticizes Egypt's Attitude (Editorial; SUDANOW, Mar 80) .....	284
Former Minister Criticizes Government Policy (Mansur Khalid Interview; SUDANOW, Mar 80) .....	286
Opposition Leader Urges Neutral Arab Stand on Sudan (Al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi; AL-DUSTUR, 17-23 Mar 80).	290
Opposition Leader Urges Anti-Nimeiri Arab Stance (Al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi; AL-DUSTUR, 3-9 Mar 80) ..	300
Review of National Conference of Socialist Union (Usamah Ayyub; OCTOBER, 9 Mar 80) .....	309
Gezira Scheme Being Restructured (SUDANOW, Mar 80) .....	316
Problems Noted Managing Director Comments, Hassan el Tayeb el Hag Interview	
Attitudes of Sudanese People Recalled (SUDANOW, Mar 80) .....	335

ACTION BY BOTH SOVIETS AND ISRAELIS EXPECTED IN ARAB REGION

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 15 Mar 80 pp 29-31

[Article: "Expect Soviet 'Action' in the Arab Countries If Moscow Gets 'Squeezed' in Afghanistan"]

[Text] Syria asks: "Will Israel launch an attack in order to save the autonomy negotiations, and is the Palestinian Resistance [Organization] getting ready to escalate its military activities in the occupied lands?"

Official reports speak of the explosion of conflicts in Arab North Africa and along the Egyptian-Libyan border.

A week before the Arab League Council met in order to look into the Tunisian-Lybian dispute, there were reports being exchanged between a number of North African and eastern Arab capitals which called upon [people] to be on their guard against events which were about to happen and which might have the Arab countries as their arena.

And if Arab concern about the probability of Israel undertaking to inflict a military blow against Syria has dominated [concern] about anything else that might be expected in some of the eastern Arab capitals, these reports, this time, focussed in particular on the expectation of grave happenings in Arab North Africa, and [indicated] that more than one party of people are busy electrifying the situation in Arab North Africa with all the factors of an explosion and are using existing disputes between the North African countries as a means of introducing these [explosive factors].

And these reports contain what was expected concerning the escalation in the Moroccan-Algerian conflict over Western Sahara. Information available on this matter says that the situation could very well explode at any minute.

And there are other reports which consider that the chapters of the Libyan-Tunisian conflict, which exploded in the "Gafsa" war, have not been concluded, and that the situation there is possibly due to explode again.

These reports are once again focussing on the Egyptian-Libyan front, and this is in light of information which speaks about the probability of the Egyptian regime unleashing a new war against the Libyan Jamahiriya.

And a prominent Arab figure, who for weeks has been participating in Arab consultations that have been going on, says that the Arab world, including its eastern part and its North African part, is still like a powder keg, ready to explode at any moment. [And he says that this] is due to international and regional factors and conflicts which are connected to the cold war between the two superpowers, and that this showed up in the events which took place in Afghanistan.

In the view of some Arab sources the events and happenings which are expected [to take place] both in the eastern and the western part of the Arab world are, in reality, subject to events which have happened and are still happening in Afghanistan on the one hand, and, on the other hand, in the realm of the autonomy negotiations which are taking place between Israel and Egypt under the patronage of the United States.

There exists official information which has been imparted to high authorities in the capital of Lebanon and which speaks about the direction which events in Afghanistan are beginning to take and about the fact that calculations made in Moscow did not completely fit the realities of Afghanistan.

[This is because] the development of the Afghan situation ended up contradicting the calculations on the basis of which the Soviet army entered Afghanistan. It turned out that the estimates that were made led to the expectation that Soviet military intervention would decide the situation in Afghanistan within the framework of a period of from 2 weeks to a month at most. Nobody really counted on the possibility of the occurrence of a Soviet military involvement of this sort which all but conjures up the picture of American military involvement in Vietnam. This [happened] as a result of the extent of the scope of Islamic Afghan resistance and opposition in the face of Soviet troops.

In addition, calculations were made which did not take into account the fact that the bases and strength of the regime of President Karmal and his comrades are so weak. Arab circles say that this surprised the Soviet leadership.

And a West European diplomat, who serves in the Lebanese capital, said that there are indications which have begun to show the gravity of the embarrassing predicament which Moscow has begun to feel in Afghanistan. [He says] that some of these indications are of a political nature and that some of them are of a military nature.

The European diplomat added that the fact that the Soviet chief has said that Moscow is ready to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in the event that it obtains guarantees which assure that no foreign intervention by Americans or

by anybody else into the internal affairs of Afghanistan will occur is an indication of weakness which shows the tough times that Soviet troops are facing there and is an attempt to avoid more long-term involvement. This is something that Moscow demonstrated militarily when it allowed its air force and ground troops to shell and bomb the people's processions and demonstrations, which were witnessed by the capital city of Kabul as a protest against Soviet intervention, and which led to the killing and wounding of hundreds of people.

The Western diplomat said that there is information which confirms the fact that Moscow now stands before a crossroads. Either it will try to avoid more involvement and will be oriented toward a political solution on the basis of what Brezhnev has stated or it will continue to combat the [Afghan] challenge, will continue its smashing of popular resistance in Afghanistan, and will try, by all means possible, to liquidate this resistance. On the other hand, the bigger the Soviet predicament in Afghanistan gets, the more the Soviet Union will be prepared to furnish an answer in some other area of American influence. Some people anticipate that the Soviet reply to the Americans will occur in the Arab world, and so far it is not certain, [but it is possible] that this reply could begin via Lebanon. In any case all of these possibilities could take place within a few weeks, and possibly before the end of next April.

#### Syria Is on Its Guard, and Is Preparing Itself

This atmosphere, which the area has been experiencing for a long time, has become more and more charged after the warnings that were exchanged between Syria and Israel and the accusation made by each of the two countries that the other is preparing for military action against it.

These warnings have taken on new dimensions after the memorandum which was sent by Syria's foreign minister, Mr. 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, to the Secretary-General of the UN, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, in which he informed him that Israel was preparing to undertake hostile action against Syria. This memorandum is what has taken the mutual warnings out of their news-media framework and put them into an official and international framework.

The Syrian capital really is living in an atmosphere of getting ready to reply to an expected Israeli military attack which will have, as its aim, the curtailing of Syria's political and military role in the Middle East crisis. [And Israel will do this] in order to pave the way for subjugating and subduing Syria's position and to make Syria receptive to solutions that are being suggested for the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of the Camp David agreements or similar such agreements.

The decision to regroup Syrian forces which are stationed in Lebanon is one of the preparations which Damascus is carrying out as a precaution against an Israeli attack. This has been confirmed by high Syrian officials when speaking with numerous Lebanese organizations and leaders that lately have been streaming into Damascus.



One thing that the Syrian foreign minister, Mr. 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, has said in this regard is that in addition to the information and data which Damascus has, the constant warnings which have been issued by Israeli leaders during the last two weeks about Syrian getting ready to undertake military action against Israel are an indication that Israel is attempting to prepare to make a military strike. [And he said that] this is something that previous experience has taught us, since Israel previously has made efforts to prepare its own public opinion and world public opinion to accept its aggression after having made itself appear as the one whose security is threatened and as the weaker party which is afraid for its survival.

Semi-official information from Syria expects that Israel will launch its attack just before or after the deadline which has been set for the autonomy negotiations which are being conducted right now between the Egyptian regime, Israel, and the United States.

Damascus's view has not changed, and it is that the autonomy negotiations are leading toward failure and are doomed to failure, whether or not the Egyptian president, Anwar al-Sadat, agrees to the autonomy formula that Israel wants or does not agree to it. [And Damascus feels] that this consequence will lead Israel to launch an attack on Syria, the purpose of which would be to hit two birds with one stone, that is, to strike a blow at the Palestinian Resistance [Organization] and to curtail Syria's role. The purpose of this would be to create a new status quo in the area which would lead toward capitulation by the Arab countries and consequently toward bringing the Egyptian regime out of its isolation. The more this isolation closes the noose around the Egyptian regime, the closer it brings it to death and the more it makes it subject to collapse. This is the complete opposite of [the purpose of] American-Israeli strategy in the area, which has come to see President Sadat's regime as one of its most important props in the Middle East after the collapse of the shah's regime in Iran.

Contrary to what anyone expected, information which has been available to Lebanese officials has confirmed the fact that the Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, made absolutely no mention of the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon during his latest visit to Damascus and during the discussions which he had with President Hafiz al-Asad and high Syrian officials. [The information says] that the discussions particularly focussed on the situation in the area as a whole after the events in Afghanistan and the crisis between the U.S. and Iran, [and the discussions focussed upon] to what degree the U.S. would be prepared to accept an Israeli military attack against Syria under the pretext of trying to save the autonomy negotiations.

And it is said that Moscow, when discussing the subject of a possible attack by Israel on Syria, [considers it] to be contrary to all logic because basically it considers it unlikely that Washington would agree to give Israel a free hand to do that. However, the loss of logic in the heat of the American election campaign could make all of that possible.

And it was on this basis that Syria wanted to include the subject of normalization of relations between Israel and Egypt and the probability of Israel undertaking an attack against Syria as part of the agenda of the last meeting of the Council of the Arab League which was held especially to look into the Tunisian-Libyan dispute.

And by doing this, Syria aimed at charging the Arab countries with their responsibilities and consequently warning them to be on their guard against an Israeli attack of this sort which would have the purpose of liquidating the Palestinian Resistance [Organization] and curtailing Syria's military role in the problem of the conflict with Israel.

And the atmosphere that the Palestinians are living in hardly differs at all from the atmosphere that Damascus is living in. Both parties believe that the area is living under the shadow of a countdown, anticipating the end of the autonomy negotiations and consequently hour zero (which would be the cue) for concocting events in the area either as a result of what is going on in Afghanistan, as a consequence of the war of confrontation which began there between Moscow and Washington, or as a result (or the failure of) the autonomy negotiations.

During the last few days these probabilities have been the principal source from which Yasir 'Arafat, the head of the PLO, has derived inspiration for several speeches which he has given on several occasions.

Abu 'Ammar hopes that the government in Lebanon will keep up its efforts and its actions in favor of an accord, because the more success these efforts have, the more that will lead toward freeing the Palestinian Resistance [Organization] from being involved in secondary and marginal events and problems in the Lebanese arena which would turn it away, to a certain extent, from its real battle which has begun with the autonomy negotiations and which is becoming progressively more intense as these discussions come to and end.

The reason for this is that the Palestinian Resistance [Organization] will be called upon to escalate its military activities inside the occupied lands, and the closer the autonomy negotiations come to their conclusion, the more intense preparations will become for these military actions inside the occupied lands.

One informed Palestinian leader has said that the significance of what is being expected in terms of events in the area is basically two-fold:

1. Any occurrence which takes place in the area may take on the same dimensions which have been taken on by events in Afghanistan because Moscow will be a direct and basic party [involved] in it and because America's position will be impelled by domestic considerations having to do with the [presidential] elections.
2. Both of the superpowers are now in the stage of revamping their strategies in the Middle East.

PALESTININE QUESTION COMPLICATED BY U.S. POLICIES

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 22 Mar 80 pp 6-8

[Article by Dr Hisham Sharabi: "Palestine Issue and United States"]

[Text] The U.S. policy toward the Arab East is a hostile policy. On the one hand, this policy supports the Israeli occupation of Arab land and, on the other hand, it works to break up Arab unity and to strengthen Israel's military domination. Furthermore, this policy threatens with military intervention in the Arab homeland.

Last January, a delegation representing the Georgetown University Contemporary Arab Studies Center toured the Gulf states. I was one of the delegation members. On our return to Washington, we held a press conference in which we underlined the serious situation in the area because of the U.S. position toward the Palestine issue. We also expressed the need to overlook the Camp David accords and to establish a just peace based on the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. We held meetings with a number of State Department officials and senators. We conveyed to them our impression of the situation and discussed with them the details of the just solution.

A senator from a state where the Jews constitute a major force said to us: "What you are saying is fully obvious. But the question is: How will this change which you are demanding take place? The occurrence of such a change in the Congress is almost impossible." The senator added: "Revealing the truth of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the members of Congress is not an easy thing. But even if the truth of the conflict becomes known, and it is known to a considerable number of members, such knowledge will not mean accepting this truth and acting upon it. The Jewish pressures compel the Congress members to support Israel regardless of the circumstances, and even versus the White House and the State Department." The senator then reiterated what we had already heard frequently, namely: "The final decision regarding our Middle East policy is in the hands of the executive branch, i.e., the White House and the State Department and you have to persuade their officials of what you deem right."

What is surprising is that the White House and State Department officials say the opposite. When I was president of the Union of American Arabs and made contacts with the White House and the State Department on the U.S. relationship with the Arab world, especially in regard to the Palestine issue, I was told: "We cannot change the world, especially in regard to the U.S. Arab world policy without a change in the position of the Congress."

But the issue is more complicated than this. The Jewish influence exerts itself not only on the Congress but also extends to the executive branch itself. Let us, for example, take Arthur Goldberg who was the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations during the 1967 war and who played a major role in Johnson's policy during that war. Goldberg revealed his true character as an old-established Zionist working for the interest of Zionism and of Israel. He visited Israel after leaving his position and was received like a native son.

We forget at times that Zionism is an international movement, that the Zionists are found everywhere and that each of them, regardless of his position or status, performs a role insofar as Israel is concerned. Last year, there was an incident about which the press published numerous reports and which the Arab press must have carried. Briefly, the incident was as follows: The aide to the chairman of the Middle East Subcommittee of the Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee was a Jew named Steve (Brian). The subcommittee chairman, Senator Richard Stone--a Jew from Florida--was having breakfast at the cafeteria of the Madison Hotel in Washington, the capital, in the company of a number of high-ranking military officers of a foreign country, which later turned out to be Israel. The officers were the members of a delegation accompanying Israeli Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman who was on an official visit to Washington at the time.

By pure coincidence, Michael Saba, the former president of the Union of American Arabs, came to the hotel and sat on the adjacent table. Michael knew Steve Brian and so he started to listen to what Brian was telling the Israelis. It became evident to Saba that Brian was discussing with them extremely serious military and political matters and so Saba took out a pen and a pencil and wrote down all that was discussed. I read the text of the conversation afterwards and it dealt with extremely sensitive security issues. After the Jews left the dining room, Michael went to an American Arab lawyer and acquainted him with the record of the conversation. The lawyer immediately advised him to contact the FBI to request a meeting with the official in charge of the external security department. On the following day, Michael met with this official and handed him the transcript of the conversation, typewritten and officially notarized by the lawyer, and told the official that he was prepared to take a "lying test." Brian was consequently interrogated, his story was published in the press and he was dismissed from his position. His case is still before the courts. What draws attention in the conversation recorded by Michael Saba is that this American Jewish youth, who was holding such a sensitive position in a committee concerned with the Middle East, referred to the Israelis in his conversation as "we" and to the Americans as "they" or the "others."



Let us take another example. During the 1973 war, Henry Kissinger was the commander leading the U.S. policy in his capacity as secretary of state. That war ended, as is well known, with Israel being able not only to repel the Egyptian-Syrian offensive but also with its being able to cross the canal to Egypt and to march to the outskirts of Damascus after having had to retreat on both fronts.

What happened to change the situation?

It was solely the U.S. intervention in support of Israel to prevent Egypt and Syria from liberating their occupied territories and to enable Israel to emerge from the war triumphant when it had been on the verge of defeat. Moreover, the United States continues to support Israel to maintain its occupation of the Arab territories and to persist in its defiance of the entire world. All this happened during the time of Kissinger. Under Kissinger's supervision, Israel received during Nixon's stay in office, i.e. from 1968 to 1975, more funds and weapons than it had received since the time of its creation. After leaving the administration, Kissinger delivered a speech to a Zionist meeting in New York City in which he displayed his real identity as a Zionist Jew with his ideas and inclinations. Some of what Kissinger said at this meeting was, 'according to published press reports citing some people who attended the meeting, that he had never committed in the policy that he had followed any action detrimental to Israel and that he had always kept Israel's interest before his eyes. When we assess today the results of Kissinger's policy, we find that he has said the truth. Didn't he rescue Israel from an almost certain defeat? Didn't he drive a wedge between the two major Arab countries that used to constitute the main danger to Israel? Didn't he start the step-by-step negotiations which paralyzed the Arab movement? Didn't he isolate Egypt and push it toward concluding a separate peace with Israel?

Kissinger has done all this and succeeded, thanks to the presence of al-Sadat as the president of Egypt. However, Kissinger has never respected al-Sadat and has always harbored extreme contempt for him, as evidenced by this anecdote recounted to me by an American friend who was tantamount to an eyewitness:

In November 1977, Kissinger was in a big television studio in New York to comment on President al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. When the door of the Egyptian plane which had landed in Jerusalem airport opened and al-Sadat emerged, Kissinger said: "I have known three insane leaders in my life and this (pointing his finger at al-Sadat's picture) is the most insane."

It is well known that Henry Kissinger, like most Zionist Jews, harbors special hatred for the Palestinians. He doesn't consider them a people like other peoples. A friend of Kissinger's—a rabbi teaching at one of New York's major universities—has told me that Kissinger views the Palestinian people the same way the Americans view the American Indians. In Kissinger's view, the Palestinians are the American Indians of the Middle East and their fate

is the same as the fate of the American Indians in North America: Defeat and extinction. This is what Kissinger and every Zionist Jew aspires to achieve.

Regarding the Jewish role, this question poses itself: Hasn't the U.S. President found anybody to represent the United States on the Middle East other than Robert Strauss, the Jew who is well-known for his support for Israel? It is as if only an American Jew can tackle the Middle East issue! After Strauss came Lawyer Sol Linowitz, a man also well-known for his immense efforts in the charity functions staged for the benefit of Israel.

Last month, Linowitz visited Jerusalem, went to Riyadh and stopped over in Rabat on his way back home. Edward (Cody), a reporter of the WASHINGTON POST who knows Arabic and who is extensively acquainted with the Middle East affairs, described Linowitz' meeting with the Israeli minister of the interior in Jerusalem as more of a meeting of friends or of relatives than that of the representatives of two states. Cody noted how the two spoke in Yiddish and how Burg was impressed with Linowitz' personality and gave him the title of rabbi!

I also want to dwell on the inclination to act powerless when dealing with the Americans. We find the ugliest form of this tendency in al-Sadat. Hasn't al-Sadat said that 99 percent of the solutions are in the hands of the United States, that the United States is the only superpower in the world capable of restoring the right to its owners and that the West is the party which will rescue Egypt from its tribulation and will restore its prosperity? What is the meaning of these statements? Their meaning is clear and obvious, namely that the United States is everything and that we are nothing!

The Americans, naturally, encourage such a position. A U.S. relations with the third world countries depend on people like al-Sadat who aspire for nothing more than to join the bandwagon of the United States, regardless of how deeply opposed to the United States their peoples are. But the Americans harbor no respect for al-Sadat and for people like him who act powerless. As we have been repeatedly shown by the events, the Americans—the moment they no longer find use for such friends—desert these friends and leave them friendless to face the wrath of their peoples. The position of pretending to be powerless has never served a national interest or a liberation goal. A right that is begged for is not handed over. Such a right is terrorized and devoured and nothing is left of it but crumbs. Experience has taught us that the position of interest and not that of powerlessness is the position that the Westerners respect. The values of right and justice, especially if pertaining to the rights of and justice for the third world countries, are of no interest to the ordinary American and do not influence his positions greatly. These values do not mean to the ordinary American what they mean to the masses of the third world who are still suffering from tyranny and oppression daily and whose fate is linked to the fate of the struggle for liberation. The main motive in the conduct and position of the Americans is the individual interest and the benefit or harm that the individual feels.

Throughout 30 years, the ordinary U.S. citizen did not pay the Palestine issue any attention, except in 1973 when the Arab oil was embargoed. This is why we say that the Americans will not change their anti-Arab and pro-Israel position out of conviction, i.e. by merely explaining to them the just Arab demands and revealing to them the Zionist lie. A change in the U.S. position can be brought about only by way of the U.S. interests and by making the Americans understand that occupation of the Arab territories is something that the Arabs will not accept.

When such a strong position is taken, it is possible that the Americans will listen to what the Arabs say about their just cause, will discover that their blind support for Israel is not in their interest, that Zionism is a movement that is as criminal as Nazism in its racism and that the U.S. public opinion has been the prey of the Zionist lies throughout 30 years or more.

This is on the one hand. On the other hand, there are those who say that the nature of the American system must be understood and that rigid and confrontational positions must be avoided with the Americans. These people also say that the Arabs should be realistic and should appreciate the U.S. Middle East position. The people holding this view say that even though we are aware that the U.S. policy is unfair to the Arabs and damaging to their national interests and even though the United States supports the Israeli occupation and finances its settlement and expansion in the Arab territories and offers Israel whatever weapons it wants in order to impose its domination over us--despite all this, we appreciate the hard circumstances of President Carter, especially his election problems and his need for the Jewish support, and we understand the reasons that urge him to adopt his policy which is unfair to the Arabs.

Thus, the side done the injustice and subjected to the aggression is the side that offers excuses and justifications for what the unjust and aggressive side does. If the Arabs persist in this position until it reaches its logical conclusion, they will inevitably reach where al-Sadat has reached, will squander the national interests and will accept military and economic subservience and capitulation.

The question that must be asked is: Why don't the U.S. President, Congress and U.S. citizen view the Middle East from the angle of the U.S. interests and not the angle of the Israeli interests? Why don't the Americans appreciate the danger of their anti-Arab and pro-Israel policy and the grave consequences that may emanate from their persistence in this policy? A confrontation like this is something of which the Arab regimes are capable. Such a confrontation is also in the interest of the U.S. people as it is in the interest of the Arab peoples and of world peace. A strong Arab position and a confrontation between the Arabs and the United States will not lead to landing U.S. troops, as American Jewish advisers and commentators say, will not lead to freezing the Arab assets in the U.S. banks and will not lead to a fierce enmity between the Arabs and the United States. On the contrary, such a confrontation will lead to laying down the Arab-U.S.



relations on sound foundations and will restore the relationship to one of mutual interests. Such a confrontation will also restore the Israeli-U.S. relations to their natural basis and will give them their real dimensions. All this will lead to security and stability in the area. The adoption of such a decisive Arab position requires that the national interest be put above all interests. This is the only position capable of pushing the United States toward abandoning its current anti-Arab policy and to adopt a policy based on respecting the Arabs and acknowledging their rights.

The Arab resources are wasted and are not used rationally. The actual Arab capability at present is like the capability of a car that can move at a speed of 150 miles per hour but that is not actually moving at more than 30 miles per hour. The effectiveness of the Arab activity in the United States can be measured by the same yardstick.

It is a limited effectiveness and is the biggest example of the inability of the Arabs to defend themselves in the face of the open challenges directed at them by Zionism in the United States. Let us go a little further. Last year, an important issue connected with the U.S. national security was raised and we followed it through the Union of American Arabs and through the Arab lobby in Washington. The crux of this issue was the disappearance of a quantity of uranium which is used in manufacturing the atomic bomb from one of the factories contracting with the U.S. Department of Defense. The official in charge of the factory, an American Jew, was accused of smuggling the substance to Israel. The report was published vaguely in the press and then disappeared entirely. In view of the fact that our organization is a political organization, we were able to contact the FBI officially and to ask to know the details of what happened and of what measures were taken against the defendants. We received a reply saying that the issue was still under investigation and that no details of the incident could be made available as long as the investigation was in progress. Several months passed and I again wrote to ask where the investigation had reached and we received a lengthy reply saying that the investigation was still proceeding and that details of the incident were still confidential. No official report on the incident has been published until this moment. It is said that the investigation is still in progress and I do not want to cast doubts on this. However, it is certain that the uranium reached Israel and that Israel now owns more atomic bombs as a result.

Zionism is, undoubtedly, an effective factor. But it is not the sole factor moving the U.S. policy toward the Arabs. We must not forget that the responsibility for making and implementing the U.S. policy falls on the shoulders of those who safeguard the system and seek to achieve its goals. But is the presence of a strong Jewish state in the [Middle East] area compatible with the interest of this system and does this presence constitute one of the system's strategic goals? This question can be raised in the light of the U.S. positions in the area, especially toward the Palestine issue. This conflict between the Arab position and the U.S. position toward the Palestine issue is reflected in other aspects of the U.S.-Arab relations.



Regarding the Gulf security, the Arab viewpoint says that the oil which the United States demands to protect and about which the Americans talk as if it were their own is the property of the Arabs, is under Arab sovereignty and only the Arabs have the right to decide how to protect it.

The Americans say that the protecting the Gulf oil can be guaranteed in two ways: Through military alliances or through direct military intervention. This statement is based on the tacit consideration that the two sides of the relationship concerning this issue are not equal and that one of the two sides has the priority over the other insofar as rights and duties are concerned. I wonder: If Israel were exporting the oil instead of the Arabs, would it have established its relationship with the United States on the unequal and unparallel basis existing between the Arab oil producing countries and the United States? The evident fact is that the United States does not take the Arab peoples and their rights into its consideration. Insofar as the United States is concerned, there is no such a thing as Arab public opinion. Where the Arabs are concerned, the United States seems as if it were blindfolded and can see nothing in the Arab world other than oil and other than states which it classifies as radical or moderate, depending on the U.S. wishes and goals. The fundamental point is that a change in the U.S. Middle East policy cannot be brought about by begging for the right but by employing the Arab power which is an enormous power.

There are two facts that the United States must understand: First, the time of military invasion has gone. Second, there is no force capable of standing in the face of peoples when they march, as proven by the recent events [presumably Iran]. If we want security and stability to be established in the area, the positions must be defined clearly. The Arab position must proceed from the following clear points:

First, the Arab oil is the property of the Arabs and nobody else has the right to dispose of it.

Second, protecting the Gulf is the responsibility of the Gulf states and any foreign intervention is a violation of the sovereignty of these states.

Third, the policy of nonalignment is the fundamental base on which the Gulf's security and stability are established.

Fourth, the Arab Gulf is a part of the Arab homeland and a threat against any part of the Arab homeland is a direct threat to the Gulf area.

Fifth, the Gulf security and the area's security are linked with the Palestine issue and with the issue of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and right to create their independent state on their land. The fundamental question is: In light of the current conditions, is it possible to reach practically a just solution to the Palestine issue?

The answer is that the just and comprehensive solution cannot be reached without a change in the currently existing Arab-Israeli balance of powers. Israel will not withdraw from the Arab territories and will not accept peace unless it dictates this peace as long as the balance of powers is in its favor. How can the Arabs change the balance of powers in the foreseeable future?

Militarily, this balance cannot be changed unless the Arabs come to possess the atomic bomb--and possessing the bomb does not necessarily mean using it. Until this is done, Israel will continue to be the strategically dominant military force in the Middle East, as the United States was dominant internationally from 1944 when it exploded its hydrogen bomb over Hiroshima and until 1949 when the Soviet Union exploded its atomic bomb. The Arabs are capable of manufacturing the atomic bomb and if they start building it now, they will be in possession of this bomb within a period of 5 to 8 years.

Politically, the change in the balance of powers cannot be realized unless the Arabs decide to use their strategic weapon, the oil weapon. Using this weapon does not necessarily mean an oil embargo. This weapon is undoubtedly a two-edged weapon. Employing this weapon, like employing any other strategic weapon, requires rational planning and accuracy. If the Arab will succeeds in making the necessary decisions and if it moves seriously at these two military and oil levels, then it will be also necessary to replace the vague current diplomacy with a policy established on frankness and clarity. The diplomacy of whispers and of soft touches currently followed by the Arabs is not fit for defending the national interests. Can't we hear what language the United States uses when its vital interests are threatened--"We will wage war if the Soviet Union interferes in the Gulf"?

These are the circumstances governing the balances of powers existing in the Middle East. If the existing Arab regimes can change them, the Arab East will be approaching a new phase of social change and economic progress. But in case of failure to change these balances, there is another course that will impose itself, namely the course of popular uprisings. It is difficult to predict how and when such uprisings will take place but the events have taught us that they take place when the national destiny is exposed to fatal danger and when all other paths to confront and overcome this danger are blocked. Insofar as we, the Arabs, are concerned, these uprisings may occur when the regimes expose their inability to confront the Zionist and imperialist danger and their inability to mobilize the material and human resources capable of confronting and overcoming this danger.

8494

CSO: 4802

HUSAYN'S, 'ARAFAT'S POSITIONS ON PALESTINE PROBLEM

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 30 Mar 80 pp 20-21

[Article by Nuhad Al-Mashnuq: "'Arafat Has no Recognition of a New UN Resolution for Giscard, and Husayn Has no Palestinian Solution for Carter"]

[Text] When King Husayn arrives in Washington early next month he will have a number of topics in his files. The most important of these is Jordan's reproach of the United States, sanctioned by such Arab parties as Saudi Arabia, for its policy on a settlement of the Middle East crisis and the latest byproduct of this policy--the Camp David accords. He will also carry a unified Arab position vis-a-vis the American policy in responding to the events in Iran and Afghanistan by a policy of military bases and pacts in the Gulf and Arab regions--a policy which has no support in the countries concerned and which is functionally useless as well.

There is a second file which is devoted to the question of finding a "parallel," but not an alternative, formula to the Camp David accords regarding the political and geographical future of the Palestinian people. The reason for proposing a "parallel" formula is that the American president, while prepared to receive King Husayn, is not prepared, however, to do away with the Camp David framework, although he is agreeable to a modification in the contents of the framework in the light of the complete failure which has been, and still is, encountering the Palestinian autonomy talks.

The American administration has repeatedly stated that it is prepared to receive King Husayn provided that he is willing to discuss the Camp David accords as they are. Late last year, the Jordanian monarch went to New York where he addressed the United Nations General Assembly, but he did not meet with any senior American official. Later, 'Abd al-Hamid Sharaf, then chief of the royal cabinet, went to New York too and met there with the United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Sharaf returned to Jordan saying that the Arabs should develop an alternative unified formula to the Camp David accords instead of just rejecting those accords.

The third file concerns King Husayn's frequently stated position that the present Israeli government of Menachem Begin is incapable of reaching a

settlement which is both serious and acceptable to the principal parties, that it is the Palestinians and the Arabs in general. It seems that the American administration is leaning to this political fact.

The fourth file contains the joint French-Jordanian statement in which Jordan recognized for the first time the right of all states of the region, including Israel, to live within secure and recognized borders, irrespective of the other pro-Palestinian and pro-PLO aspects of the statement. This recognition by Jordan has a deep impact within the American administration and the American and world public opinions. It is a sign of good will which only the Egyptian president had carried but which has now lost its importance as a result of the deadlock he has reached in his talks with the Israelis.

Would that mean an American retraction in favor of Jordanian policy?

#### The Parallel Formula

It may be an exaggeration to go that far in our expectations. But the re-establishment of an American-Jordanian dialogue is a serious shift--the first shift of its kind in the American policy since the signing of the Camp David accords. This is not due to a new "sensibility" on the part of the American administration but to Washington's express determination to prevent the failure of the autonomy talks by attracting to them any Palestinian personality which has a representational capacity, whether that personality had pro-Egyptian, pro-Jordanian or pro-PLO tendencies.

The search for a parallel formula by the Jordanian monarch and the American president will be supported by the king's files, on the one hand, and by the Israeli intransigence, on the other. King Husayn has several personal tales and stories about that intransigence and he has been telling them to those who try to explain to him the benefits of direct contacts with the Israelis or of entering the labyrinth of the Camp David accords. The French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was the latest listener to those stories.

What are the details of that "parallel formula"?

When President d'Estaing toured some states of the region, he stated in Kuwait that he is convinced that the Palestinian question is not a question of refugees but one of a people who should enjoy their right to self-determination within the framework of a just and permanent peace. In Amman, Giscard d'Estaing explained his views on this subject when he said that all parties must be brought into the negotiations for a peaceful settlement, which means involving the PLO as a party in the negotiations.

The French initiative which President Giscard d'Estaing has been quietly developing before and after his visit to the region is capable of achieving several objectives. The first is to defuse--even though temporarily--the explosive situation in the region which surrounds the Arab-American



relations, especially the relations between the United States and the oil-rich Arab countries, because the persistence of American policy in its present course will lead it to a dead-end, after the failure of the autonomy talks, on the one hand, and will lead its friends in the region to a dead wall vis-a-vis those who are calling for detonating the relations with Washington.

This is why some people have characterized the French initiative as actually an American one. But a thorough knowledge of French policies would make it clear that France is intent upon maintaining an independent line within the general framework of efforts designed to protect Western and American interests in the oil-rich areas and elsewhere. Therefore, the second--and more important objective--of that initiative is to emphasize the independent nature of the French position within certain concepts and to try to win over the rest of Europe to that position. France has scored an initial success in that regard. Britain has been talking about introducing a supplement to Resolution 242 which would cite the national rights of the Palestinian people. But it changed its position and came out in support of the French initiative, saying that its proposal is part of that initiative.

However, the most important file which King Husayn will carry with him to Washington, with regard to the "parallel formula", and which has been the subject of speculation is the file which deals with the position of the PLO vis-a-vis the entire host of new political realities, whether they are a European initiative or American promises predicated on a specific Palestinian conceptualization of the relationship with Jordan, on the one hand, and with Israel, on the other.

In principle, Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the PLO's executive committee, had a cool reception for the French initiative, saying that the French government should recognize the Palestinians' right to self-determination as well as recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and that people's right to establish an independent state in Palestine. On the other hand, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), speaking in Kuwait, urged the Arab states to support the French policy, but he said that the international balance of power does not lean in favor of the establishment of a Palestinian state.

#### What is Wanted and Desired

The true position, however, "although it is not too far from those statements," was carried to Amman last week by Faruq al-Qaddumi, head of the PLO's political department, after the completion of the French President's visit and before King Husayn's departure to Washington. Some aspects of that position appeared in the unpublicized French-Palestinian dialogue on Mr 'Arafat's visit to Paris. The positions of the French government are often reflected in British statements. Britain usually makes clear what is required of the Palestinians, whereas France prefers to stay away from



specifics. Thus, in a television interview, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said that "Giscard d'Estaing's reference to the right of self-determination reflects a common European stance." She explained that "in return, the PLO and the Palestinian people should recognize Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized borders." She added that "the real difficulty lies in how to reconcile those two things."

Therefore, the French administration shows no readiness to make a new approach to the PLO unless the Palestinian leadership--before or during 'Arafat's visit to Paris--shows readiness to recognize a new United Nations resolution which would incorporate most of the provisions of Resolution 242, but would replace the reference to refugees with a provision referring to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. This is what was mentioned in the joint French-Jordanian statement, which means an indirect recognition of Israel.

What is required by Paris and London is also desired in Washington. But can Mr 'Arafat give this card to Europe through the French president or to Washington through the Jordanian monarch?

The Palestinian leader has been persistently saying that the only card he holds with any certainty is the card of recognition. He says that he does not hold the weapon of oil and is not certain of a unified Arab position and that, therefore, he would not play the recognition card unless he is very close--or closer--to the state he wants. And even if Mr 'Arafat gets close to the prospect of a state, his comrades will look for a formula which would be not so much a political recognition of Israel but an acceptance of the status quo. The Palestinian leadership believes that the European initiative will not be allowed to achieve concrete results before the American presidential elections. Therefore, to make use of that initiative during the next 10 months is a must and a useful action, but it does not equal the price of recognizing Israel through a new Security Council resolution.

And so, neither is the United States willing to grant Europe the "honor" of solving the Palestinian question, which would increase Europe's independence and its moral control of the oil sources, nor is the Soviet Union, which expresses support for the European initiative, willing to allow Europe to go too far into Middle Eastern policy. Moscow believes that, in the final analysis, the European position is part of the general American policy and will rebound to America's benefit in the region. Moscow is betting on the assumption that its stake is higher in dealing with the whole, that is America, than in supporting the part, which is Europe. In addition, some of the parties to the Middle East conflict, primarily the PLO, do not feel that it is in their interest to enter the settlement arena unless the Soviets have a major part in the process.

As to the Jordanian-American dialogue, some Palestinian circles are talking about an old proposal which the king can take with him to Washington, namely, to grant Jordan the right to retrieve the West Bank in its capacity as the party from which it was taken away, after which an agreement is worked out between Jordan and the Palestinian leadership on the future of the West Bank. This proposal, however, is unacceptable to Israel, on the one hand, and is not desirable by Jordan, on the other. King Husayn does not want to solve this problem bilaterally with the Palestinians without the participation of other parties.

Among the practical proposals which have slipped out and become known is one calling for a return to an international conference which the PLO would be asked, in a separate invitation, to attend, provided that it attends as part of a joint delegation with Jordan. According to that proposal, the PLO would not be required to recognize Israel before attending the conference, but simply required not to reject a new Security Council resolution referring to the right of self-determination. At the conference, details of the recognition would be discussed together with the kind of relationship between the West Bank and Gaza and Jordan following the 5-year transitional period, under the auspices of Jordan--and through it the PLO--and Israel.

The indicator that would clearly signal to what extent these and other proposals will succeed is not the re-election of President Carter or the election of a new president, but initial American pressure to bring down the present government of Menachem Begin and bring about an Israeli government led by the Labor party which considers Jordan a major party in efforts to solve the Palestinian problem. Therein lies the gamble.

9254

CSO: 4802

PLO LEADERS COMMENT ON EUROPEAN INITIATIVE

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 22 Mar 80 pp 30-32

[Interview with Khalid al-Hasan, Fatah Central Committee member, by Sulayman Nimr and with 'Abd-al-Muhsin Abu-Mayzar, PLO official spokesman, by Faris Bizzi; "Khalid al-Hasan: Strategy of European and of Americans Is Same; Abu-Mayzar: European and American Positions Are Inseparable"]

[Text] What is the true Palestinian position vis-a-vis the new French stance toward the Palestine issue and what is the Palestinian position vis-a-vis all that has been said about a new European initiative to find a peaceful settlement for the Middle East crisis?

AL-MUSTAQBAL has met with and interviewed two Palestinian personalities separately on the French stance and the European initiative and on its reflections on the Middle East issue.

In Riyadh, colleague Sulayman Nimr interviewed Khalid al-Hasan, a Fatah Central Committee member, who had met with Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the Saudi crown prince, who acquainted al-Hasan with the outcome of President d'Estaing's discussions with the Saudi officials. Al-Hasan had accompanied closely the French president's visit to Kuwait and it has been said that he was not far from the French president's discussion with Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah, the Amir of Kuwait, and with the Kuwaiti officials.

In Marrakech, AL-MUSTAQBAL correspondent Faris Bizzi met with 'Abd-al-Muhsin Abu-Mayzar, the PLO official spokesman, after conclusion of the works of the Jerusalem Committee. Abu-Mayzar had headed the Palestinian delegation to the committee's meetings. The Moroccan monarch had also received 'Abd-al-Muhsin Abu-Mayzar for more than 1 hour in the presence of Salim al-Za'nun, a Fatah Central Committee member, and Abu-Marawan, the PLO representative in Rabat.

AL-MUSTAQBAL asked Khalid al-Hasan:

[Question] How do you view the recent French initiative and what is your evaluation of this initiative?

[Answer] Even though all the statements made by President d'Estaing and the joint communiques issued during his recent visit to the Gulf states, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have contained a step that can be considered positive and of special significance insofar as the Middle East conflict and the Palestinian people's struggle are concerned, especially what these statements have contained regarding the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and regarding the need for the Palestinian people to participate in any Middle East settlement, we must not attach to these statements more significance than they can withstand. The statements are tantamount to a European move, led by France, from the position of absolute refusal to recognize the Palestinian people's rights. This is a beginning for recognizing these rights--a beginning which has started with recognition of the right to self-determination. However, this cannot be called a French initiative or a European initiative because an initiative is a plan for a settlement and President d'Estaing's statements have contained no plan for a settlement. Even if his statements or his initiative did contain a settlement plan, we must understand that Europe does not possess the actual power to implement its initiative--even if approved by the PLO. This is because any settlement process concerning the Middle East will pass through the Security Council and there exists there a permanent obstacle, namely the U.S. veto. This is why we shouldn't attach any (practical) significance to the European position. The European role may come to have certain importance if it is reached in agreement with the United States so that the veto right may not be used in case there is an initiative that has to go through the Security Council. Here is where the PLO's role comes. If the PLO approves the initiative, its friends at the Security Council will not use the veto right and thus the initiative becomes likely to be issued as a Security Council resolution. The implementation process, which is exhaustive and lengthy, will follow. This is why we should not attach to all what is being currently said about an initiative or a new European position more importance than it deserves so that we may not become color-blind and imagine that we have realized our goals while the situation is still the same.

At the same time, we must not underestimate the statements of President d'Estaing that have been followed by German and British support. Logically, this means--and we hope that this will become a reality--that a statement will be issued by the EEC Council. Such a statement will influence Japan to adopt a more positive stance toward the Palestine issue. In such a case, the capitalist camp states will have adopted a position that is far ahead of the U.S. position and here is where the process of exerting pressure on the United States to lead these positions toward practical steps will begin.

This requires practical struggle and cannot be realized easily. We must also realize that even if all of Europe, and the United States along with it, approve [the new initiative], the implementation of such resolutions--even if issued by the Security Council--cannot become a reality unless a fierce Palestinian struggle is conducted under a united Palestinian leadership and is compatible with the Arab position that is committed to the Baghdad summit resolutions which reaffirm the Tunis summit resolutions and unless there



is a Palestinian push--a push actually comprised of all the power held by the Arab position in all the spheres, including the spheres of economy, oil and money.

Matters should be fully clear so that we may not be afflicted with vanity and may not, at the same time, experience a feeling of failure. We must understand the truth of the matter and must give things their importance according to their dimensions so that our path toward achieving our phased objective concerning our national rights may be a sound path.

[Question] It has been said that the French stance calling for the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people and for involving the PLO as a participant in any settlement negotiations is in preparation for a European initiative, led by France, aimed at finding a peaceful settlement for the Middle East crisis. Do you also believe this?

[Answer] It is possible for me to say that the recent French stance is tantamount to opening the door for a European initiative. Practical significance may be given to these statements by the tour made in the Gulf states by Douglas (Hude), the British minister of state for foreign affairs [name and title as published], and the statements preceding his tour and to the effect that Security Council Resolution 242 is no longer adequate for finding a solution because it does not include the real Palestinian issue.

This British diplomatic movement which has come in the wake of French President d'Estaing's visit to the area means the presence of some sort of coordination between the French and British movements. We have been accustomed throughout the past 15 years to find that France coordinates at the European level while Britain coordinates with the United States.

This is why we can say that the atmosphere is right for projecting a new initiative for a new plan to secure the phased rights of the Palestinian people. But we must also realize that no practical steps can be taken before the end of this year to present any kind of initiatives. Until the end of the U.S. elections, the European position, including the French and British stances, will remain within the theoretical framework.

[Question] Do you think that the new European initiative about which a lot has been said will be presented in coordination with the United States?

[Answer] It is my belief that the European countries do not act in total separation from the United States. It is also my belief that the historic international circumstance under which we are living does not enable the U.S. friends to tell the United States that it has committed a mistake and has failed. This is why after declaration of the Camp David accords the position of the overwhelming majority of Europe was one that rejected those accords as impractical, unimplementable and incapable of realizing peace. But no full declaration of rejection and of failure has been made public. They [presumably the Europeans] are waiting for the end of the time period connected with implementation of the Camp David accords. They will then

search for an outlet from the dilemma without stating that the accords have failed or have been a mistake or that the United States has failed in this effort. What becomes needed is to look for a way out from a crisis that has resulted from the failure of the Camp David accords.

This is why the European position cannot be separated from the U.S. position. Both move within the same strategy.

[Question] Does this mean that the European initiative to be presented will be tantamount to a new approach for finding a peaceful settlement for the Middle East crisis within the framework of the U.S. and European strategic visualization of the peaceful settlement in the area?

[Answer] In fact, it will not be a new approach but the same old approach. The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union will be on whether they will act as partners or act separately in bringing about a settlement and whether Europe will have or will not have a role in the next decision. These are the same questions and this is the same approach that has existed for years. What is new in the issue so far is that the talk about the inadequacy of Security Council Resolution 242 has become public. This is the same as what the PLO has been saying. The Security Council must issue a new resolution.

What is new in the matter is the issuance by the Security Council of a resolution dealing with the Palestine issue as the issue of a people and not one of refugees—an issue that has become, thanks to the Palestinian struggle, a tangible reality.

Therefore, a new resolution will be established accordingly. The nature of this new resolution is not known yet. The British are trying to ask the Arabs for their opinion on the formula of the new resolution and how it should be. As usual, the British are presenting vague drafts that are subject to various interpretations, additions and amendments.

[Question] It is said that the new European initiative will take the following practical form:

First, a new draft resolution amending resolution 242 will be presented to the Security Council. This draft will contain four important provisions, namely: Recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, a demand for Israel's withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, acknowledgment of the right of all the area's states to live within secure and recognized borders guaranteed by the five major powers and a call for the holding of negotiations under international supervision among all the parties involved approving this resolution.

Second, a call will then be issued for convening a conference similar to the Geneva conference to hold direct negotiations.

Do you think that this will take place or that this is the scenario that will be followed within the framework of the new European initiative?

[Answer] This projected scenario may constitute the general form in accordance with which the practical steps of the new initiative could be taken. However, this scenario will remain a mere big possibility [sic] and may change at any moment and at any time because its implementation or lack of implementation will depend on the political game that will take place or, to put it more precisely, will depend on the degree of success in managing the political struggle. All this is dependent on the elements of pressure and power that the Arabs possess and the PLO possesses through its military struggle inside the occupied Arab territories. I will again say that this will not happen within a few months but requires a very long time.

[Question] Amending Security Council Resolution 242 or adding new provisions to it must include the addition of a provision on the right of the area's states to live safely within a secure and recognized international borders. Don't you think that this will create a political dilemma for the PLO if it fails to approve such a provision and that it will generate confusion and conflict within the PLO circles if the organization approves it?

[Answer] I believe that this will not create a dilemma because the PLO is committed to the Palestinian National Council's resolution which states that the creation of a Palestinian state should not be coupled with a legal recognition of Israel or with the conclusion of peace with it. This is the red line that neither the PLO nor any Palestinian official can go beyond. At this point, there will be a hard diplomatic battle in the international lobbies. How this battle will develop is something that nobody knows yet.

[Question] Do you think that the Soviet Union will play a role in the new European initiative which will be presented? What, in your opinion, will this role be?

[Answer] It is my belief that as long as the U.S. monopoly to find a settlement for the area's crisis is rejected by us and by Europe also, then this means that the Soviet Union must have a role in any new initiative because such an initiative must pass through the Security Council, and the Soviet Union is a permanent Security Council member. Therefore, the Soviet Union and the United States cannot, by virtue of their status in the United Nations, be excluded from any future initiative or settlement plans within the framework of our phased goals.

[Interview with Abu-Mayzar]

Answering a question on the relationship between the European movement concerning the Middle East and what the Camp David accords have accomplished so far, 'Abd-al-Muhsin Abu-Mayzar has said the following:



The observers may form the impressions they wish to form but what is very important is to assert that the PLO knows what it wants and that it is determined to realize its political program which was approved by the Palestinian National Council and which has been reaffirmed by the international legitimacy [sic], especially in UN General Assembly resolutions No 3236 and No 3237 and other subsequent resolutions. These resolutions underline the Palestinian people's firm national rights to repatriation and to self-determination without foreign intervention and their right to sovereignty and independence in their homeland, Palestine. As for your question concerning the French initiative, we have been informed of no French initiative. All we have been aware of so far are statements and positions expressed by President d'Estaing. We have considered these statements a first step in the right direction and we have welcomed them to this degree and on this premise. We have underlined at the same time the positions expressed by France in 1976 during the Security Council discussions on the Middle East problem and the Palestine issue. The Jerusalem Committee has adopted the Palestinian position toward these statements and has expressed its appreciation for the French position and for President d'Estaing's recent statements. The committee has also affirmed the need to continue the efforts and the contacts in the manner that the committee chairman, King Hassan II, deems fit. These efforts may include a visit to be paid by the Moroccan monarch to France and other European countries to develop their positions vis-a-vis recognizing the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and recognizing the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people. The PLO, as decided by its National Council in its two latest session, demands and supports the implementation of the aforementioned UN General Assembly resolution No 3236. Insofar as the PLO is concerned, the realization of this demand is a fundamental condition for establishing a just peace in the Middle East. If this demand is not realized, the only option left to the PLO is the option that the PLO has put into practice since its inception in 1965, namely the option of struggle with the various means, including the armed struggle to repel the occupation from all the occupied Arab and Palestinian lands and the Arab and Islamic struggle to realize this goal. The PLO understands clearly the difference between flexibility and relinquishment. It also realizes that the Palestinian people's will which derives its strength from the legitimacy of the revolution and its institutions will not permit any attempts seeking to undermine the independence of this will or to undermine the firm national rights of the Palestinian people.

[Question] There are those who believe that the recent French movement is some kind of role distribution between the United States and the European countries--a role distribution seeking ultimately to reach a formula for a peaceful settlement with Israel that does not abolish the Camp David accords. What is your opinion?

[Answer] It is difficult to imagine the latest French position and the positions of the other West European states as being in total isolation from the United States. As I have already pointed out, we are facing in this phase positions and not a formula for settlement. We have expressed our opinion on these positions.



[Question] Some observers believe that the Soviet Union will obstruct the French initiative because it is not in its interest at present to reach a peaceful settlement for the Palestinian issue in which the U.S. weight seems to be the heavier so far?

[Answer] The Soviet position regarding settlement of the Middle East crisis is clear and firm. The Soviet Union has already repeatedly declared and reaffirmed its position to us and to the entire world. It is a position that fully supports our position because the Palestinian people through their National Council's resolutions, the Arab nations through the Baghdad and Tunis summit resolutions and the Moslem states through the Yez conference have underlined their rejection of the Camp David accords and of the parties involved. This rejection enjoyed wide-scale international support at the sixth nonaligned countries summit in Havana, as well as in the United Nations. The Jerusalem Committee has expressed its thanks to the Security Council members, including the Soviet Union of course, for their honorable positions that have condemned the settlements in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including Jerusalem.

[Question] There is an opinion that says that the U.S.-Egyptian-Israeli settlement of the Palestine issue must be passed before the Iranian revolution can plant its feet firmly and overcome its domestic problems. What is your comment?

[Answer] The Camp David accords are a deal that has taken place in the dark and that is in conflict with the real interests of the Arab people in the fraternal Egypt and the interests of the Arab nation. It is a deal that has been concluded at the expense of the Palestinian cause, rights, land and sanctities. This unclear deal cannot be passed, especially since our people are confronting it valiantly and since the international legitimacy has condemned it. No deals conflicting with the interests of people can endure in the face of the movement of history and all such deals will vanish. The success of the Iranian revolution has undoubtedly affected the balance of powers in the Middle East and has constituted a strong blow to the U.S. and Israeli strategy. Moreover, the triumph of the Zimbabwe people, embodied recently in the will for real independence for the Zimbabwe people, constitutes an indicator of the movement of history and of the inevitable triumph of the causes of the world peoples.

[Question] What is your assessment of the possibilities of the success of Lebanese detente under the current Lebanese, Arab and international circumstances?

[Answer] We in the PLO have declared our support for all the sincere national efforts to achieve the Lebanese national detente because we realize that the achievement of this detente on the basis of safeguarding Lebanon's independence, unity, Arabism and sovereignty has its role in confronting the Zionist enemy's plans and is fundamental for the Arab national security.

The PLO has declared its full abidance by the Riyadh, Cairo, Baghdad and Tunis Arab summit resolutions and its support for Bayt-al-Din resolutions. It is our assessment that the possibilities of the success of the Lebanese national detente are large if goodwill prevails and if the determination is there. The Palestinian resolution's interest lies in the achievement of such detente.

We have expressed this opinion in a statement issued by our Executive Committee. The Lebanese people are eager for the achievement of this detente. On our part, we will spare no effort to bolster all the chances and possibilities of bringing success to such a Lebanese national detente.

[Question] What is your opinion of the fact that Syria has now become the second target after Lebanon for imperialist sabotage in the Middle East area?

[Answer] There is no doubt that Syria's position toward the Camp David accords and toward the U.S.-Israeli settlement steps makes Syria the target of imperialist pressures and trouble making. The PLO is aware of the importance and of the decisive effect of Syria's continued strength, steadfastness and ability to foil the plans of the Camp David parties that are aimed against the Palestinian cause and are in favor of the Zionist enemy's interest and of subjecting the entire Arab area to the imperialist and Zionist domination. However, we are confident that the will for progress and for liberation will triumph over the will of imperialism and Zionism and that Syria will march on and will continue to perform its national role in its capacity, along with the Palestinian revolution, as the main front in the battle of Arab steadfastness against the hostile plans.

B494

CSO: 4802

OUTLOOK FOR GULF STATES IN THE 1980'S DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 29 Mar 80 pp 24-25

[Article by Riyadh Najib al-Rayyis: "The Gulf of the 1980's Between the Possible and the Impossible"]

[Text] If one has to return to the subject of the Gulf's neutrality, he should begin with a question inspired by the premise that the neutrality of the Gulf falls within the strategy of the West and its pressing need for the oil supplies which abound in this waterway. It is necessary then to discuss the extent to which the Western world can allow the Gulf states to achieve the kind of neutrality they seek, because such neutrality--if at all possible--must be sanctioned by a collective international approval, especially the approval of the party which would be most adversely affected by this neutrality, namely, the West. Now that the Gulf stands on the threshold of the 1980's and now that it has acquired a certain degree of political maturity after 10 years of internal ordeals and foreign threats, one has to probe into the background of events which have prompted the Gulf states to consider neutrality as an alternative to the disarray in which they presently live.

If the Gulf states acknowledge that they have become the front gate of the Arab world and that this gate cannot be closed in the face of the West, and ultimately the world, without subjecting the entire international balance to jeopardy, then one can review with some candor the sets of predicaments and dilemmas which lay ahead for those states as they enter the 1980's.

The Iranian revolution has engendered a host of factors which began with the series of tremors that rocked the region, upset its traditional balance and threatened to a large extent the oil supplies to the West which account for about 40 percent of the West's annual needs. In February 1979, the pro-Western rule of the shah fell and was replaced by the Islamic and non-aligned regime of Ayatollah Khomeyni. As the Iranian armed forces grew weak, Iran no longer remained the buffer state that it used to be between the Soviet Union and the Gulf states. The economic and political chaos which resulted from the Iranian revolution created a shortage in oil

supplies. This sent prices upwards and in turn affected the oil policy of OPEC on pricing and production. With the deterioration of Iran's relations with the West, especially with the United States, the position of the Western states on Iran became difficult. The difficulty was exacerbated by the holding of the American hostages at the American embassy in Teheran which seems unlikely to be solved for a long time.

With the withdrawal of Iran from its traditional role under the shah as the "policeman of the Gulf," the Gulf states lost the hatred "protection" of Iran, although they felt a certain sense of fear after that. The Gulf states also realized that an adventurous Iran might again advance territorial claims (in Bahrain, for example). They realized too that revolutionary Iran, under the slogan of militant Islam, has again exacerbated the historical Sunni-Shi'ite dispute and turned it into a certain state of hostility which has already threatened, and still threatens, to create a schism in the Gulf. Iran's support of the Palestinian revolution revitalized the "extremists" who are opposed to the present regimes in the Gulf, thus prompting the states of the region to be wary of adopting a policy that may be interpreted as "un-Islamic" or even "non-Arab."

All this is worrying the leaders of the Gulf states and making them feel concerned that the regional disturbances which surround them will be a source of destabilization within the regimes of the Gulf. The concern has included the following:

- 1--A disparate and diverse group of non-Gulf citizens who live in the region and who have different religious sectarian affiliations.
- 2--The host of economic-social demands resulting from the rapid growth of the oil-producing countries.
- 3--The weakness of the level of local popular participation in the decision-making processes.

Some events in the region have tended to confirm those fears. The rulers of the Gulf have lost confidence in the United States ability to protect them after it has failed to protect the shah. The loss of confidence came at a time when the Soviet Union began to score certain political victories in the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan and to show growing interest in the Middle Eastern oil through seizing the opportunity which might be offered to it by the troubled revolutionary conditions in Iran. This sense of restlessness and uncertainty has led the Gulf rulers to make certain adjustments in their internal and external policies. With regard to the Arab-Israeli struggle, they realized that their opposition to the Camp David accords, their boycott of Sadat's Egypt and their adherence to the resolutions of the Baghdad summit have enabled them to have a moderating influence on their neighbors in the steadfastness front. The moderation has given them a certain confidence in the prudence of that policy. The



disturbed Iranian situation has convinced them of the need for security coordination among them. It has also convinced them that the wave of religious extremism which has pervaded the region might prompt a slowdown in the rate of growth and development which in turn might affect the levels of oil production. As to the Soviet Union, if the West is incapable of giving those rulers any safeguards that would ward off the likely Soviet advances, then they will have to reach a certain understanding with Moscow. There is a lot of talk about the need for an understanding with the Soviet Union and for the exchange of recognition and diplomatic representation as a prelude to putting the idea of neutrality into effect.

Those political positions have put an end to any possible optimism about reliance on the West to defend Gulf interests. They have also ended any optimism among Western officials that the Gulf states will not impede or oppose the American initiative, represented by the Camp David accords and the American peace endeavors which conflict with Arab interests. Those positions have also confirmed to the West that its oil needs will remain in an uncomfortable position for a long time. The Gulf rulers are no longer in a position which allows them--even if they wanted to--to produce all the oil the West needs or to import all the commodities the West would like to export to their countries. The West's economic interests will inevitably be exposed to certain tremors, from now on, for it is no longer an acceptable premise that the Gulf should remain an economic preserve of the West. In addition, there exists the possibility that the policy of that region will shift from a "pro-Western" policy to a policy dictated by national and pan-Arab interests first.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has augmented, not detracted from, that possibility. If we are to assume a minimum level of sensibility in Western policy, we should realize that this Arab policy, while it appears to be opposed to Western interests as we, and as the West, customarily know them, is better in the long run than a policy by which the Gulf rulers would try to keep conditions as they are today.

The degree of Western dependence on the oil of the Gulf and on the Gulf countries as an open market for Western industrial and consumer products, in addition to the strategic importance of the region, have placed the traditionally pro-Western Gulf rulers in an import position as far as the West is concerned, and in an embarrassing position with the Arabs who oppose or antagonize American policy on the Middle East problem. Despite this sticky situation for the Gulf rulers and despite the present largely friendly exchange of relations between the West and the Arab states, this exchange does not constitute a guarantee. The gap in the levels of oil production and of trade imports from the West will continue to grow in the 1980's and will be quite different from what it used to be in the 1970's, specifically before 1973.

All this raises a number of question marks in the West. The first is that despite the fact that relations with the oil-exporting Arab states will inevitably undergo some changes and be subjected to some pressures during the 1980's, it would still be possible, nevertheless, to lessen the harm if the West were to show some understanding and sensitivity in dealing with the Arab leaders. If the West does not show a greater degree of rational understanding and sensitivity toward the Arab issues, conditions in the Gulf will inevitably move toward internal instability which will threaten the flow of oil and provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity to exploit the situation to its own advantage. This will also lead to a conflict--indeed, a clash--among Western interests in the region, since there exists no coordination in policies and positions among the Western powers themselves. Therefore, Western policy has to have general objectives which can provide a point of reference on which there can be understanding and agreement among those states. Among the objectives in question:

1--Developing the political and strategic military capabilities of the West to enable it to protect the Gulf states against any foreign attack. Such a step would give those states a sense of complete confidence and trust in Western intentions without creating any embarrassment for them in their relations with the other Arab countries or the rest of the nations of the world.

2--To speed up in a decisive manner the attainment of an Arab-Israeli settlement that would give the Palestinians in a manner acceptable to them the right to self-determination and would provide security for Israel within the 1967 borders.

3--To encourage the emergence of regional political, economic and defense organizations in the Gulf, which can intercede in the event of any disputes or disagreements among the states of the region and which can create with time some kind of regional cooperation and coordination among them.

4--To strengthen bilateral relations and ties between the states of the Gulf, on the one hand, and bolster relations between the Gulf states and the bloc of Western nations, on the other.

5--To encourage the drawing up of economic and social development plans in the countries of the Gulf that would close the gap between the rulers and the ruled and do away with the economic, social and class distinctions that exist now.

6--To insure that the West take serious steps to lessen its dependence on oil imported from the states of the Arabian Gulf.

Those steps are bound to strengthen relations between the West and the states of the Gulf, because it is unwise to assume that the security of the Western world which is dependent on energy and oil will continue to

be safe so long as the pro-Western Gulf rulers are in power. Western initiatives, no matter how well-intentioned, cannot stem the growing patriotic and national tide in the Gulf which will inevitably find itself in a position of unfriendliness--if not animosity--toward Western interests. If the West continues to exaggerate its reactions to what goes on in the region and pressure its rulers to fulfill demands that are unacceptable and that they cannot fulfill, the expected explosion will take place or will, at best, be speeded up. It remains that the West will have to change its habits, adapt to new circumstances and learn the meaning of dependence on others. The West is no longer the undisputed master of the ring as it used to be at the beginning and middle of this century.

These words contain ideas about the trends of Western thinking and about a new style of approach in dealing with the states of the Gulf as they stand on the threshold of the 1980's.

These words also contain a clear warning about the difficulties which can encounter the states of the region during the present decade. The most important thing, however, is that these are words which spell out to the Gulf of the 1980's what is possible and what is impossible. Between what is possible on the level of the Gulf and impossible on the Arab and international levels lies the adventure of keeping the states, peoples and rulers of the Gulf securely anchored to the coast of safety.

9254

CSO: 4802

EDITOR DISCUSSES GULF STATES' UNITY, NEUTRALITY

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 22 Mar 80 pp 28-29

[Article by Riyad Najib al-Rayyis: "Gulf Developments Made Known by AL-MUSTAQBAL; Unity of Neutrality of Gulf?"]

[Text] I will begin by immediately asking the question: Why isn't the Gulf's neutrality declared?

I will answer immediately: Because there isn't anybody who is thinking of this neutrality seriously. All claim this neutrality theoretically but do not apply it in practice and all know that any serious projection of the issue of neutralizing the Gulf as an area whose neutrality is acknowledged internationally requires a certain role which is difficult for this area's states to perform and a role whose simplest rules these states lack.

However, it may be necessary to raise this issue and to project visualizations for this concept in the light of a number of political developments that have taken place in a number of the Gulf states in recent weeks. These developments, which are being revealed by AL-MUSTAQBAL for the first time, may help to explain and clarify the features of the idea of the Gulf's neutrality before the door is made wide-open for those who are "with" and those who are "against" these ideas.

First, there is a Kuwaiti unionist plan prepared by the Kuwaiti political and diplomatic circles with the aid of legal experts. Copies of this plan have been distributed to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the Emirates only. This idea was raised in the wake of the conference of the foreign ministers of the six Gulf states in al-Ta'if last October. The plan was brought up after a session between Prince Fahd, the Saudi crown prince, and Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, the Kuwaiti minister of foreign affairs, at which Prince Fahd raised the question of the need for a higher council for the Gulf. The idea developed into the Kuwait plan with which Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, the Saudi minister of foreign affairs, has been familiarized and which he has studied. While awaiting the remarks of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE, the Kuwaiti plan is being re-drafted and will be distributed to the Gulf states to study it in its semi-final form before it is presented officially for



diplomatic deliberation. The Kuwaiti plan, produced by Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad's thinking, has been welcomed by Saudi Arabia and has been received with enthusiasm by Bahrain and Abu Dhabi. The gist of the plan is a unionist framework—a federal or confederal union for the group of the Arab Gulf states.

Second, the return of parliamentary democracy with new specifications to a number of Gulf states after formation of the committee to amend the constitution in Kuwait last month so that parliamentary life may be resumed on the basis of this amendment within a maximum period of 6 months. At the same time, Bahrain will embark on action somewhat similar to what has happened in Kuwait. Shaykh Khalifah ibn Salman Al Khalifah, the prime minister of Bahrain, had announced to AL-MUSTAQBAL (on 12 January 1980) before formation of the Kuwaiti committee to amend the constitution his country's readiness to present its past experiences in various forms and in the new facts without acting as the exception to its neighbors. Shaykh Muhammad ibn Mubarak Al Khalifah, the foreign minister of Bahrain, paid a quick visit to Saudi Arabia last month to inquire about the Saudi consultative council plan presented for discussion there and referred to by Prince Fahd in a number of his recent press statements. There is no doubt that the Gulf area will witness in the next few weeks a number of measures declaring the bolstering of democratic practices in the Gulf.

Third, despite the re-emergence of some Gulf disputes and despite the intensification of some of these disputes (Qatar and Bahrain over the Island of Hawad and Oman and South Yemen over political relations), new efforts are being exerted to overcome these disputes. Kuwait is prepared to mediate, if it believes in the success of its mediation or if it is asked to do so. Kuwait has already gotten a promise from the Sultanate of Oman to modify its foreign policy if the problem with South Yemen is settled. However, Muscat believes that Aden is not serious in seeking to settle the dispute which is a superficial dispute involving unrealistic demands. Kuwait has also gotten a Qatari-Bahraini promise to freeze the issue of the Island of (Hawad) and not to raise it at a time when serious efforts are being exerted for Gulf rapprochement amidst sharp international crisis that are shaking the area.

Fourth, freezing the personal disputes between the officials of some Gulf regimes—disputes that weaken in one way or another a regime's internal structure. There is an attempt to settle these disputes by persuading the parties involved of the need to reach an understanding since considerable time has passed since the eruption of these disputes and especially since the same country is spacious enough and needs the capability and efforts of all the disputants. Any mediation required for this issue will be prepared to discuss the issue if all the parties involved accept it. The Gulf circles believe that these disputes are not difficult to settle and that they are based more on personal obstinacy than on certain demands. Moreover, the passage of time weakens the demands of some of the parties involved. However, if these disputes persist or are prolonged, domestic stability—which is the guarantee to the safety of a regime in its entirety—becomes threatened.

Fifth, the renewed call for a conference of the foreign ministers of the Gulf states. This will be the second conference after al-Ta'if conference. The date for the new conference was set in Abu Dhabi last December. Iraq will attend the conference this time. Iraq had censured the Gulf states for failing to invite it to al-Ta'if conference and the Gulf reply to Baghdad's censure at the time was: Why don't you ask us about the plan for unity with Syria and want us to ask you about a Gulf meeting? However, this issue has been settled and the Iraqi-Saudi rapprochement has contributed toward merging Iraq in the Gulf group that has expressed its support for the national solidarity charter advocated by Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. The Kuwaiti plan for the unity of the Gulf may be presented to the conference if agreement is reached on its broad lines by the conferees. It is expected that the invitation to this conference will be issued next April or May, circumstances permitting.

In view of the likely developments in the Gulf and within the framework of the five recent developments that have taken place, serious talk has started in a number of Gulf political circles about discussing the possibility of declaring the neutrality of the Gulf to keep it far from the international conflicts. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, previously, the Iranian revolution and the positions generated have come to pose a threat to the area's stability, thus urging the two super powers to transfer the military conflict to the Gulf's warm waters and to its vast sand borders.

This concept of neutrality is still largely crude and the details on how to reach a real basis fit to be presented for discussion and deliberation on this concept are still brittle and lacking depth. However, it is possible to present the Kuwaiti unionist plan, to make the mediation for rapprochement among the Gulf regimes and to try to restore partial democracy to the area as some sort of popular settlement and participation if "some kind of a declaration" is made from the platform of the foreign ministers conference that is planned to be held.

But the question remains: What neutrality is the Gulf looking for? Does this theoretical neutrality agree with the affiliation of the Gulf states with the remaining Arab countries as a nation, a culture, a heritage and a religion? Moreover, will this neutrality, if guaranteed by all the international charters and conventions, affect the fact that the Gulf, as states, regimes, rulers and peoples, is an indivisible part of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the fact that, consequently, there can be no real neutrality before a comprehensive and just solution is achieved for the Palestine issue? Furthermore, what is the role of oil as one of the strong Arab weapons in the fateful battle with world Zionism?

This is a question, rather numerous questions, raised by the issue of the Gulf neutrality. Perhaps [the desire] to avoid [the presence of] U.S. fleets in the waters and seas of the Gulf, to prevent the arrival of the Soviet snows to the warm sands and to get out of the whirlwind of having the Gulf as the hostage of the international conflict is behind the search

for this concept. But what is more important than dwelling on this concept, despite its tempting goals, is to have this concept preceded by a unionist concept--regardless of what form it takes--because there is no real neutrality within states such as Hong Kong and Macao. Real neutrality is found in the intrinsic power emanating from democratic participation and from propelling the abovementioned developments on the path of realization.

The Gulf neutrality must be preceded by the Gulf unity. As for the conditions of this neutrality, we will deal with them in a future article. Let the expected "some kind of declaration" be a final declaration of intentions stating that the Gulf can have no salvation and no escape from its fateful destiny without acknowledging that it has become the Arab world's front and fundamental gate and that it cannot close this gate in the face of the other Arabs.

8494  
CSO: 4802

## INTER ARAB AFFAIRS

### MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF NORTH, SOUTH YEMEN COMPARED

Paril AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 17-23 Mar 80 pp 28-29

[Article by Tawfiq Nakhiah Ibrahim: "The Two Yemens: South Yemen Is Eastern, North Yemen Is Not Western; Yemeni Soldier Is 12 Years Old; Enlistment of Men Between Ages of 18 and 30 Difficult"]

[Text] A year ago the following fact emerged when the subject of the armies of South and North Yemen was raised.

On the one hand, there was the army of South Yemen. It is organized and equipped by the Soviets; it is supervised by 2,000 experts from the eastern bloc and 300 Ethiopians; and it is backed up by a popular militia. In other words it is an army prepared in a communist country to wage a "classical" war of liberation.

On the other hand, there was the army of North Yemen which is not organized in the western manner. The character of its structure is rather purely Yemeni. It lacks the necessary materiel; and it is not capable of defending its borders.

The picture has changed since then. South Yemen has strengthened its capabilities, and the new news indicates that Soviet presence in South Yemen is increasing. Two heavy submarines--undoubtedly (Floxtrots)--and approximately 1,000 Soviet navy marksmen have arrived in Aden. Furthermore, Aden itself has become a military base serving Moscow. It is no secret that the Soviet Union is taking advantage of four bases it built in South Yemen.

Mukalla Base is on the coast, about 100 kilometers from the capital, Aden. It is equipped with modern radar, and it controls the route between Aden and Oman.

The island of Socotra is equally a "nest" for long range radar that serves satellites and a base for training terrorists in the world.



[The port of] Aden has been equipped to make it able to accommodate medium size Soviet vessels. This port and the port of Asmara in Ethiopia represent two principal bases for Soviet troops.

The Khornaksar Base is more of a weapons and ammunition warehouse than an important base.

President of South Yemen 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il announced last February 27 that there were no Soviet bases in his country and that no Afghan-Aden-Ethiopian axis existed. He added that all news to the contrary was no more than "imperialist propaganda" enabling the Americans to ensure control over the Arabian Gulf.

In the North the situation changed in two stages. Following the clashes that broke out on 23 February 1979, the United States proposed that it send military equipment immediately. President Carter was able to obtain approval from Congress, in the midst of Iran's rebellion against Washington, to provide North Yemen with TOW and Dragon anti-tank missiles, several hundred M-113 armored personnel carriers, 60 M-60 tanks, and 12 F-5 bombers. Washington sent to San'a' 100 experts for technical assistance.

At the outset this U.S. aid was received with enthusiasm because it came quickly--the airplanes were sent in 6 weeks. Soon, however, San'a' became apprehensive of becoming a capital revolving in Washington's orbit.

U.S. support was in fact timely. North Yemen had only a few old MIG-17 and MIG-15 airplanes and a squadron of 28 Ilyushin-14 bombers, or a total of 22 fighter airplanes. Along with the F-5 (Tiger 2) airplanes which are equipped with Sidewinder missiles, two 20 millimeter guns (with a capability of carrying 3 tons of bombs), Washington also sent two huge C-130 Hercules transport airplanes. The problem that San'a' faced when it received the F-5 fighter bombers was the fact that it did not have pilots [for these aircraft]. Preparing pilots for flying this kind of aircraft would require 12 months at least. San'a' was therefore forced to seek the help of pilots from Nationalist China (Formosa). But the U.S. press revealed this matter, and this forced North Yemen officials to respond by saying, "Such news gives the Soviets an excuse to escalate [their activities]" especially since the bill for the arms deal (400 million dollars) was paid by Saudi Arabia. San'a' would not have been able to pay this sum of money because [the total bill] represents 7 times its annual military budget.

The citizen of North Yemen is [almost] born with a gun in his hand. He becomes a skillful marksman by the age of 8 or 10. He can also easily join the army at the age of 12. Authorities in North Yemen are trying, but are finding it difficult, to attract young men between the ages of 18 and 30 to the ranks of the army. North Yemen soldiers, however, are facing a technical problem: this is their inability to utilize the modern anti-tank missiles such as the Dragon missiles which are fired by the

marksman from his shoulder. Approximately 80 percent of the soldiers are also illiterate, and the problem of educating them is also facing numerous difficulties.

Strengthening the army of North Yemen with anti-tank missiles and with modern tanks presupposes the weakness of the land forces which have 39,000 men--for a population of 7.5 million--especially since the land forces have no more than 50 old T-54 and T-34 Soviet tanks, a few Saladin British reconnaissance tanks and about 100 Soviet BTR-50 and BTR-152 personnel carriers. The U.S. operation to develop the army of North Yemen faced some difficulties also in the artillery, especially since San'a' did not have but 120 British 76 millimeter guns and Soviet SU-100 guns.

#### Cubans and Ethiopians

In South Yemen where the population is not more than 1.5 million persons, the Soviets had to mobilize 8-year old boys to form a popular militia. The army of South Yemen, which has 21,000 men, is a young army. Its land forces have 19,000 men who are supervised by the Soviets. This army undoubtedly has a large number of illiterate people just as the army of North Yemen does. To close this gap many efforts were made: about 700 Cubans have been supervising the (Organ Stalin) missile launchers; 300 Ethiopians have been driving most of the 200 T-62, T-34 and T-54 tanks; only 500 men in the air force (out of 2,000 men and 33 airplanes) are Yemeni nationals. It is known that air force crews received their training in the Soviet Union and that some of those pilots did fight in Addis Ababa against the Eritreans. The air force, which has been equipped with only about 12 MIG-21 airplanes and a few old MIG-17 airplanes, has recently been strengthened with MIG-23 airplanes.

The role of the navy in South Yemen (300 men) is secondary. This is due to the dense presence of the Soviet navy. The navy of South Yemen has two old Soviet submarines (GIL SO-1) and a few old Soviet made B-6 torpedo boats.

One last reference is to be made to the fact that Aden and Moscow are bound together by a 20 year friendship treaty. This treaty makes South Yemen a member of the Warsaw Pact, with all the military implications of such membership.

North Yemen, which has not severed its ties with the Soviet Union, seems to have deduced some lessons from the decline of the influence of the U.S. role in the area and from the increasing rise of the military power of the Soviet Union and its allies. North Yemen, therefore, approved of the Soviet military aid (MIG-21 airplanes and others) that was sent by Moscow which is making an effort to unite the two Yemens under a communist umbrella. The Soviets have recognized that the outcome of a "war of liberation" against North Yemen would not be successful, especially since there is a reserve of 20,000 tribesmen who are supporting the San'a' government. [Furthermore], providing the forces of North Yemen with antitank missiles and ammunition would make every attempt to subdue the enemy in a country whose terrain is hilly a difficult attempt.

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### SAUDI-PDRY RELATIONS IMPROVE AFTER PDRY FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 5 Apr 80 p 26

[Article by Riyadh correspondent: "The Foreign Minister of Aden Says: 'There Is No Dispute Between Us and Saudi Arabia, and There Are No Foreign Troops in Our Country'"]

[Text] The Foreign Minister of Aden says: "We agree with Saudi Arabia that the region of the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf should be kept away from any foreign military intervention."

Some people may have been surprised by the statements made by Prince Fahd Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the heir to the Saudi throne, after his meeting with Mr Salim Salih Muhammad, the foreign minister of Democratic Yemen, last Monday, in which he said that "our points of view were in agreement about interests of mutual concern to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and democratic Yemen," and that "the atmosphere of the meeting was friendly and there prevailed a mutual understanding about levels of responsibility concerning our national interests." These people were asking whether or not this means that the "differences" between Aden and Riyadh have been solved. These people were also asking: "Has Saudi Arabia become reassured about the ruling regime in Aden which is known for its involvement with the nations of the Eastern camp? And what are the new factors and circumstances which have imposed 'this sudden change' in the course of relations between Saudi Arabia and Democratic Yemen?" This is quite a change, because these relations used to be quite often dominated by total caution. Now the relations are such that the joint press communique which came out after the foreign minister of Aden visited Saudi Arabia says: "The two governments have agreed to expand the scope of their relations and to consolidate them."

Actually there were no new factors of change or situational factors which were responsible for what has been described as a rapid change in the course of relations between Saudi Arabia and Democratic Yemen, other than the fact that the two countries' leaders in Riyadh and Aden have realized--as a Democratic Yemen source has said to AL-MUSTAQBAL--that "there are

certain parties who are trying to keep relations between the two countries such that they will be characterized by wariness and suspicion, sometimes by means of creating tension along the borders of the two countries, and at other times by means of spreading rumors and lies about each country's attitude toward the other." When AL-MUSTAQBAL asked the Aden official about the identity of these "parties," he answered by saying: "These are the parties that want the Arabian Gulf area and the Arabian Peninsula to live in a constant state of tension and turmoil so that the area will remain unstable." And the [Southern] Yemen source pointed out the fact that whenever any contacts have taken place between the two countries, these "parties" have undertaken to arouse suspicions about whether or not there was any foreign military presence in Aden or else they have undertaken to spread lies about the two countries mobilizing their forces along their borders. [He says that] all of this is for the sake of creating a barrier to mutual understanding between the two countries, and this is a mutual understanding which was defined by the "Six-Point" Document or Agreement which was signed by the two countries in 1975, based on the principles of mutual respect, national sovereignty, and non-intervention in [each other's] internal affairs. The Aden official, who was accompanying the minister Salim Salih Muhammad on his visit to Riyadh, was then reminded "that the main point of dispute in relations between Aden and Riyadh is the fact that you have signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union and that there are Soviet troops on the territory of Democratic Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, as everyone knows, is alarmed by the presence of foreign troops in the area, so what should it think if this happens right on its borders?"

The official answered by saying: "Everything that is said about this subject is not true. We fought and struggled for the sake of getting rid of the foreign presence [in Aden] which was embodied by British imperialism. It is not reasonable that we would substitute it with another foreign presence, whatever form it might take. We have assured the Saudi authorities that this is our position. And we fully agreed that foreign presence in any country in the area is a danger which threatens the security, stability, and well-being of the area's countries. Also, we fully agreed that every country [in the area] should have the freedom to choose the type of political regime that it wants, as long as this regime does not threaten the security of any other country."

What the official from Aden said about this subject was also echoed by the foreign minister of Democratic Yemen when he told AL-MUSTAQBAL: "We are fully aware of what foreign presence entails in terms of danger to the area's security, stability, and peace. We have striven, and we are still striving, to keep all foreign presence out of the region. For this reason we are in full agreement that foreign presence is a danger which threatens the security, well-being, and stability of our countries. And it is necessary that we join forces in our sincere efforts to keep all foreign military intervention out of the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf area. We hope that we will succeed in achieving all of what is necessary to consolidate stability and cooperation which will be in the interests of our



countries and our peoples." And Mr Salim Salih Muhammad added: "There is no doubt that [close] brotherly coordination, based on mutual respect and fruitful cooperation, is a much better solution than is cooperation with foreign forces. But we have to distinguish between our friends and our enemies, between those who plunder and attempt to plunder our riches and our wealth and aid our enemy, especially the Zionist enemy, and our friends who stand by us in our just causes, especially the great Arab cause which is the Palestinian cause."

When we asked the foreign minister of Aden about his concept about the nature of relations between his country and Saudi Arabia in view of the difference in their regimes, he said: "In our view there is nothing that prevents us from the creation of fruitful cooperation and coordination between our two countries, regardless of the nature of the existing regimes. And we should anchor our relations on the principle that says that when we have political differences, this should not be reflected in the relations between our peoples. In my view, regardless of the nature of the different types of regimes, it is possible for us to have good relations and to begin taking practical steps that will actually enable us to then take further subsequent steps in this direction. We have to earnestly search for a way to create practical steps such as these."

#### The Elimination of Misunderstanding

Some people were surprised by the statements made by the Saudi crown prince concerning the results of the visit made by Mr Salim Salih Muhammad. But those who followed the visit by Democratic Yemen's foreign minister to Riyadh and Jiddah, which lasted 3 days, noticed the great importance which Saudi officials attached to this visit. They were not surprised that the talks resulted in what the Saudi crown prince described as "agreement in points of view," nor were they surprised that an agreement was made that the head of the presidential council in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Mr 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, would make a visit to Saudi Arabia. The talks--as the official from Democratic Yemen told AL-MUSTAQBAL--were characterized by frank and open discussions concerning a number of matters which had been creating misunderstanding on the part of authorities in the two countries. [And the talks were characterized by] a positive atmosphere in which there prevailed a complete desire to eliminate all the tensions and obstacles which had arisen in the path of their bilateral relations.

Perhaps the assurances given by the representative of Democratic Yemen, during the discussions which took place, that everything that had been said about the existence of Soviet troops in the territory of [Southern] Yemen was merely rumors was the main thing which contributed toward making the visit by the Democratic Yemen foreign minister a success and [contributed toward] the publication of the joint communique about the visit in which mention was made about the fact that the two parties reached agreement in their points of view that "the progress and development of the peoples of the Arabian Peninsula in the economic, social, cultural,

and scientific fields, basically depend upon the existence of political stability and the stabilization of security for the countries in the Peninsula." [The communique] also said that the two countries agreed to expand the scope of their bilateral relations, and that this is a matter which will be crowned by the visit by the head of the presidential council of Democratic Yemen, Mr 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, to Saudi Arabia during the next few weeks.

9468

CSO: 4802

JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN CONFEDERATION FAVORED BY FRANCE

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 15 Mar 80 pp 10-12

[Article by Antoine 'Abd-al-Masih: "France Asks the Arabs: What is Your Opinion About a Jordanian-Palestinian Confederation?"]

[Text] The French initiative [maintains that] a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation would diminish Washington's wariness and Israel's obstinacy.

France is studying, in total secrecy, the legal status of Jerusalem before and after 1967.

Vance says to the French: "The year of 1980 will be the year of decision as far as the Palestinians are concerned." France's attitude toward the Middle East problem during the last 2 years and up till the beginning of the month of March in 1980 has been characteristically one of cautious calm. Was this similar to the calm that usually precedes a storm? And the storm which has accompanied the new French attitude--is it strong enough to have a clear effect on the Middle East issue and on the total international political situation?

So far it has not been possible to feel the effects which have been left behind by the French political storm because this storm still has not quieted down. So how could one feel the results which have been produced by it?

But in international politics there is no such thing which is called a sudden storm. And what might be called a storm is nothing more than a more or less inevitable result of various, different interwoven economic and social developments and factors. History is not made by "storms," but rather by economic laws which dominate it and which impose themselves [on it] by virtue of development and need, and in consideration of the circumstances which influence these "laws: in negative and positive ways.

So the new French attitude toward the Middle East problem is not a storm which suddenly started blowing. It is a development which was subject to,

social, economic, and political laws. And these are natural laws which affect the contradicting and interlocking interests of international relations. And what has been called "a French bomb" is nothing more than an important stage which had the resounding of a bomb or its effect, or a major station [along the road] of the general development of French foreign policy.

The important development which French foreign policy is presently experiencing with regard to the Middle East problem may, by virtue of its own force, lead to a further development which would inevitably overturn equations and consequently impose more flexible conditions for changing the situation. The new French initiative, which revolves around its official declaration concerning the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the necessity to include the Palestinian Liberation Organization in any negotiations, has laid down a new layer of bricks in the [wall] of the structure which rises higher each day. But this layer of bricks is a foundation, because it has been laid by a major power. One could say that it has been laid by a continent, considering the great influence that [France] has on the world stage of mankind.

But what are the probable repercussions that this new French initiative or the bringing up [of this issue] will have? And what are the possible practical steps which could follow the initiative and which could lead to a decision which could be implemented?

Historically the French position with regard to the Middle East problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict has been characterized by indifference, except in three cases:

In the first instance it was negative, when France participated along with Britain and Israel in the attack on Egypt in 1956 (the Tripartite Aggression).

In the second instance it was positive when, during the June War of 1967, General DeGaulle announced his famous decision to put an embargo on the export of weapons and spare parts to Israel because it began the war. And it is possible to say that, beginning with General DeGaulle's position in 1967, French policy toward the Middle East problem began to take on a new direction. But it was a direction which was slow in its movement and was not radical, in spite of the fact that it led to French-Israeli relations taking a turn for the worse and declining. In short, the French position was a moderate one, which angered the Israelis and did not completely satisfy the Arabs.

The third instance is the new initiative expressed by the French president, d'Estaing, concerning self-determination for the Palestinian people and participation by the PLO in any negotiations.

But the new French initiative cannot be classified along with these two previous instances except within a historical point of view. This is



because the first two instances were a reaction to an event or a repercussion of it, but the new initiative is not at all like this, because it reflects a desire to vigorously participate in the decisionmaking process which had been left up to America and the Soviet Union. And maybe this is precisely why it is so important. Before this new French position matured, it was accompanied by a [whole] series of "minor" statements and positions which occasionally came out of the French foreign ministry and at other times came out of the Elysee Palace. At the beginning of 1979 the Elysee [Palace] spokesman, after a session of the French cabinet, announced that a lasting and comprehensive solution for the Middle East would not take place unless three conditions or principles are fulfilled. They are:

Total withdrawal from the lands occupied in 1967.

The creation of secure, guaranteed borders which will be recognized for all of the countries of the area, including Israel.

Providing for the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to have a "nation."

But the meaning of the word "nation" is different in French than it is in Arabic, since it means, or could be interpreted as, a democratic state in all of Palestine, a state on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, or a confederation. Thus the obscurity [of this term] satisfied all parties.

It may seem that the new French position is a repetition or carbon copy of the aforementioned decision by the French cabinet. But even if it is, it still gives the Palestinians their right to self-determination--and self-determination means the possibility of setting up their own state--and [it provides for] the necessity of having the PLO participate in any negotiations.

About 10 days before his visit to the Gulf, President d'Estaing met with the Arab ambassadors in Paris in the villa of the Moroccan ambassador. The PLO representative in France, Ibrahim al-Sus, was among those invited. Those present noticed the "warm greetings" which the French president and the PLO representative exchanged with each other, as well as the particular interest which President d'Estaing showed in Ibrahim al-Sus. And among a small circle of people, which included President d'Estaing, al-Sus, and some of the Arab ambassadors, the French president said: "Welcome to France." And the PLO representative answered: "And we hope to welcome you tomorrow in the state of Palestine." The French president replied: "I am optimistic about a solution. I have reasons for feeling this way..."

Then the circle of people got much smaller because the [Arab] ambassadors withdrew, one after another, purposely leaving the path open [for President d'Estaing and Ibrahim al-Sus]. Out of the whole circle [of people] only President d'Estaing and Mr Ibrahim al-Sus remained. To the surprise and

delight of the Arab ambassadors, President d'Estaing and Mr al-Sus chatted in private with each other for 10 minutes. Afterward, some of the ambassadors said that it was "a very important [discussion]," and one of the ambassadors even said: "In the near future you can expect a surprise."

In spite of the fact that this unofficial meeting was the first of its kind between a French president and an official Palestinian representative, other meetings have taken place between French and Palestinian officials. There was the meeting of the head of the PLO's Political Bureau, Faruq al-Qaddumi, with the French foreign minister, and there was the meeting between (Ruban), the French envoy to Lebanon, and Yasir 'Arafat in Beirut last year. In addition to this there were some French political and diplomatic moves which reflected an official French rapprochement with the PLO, and this was in spite of French opposition.

But why should the initiative come now, and why in these particular circumstances?

A number of international circumstances have paved the way for progress in the new French position. French policy has utilized the present critical international situation and the failure of Soviet and American plans. The Soviets' predicament in Afghanistan and its repercussions in the Arab countries have tied Moscow's hands and do not permit it to make any moves after the failure of the Geneva plans. And the same is true of the Americans' predicament in Iran and by extension [America's involvement with] the Arabs, especially those in the Gulf. This is in addition to the main predicament, which is the result of the "Camp David agreements" and the deadlock which these agreements have reached concerning the autonomy negotiations which will be ending next May 26.

In the face of these predicaments, and after the failure of all plans on the part of Moscow and Washington to achieve a settlement, French policy has known how to strike its blow, and it struck it very cleverly!

But does France have the [necessary] economic and political weight which would make it capable of carrying out its plans, and, in particular, does it have means sufficient to do this?

Among the very narrow circles [of people] who are close to the makers of French policy, there are signs and indications that Paris has already informed Moscow about a new plan which it is preparing to solve the Middle East problem. They infer this from the French president d'Estaing's attempt to once again bring up [the question of] a policy of accord, [but] from a European point of view. The French position toward the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was relatively slow in being expressed, and this is of political significance. In addition to this, France has refused to boycott the Olympic Games which are to be held in Moscow. Nothing could more conclusively indicate the difference in the French position, in particular

--and the European position, in general--and the American position than the statements made by the American secretary of state Vance after two visits which he had made to Paris in order to discuss the Afghan problem and its international repercussions.

Right now the French position with regard to the Middle East problem is approaching that of the Soviet Union. Moscow demands total Israeli withdrawal from the lands occupied in 1967, as well as self-determination for the Palestinian people and their right to set up a Palestinian state. The French position does not differ from the Soviet position except in regard to the setting up of a Palestinian state, although the expression "right to self-determination" implicitly means the right to set up a state.

In the French capital they are also pointing out that there are strings which have tied Paris and Washington together and are linking their plans. They infer this from the fact that the U.S. condemnation, in the Security Council, of the Israelis' setting up of settlements on occupied Arab lands is in agreement with the French initiative, [and they infer this from] the statement made by MacKenry, the American delegate, after the voting in the Security Council, to the effect that "America considers the settlements on the occupied lands to be illegal as far as international agreements are concerned."

And although this information has not been confirmed, and although the American decision to condemn [Israeli settlements] accidentally coincided with the French initiative, it is still more or less certain that the Americans are fearful of the experiment in Iran and of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, and that, for this reason, they are going along with having European influence in the Middle East as a replacement for Soviet influence. They are agreeing to [this European influence] as a matter of tactics, because they are convinced that the Europeans will not really be able to replace them. And as for the Europeans, [policy] coordination appeared right after the announcement of the new French position. Support came from West Germany, Britain, Ireland, and from Luxembourg. And Spain and Belgium had publicly agreed to this principle before the French president visited the Gulf countries.

Perhaps something of this European [policy] coordination already leaked out before the visit when secret information mentioned that President d'Estaing had conducted secret consultations with West Germany and Britain before his trip. Also the magazine LA TRIBUNE (JUIFE), which expresses the points of view of the Jewish organizations in France, did not conceal its anxiety in this area before President d'Estaing began his trip to the Gulf and to Jordan. It inquired (and stated that Israel was also inquiring) about whether or not France and Britain, in studied fashion and in coordination with each other, were setting the stage for an attempt to modify Resolution No. 242 in order to confirm the political rights of the Palestinian people!



The revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had a very strong effect in Europe. The stability of the Gulf area is of great importance as far as western Europe is concerned, because [western Europe] believes that real stability in the area, which could stop the Soviet advance toward it, is to be reached by means of solving the Palestinian problem. Europe considers that it is in a race with time, and it does not want to wait for favorable domestic conditions in America, that is, [it does not want to wait for] the end of the current American election campaign, before starting to solve the Middle East problem. Based on agreement with certain American government circles, or based on a decision to confront these circles with a fait accompli, [Europe] is continuing in its initiative to make Israel change its attitude, and to bring the situation out of its [present] deadlock which is a foreboding of the danger which it would face after a failure of the Camp David agreements.

And if the French president's visit to the Gulf countries could be described as having been both political and economic, his visit to Jordan may prove to be of more importance in as far as his goals are concerned, and due to the lengthy discussions, private in nature, which President d'Estaing held with King Hussein. This is because Jordan, as we know, is the [Arab country] which is most closely bounded to the Palestinian problem and to the Palestinian people. This is in addition to the moderate, balanced policy which Jordan is currently pursuing and to the relations which are gradually being reestablished and reaffirmed between Jordan and the PLO. Also, [Jordan] has avoided entering into the [various] Arab axes, and its relations with the United States have become clouded.

What plans and ideas, then, did the French president Giscard d'Estaing bring to the Jordanian monarch, and what answers did he get from him?

Informed Arab sources have assured AL-MUSTAQBAL that the talks between d'Estaing and Hussein were different from the talks held by the French president with the rulers of the Gulf states. These talks touched upon "detailed, critical, and profound" aspects. They dealt with plans to solve the Palestinian problem. D'Estaing concentrated on "finding out the seriousness of the relations which exist between Jordan and the PLO, and on finding out how strong they are and how long they will continue," because these relations could make it possible "to set up a federal union or confederation between a future Palestinian state and Jordan." France feels that "a federation or confederation is the only solution which would not be coercive to any of the parties in the conflict, aside from the fact that it might satisfy all of the parties involved."

D'Estaing pointed to "the Swiss confederation" as an example of a federation or confederation of the type which he is suggesting. And he hinted that plans for a federation or confederation would "pressure Israel and the U.S. both, and could save America from its predicament."



D'Estaing did not hide his demand for the necessity of "the creation of a new resolution which would add, to Resolution No. 242, the Palestinian people's right to self-determination." D'Estaing mentioned that this position was based on the support of his European allies, especially the British and the Germans.

Judging by the detailed matters which were brought up by President d'Estaing, and King Hussein, it appeared that France "is currently studying, in great secrecy, the legal status of the city of Jerusalem both before the war on 5 June 1967 and after it."

In light of the suggestions and ideas which were presented by d'Estaing, King Hussein's answer was as follows: "Jordan's relations with the PLO are good." And Jordan "supports any formula for a federation or confederation on the condition that the PLO agree to it."

Many questions emerge on the horizon of the Middle East at the conclusion of the French president's visit to countries in the area:

Will there be a revival of the plan for a "United Arab Kingdom," as was previously suggested by Jordan, and which died out after the Rabat summit [conference] in 1974? This was the summit [conference] in which the PLO was recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Will there be a modification of this plan?

Will the PLO agree to any type of federation or confederation?

The Palestinian National Council, [whose decisions are] obligatory for the PLO, has already given its approval for an independent Palestinian state on any part of Palestinian territory which is either liberated or is evacuated by the Zionist enemy. And the PLO's executive committee cannot agree to any formula for a confederation unless the Palestinian National Council ratifies it. And until the council meets—that is, if it meets and if it discusses the subject of a confederation—the plan for a federated state or a confederation will remain a subject which is shelved.

While standing on the hill in Jordanian territory called "Umm Qays," which overlooks the spot where the borders between Jordan, Syria, and Israel come together, the French president observed and contemplated the geographical situation which is capable of exploding very rapidly. But there was another situation, lurking behind the border to the west, which has an even greater possibility of exploding. It is the domestic Israeli situation. The internal disputes are really very intense and could lead to violent demonstrations, like what happened last year. Some Israeli draftees are refusing to do military service in the occupied lands. And the economic crisis is continuing to be oppressive. All of this is occurring in the midst

of divided public opinion in Israel concerning Begin's extremist policies, policies which have still not been able to attain the approval of all the members of the government.

Europe is betting on the failure of Begin and on the return of the Labor Party to take over the government. There are many indications that this [could happen]. The new French position was not met with unanimity in Israel. The head of the Labor Party, Shimon Peres, attacked Begin and his policy, and made him responsible [for the new French position]. Even the minister of defense, Ezer Weizmann, addressed Begin in the Knesset, making the following comments about the French position and the American condemnation [of Israeli settlements]: "This is the result of your settlement policy." As far as western Europe is concerned, a return of the Labor Party to power would mean a return to moderation and a balanced policy. And all indications are making this return seem likely. In such a case it would be easy for the Labor Party to offer "concessions," especially if there were European forces, most notably [the forces of] international socialism, which would have influence over this party. Also, it might offer "concessions" in its election campaign platform concerning withdrawing from the West Bank.

But what Europe is afraid of is that Begin, if he stays in power, will unleash a war. For this reason, many European circles are working toward eliminating this predicament by trying to move forward the question of elections which might prove to be the way out.

Will the French initiative be the cause of coercion for the Israeli government, and consequently [lead to] more splitting off and dissidence within the Israeli government, which would bring about general elections and the return of the Labor Party [to power]?

And the [French] initiative—will it join the list of other international initiatives? Or will it find its way toward being implemented? And what are the means by which it can be implemented?

A diplomatic source has told AL-MUSTAQBAL that the French president soon will send a mutual friend, (not a Frenchman), to Beirut to meet with Abu 'Ammar.

And Arab diplomatic circles have mentioned to AL-MUSTAQBAL that a high-ranking French official passed the word along to an Arab ambassador who, in return passed the word on to the Palestinians that Cyrus Vance, the American secretary of state, said words to the effect that "1980 will be the year of decision with regard to the Palestinian problem." These circles have also said that Vance is the one who asked that the Palestinians be informed of this.

And (Bunsih), the French foreign minister, stated in Doha "Wait and see, everything will come . . . even the English . . ." And (Raymond Aron) writes in the French magazine L'EXPRESS: "Whether we are in favor of it or

not, 'the Palestinian state' will not arise overnight because of a decision made by diplomats. But it can arise as a result of a gradual peace process..."

The important thing is that it is possible for it to exist, whether as a result of a gradual peace process or as a result of a gradual revolution!

And probably it will be as a result of a revolution. So say the Palestinians.

9468

CSO: 4802

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### RELATIONS BETWEEN ARAB STATES AND FRANCE ANALYZED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 30 Mar 80.pp 31-34

[Article by Ahmad Jawad: "On the French President's Visit to the Gulf States: France Sells the Arabs Political Positions"]

[Text] The visit by French President Giscard d-Estaing to the Gulf states (Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia) and later to Jordan, which began on 1 March, was initiated with a statement by the French president which had an extremely deep impact on the Arab and international levels. In addition to asserting that peace in the region is impossible without the participation of the Palestinians, he welcomed a visit by Yasir 'Arafat to France and said such a visit would be useful and essential. A Palestinian leader (Abu Iyad) regarded that invitation as the first recognition by a major power that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The French official spokesman (Jacques Blue) affirmed that his country is for the first time calling for giving the Palestinians the right to self-determination as part of a comprehensive peaceful settlement in the Middle East. It may be recalled that, before his arrival in Kuwait, the French president met with the special American envoy to the Middle East Sol Linowitz when he visited France together with Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil on their return from the Hague. They [Giscard and Linowitz] discussed the outcome of the Hague talks among Egypt, Israel and the United States. The French foreign minister met with Mustafa Khalil for the same purpose. Western circles confirm that the United States and members of the European Common Market have entrusted France with the role of persuading some Gulf states to participate in the efforts to settle the Middle East conflict.

The French president's visit to the Gulf acquires a special importance, for observers believe that it involves two important aspects--political and economic. The first aspect focuses on:

1-- Finding a solution for the Middle East problems under new conditions and giving ushered in by a European initiative which would insure Palestinian rights and call for a national homeland for the Palestinians.



2--Consultations about the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the extent of its impact on the Gulf, especially now that the Soviets have drawn closer to warm waters and the Americans have moved their fleets toward the Arabian Sea.

3--The security of the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean--on the assumption that anything that threatens the security of the Gulf or the Indian Ocean would necessarily affect the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, hence European security. The French have therefore proposed that those vital areas, which are the arteries of Europe's trade, should be kept out of the sphere of competition between the two superpowers.

4--Consultations about the Lebanese crisis and the question of southern Lebanon which the French side believes to be part of the settlement frameworks that are being proposed at present.

The second aspect, which is the economic one, aims at the following:

1--A demand by France that the Gulf states secure oil supplies to the European Common Market in return for receiving Western technology in various fields.

2--To study a Kuwaiti proposal inviting France to participate in establishing weapons factories with a capital party raised by the Gulf states.

3--To strengthen Arab-French and Arab-European cooperation in the areas of trade, culture and politics.

It is worth noting that almost all the Arab states have shown a strong tendency to strengthen Arab-European cooperation, and especially Arab-French cooperation. Thus, the Arab states are opening new chapters of cooperation after having closed, during the wars of independence, the old chapters of European colonialist domination, which was normally followed by liquidating and fighting the European economic and political interests in the region. How did this come about and what is the secret of the new rapprochement? This is what we will be discussing in this article.

#### Yesterday and Today

As with all the colonial states, the Arabs retained a bad memory of France. The occupation of Algeria in 1830, followed by the occupation of Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, the Sykes-Picot treaty, the tripartite aggression against Egypt, the Algerian-French war (the war of liberation and the one million martyrs)--all those events and histories shaped the Arab attitude toward France and cast it in a mold of unremitting belligerence and hatred.

Things, however, took a new course. As the world changes, new factors enter the political arena. Under De Gaulle, France recognized Algeria's independence. After the 1967 war and Arab defeat, De Gaulle again adopted a neutral stand, for the first time ever, and withheld arms shipments from the region. He also strongly condemned the aggression and the occupation of lands by force and voted in favor of United Nations Resolution 242 which calls for complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories. Thus emerged a new criterion in favor of the Arab cause--for whenever France turned away from the American policy and clashed with it, it drew closer to the Arabs and their cause. This is what happened in July 1967 when France voted against the Latin American draft resolution at the extraordinary session of the General Assembly. The draft resolution in question, which basically reflected Israel's point of view, was rejected by France, Spain and Greece which voted with the Arabs, while the other European states sided with Israel.

The October 1973 roused and alerted the world--Europe, in particular--to the seriousness of the Middle East conflict and the extent of its impact on European security, thus prompting the then French president, Georges Pompidou, to call for a European summit at the end of 1973 to coordinate European positions on the Middle East problem. The crisis required a European role. An understanding between the two superpowers would serve detente, but a lack of understanding would lead to a confrontation. Europe had therefore to participate in the efforts to establish a just peace in the region. Thus were the French views at the time.

The factor that speeded up and fueled the zest of France and Europe to participate in solving the Middle East problem was the Arab decision to stop pumping oil to the United States and the Netherlands on 17 October, 1973. That decision gave rise to consternation in the European community and proved to it that the security of the Arab world has a direct bearing on its security and that Europe's trade and factories might stop and cease to function if the conflict were allowed to grow in intensity to the point of explosion. In the light of this, France was instrumental in having the European community issue the Brussels statement of 6 November on the Middle East which recognized for the first time the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

Meeting in Algiers on 29 November 1973, the leaders of the Arab countries welcomed the Brussels statement and hailed the progress which took place in the European position. At the same time, they displayed a greater degree of amity for and cooperation with France, both politically and economically. On 31 July 1974, the French foreign minister and chairman of the European community commission, met with the foreign minister of Kuwait and the secretary general of the Arab League in Paris--the first official meeting in which the idea of establishing an Arab-European dialogue was discussed.

The French attitude toward the central Arab question--the Palestine question--developed further when France voted for a draft resolution inviting the PLO to participate in the debates of the General Assembly in 1974. The draft resolution was supported by France, Italy and Ireland, while the Netherlands, Denmark and Britain opposed it. The same thing happened when the question of including the PLO in the Arab-European dialogue was proposed. France, Italy and Ireland showed an inclination to agree with this proposal, but the other European states opposed it on the grounds that the European states do not recognize the PLO.

The improvement in the French position in terms of understanding the Palestine question did not stop there. France played an effective role in the London statement made by the European community at the end of June 1978. The statement marked a major progress in understanding the Palestine question, citing the "Palestinian people's right to effectively express their national identity, including the establishment of a homeland." The statement had immense effects in opening up European markets to the Arab states. In 1978, the Arab states accounted for about 14.3 percent of the overall exports of the European community. The 9 members of the European Common Market became the most important trade partner of the Arab world, after the value of trade exchanges between the two sides nearly quadrupled in the last four years. It became clear to the Arab and French sides that the factor of common interests in the relationship between them is there, and that it behooves the two sides to make better use of it by promoting the climate of understanding between them.

#### Development of Arab-French Trade Relations

Trade relations between France and the Arabs have never flourished at any point in history as they are flourishing now. Before the 1967 Arab debacle, France had only a very marginal and limited role (North Africa) in the field of trade with the Arabs. This can be clearly seen in the course of trade exchanges between the two sides and through the decline in France's trade deficit with the Arab states (resulting from its oil imports). According to preliminary estimates for 1978, France has managed to decrease its traditional deficit by 24.3 percent--to 18.9 billion francs compared to 18.9 billion francs in 1977. Table One shows the course of French-Arab trade relations in 1977.

It should be noted that the deficit in the French trade balance amounted to 3451585 European accounting units. This is due to the fact that France leads the Common Market nations in the percentage of its imports from the Arab countries. These imports account for 27.32 percent of Common Market total imports from the Arab countries. France is followed by Italy with 21.95 percent, West Germany with 19.38 percent, then Britain with 12.60 percent. In terms of Common Market exports to the Arab countries, France ranks second. West Germany leads with 26.23 percent, followed by France with 23.64 percent, then Italy with 19.11 percent and Britain with 17.70 percent.

It is to be noted that the Arab customers of France fall into two groups. The first is made up of the Arab Maghreb countries, the Near East countries, Mauritania, Sudan, Somalia, the two Yemens and Oman. In this group, France's trade balance registers a surplus. In the second group, the French trade balance is in deficit. This group is made up of oil-exporting countries: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait and Libya. France was able to decrease its trade deficit with the second group from 32.2 billion francs in 1977 to 27.5 billion francs in 1978. It is well-known that the countries of the Arab Maghreb still represent the major markets of French exports. They account for 45.7 percent of French exports--and about 53.4 percent if we added Libya.

#### French Economic Contracts With Arabs Increase Proportionally to Greater Understanding of the Arab Position

In order of priority, the major Arab exporters to France are Saudi Arabia with 39.7 percent, Iraq with 20.6 percent and the UAE with 10.2 percent of the total imports from the Arab world. Table Two clearly shows the course of Arab-French trade exchanges in 1978.

In a study prepared by the (Institution for International Trade Monitoring) with regard to French technological contracts signed with foreign countries, it was found that in the period from 1969 to 1978, French establishments signed 553 contracts with the Arab countries. These can be broken down as follows: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco signed 276 contracts of the total with an overall value of 2322.3 million francs. This represents more than 44 percent of the total contracts with the Arab world. Saudi Arabia, the UAR, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya and Qatar signed 173 contracts with a value of 2164 million francs or 41 percent of the total value of Arab contracts. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria signed 65 contracts with a value of 472 million francs or 8.94 percent of the value of the contracts.

If we laid aside the general outlines of the Arab-French trade relations and looked briefly at the visit of Giscard d'Estaing to the Gulf states in particular, and its economic significance, we will find that France is seeking to strengthen its economic ties with the states of the region by competing with the United States and Japan and by attempting to hitch the economics of the Gulf to the European Common Market in its capacity as a distinct group which is independent of the two superpowers. This is the message we will detect in reviewing France's relations with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

#### Kuwait

Despite the small volume of exports and imports between France and Kuwait, compared to the rest of the Common Market countries, the two sides are seeking to bolster trade exchange between them by means of contracts with industrial establishments or engineering establishments in the sector of building and construction or in the agricultural sector.



It seems that efforts are being made to give France a special preference in trade exchange because of its distinct position on the Palestine question. A quick look at the last five years confirms that France's relations with Kuwait are developing constantly. While France held fourth place among the Common Market countries in terms of its trade exchange with Kuwait, in 1976-77, it has now begun to compete with Italy and is trying to edge the Netherlands out in order to compete with Britain which holds the top position. Table Three makes this development clear.

The latest published statistics show the increase in the trade exchange between France and Kuwait. In 1978, France's imports from Kuwait amounted to 1,209,732 thousand francs, while French exports to it amounted to 947,048 thousand francs. The French deficit thus amounted to 262,684 thousand francs. Kuwait supplies France with 2.1 percent of its oil needs, or 2.5 million tons in 1978. This percentage was higher in the past, amounting to 11.5 percent in 1973. The decline is due to increased French demand for Saudi oil. That demand shot up from 22.4 percent in 1973 to 34.3 percent in 1978. The French demand for oil is expected to increase if Kuwait reached an agreement with the French oil company. Despite the paucity of Kuwait's contribution to French oil supplies, the French trade deficit remains. In 1979, that deficit came to 841 million francs. The contracts France has recently signed with Kuwait are expected, however, to overcome the deficit and maybe even turn it into a surplus.

The most important contracts which were signed between France and Kuwait before d'Estaing's visit are:

1--A contract between the Kuwaiti oil tankers company and the French (Siota) workshops for the purchase of 4 gas tankers for a total value of 1 billion francs.

2--A contract between the same Kuwaiti oil tankers company and the Atlas workshops for the purchase of two oil tankers for a total value of 500 million francs.

As to weapons contracts, Kuwait has recently received a shipment of French arms which included 20 A.M.X. self-propelled 155 mm guns, 20 Mirage F.A. aircraft, Gazelle and Puma helicopters, Super-530 and Magic surface-to-surface missiles and SS.2 anti-tank missiles. Kuwait hopes that France will participate in the construction of weapons factories in the Gulf region.

#### The UAE

In 1979, the UAE ranked third among France's oil suppliers, providing 15 million tons or 6 percent of France's oil needs. Saudi Arabia and Iraq held the first and second places respectively. In return, French exports account for 4.7 percent of the total imports of the UAE. The French trade balance with the UAE is perennially in deficit. In 1979, French imports

from the UAE stood at 6 billion francs against exports valued at 1 billion francs. In 1978, French imports from the UAE were valued at 4.6 billion francs (worth of oil, of course), while its exports to the UAE amounted to 970 million francs. In 1977, the figures were 4.6 billion francs in imports and 697 million francs in exports. Table Four shows the development of trade exchange between the two countries in the years 1975, 1976 and 1977. France ranks fifth in trade exchange with the UAE. It is preceded by Britain, the United States, Japan and West Germany.

#### Saudi Arabia

The French president's visit to Saudi Arabia was not the first. He had visited the Saudi kingdom in January 1977. This was followed by a visit by King Khalid to Paris from May 24 to 31, 1978. The visits led to major developments in the trade relations between the two countries. On January 29 and February 5, 1979, 30 French firms went to Saudi Arabia to develop Saudi-French cooperation in the private sector, while the two countries agreed to increase the volume of trade exchange between them. Indeed, French exports to Saudi Arabia scored a big increase over the past 5 years because of armament and infrastructure imports by Saudi Arabia. In 1976, those exports increased by 91 percent and by 85 percent in 1977. France's share of Saudi exports increased from 4.1 percent in 1976 to 5.3 percent in 1977. They have reached very high percentages in recent months because of the arms contracts Saudi Arabia and Iraq have signed with France to the tune of 40.7 billion francs.

Through its exports of arms and technology, France was able to decrease the trade deficit with Saudi Arabia. During the first 8 months of 1978, French exports to Saudi Arabia increased by 32 percent over the same period in 1977, while French oil imports fell by 11 percent. As a result, the French trade deficit went down from 14.5 billion francs to less than 12 billion francs.

As to Bahrain and Qatar, their trade relations with France seem invisible in comparison with other Arab states. Bahrain, for example, imported no more than a total of 9.5 million dinars' worth of French goods in 1976. This increased to 11.3 in 1977 and remained the same in 1978. The reason is that Bahrain primarily imports British, Japanese and American goods, whereas France ranks 9th. It is expected that Giscard d'Estaing's visit will push France to a leading position of trading with Bahrain.

Qatar, on the other hand, witnessed a rapid and huge development in its trade with France. In 1974, Qatar's imports from France were valued at a mere 28.1 million Qatari rials. In 1977, however, its imports shot up to 277.5 million rials and in 1978 to 333.8 million rials.

It is clear from the above that Arab-French relations are developing rapidly and that France is competing strongly with the other world industrial powers in order to absorb Arab oil revenues. This development has been accompanied by new Arab and European conditions which can be classified as follows:

1--The Arab states are seeking to get from France and the other members of the European Common Market a more clear-cut position on the Palestinian issue. Some people still believe that France's vague neutrality on the Palestine question allows it to win friends among the oil-rich Arabs, while maintaining at the same time strong relations with the Zionist enemy.

2--The Arabs--especially the oil-rich Arabs--are seeking France's help to set up large arms factories, more advanced and developed than the Arab Authority for War Industrialization (which was kept by Egypt).

3--France and the other members of the European Common Market are proposing new defense pacts to protect the region's security from the ambitions of the two superpowers and their camps. Arabs should beware of security or defense pacts and alliances and should seek to reject any foreign interference in the region.

4--France and the other members of the Common Market are trying to absorb the Arab oil weapon by insuring their own oil needs, while at the same time asserting their independence from the United States by winning over the oil-rich Arabs.

[See Tables on Following Pages]

TABLE 1

French Exports & Imports to the Arab Countries  
in 1977 (in thousand European accounting units)

Country	French Exports to Arab Countries	French Imports From Arab Countries
Morocco	847056	382622
Algeria	1574062	691276
Tunisia	470411	167735
Libya	348732	270226
Egypt	351371	56269
Sudan	93554	61964
Mauritania	-----	47022
Somalia	-----	-----
Lebanon	148225	-----
Syria	233061	168161
Iraq	389159	1601718
Jordan	41109	-----
Saudi Arabia	541218	3776857
Kuwait	139898	309462
Bahrain	17234	-----
Qatar	53556	276918
UAE	161472	1041090
Oman	18016	56517
North Yemen	28128	-----
South Yemen	-----	-----
TOTAL	5456262	8907847

Source: Report of the Secretary General of the Arab-French  
Chamber of Commerce on Arab-European Trade in 1977



TABLE 2

Trade Exchanges Between France and the Arab World in  
1978 (Preliminary Estimates) In Thousand French France

Country	French Imports	French Exports	Balance + Surplus - Deficit
Morocco	2,351,932	4,308,742	+ 1,965,810
Algeria	3,203,393	6,939,388	+ 3,735,995
Tunisia	863,901	3,403,476	+ 2,539,575
Libya	1,719,439	2,414,231	+ 694,792
Egypt	384,781	2,494,008	+ 2,109,227
Sudan	404,364	501,128	+ 96,782
Mauritania	183,460	263,954	+ 80,485
Somalia	2,418	31,041	+ 28,623
Lebanon	25,823	843,985	+ 818,162
Syria	946,772	1,222,456	+ 275,684
Iraq	9,534,352	2,262,789	- 7,271,563
Jordan	12,661	227,390	+ 214,729
Saudi Arabia	18,414,580	3,940,859	-14,473,721
Kuwait	1,209,732	947,048	- 262,684
Bahrain	10,036	116,940	+ 106,904
Qatar	2,229,562	351,093	- 1,878,469
UAE	4,730,725	1,083,433	- 3,647,292
Oman	4,730,708	161,053	+ 67,345
North Yemen	140	379,435	+ 379,295
South Yemen	1,438	84,828	+ 83,390
TOTAL	46,323,199	31,977,268	-14,345,931

Source: AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL [Economy and Business]  
Magazine, Beirut, April 1979, p 38

TABLE 3

France's Rank Among Members of the European Common  
Market in Exports to and Imports from Kuwait in 1976-77

(in million Kuwaiti dinars)

Country	Exports		Imports	
	1976	1977	1976	1977
EEC	840,454	792,767	317,363	443,411
France	121,570	87,457	50,644	42,215
West Germany	18,288	25,985	106,317	128,671
Italy	107,351	187,978	42,681	69,782
Holland	280,953	201,409	15,126	28,783
Britain	235,112	247,681	79,246	137,128

Source: The Arab Economic Report, the General Federation of  
Arab Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture,  
1979, p 420

TABLE 4

Oil Years	Imports	Exports
	(in million dirhams)	(thousand barrels)
1975	535	111,425
1976	530	93,527
1977	517	93,739

Source: The Annual Statistics, 1978

9254

CSO: 4802

SYRIAN VICE PREMIER SPEAKS OUT ON CAMP DAVID, OTHER ISSUES

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 13 Apr 80 p 5

[Interview with 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Syrian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, by Ahmed Fattani, special correspondent in Damascus; Damascus, 25 March 1980]

[Text] 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, Syrian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, who received me on Tuesday, 25 March 1980, in his office located a few steps from the presidential palace was visibly satisfied with the results of the Algerian-Syrian political talks which were held from 22 to 24 March 1980 on the occasion of the visit of Algeria's President Chadli Bendjedid.

"President Chadli Bendjedid's visit to Syria was a good occasion to reassert the common position of Syria and Algeria vis-a-vis Zionism, imperialism, and the maneuvers tending to undermine the Palestinian cause and the Arab liberation movements.

"We proceeded with a global and detailed exchange of views on the situation in the Middle East and our positions are identical on all the questions examined. We put the stress on the importance of strengthening relations between our two sister-countries and the consolidation of the Steadfastness Front as the principal means of our struggle against the goals of the Camp David plot and the separate Egyptian-Israeli treaty."

Question: These past few days there have been reports of incidents occurring in Aleppo, Hama, Hama, and Latakia. To what causes do you attribute these incidents?

**Answer:** It is because Syria has taken a clear position regarding the Camp David agreements and because it is determined to frustrate them that it is today the target of pressures from the United States, Israel, and the intelligence service of Anwar Sadat's regime.

When Syria decided to oppose with determination the policy of Camp David it had to expect that pressures would be brought to bear on it. And naturally, in this case, the instigators of Camp David found some allies among the reactionaries who agreed to be the executing tools of these pressures. They used a few reactionary minigroups historically linked to the West in their attempt to create a kind of anarchy in some regions by resorting to the crime of sabotage and by creating a climate of insecurity and terror.

Our party [the Ba'ttu] and our popular organizations represented by the workers and peasants confronted these actions. They have managed to contain them and halt them. We believe that Syria will continue to be the object of threats and pressures as long as it will persist in its present policy which makes of it the avant garde of the anti-Zionist, anticolonialist, and anti-imperialist struggle in the region.

What does Syria's rejecting the Camp David accords mean? It means that by virtue of its position in the Middle East Syria has at least been able to constitute an obstacle against the "diktat" of U.S. policy. And this fact has not left American circles unmoved. Against this background one should add the existing international tensions, among other things the events in Afghanistan. In our opinion these events do not concern us directly because the only question which is of interest to us continues to be the Palestinian problem. And with regards to this question we have adopted a clear position. This has enhanced the anger of American reaction as well as of its agents.

I would like to indicate by this that the incidents which occurred in some Syrian cities are part of all this plot whose goal is our country's destabilization. By way of a natural response our party and mass organizations have reacted. They have taken all the necessary measures to face these pressures and these attempts at domestic destabilization.

**Question:** President Hafiz al-Assad has announced the broadening of the National Progressive Front to include workers and peasants.

In future would this opening include some political factions and Syrian religious personalities [as well]?

**Answer:** In his speech at the Sports Palace of the National Front President Assad spoke of the opening of this front to some organizations. We have discussed the basic principles which bear on the expansion of this front.



First, an agreement was reached to the effect that workers and peasants must be the pillars of this front.

Second, we agreed that this front should consolidate all those opposed to the policy of Camp David. This means that new organizations could join it, even political personalities known for their patriotism. Among the latter religious personalities may be included. All these decisions reflect the resolve of the National Front to strengthen the domestic front to better confront our foreign enemy.

All those who could play a positive role in this confrontation with the enemy will have their place in this expanded front: They will be welcome.

Question: According to some sources Syria is reportedly getting ready to withdraw the last contingents of its troops in the Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon. Could you give us more details on the causes underlying this withdrawal of forces and how this pullback will be staggered? And what role does Damascus plan to play in the process of national conciliation [in Lebanon]?

Answer: We have not decided to take such a step. We have not decided to withdraw our troops from Lebanon. We have merely decided to regroup our forces which were performing police duties in Beirut. That situation had become intolerable. There is no country in the world where the army's role is confined to fulfilling the petty duties of a police force. For us it became necessary to put an end to the tasks which our army had performed in Beirut. Second, there has been a change in the situation in the region. Israel is concentrating its troops and is making new threats in the area.

Our analysis on the nature and goal of the Camp David plot has obliged us to take some measures including the regrouping of our forces in Lebanon.

It is true that a sizable military force is involved. That is why we felt that these military units have an important national defense role to play in case our country is threatened by the Israelis. The operation involving the regrouping of our forces gave occasion to the Lebanese Government and the various Lebanese parties to consider the question of national conciliation. The Lebanese Government has drawn up, as we find, a document in this connection enunciating the basic principles of such conciliation. In a general way a very important document is involved. We believe that national conciliation is an exclusively Lebanese matter and must consequently be achieved by the Lebanese themselves. The idea of national conciliation should not be understood as being conciliation between some Lebanese parties and Syria nor conciliation between one Arab faction and another faction. Rather, it is the business of the Lebanese themselves.

Our role is to assist all the parties involved in achieving this conciliation and of working jointly with them to eliminate the obstacles existing in its path.

We shall not spare any effort to create a favorable climate for its realization in accordance with our vision of the role which Lebanon must play at the Arab and international levels. This means an Arab, multiconfessional Lebanon drawing its strength from the unity of its people and the integrity of its territory.

Question: Washington has provoked and maintains for undisclosed reasons an "arc of crisis" stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Maghreb. What analysis does the Syrian foreign minister make of these American maneuvers which are focused especially on the outermost regions of the Arab world?

Answer: We have to avoid making separate interpretations of U.S. policy as a function of some region or other in the world. Rather, we have to view the United States as an imperialist state with designs on countries and seeking to dominate the world. Its designs are now aimed at the Arab world for strategic, economic, and military reasons.

1. Military reasons: This region is located in the proximity of the USSR.
2. Economic reasons: It contains a sizable portion of the world's energy supply.

Naturally, in case that the United States managed to dominate this region America would by the same token succeed in dominating Western Europe and Japan. Consequently, the United States would secure its domination of the Third World. It is in this light that we have to analyze U.S. policy whose aim is to include in its sphere of influence and in its strategy Western Europe and Japan to fight the USSR, the socialist forces, the forces of liberation and progress in the world. This policy is now focused on the Gulf region for the latter, as we know, has become an important strategic point in the world. It is obvious that when the Arab-Israeli conflict heats up the Persian Gulf region cannot remain outside this conflict. The Persian Gulf countries will line themselves up on the side of the Syrian, Palestinian, and Jordanian peoples for these countries are part of the Arab nation. All this confers a new dimension on the Arab-Israeli conflict especially because of the significance of the energy supplies available in the region. That is why the United States is striving to isolate the Persian Gulf region from the traditional framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is as a function of these aspects that we have to understand the Americans' sudden interest in Islam following the evolution of events in Afghanistan.

President Jimmy Carter called on the creation of an Islamic self-defense movement. He is suddenly posing as an apostle of Islam, its cultural heritage, and its [source illegible], establishing in this way a new link between the United States and the Islamic world in the context of [source illegible] with obvious overtones.

By means of this effort the Americans have strived to make the Arabs and the oil-producing countries believe that their only major enemy can only be the Soviet Union. "This danger is at your door," the Americans tell them. "Defend yourselves." That is the diversionary tactic of Washington striving to make the Arabs believe in the existence nearby of a new and terrible enemy other than the traditional Zionist aggressor.

The attempt made by the Americans to turn the attention of the Arabs to the events in Afghanistan is aimed at including them in the imperialist realm. It diverts them toward an enemy which does not exist. Why?

If the communist danger were really represented by the USSR this could have occurred long before the events in Afghanistan. Are the progressive regimes of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Ethiopia not at the door of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea?

Does the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen not have common borders with Saudi Arabia? Is Ethiopia not located along the oil route? Geographically, are these two countries not as close to the Persian Gulf as Afghanistan? And why was there not an orchestrated campaign in the past about the fate of Afghanistan? What new thing has occurred? Afghanistan was no longer an Islamic country after Taraki's coup d'etat which had installed a Marxist regime.

Why did the Americans not denounce and mobilize public opinion about the communist danger as soon as the Marxist regime was established [in Afghanistan]? If there had been at that time [American] reaction on behalf of Islam one would have accepted as logical Washington's latest response to the events in Afghanistan.

The present campaign focusing on Afghanistan has not been unleashed to serve Islam but rather to divert the attention of the Arabs from their essential problem--the Palestinian cause. Additionally, if our brothers from the Moslem countries were to discuss this matter calmly and logically, far from all pressures and influences, they would surely raise the question: Why this sudden attention by the United States to the fate of Islam in Kabul? And why, too, this new determination by President Carter to liquidate Islam in Jerusalem? Did the chief in the White House not assert that he favored a united Jerusalem under Israel's control? This is evident following the [U.N.] Security Council's decision on [Israeli] settlements. Carter himself

had stated that the United States had committed an error during the voting. Consequently, President Carter committed an error in voting for the resolution since he claims to be supportive of the values of Islam and its civilization [sic].

How should one reconcile, then, the American's fuss about Kabul and their dance around the "corpse" of Islam in Jerusalem and in Palestine?

The American game in the Arab world is clear. Washington strives to use the Arabs in its conflict with the USSR on one hand and tries to isolate the majority of the Arabs from the Arab-Israeli conflict on the other, all the while attempting to get them involved in other conflicts which are obviously alien to the Arabs. It is clear that any Arab who acts outside the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its principal cause, the Palestinian problem, cannot help serving Israeli interests best.

It is obvious that this American game either strives to explain the connection in a way to serve American interests or to minimize the importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict by diverting the attention of the Arabs and Moslems to other struggles which are not theirs.

Question: Through the intermediary of Paris, Western Europe is striving to take over from Washington in seeking a settlement of the Middle East question. Mr Minister, how do you interpret the latest tour of the French President in the countries of the Persian Gulf, in Saudi Arabi and in Amman, and do you think that Europe would be able to achieve a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Answer: We hope that Europe may be able to help a settlement for a just and global peace just as we hope that all the countries of the world may be able to play a role in this connection because the Arab-Israeli conflict assumes international dimensions. It is true that this is a regional conflict but one whose international consequences could jeopardize world peace and security as well as the international economic system. That is why we hope that the world may play a role to achieve a just and global settlement. But the lag between desires and reality is alas very great.

Some consider that Europe is sincere in its moves for a settlement in the Middle East but the truth is quite different. During the last visit that I made to the European parliament in Strasbourg I understood that it was not possible to entrust Europe with assuming a role for which it is not prepared. It is impossible for Europe to assume our problems. The Europeans themselves recognize this fact. The only role which Europe could play in this context is a role of information, of consciousness-raising.



Should we be satisfied merely with declarations of intention on the part of Europe while we are not offered any real material or political action to hasten a settlement for a just peace?

In my opinion there are several hypotheses that could define Europe's position vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict.

First, European policy continues to be subjected to U.S. policy.

And as long as American nuclear weapons continue to protect Europe the Europeans could not seek to remove themselves from American influence. That is the truth of the matter.

This point must be clear, for it is on such basis that we had supported the policy of detente in Europe. We hoped then that Europe would be able to act to get rid of this American net in which it was snared and determine its foreign policy more freely. This could not have helped bringing the Arabs closer to the Europeans. By virtue of these new political facts we do not believe that Europe has effective power to play a role in the achievement of peace in the Middle East.

Second, was there real resolve on the part of the Europeans? When? And in what way would this resolve, even if it had existed, have become operational?

Only when a European country will clearly take a position favoring a desirable decision for the Arabs and when it will demand its implementation from Israel or else only when this same European state would take the necessary sanctions vis-a-vis Israel [will there be rapprochement between us]. We could then say that the European countries have moved from the stage of pious wishes to that of reality. That is my opinion on this matter.

Naturally, we shall hail any progress in the European position. We shall cite by way of example the French position as well as those of some European countries which, in the context of the present situation, are acceptable. From the initial position outlined in 1967 to our time, there has been a clear evolution in French policy concerning the recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people and the total withdrawal of the [Israeli] occupation forces from the Arab territories. It is obvious that such a position is ahead of those of the United States and other European countries. We hope that other countries will shift their positions in keeping with the path taken by France. Our wish is to see Europe adopt positions that could especially become operational.

Question: Most of the Arab states are aware of the danger which the [Arab] nation faces at the present stage of the post-Camp David era. According to you, what should be the next steps of the Arab resistance front?

Answer: In this connection we can say that the Arab effort has diminished both on the strategic front and on that of the immediate tasks to be realized. There is a lag between Arab action and Arab potentials.

We have raised the question of Arab solidarity because we have always believed that the conflict between Israel and ourselves involved the entire Arab nation. This is neither a Syrian-Israeli conflict nor a Palestinian-Israeli conflict nor a Lebanese-Israeli conflict. Rather, it is a conflict which confronts the entire Arab nation against Israel. It is in this perspective that we have always considered the matter so as to clarify the goal of the Arab nation as much as possible.

Anwar al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David agreements which are new parameters in the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict have created a certain degree of imbalance which the three Camp David partners strive to exploit in their interest. It is as an Arab nation, united and interdependent, that we must face the Israeli enemy who threatens our existence and our land.

And it is as an Arab nation that we must seek the best means to face and energetically at that everything that threatens us.

At the Baghdad summit meeting an attempt was made to respond to Camp David. But the result has been very insufficient. The goals that we have reached are even more insufficient than those that we had achieved in the Arab League in 1950 when King 'Abdallah [of Jordan] tried to negotiate with Israel. One will recall that the Egyptian Government had convened a special Arab League conference to examine this matter. It was a conference held at the prime ministers' level. Egypt was represented by Prime Minister Mustafa Nahas, Muhammad Salah al-Din, and [Fu'ad] Serag [al-Din], ministers of foreign affairs and interior, respectively.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was represented by the late King Faysal. At that time he was the foreign minister. Syria was represented by its prime minister as was Lebanon. Iraq was represented by Ahmad al-Souidi.

The level of representation at that meeting was high since several prime ministers represented their governments. It was at the time of that special conference that it was decided that any Arab state that would negotiate or sign a treaty with Israel would be the subject of a boycott at the political, economic, and diplomatic levels and that any cooperation with such a country would be severed as a matter of course.

Why such severe measures? They aimed at isolating any Arab regime that would negotiate with Israel and to cut it off from its people so as to favor the toppling of such a treasonable government.

The question that we raise is the following: Did the goal sought by the Baghdad summit go beyond that approved by the Arab League 30 years ago? Unfortunately, not. There were in the earlier instance fears regarding the conclusion of an agreement between King 'Abdallah and Israel and we knew how to take the necessary measures to check such an initiative. But with Sadat it is quite the opposite. His peace agreement with Israel has been consummated and the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement is becoming closer each day, but we have barely reached one-fourth of the goals set at the Baghdad and Tunis summit meetings.

And this result clearly falls short compared to the importance of the goal pursued earlier.

At this time it is a matter of seeking optimal means to create a real Arab force capable of constituting a strike force against Zionism and imperialism because we are unable to make a distinction between Israel and the United States.

It is impossible for us to be simultaneously the friend of the United States and the enemy of Israel.

When we shall manage to create this genuine Arab force, an effective one, we may then say that we have reached an appreciable qualitative stage in the conflict that confronts us with Israel.

The other goal that the Arabs must take seriously into consideration is the realization of an equilibrium in the force relationship in the region. The USSR must occupy the same place as the United States and play the same role as the latter.

We must face the United States, Israel, and Egypt by getting closer to the Soviet Union which is the friend of the Arab peoples and strengthen our relations with all the socialist forces, those of progress and liberation. Furthermore we must react to this attempt to set us up against the USSR. We must seriously think of that to better check the threats leveled at our land and our resources. In a general way it is time to re-examine Arab steps and initiatives with reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian cause.

Question: Could you outline for us the political prospects after 26 May 1980, the deadline for the achievement of the so-called [Palestinian] autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza regions?

Answer: As far as we are concerned we make no distinction whatever among 26 May, 1 April, 3 February, or any other date for we reject the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations no matter what their results may be.

We oppose and denounce the spirit and the framework of these negotiations as well as their goal. We feel that our political goals are not linked to what is happening or will happen on 26 May 1980.

The goal of our political options is to check anything that underlies the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement and to challenge the Camp David agreements and their consequences. We cannot consider these dates or these events to be important and wait to see what will happen on 26 May. All of this is a staged scenario and is part of the game in which some try to involve us. They tell us to wait. But wait for what?

Everything that is taking place now is swank. What should we wait for? For results inspired by the accords that we have rejected and denounced?

What should we then wait for? For results that we shall reject later. In our opinion what will happen after 26 May 1980 will be consistent with the developments that have followed Camp David. Anwar al-Sadat will certainly sign agreements with Israel again and will strengthen his alliance with it.

We have to recall some declarations of Sadat and Israel concerning their joint military projects.

Sadat's treason has reached an unacceptable level. Are we going to expect that he stop at a given stage?

Even if he did so he would continue to complete his betrayal subsequently. The Arabs have the duty to broaden their struggle, to strengthen their capabilities to frustrate everything that our enemies have done since the Camp David accords. Every individual in the world must know today that we reject and denounce everything that takes place in the context of that treaty or anything that would further it.

2662

CSO: 4400



ARAB INFORMATION ABROAD DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 15 Mar 80 pp 18-19

[Article by Riyadh Najib al-Rayis: "Arab Information ... (Is it) Money or People? "]

[Text] Among Gulf circles they are talking a lot about the 5th Conference of Information Ministers of the Gulf Countries which was held last month in Doha. And most of the talk centers around the working paper that the government of Qatar presented, which concerned a plan for action in the field of information in the West, and which was called "the Doha Declaration." It appears that [this working paper] was the main item which was brought up for discussion, in addition to a number of routine organizational and technical matters which a conference of this kind abounds with and which usually [make a conference of this sort] end up with announcements that there has been full agreement in points of view, and that the conference has achieved its aims!

This time there was no full agreement concerning the working paper presented by Qatar, and the conference did not achieve its aims concerning action in the field of Arab information in the West. It was not in Doha and circumstances did not permit me to cover or attend this conference. But I followed its proceedings by means of covering the Kuwaiti press which wrote about it. I was surprised when the Kuwaiti newspaper AL-SIYASAH, in its issue of 15 February 1980, published the text of the plan of Qatar's working paper, and I was struck by what was mentioned concerning "ideas" which I think it would have been better to leave in the dossiers of the ministers of information because they constitute a plan. Usually plans are not announced, especially when they have to do with the fierce media war which is being waged between us and our enemies. However, I wish to show my admiration as a journalist for the scoop which AL-SIYASAH achieved by publishing this working paper, because it has contributed to breaking the "secrecy" complex which dominates the Arab information agencies and it has shown that there is no such thing which can be called "secret" in the media field.

But since this working paper has already become the property of the readers, I will permit myself, without any apologies, to seize and take up everything that was mentioned in this plan, [at the same time wishing to] assure

my great admiration for the sincere efforts that have been made by the Qatar ministry of information and that have been made personally by the minister 'Isa Ghanim al-(Kviri) toward making this conference a success. And I will also permit myself, and without meaning to be derogatory about anyone's efforts, to discuss this working paper which concerns me as a journalist who has studied, lived, and worked for many years in Europe. And when this working paper said that "right now it is not useful or required to suggest a complete and definite concept (for a plan of [Arab] information action in the West) while we are still at an early stage in discussing the matter, but it could help to crystallize the idea if we present some thoughts concerning it, thoughts which, by their nature, lend themselves to being discussed and modified," I decided to permit myself, most emphatically, to disregard all Arab and Gulf sensitivities that might be touched upon by a number of remarks which I feel that I have the right to make.

I will start by saying that the idea which the Qatar working paper has suggested, which is "the setting up of a specialized Arab agency which is able to speak to the Western mind," was one of the most important and courageous ideas concerning the field of information that were suggested at the conference of the Arab ministers of information. Let me add that the setting up of an agency such as this has become a belated Arab national duty. But it is unfortunate that this latest Doha conference, which invited a group of Arab ambassadors serving in Western capitals—and this was a good idea and deserves to be repeated—did not invite a single Arab journalist who has connections, expertise, or experience with the Western news media, not even as an "expert." [And this could have been possible] since there is a complex concerning experts, of any kind, which still dominates the field of Arab information. [Such a journalist could] have made his contribution along with the Arab ambassadors who attended the Doha conference, and could have at least told them that it is the people of Mecca who best know [Mecca's] ravines, and that it is those who practice the profession who best know its alley-ways, and know them better than the [Arab ambassadors] know its main streets. With all due respect to these ambassadors, they are diplomats and not media people, and the ideas that some of them have about media and information are ideas which are tainted by direct political interests concerning the countries which they represent.

The Qatar working paper says that the Moslem and Arab peoples and countries "are being subjected, by means of the various news media in the West, to an unprecedented campaign of defamation and inflammatory propaganda. And the Arab oil-producing states, in particular, are bearing the brunt of this attack, since the Western news media are trying to hold them responsible for the inflation, unemployment, and unstable economic situation that the industrial countries are suffering from." Then the working paper adds a long, repetitious, well-known, widely-circulated list of reasons for the attack, beginning with Zionist circles "which are influential in the political and news media realms in the West," and ending with "historical hatred [which dates from the time of] the Crusades." This working paper ventures to enter the science of platitudes and to say "that the Arab peoples and countries have an

urgent strategic interest in resisting these attacks and exposing the deliberate falsehood and forgery which they include, and at the same time presenting, as a substitute, a positive picture about the rise and development of the Arab peoples. . . especially since the Arabs now have available the two necessary elements with which to make this response: money and men."

Then the working paper arrives at the discovery that Arab informational media—including the Arab League and its offices as well as Arab news media such as newspapers, radio, television, and public relations--during the last 30 years has failed to embark on counterattacks. Then [the working paper] jumps to a certain conclusion when it says that "there is no doubt then of the need to set up a specialized Arab agency which would utilize Arab capabilities that are able to talk to the Western mind by means of all of the news media available to it, and according to a comprehensive plan to be made by these experts and financed by countries which are able to do the financing, that is, the Arab oil-producing countries."

But it is unfortunate that the working paper did not stop to add or inquire as to the reasons for the failure of the Arab League's informational agencies or for the failure of the private Arab news media. The reason is simply that the former were lacking in personnel (and by this I specifically mean professional journalists, not informational media officials) and the latter were lacking in money. The formula of mixing the right people with sound financing is a formula which the Arabs have been unable to understand and absorb. And if the solution--the whole solution--is to be found in setting up this "Arab agency" which has both the men and the money, then it is necessary from the very beginning--especially since we are confronted with a serious suggestion of a creative idea--to caution that this agency, in case it is set up, not be transformed into a new "refuge" for coffee-house media people, especially officials of the Arab League and ministries of information of the Arab countries. I have no objection to solving the problem of giving employment to holders of degrees in the Arab world, including "informational experts," by means of such a plan, provided that we do not count on the Arab informational media in the West or on action by the Arab informational media in the West to improve the image of the Arabs and to gain more friends for them there.

Money, although it is important, is not able to buy the Arabs even one single enlightening image in the West if the people who utilize the money do not know the principles, bases, and traditions of the media profession as they are practiced in the Western countries. The road which has been trod by the Arab League--and this is something that the Qatar working paper faithfully pointed out--since the days of 'Azzam Pasha, Hassunah Pasha, and Mahmud Riyadh, has been paved with the bodies of informational media failures. Even up to the days of the new League of al-Shadhili al-(Qlibi), which we were hoping would have better luck and would have a better understanding of the media. And this was, and still is, the basis of my fear that this agency would be transformed into a new channel for squandering more money and wasting the efforts of [more] personnel.



Perhaps the most important thing that attracted my attention in this working paper is that it always, and at great length, speaks about "experts." [It speaks of] legal experts who will lay down its legal framework, administrative experts who will set up its internal organization, financial experts who will determine ways to finance it. This working paper [refers to all of these experts] without referring to even a single "media expert," and by this I mean someone in the field of journalism, or movie or television program production, nor does it refer to this agency's need to primarily have media content before having administrative laws which determine who collects the money, who spends it, and who does the hiring. These matters, concerning media, are the last thing that are known by these various types of "experts." who, if they got their hands on an agency such as this, would attempt to force it to enter the pitfalls of routine and bureaucracy, which have eaten away at all of the ministries of information in the Arab world and have destroyed their effectiveness. [This happened] after they had already previously destroyed all of the media agencies belonging to the governments, regardless of these governments' type of political regime. The pitfalls of bureaucracy are the only means which can be resorted to by any successful legal and administrative expert or official who wants to avoid having to take any personal responsibility. And effective and useful action in the field of information and news media is action undertaken by someone who wants to undergo the risk of taking responsibility.

At this point I would like to draw the readers' attention to some of the things which this working paper suggested. They include the activities which this agency would venture to undertake, and these include the publishing of books in foreign languages, producing movie and television films, having Arab lecturers be invited to the Western countries, inviting foreign journalists to the Arab countries, and working toward penetrating the large newspaper establishments in the West and creating an Arab lobby on the model of the Zionist lobby in America and in Europe.

One of the most important things here is [the suggestion of] publishing books in foreign languages which would acquaint readers with the Arab world and its achievements. What is needed in this realm is not to, once again, publish books and publications like those which the Gulf information ministries published and which end up in storerooms or in wastebaskets, and which nobody ever reads or knows how to distribute. Would it not be better to do as the intelligent, civilized informational media do and to publish these books through international publishing houses whose services can be contracted through traditional commercial means, without the interference of the ministries of information, so that this will guarantee that the books arrive where they are supposed to arrive—to the readers?

And as for the production of movie and television films about the Arab countries, in particular about the oil-producing countries, we should realize that if we produce such films--regardless of their content--we have to address ourselves to the question of which movie houses would show them or which television stations would agree to show them.



More importantly than this we should know that world Zionism already bought movie houses and television stations even before thinking about producing the films to be shown by means of them. Why do we always insist on putting the cart before the horse? Would it not be more suitable to study how movie houses and television stations in Europe and America work and are administered, that is, [movie houses and television stations] which are not dominated by ministries of information—which basically do not exist—and which in our countries are administered by a group of administrative and financial "experts," and not by media experts?

And when we do invite foreign journalists, political party leaders, student leaders, and heads of unions [to our countries], we cannot find a single official that has the time to receive them or to talk to them in a manner which demonstrates his self-confidence and confidence in them.

Such officials hope that these visitors will be content to sit in their luxury hotels, enjoy the hospitality of the Arab Gulf countries, and sniff the gentle breezes which are full of heat and humidity. And after all of this we are ambitious enough to [want to] penetrate the great newspaper establishments in the West "by all means possible, including even buying shares in some of them." How is this supposed to happen? In the first place, the shares of these newspapers are not simply put on the market to be bought by anyone who wants to. Secondly, one must know how these newspaper establishments are run, who sets policy for them, and who supervises their orientation. And [we must know] that the ownership arrangement of each newspaper differs from other ownership arrangements. Thirdly, domination of the policy of these newspapers may require things other than money. It requires professional media personnel who are well-versed in the principles of the game and its conditions, [and it does need] "the experts."

And if we speak about the creation of an Arab lobby "using as a model the Zionist lobby in ruling establishments," and likening this lobby to the Greek lobby in the United States, then this will primarily depend on the Arabs who live in Europe and America, on their ties to the country that they are living in, the degree to which they feel that they belong to their mother country, and the extent of their influence in their new country. [This is] influence which is primarily determined by the activities of Arabs who are citizens, and not by refugees or visitors or tourists, in the country which they are living in, [and is determined by] the extent to which political, economic, and media institutions and important people of that country respect the efforts which they make and the services which they render, rather than being determined by how much financing is available from abroad. People are still more important than money. And Arab money [is still used in such a way] that makes it go astray and hit wide of the mark.

The Gulf countries objected to the "Doha Declaration," and the Qatar working paper did not obtain official circulation in the Gulf countries. Probably this was because it came from Doha and from Qatar, assuming that we do not want to enter into more details concerning the conference. This is not what

is important. The important thing is that the "Doha Declaration: not fall by wayside in Doha itself, that Qatar's enthusiasm for it not turn cold, and that Qatar's determination to insist on seeing this plan implemented not slacken. Perhaps in this domain the government of Qatar--which has been a pioneer in a number of media fields--could single-handedly bring this plan out into the open, have it implemented, and impose it on the Arabs in spite of themselves and for the sake of the Arabs' own interests. By doing this it would have rendered one of the most important contributions that it could make as a government toward serving the most significant and important cause which concerns the overall image of the Arabs and which perhaps could not be served by money when it is personnel that are scarce.

How happy I would be if these words would provide an occasion for opening up the doors to a broad discussion which would lead to hearing more opinions on the part of those who work in the media field. And similarly, how happy I would be if the 6th Conference of Ministers of Information for the Gulf Countries, which is to be held in Muscat next year, would escape the domination of the opinions of the "experts' in the media field, and would grant the real media people, that is, professional practicing journalists, the opportunity to let their voices be heard. Because they are the only men [who can function] in a field with which they are directly concerned.

The only thing that remains is to realize--for those who have to realize--that the baking of bread should be left up to the bakers!

9468  
CSO: 4802

## INTER ARAB AFFAIRS

### BRIEFS

SAUDI AID FOR DEVELOPMENT--The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Arab Republic have signed two agreements requiring that two loans for 91 million riyals be granted from the Saudi Development Fund. The funds will finance two important development projects in Yemen. The first one will develop central electrical power there by building steam generators with a production capacity of 150 megawatts. The sum of 54 million riyals has been allocated for that project. The second loan, in the amount of 37 million riyals, will finance the construction of grain silos for storage purposes. [Text] [Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic 21 Mar 80 p 7] 8592

CSO: 4802

## AFGHANISTAN

### 'CARTER'S DOCTRINE' CONSIDERED DETRIMENTAL TO PEACE

Kabul ANIS in Dari 29 Apr 80 pp 2,3

[Article by Firuz Kuh; all quotes as published]

[Text] American imperialism, this deserving heir of the "Hitler school of fascism," this war monger, this great organizer of the imperialistic war-aspiring camp of NATO, this destroyer of the world which has developed and progressed to such an extent through the labor of millions of working human beings, this great enemy of world peace and democracy, is attempting to transform the cold war that it has already started into undeclared wars and armed aggression against Asian, African, and Latin American countries.

It is quite clear to the people of the world that American imperialism has been lately fueling the "nuclear military doctrine and arms race." For instance, it ignores the 1957 Helsinki accords and it postpones the actualization and approval of SALT II. It disturbs the peace and tranquility of Europe, which resulted because of its policy of peaceful coexistence paid for with the blood of millions of human beings in the wake of the fascism of Hitler.

It has begun its European anti-peace activities with the installation of "cruise and Pershing" missiles and mid-range rockets in western Europe under the pretext of the so-called "Soviet threat." Why has imperialism invented the phrase "Soviet threat" through the war machinery of the CIA and the Pentagon? Because through this groundless concept it can establish its own and its allies' plundering and monopolistic interests and establish military bases, places for treason and crime.

Mr Carter should be asked why it is that as soon as the banners of peace and freedom are raised in the far away places of



the world he rushes to the aid of anti-freedom, reactionary forces with loads of arms and bundles of dollars thus endangering the destiny of nations.

Was it not the American authorities who with the help of the CIA overthrew the young, newfound Congo government which had just freed itself from the bonds of Belgian colonialism through the champion of freedom, Patrice Lumumba? Was it not the American authorities who overthrew the revolutionary regime of Dr Allende in Chile and bought the fascist Pinochet, turning Chile into a virtual prison of the masses? Was it not the American leaders who supported Pol Pot, the murderer of more than 3 million human beings in Kampuchea?

Is it not Carter who defends the South African and Zimbabwe racists?

Is it not Carter who initiated the infamous Camp David agreement between the bought Sadat and Begin the Zionist in order to secure America's treacherous interests in the Middle East? Was it not Carter who announced a few days ago that he will not recognize the PLO which is the sole political, revolutionary representative of the true rights of the struggling Moslem Palestinian people?

Is it not Carter and his friends who support "Amin the distrustful," this infamous criminal, faithful servant of the CIA, and murderer of Moslems? And finally, is it not the Carters, the occupiers of the White House, who in conspiracy with the back-sliding supremacists of China, submissive Egyptians, Zionists of Israel, and reactionaries of Pakistan, "all united in a sinister front," interfere and plot against the national democratic revolution and its new phase and against the persistent struggler, revolutionary Iran?

The drafters of this doctrine must understand that the awareness of our nation can no longer be impeded. No obstacle can block the path of revolutions and world-wide revolutionary movements for the benefit of nations. The masses will no longer be deceived, but for a small group who have already been bought.

Breaking the chain of colonialist systems, escape from the subjugation of capitalism, and the dispersal of old orders

have begun in our time. The belief that "nations have the right of self-determination in attaining complete freedom" has become very popular among the people who also despise war and colonialism.

Today American imperialism has begun an arms race, does not accept SALT II, and uses its propaganda machinery of lies against the progressive countries and liberating movements of the world. It has chosen a two-faced policy; that is, on the one hand it defends Israel's transgressions against the Moslem Arabs in Arabian countries while on the other hand, in Afghanistan and Iran it seems to have become a convert defending Islam. This is a newly contrived trick; but it must be understood that it will prove inconsequential.

While American imperialism and its allies feel it their duty to attack the freedom and honor of others and to protect their imperialistic interests through all kinds of deception, humanity also has the right and duty to defend and sacrifice for its honor, conscience, freedom, and peace.

American imperialism can no longer destroy detente at the root because all humanity will spread it from one continent to another, from one nation to another, from one city to another, from one village to another, and even from one alley to another. There is a vital need for detente and today the "doctrine of persistent struggle for peace and security" shines over the continents. The struggle to attain this revolutionary human goal moves onward towards victory.

"Carter and those who have flocked around him" want the people of the world to ask their permission even to eat and sleep. They hope to overshadow detente with their aggressive policies; but they will find no opportunity to carry out this scheme. There are now extensive forces who have risen together against the actions, both direct and indirect, of imperialistic forces, against the monopolistic military preparations for war, and against the racket of the mass media.

This doctrine will not last. It is condemned to defeat, because progressive humanity has the total capability for the defense of peace, freedom, territorial integrity, national independence, and

national government and it can protect  
all the benefits of peace and democracy.

Today the developing countries of the Third World are progressing towards growth and evolution with the brotherly cooperation of socialist countries who have no self interest, in the forefront the Soviet Union.

The friendship between the Third World and socialist countries is based on a strong policy of non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The peaceful policies of socialist countries and the Third World have violently angered American imperialism and its imperialistic cohorts.

But our age is no longer an age of blind belief. Our age is an age of work, struggle, and victory. It is an age of the triumph of social revolutions, an age of the universal expansion of detente, an age for the destruction of aggression and the defeat of imperialistic "doctrines."

9593

CSO: 4903

TENSE CALM PREVAILS IN KABUL

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 4 May 80 p 8

[Text]

NEW DELHI, May 3: Afghan troops, tanks and armoured cars were guarding the educational institutions in Kabul today amidst reports of sporadic violence and stone throwing by students, PTI news agency reported from the Afghan capital today.

Soviet-piloted gunships were seen flying frequently over the capital in an apparent attempt to frustrate the students who organised a massive anti-Soviet demonstration in Kabul from April 28 to 29.

The students had been forced to confine themselves to their classes and several hundred had been arrested, PTI said.

The situation in several major Afghan cities was described as tense, with combat troops guarding highways and Soviet tanks patrolling the deserted streets in Kabul after the anti-Soviet protests by students that left more than 70 people dead and hundreds injured.

travellers from Kabul reaching here said.

A protest strike of the Kabul University and high school students, which began in mid-April, ended in violence when an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 students took to the streets on April 27 to jeer Soviet and East European dignitaries at the anniversary celebrations of the 1978 revolution, travellers said.

PTI estimated that 16 students were killed.

Meanwhile, a large number of Soviet transport planes were seen flying between Kabul and the Soviet Union, presumably carrying men and supplies, PTI said.

A feature of the student uprisings was the prominent part played by girls. Many girls' schools were scenes of firing and PTI said one girl, who was fatally wounded by a bullet, screamed, 'don't take me to the hospital for treatment by the

Russians, before dying on her way there.

The demonstration in Kabul was the second against Soviet-backed Babrak Karmel regime. In riots last February, hundreds of shopkeepers called a mass strike and business was paralysed for days.

One traveller said there was strong resentment for the killing of the students. He added that there were possibilities of more clashes and described the atmosphere in Kabul as still very charged.

A night curfew is still in force in Kabul, though it has been shortened.

According to delayed reports, many of the 70 Afghans killed in anti-Soviet protests earlier this week in Kabul were school girls between the ages of 12 and 11.

Most of the fatal victims were shot by Soviet troops and armed civilians, including students, who belong to president Babrak Karmel's Parcham faction of the ruling Marxist Party, said the source who has proved consistently reliable in the past. He declined to be identified.—AFP/ANA.

CSO: 4920



## AFGHANISTAN

### KARMAL HOPES FOR PEACE WITH NEIGHBORS, DENOUNCES FOREIGN INTERVENTION

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 10 Apr 80 p 11

[Interview with Babrak Karmal in Kabul by Salih Qallab: "We Are in Same Bunker with Resistance; Camp David Is Completion of Conspiracy Against Us; Our Condition for a Solution Is Non-Intervention in Our Affairs; We Are Concerned About Peace with Iran and Pakistan"; date not given]

[Text] Few people abroad had heard of Babrak Karmal before he led the movement that overthrew his predecessor Hafizullah Amin on the 27th of last December.

But Babrak Karmal is well-known inside the country. According to those who are fond of him and who know him, he is "the son of the general who was one of the pillars of King Zahir Shah's regime. He became aware of the miserable life his people were leading so he rejected his class and dissociated himself from it. While still a student he became the star of popular demonstrations in Kabul."

By the time he completed his secondary education Karmal had become a political power and was being described as the "bearer of the red banner" in Afghanistan. His father had disowned him during that time because he had violated the traditions of the family.

Afterwards Karmal moved to the stage of organizing secretly among the ranks of petty officers and intellectuals. He was involved in this activity until early in 1965 when he established the Afghan Democratic People's party (Khalq) with Nur Muahmmad Taraki. This is a leading political movement in the history of Afghanistan; it determined the course of this backward Asian country during the contemporary stage of history.

Because of his strong inclination towards Marxism Karmal remained the object of attention for the leftist youth within the ranks of the party and the other political associations. His ambition continued to be to build a Marxist party that would lead the country and liberate it from the ages of darkness and make it catch up quickly with the procession of modern civilization. It is for this purpose that Karmal went through

sharp confrontations with conservative and moderate movements in the party. He remained, however, one of the most enthusiastic party members [who favored] party unity because he was convinced that the stage which Afghanistan was going through required the efforts of all citizens from all groups and classes.

The party, nevertheless, split more than once, and the Parcham faction (al-Rayah), which is led by Karmal, emerged as the principal power behind events in the country.

This movement played a principal role in instigating against the regime of Commanding Gen Muhammad Daud who overthrew the royal regime "because his objective was to intercept a radical movement in the country." Soon after Parcham was reunited with the Khalq Party under the leadership of Taraki, it overthrew Daud's regime in 1978.

Because of his prominent role in the leadership of the Afghan Political Movement and because he could not be the leading figure as long as Taraki was still around, Karmal assumed the position of prime minister and began to play an actual role in the government and in the party until Hafizullah Amin returned from the United States after completing his studies. Amin led a tribal political bloc after joining the party's Central Committee and was thus able to have Karmal removed from his party and government positions, and he forced him to leave the country and to live in Czechoslovakia as ambassador to his country.

During the period of his exile which lasted till 3 months before his recent coup, Karmal was able to turn Parcham into the most secret political movement and the most widely spread movement among the ranks of petty officers, intellectuals, students and junior civil servants.

Karmal was helped in strengthening his party and facilitating its spread in the most important, sensitive sectors of the country by the circumstances that prevailed during Amin's regime and especially the primitive and illegal elimination of Taraki, the spiritual father of the Afghan Political Movement.

Zealous leftist students are saying that Karmal had returned secretly to the country immediately after the death of Taraki and that he had begun to carry out broad campaigns, gathering people against the regime, until he was able to overthrow Amin's regime on the 27th of last December.

Karmal, who has been carrying his ideas in his head for tens of years, is now in a position of putting these ideas to the test.

We met President Babrak Karmal in the palace which resembles a medieval stronghold from the outside, unmarred by the bullets or missiles of coups. There was only one tank which had been placed on a pedestal in front of the entrance to the castle. It is being said that this tank was the first one that fired on the palace in the movement of the 27th of April, or

Enqelab-e Sawr as it is called. In other words it represents the dawn of the Afghan Revolution if this figure of speech is correct in this context.

We met Babrak Karmal the president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the secretary general of the Afghan Democratic People's Party in the context of a press conference. But [our] comrade the president soon favored us with a portion of his time, and we asked him the following questions:

[Question] Mr President, you have always been affirming that your relationship with the Palestinian Resistance was strong, dynamic and based on principle. It is known that the PLO enjoys a very important position on the Islamic and Arab scenes. Have you tried to take advantage of this in solving the Afghan problem and in [fighting] the political battle that you are waging in this area?

[Answer] The term, "the Afghan question" was coined as a result of imperialist and reactionary intervention in our country. The struggle of liberation movements--and the Afghan Liberation Movement is one of them--cannot be a problem. The just struggle of our people cannot be a problem, nor can any national liberation revolution be described as a problem or an issue.

I am affirming that relations between our people and the Palestinian people are more than strong and more than fraternal. Our people are standing alongside the Palestinian people: they are facing the same enemies, and they have the same friends. The purpose for which the Palestinian Revolution is struggling is essentially the same one for which the Afghan Revolution is struggling.

The world today is characterized by the fact that it is experiencing a sharp process of classification. The forces of progress, peace and liberation are on one side, and the imperialist, expansionist and reactionary forces are on the other. In the context of this classification process the Afghan Revolution can distinguish its friends from its enemies. On this basis we are certain and we are quite convinced that the heroic Palestine Liberation Movement is standing alongside our revolution and our people in the battle that has been forced upon us and thrust on all the Arab, Islamic and international scenes.

The Palestinian Revolution and we are [fighting] on one front and in one bunker. We are, therefore, determined to benefit from the capabilities of the Palestinian Revolution. We are consulting with the PLO and coordinating our efforts with it for the purpose of establishing peace in the area, for effecting the reconciliation and for removing the misunderstanding with our neighbors.

## The Political Solution and the Conditions for It

[Question] There has been much talk recently about finding a political solution to the Afghan question. What is your opinion about this, and what are your conditions for a solution such as this?

[Answer] I have said that it was the imperialist and reactionary forces that contrived and created the "Afghan question." We are, however, extending an open hand to all the countries of the world for the sake of human brotherhood and for establishing peace, especially with our two neighbors, Pakistan and Iran.

We have no conditions other than asking that all forms of aggression against our country and intervention in its internal affairs cease.

Attacks on us and intervention in our internal affairs must cease before everything else. Attacks launched by Washington, al-Sadat, Begin, Islamabad, Britain, Beijing and Arab reactionaries must first cease.

I am proclaiming our support for any solution that would achieve peace without conditions or reservations. I am also announcing to the whole world that we do not recognize any solution that does not represent the will of our people and does not take into consideration those questions that I have already mentioned.

[Question] Your country is facing numerous security, political and economic problems, and you are fighting on numerous fronts. What is the plan that you have adopted for victory in your battles?

[Answer] What we are trying to achieve and what we are hoping to attain is to live in peace with our two neighbors Iran and Pakistan. This is because we want to devote ourselves fully to save our people from the tyranny and injustice of the dark ages. We want to rid our people of ignorance, poverty and illiteracy. But in spite of our desire to do so and in spite of our continuous efforts [to establish] peace with our neighbors, the imperialist and reactionary countries have not left us alone. They continue to hatch plots [against us] to drain our energies and waste our efforts in an effort to keep our people backward, poor, ignorant and deprived of their will [to act].

They are exerting enormous pressures on us and on our friends, and they are trying everything to sabotage our economy and eliminate our foreign trade so as to impede our march for liberation and rob us of the independence which we obtained with the blood of those who lost their lives, with the tears of mothers and the sweat of the poor.

But I want to affirm that the Afghan people under the leadership of their party and with the support of their friends, and chiefly the Soviet Union, are determined to pursue their course to build their homeland and to preserve their independence. We are confident of our ability to overcome the conspiracy and to foil the intrigues of enemies.



Look for Camp David

[Question] What are the characteristics of the stage which your country is experiencing especially after the regime of Hafizullah Amin was overthrown on the 27th of last December?

[Answer] Afghanistan entered into a new stage of the April Revolution, Enqelab-e Sawr, at a time when the Camp David conspiracy began to reveal its ugly and horrible countenance, with al-Sadat entering openly into an alliance with the United States and Israel against the Arab Liberation Movement in general and the Palestinian Revolution in particular. Afghanistan has also come into this stage at a time when the conspiracies of Washington, and its clients against the Islamic Revolution in Iran were being stepped up.

Therefore, because the new stage of the April Revolution opened a breach in the enemies' front and formed a strong support for the liberation movements, the imperialist and reactionary forces took action to form an unholy alliance between Washington, the Chinese expansionists, the Pakistani reactionaries, Israel, al-Sadat's regime and other reactionary forces to abort this stage of the Afghan Revolution.

The United States of America has sent tons of destructive materials by air, by land and by sea. It has enlisted mercenaries to destroy the independence of Afghanistan, to demolish its will and to undermine the resistance and accomplishments of its people. Hostile forces took advantage of the circumstances and conditions that were created by the regime of Hafizullah Amin, and we have documents which prove that he was an agent for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The United States enlisted those who were rendered homeless by Amin's gangs to carry out sabotage activities against our people and to destroy property and subject thousands of innocent people to death and homelessness.

Amin has left us a burdensome legacy, and this has made our mission arduous and confined the mission of the party and the government to providing peace and stability for the citizen; resisting attacks and foreign interventions in our country; providing freedom and democracy for our people; building a front that would include in its ranks all the honest people who would save the homeland, defend its independence and protect its borders.

The Domestic Enemy: Illiteracy

[Question] You spoke a great deal, Mr President, about foreign enemies, but you did not go into domestic conditions. Does this mean that you are not facing domestic enemies?

[Answer] The most dangerous enemy on the domestic scene is the high rate of illiteracy in our country. The illiteracy which is widespread in our country is considered one of the legacies of the previous ages of darkness. We have kept the elimination of this disease in mind after the April Revolution; it consumes the energies of our people.

Immediately after the success of the April Revolution we began the effort with high aspirations to achieve this objective. But the influence of Amin's gang brought this course to a stop and even diverted it in the opposite direction. During the black age of Amin the Whip of terror affected most of the intellectuals in Afghanistan. Some of them were killed; some were forced to leave the country; some were thrown in jail; and some occupied themselves with earning a living for themselves and their children. All this led to a serious relapse in the plan that was sketched by the April Revolution to do away with illiteracy.

After the elimination of Amin's gang and with the beginning of the new stage, our party and our government proclaimed the slogan of helping the intellectuals financially and morally without discriminating between a party member and a non-party member or between a member of this ethnic group or the other.

We began immediately with a plan to confront the problem of illiteracy by opening more schools and by offering special programs. We placed all our educated cadres [in positions] so we can fight illiteracy in the cities and in rural areas. We adopted at the outset [a system of] staging popular debates to convince the citizens that the eradication of illiteracy was important and that it was imperative for the homeland and for the citizen.

8592

CSO: 4902

## AFGHANISTAN

### SOVIETS INSTALL SATELLITE COMMUNICATION STATION

Kabul ANIS in Dari 23 Apr 80 p 3

[Article by Sayyah, ANIS staff reporter]

[Text] Recently the protocol for building and installing a ground satellite communication station was signed in Kabul between the Ministry of Telecommunications of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the embassy of the Soviet Union. Our correspondent interviewed the director of telecommunications of the Ministry of Telecommunications on this subject and filed the following report:

Our people have long wanted to one day watch the Olympic games like other countries who watch athletic games on television. Fortunately, this desire has materialized with the friendly, sincere cooperation of our great friend and neighbor to the north, the U.S.S.R. The groundwork has been set in Kabul for building a satellite and installing a ground station for communication with Soviet satellites.

The protocol for this system was signed in Kabul on 19 Mar 80 [29 Hut 1358]. According to this protocol, the installation of the ground station will permit an exchange of television programs between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and will also provide telecommunications (telephone and telegram) between the two friends and neighboring governments.

The installation of the system in Afghanistan will consist of two stages:

In the first stage, a small, mobile station called Mars will be sent by the government of the Soviet Union along with

accompanying personnel to Afghanistan. This station will enter Afghanistan in the near future and will be quickly installed.

Since the installation of the main station will take some time, this small station, it has been decided, will be used to broadcast all the 1980 Moscow Olympic games in Kabul.

While the Mars station through which we will watch the 1980 Olympic games on television is being used, the government of the Soviet Union will send a stationary main station called Luts to Afghanistan. The experts of our neighboring country will cooperate in the installation of this station.

According to the protocol, a number of Afghani personnel will also work with the Soviet experts to install the station and will be trained to operate it.

Until the main station is completed and begins operation, the small Mars station will be used for television and telecommunication activities, to be returned to the Soviet Union after the opening of the main station.

The Mars station will be ready to start operation before the beginning of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. But the Luts station, the main station, will not be completed until the end of 1981.

Mars has a television channel and a telecommunications service channel, but the larger Luts contains a television channel and 12 telecommunication channels (telephone, telegraph, and telex).

The director of telecommunications of the Ministry of Telecommunications said concerning the installation locations and use of both stations in Kabul:

Since Mars is a mobile, temporary station, it has been decided that it should be installed and begin operation at the site of the present radio and television building without any changes being made. But the Luts station, which is a stationary, permanent one, requires a well-equipped building.

The shape and design of this building will conform to the picture above [photo not reproduced] and will be completed at the Rishkhor site at a cost of 16 million afghanis by late 1981.



The mobile, temporary Mars station and the stationary, permanent Luts station, worth about R7 million, will be given to the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan by the government of our friend and neighbor the Soviet Union as gratuitous aid.

Concerning the activities of these stations, the director of telecommunications of the Ministry of Telecommunications explained:

Considering the operation of the satellite communication system, it is necessary to speak briefly about electromagnetic waves, that is radio and television waves.

Electromagnetic waves are divided into long, medium, short, and ultrashort waves.

The satellite communication system works with ultrashort waves the length of which ranges from one meter to centimeters, millimeters, submillimeters, or light-waves.

In simpler terms, while radio waves range from one meter to thousands of meters in length, ultrashort waves range from one meter to one centimeter or even one-tenth, one-hundredth, or one-thousandth of a millimeter.

One of the characteristics of these waves is that they are sent between transmitters and receivers over distances within direct sight, about 45-50 km.

It is for this reason that television signals, unlike radio signals, are not received throughout Afghanistan.

Scientists discovered that satellites were the solution. And these satellites serve mankind in various ways other than television.

For instance, if station A, located in Moscow, sends electromagnetic waves via satellite by way of special antennas from one of the borders of Afghanistan, a satellite equipped with a transmitter and a receiver would pick up the waves through its receiver. Then, after intensifying them it would send them through the satellite transmitter.

The transmitter would then send these waves to antennas located at Station B, that is the ground receiver which has a special antenna that scans for waves.

Concerning the reception of television signals from other countries via satellite communication systems, the director of telecommunications of the Ministry of Telecommunications explained:

The television network of every country has individual characteristics and various private channels. When an agreement is made between the government of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union concerning the programs of other countries which the Soviet Union carries, the broadcast of television programs from some other countries will be made possible through the Soviet Union.

Finally, it must be mentioned that the government of our great friend and neighbor to the north, the Soviet Union, will host the athletes and those international sports enthusiasts of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. These games will be so interesting and exciting that each television viewer will appreciate the valuable aid of the Soviet Union and will be delighted with the interest the people of that peace-loving country show in us.

Victory belongs to those who support peace and the progress of countries and who will refuse no aid or moral support for the development of the people of friendly countries.

9593  
CS0: 4903

## CHANGING DAYS AND NIGHTS OF KABUL

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 4 May 80 p 8

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, May 3: Kabul appears to be a Russian city at night, being in total control of the Red Army, according to an Indian writer, who recently spent five days in the Afghan capital.

The write-up, by Karan Thapar published in a recent issue of London Magazine "Spectator", says that after 10.00 p.m. the Soviet enforced Martial Law takes complete command of the city and continues till dawn, with roads and alleys shaking to the rattle of Soviet military armour.

During day-time the city wears an Afghan facade, but only to the extent of human presence, with Afghans going about in backdrop of Soviet tanks, patrolling the streets, army personnel carriers thundering down the roads with Soviet soldiers jauntily manning

their guns, often swinging their barrels in mock-firing. The Soviet MIGs and gunship helicopters hover menacingly to have a close look of Kabul.

Karan Thapar further says that the Russian soldiers posted to the Afghan capital show weakness for American cigarettes, chewing gum and chocolates but pay the price of their own liking, which is generally below the market rate. He narrated an incident in which one tank soldier bought Marlboro cigarettes by paying 20 Afghans for a pack against the market price of 25 Afghans.

Though largely the Red Army is well-disciplined, the city is not free from incidents. Waiters at the Hotel Intercontinental confirmed that the occupation army had committed few crimes but the

very presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan is itself the worst crime. "He never found a single Afghan who in any way condoned this military presence", Thapar wrote.

In Kabul, Thapar continues a superficial military enforced calm prevails and there is always a constant threat of something ominous about to happen.

If a citizen of Kabul wants to get away from this city it has been made almost impossible. Checkposts have been established at numerous places on all routes out of Kabul. Afghan troops search the people, closely watched by the Soviet troops with their rifles cocked and ready.

It costs 243,000 Afghans (243 pounds approximately) to have a passport and that too is valid for one single journey. Businessmen who have to make repeated trips are only on occasion allowed a second time at a concessional rate.—APT.

CSO: 4920

## AFGHANISTAN

### ANNIVERSARY OF SAWR REVOLUTION COMMEMORATED

Kabul ANIS in Dari 26 Apr 80 p 4

[Editorial]

[Text] The second anniversary of the glorious Sawr Revolution celebrates the chearful victory and freedom of all the people of our country from the bonds of dictatorship, plunder, injustice, and various economic, social, and cultural inequities. Thus, our people greatly value this celebration and with extraordinary happiness commemorate it in splendid ceremonies.

The immortal Sawr Revolution, which triumphed under the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the joint efforts of national armed liberation forces with the confirmation and support of all the people of this country, eliminated the half-century rule of Al-e Yahya, placing the destiny of the people in their own hands and crumbling the pillars of reactionism and imperialism. And the people of Afghanistan--free, independent, and proud--began their revolutionary work and struggle to ensure a prosperous future.

The positive, fundamental changes which have begun in various economic and social areas of our society and country have established new social principles and standards in agriculture and production. They have eliminated the decrepit, unjust systems and standards of the Middle Ages. Of course, these victories and the fundamental steps being taken to ensure the glorious and powerful future of Afghanistan have alarmed universal imperialism, with American imperialism in the forefront along with regional chauvinists and reactionaries. Through various means and methods they have begun attempts to weaken the revolution and create a favorable climate for reestablishing their lost power. But the victorious uprising of 28 Dec [6 Jody] which began a new phase in the evolution of our revolution and society was a decisively firm response to



all the conspiracies and plots of imperialism, reactionism, and counterrevolutionaries. Therefore, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, more united than ever before, continues its effective struggle to attain its great national and historical goals in order to serve the people and the country.

A glance at the achievements of this brief period after the triumph of the Saur Revolution and the historical movement of 28 Dec clearly reveals the truth, that our people have accomplished such great feats in such a short time, feats which are absolutely unique in the course of our beloved and proud country's ancient history of many thousands of years. Therefore, they are right to commemorate the second anniversary of their revolution with more glory and splendor than ever before.

The celebration of the Saur Revolution is one of workers, farmers, patriotic spiritual leaders, employees, and all the intellectuals of our dear and glorious country, Afghanistan. Now that the revolution has evolved to a new phase, the people throughout the country in union with their national democratic government are prepared for any kind of generosity, self-sacrifice, work, or revolutionary struggle to implement the extensive programs of their revolution. The revolution has now been transformed into such a strong and stable anti-imperialistic and anti-reactionary fortress that the alarm and fear of imperialistic circles has increased several-fold. Of course, the sacrifices and selflessness of the true heroic offspring of our country who have strengthened and fueled the progressive movement of our country with their spilt blood will be registered forever proudly in the bright pages of contemporary history and our people will remember their good names with appreciation.

We congratulate all the free working and patriotic fellow citizens on this great second anniversary celebration of the revolution and we are certain that as we try more and more to attain the goals of the revolution our country will progress speedily through the evolutionary stages of development and be in line with the progressive, powerful, and peace-loving nations of the world.

Onward towards a free, prosperous, and proud Afghanistan!

Long live the glorious Saur Revolution!

# MUJAHIDEEN KILL MANY AFGHAN SOLDIERS

Karachi DAWN in English 6 May 80 p 10

[Text]

**PESHAWAR, May 5:** Mujahideen killed a large number of troops, according to some reports the number may be as high as 300, in a little skirmish at Dek Rawat in Uruzgan province a few days ago completely demoralising the rest of the troops who have started deserting in large numbers alongwith their arms and ammunition.

In Ghazni province, Soviet and Afghan troops resorted to indiscriminate bombing in an area killing 12 innocent civilians and injuring a large number of women and children.

Mujahideen retaliated by attacking Ghazni city killing 10 Russian and seven Afghan soldiers and destroying three tanks, five armoured cars and 10 jeeps.

Mujahideen also attacked and burnt several houses and shops of pro-Government elements and took away six of them.

In Laghman, Mujahideen who control most of the province besieged Russian and Afghan troops in Malkh last Saturday capturing two officers and 12 sepoy. Mujahideen also burnt many houses and shops of pro-Government elements in the provincial headquarters of Mehtarlam.

In Nangrahar province, Mujahideen attacked an ammunition dump in Samankhel on Saturday and took away a large number of explosives and ammunition boxes when the guarding 12 policemen joined Mujahideen alongwith their weapons. Mujahideen also carried out frings on Jalalabad water pumping station on Sunday night.

In Nizwan province, Mujahideen attacked a camp in Farang near Iran border last Thursday burning the whole area.

In Herat city, Mujahideen killed several Soviet and Afghan troops and also attacked a military camp last week.—PFI

CSO: 4920

OBSERVANCE OF RELIGIOUS RITES 'GUARANTEED'

Kabul ANIS in Dari 24 Apr 80 pp 4,5

[Article by D. Tavan]

[Text] In class societies and societies which are based on the subjugation of one individual by another, productive people are always condemned to poverty, misery, and slavery. In such societies no matter how much the governments proclaim justice and democratic freedom and attempt to appease and content the masses through so-called services, sometimes with this or that semi-political, economic or social reform, still the majority of workers cannot free themselves of the bonds of slavery and misery. For instance, in capitalistic societies which speak of democracy and so-called equality, this democracy is nothing more than the fire of tyranny and capitalistic dictatorship which swallows up the centers and homes of millions of working families and in the name of democracy crushes human beings in its bloody, destructive claws of capitalistic slavery. It does not respect human honor, beliefs, nobility, or dignity. In the end, it enslaves the human being, his thoughts and beliefs. All that producers create is poured into the storages of the monster capitalism and the prevailing, devouring thieves who feed on the people.

But only in democratic, non-subjugating societies can one speak of democratic human freedom which is in keeping with the evolved standards and general level of economic and social development of these societies, because only in societies in which political power is in the hands of the true representatives of the masses are the workers certain to benefit from all democratic rights and freedom. In other words, if governments are created in accordance with the will of the

people, and if the social system and the path to economic and social development of the society are in harmony with the demands of the people and chosen according to the times and realistic development of the societies, then the masses will benefit from the freedom of expression and ideas and other natural, social, and truly human rights.

After the victory of the triumphant Sawr Revolution which ended the reactionary domination of the ruling, subjugating, decrepit, old-fashioned ruling classes in our society, the productive working masses of our country found for the first time the opportunity to attain truly democratic rights and freedom by taking their destiny into their own hands.

Even though the conspicuous agent of American imperialism, Amin the spy, created the worst inhumane situation in the society during his short, fascistic domination, following the dictates and advice of his foreign supporters, and diverted the revolution from its original course, the uprising of 28 Dec [6 Jody] brought about a new phase in the Sawr Revolution once again providing better and broader opportunities for the productive workers and all national and democratic classes.

The planning and ratification of the basic principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have passed through their various stages in accordance with the will and demands of the heroic people. The constitution of the country affects deeply and extensively the destiny of our society, country, and people. This constitution will enable our people to succeed in building a modern democratic society since it contains fundamental methods and cures to save the millions of working masses. Such plans were scientifically devised after analyzing and evaluating the various aspects of the lives of the people who have suffered calamities and included in the constitution to bring about a healthy growth and evolution of the process of the Sawr Revolution in order to bring about the rapid, desired evolution of Afghan society. This can indeed quickly open up a bright horizon for our workers and provide better living conditions.

The constitution of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan gives special attention to the freedom to carry on religious rites and clearly states that the Moslem people of the country can more than ever before hold their religious services and worship.



Part of Article 5 of the constitution of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan reads: "The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan guarantees all Moslems respect for the observance and protection of the righteous Islamic religion and the freedom to carry on religious services."

In accordance with its nationalistic and democratic nature which protects and upholds the interests of all classes of the Moslem workers of our society, the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan from its establishment, especially after the 28 Dec uprising which brought about a new phase in the Sawr Revolution, has made every honest effort to defend the gains of the revolution, territorial integrity and the democratic rights and freedom of all the people. It has made a constant effort to encourage the rapid, healthy growth and evolution of the Sawr Revolution and to build a modern democratic society in Afghanistan. Under the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the government will not only struggle extensively to truly serve the people and to secure their rights and interests, but it will also act in accordance with the spirit of the holy faith of Islam.

Only after the victorious Sawr Revolution, especially in its new evolutionary phase, have our people been able to enjoy the freedom to observe their religious rites, worship, and religious beliefs, because the government belongs to the people, the people support their government, and there is no distance between them. Despite the false propaganda and rumors of our class enemies and forces dependent on imperialism, the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has bettered the conditions for holding religious ceremonies. It has built and repaired mosques and encouraged spiritual leaders and imams to increase their activities in order to protect and support the national and religious traditions of our people. But the government will under no circumstances permit the imperialist mercenaries and enemies of the Sawr Revolution to disturb the peace and security of the country by manipulating the religious beliefs of the people in order to hostilely oppose the revolution and its gains. Thus, the government will not only act to protect and support the religious beliefs of the people but it will refuse to allow any kind of manipulation of religion or faith against our faithful, religious people. It will fight decisively against those who use the name of the holy religion of Islam against the best interests of the Moslem people and the welfare of the Moslem country of Afghanistan.

Another section of Article 5 of the constitution of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan reads: "No citizen is allowed to use religion for propaganda against the nation and the people, indulging in acts against the interests of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the people of Afghanistan. The government will help and support the patriotic activities of the spiritual and religious leaders in carrying out their duties.

The empty-headed propagandists of imperialism and all decaying and counterrevolutionary powers intend to pave the way for their reactionary and counterrevolutionary conspiracies and plots against the Saur Revolution by taking advantage of the underdeveloped political and social awareness of our noble and faithful people. They claim that since the victorious Saur Revolution the holy religion of Islam has been endangered in Afghanistan. Regardless of the nature of such rumors and shamelessly baseless accusations from our enemies, it must be said that what has been and rightly should have been endangered by the victorious Saur Revolution are the interests of imperialism and its true servants, because with the triumph of the Saur Revolution the reactionary fortress of feudalism has crumbled down and the thieving activities of international imperialism, with American imperialism in the fore, have been overturned. Hence, the hold on our nation's honor, position, and purity of all the reactionaries, robbers of the very existence of the people, and enemies of our beloved country was broken.

The government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has actively defended, and always will, all the reasonable cultural and religious beliefs of our noble people. But it must be said that the anti-national and anti-democratic propaganda of the sworn enemies of our people and our revolution will come to naught and will not effect the spirit of our people.

The heroic and religious people of Afghanistan can clearly see that the government acts at every step in their best interest and to ensure their natural and social rights. The fact that the imperialists still shamelessly continue their accusations, false rumors, and armed insurrections against the people, country, party, revolution, and the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in itself reveals their bungling,

defeat, and anxiety and shows to what extent they find themselves ineffectual and miserable.

The government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan defends the interests of the faithful Moslem people of Afghanistan. No action has been taken which harms or endangers the interests of the Moslem people. Regional reactionism and imperialism have lost all their strongholds and greedy interests in Afghanistan with the victory of the Saur Revolution. They now will not stop short of any kind of provocation whether armed or unarmed against this revolution. But they are ignorant of the fact that imperialism and regional reactionism have lost their resiliency and stability in their confrontation with national and revolutionary movements. Hence, they still try to manipulate the pure religious beliefs of the people and in the holy name of Islam they try to establish the subjugating rule of their slavish representatives over our country. They do not know that the opportunity and possibility have been lost forever in our country and no reactionary mercenary of imperialism can deceive our Moslem people by defying their Saur Revolution. The government and people of Afghanistan will join together as a stronghold to protect the revolution.

Death to the plotting enemies of the  
Saur Revolution!

9593

CSO: 4903

## BRIEFS

**RUSSIAN GENERAL, FAMILY GUNNED DOWN**--The commandos of freedom fighters ambushed a convoy proceeding from Jalalabad to Kabul and gunned down a Russian General and his family. Besides, they destroyed a tank. Eight Mujahideen lost their lives here. According to spokesman of the Hezb-e-Islami of Afghanistan, the Afghan Army launched a heavy attack on mujahideen's position with a number of tanks and under aircover in Laghman province area. Eighteen Mujahideen, including two commanders lost their lives in this fighting. The fighting is still on in this area. The Mujahideen claimed to have killed 216 Afghan army men including some Russian troops during a fighting in the area of Gharband, a Parwan Province district. Besides, they captured tanks and armoured cars totalling nine. Six were in working condition. A few Mujahideen lost their lives in this encounter. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 4 May 80 p 8]

CSO: 4920



INFLUX OF FOREIGN CURRENCY DECLINES, CAUSES EXAMINED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 10 Apr 80 p 4

[Article: "The Foreign Exchange Black Market: How To Fight It?"]

[Text] A report of the Minister of Finance before the National Assembly made a particular impact on the lawmakers during its fall session.

Its subject was the transfer of foreign currencies to Algeria.

Two figures alone produced an impression which hours and hours of discussions might not have created: In 1960 Algerian migrants to Europe sent back to Algeria each year 100 billion Algerian centimes. Today these migrants, who have doubled in number in the meantime, transfer to Algeria no more than 3 billion centimes.

What has happened between these two periods to explain such an extraordinary drop in the inflow of foreign exchange?

What is now commonly called the "foreign exchange black market" is a practice which is developing and becoming more and more general in Algeria and abroad to the detriment of Algeria's national currency.

It consists in securing foreign currencies, primarily French francs, in exchange for Algerian dinars, in violation of exchange regulations but at rates which defy one's imagination.

If it should at times take on the appearance of an innocent operation (there are people, especially among migrants, who do not view it otherwise) the foreign exchange black market continues to be an illegal activity because it undermines our balance of payments and our economy in general.

The law, which punishes this practice severely, provides sanctions for it under the charge of "currency trafficking."

Several reasons underlie its appearance, including the following:

1. The creation of the Algerian dinar, our national currency which is not convertible abroad and is independent of any monetary zone.
2. The presence in Europe of a sizable Algerian community.
3. Algeria's development policy based on large-scale investment and austerity.
4. The low quality and quantity of national production.
5. The propagation in Algeria of a consumption model and of a "thirst for life" without relationship to the means and morality of our ideology.
6. The ridiculous amount of foreign currencies that an Algerian may take abroad as a travel allowance.

All these factors, together with others that we shall examine later, have brought about in combination a situation where the following contradictions are in evidence:

1. Contradiction on one hand between the interests of the country involved in intensive investments demanding strict control of the use of foreign exchange to counteract world inflation and on the other the interests of individuals who wish to satisfy their consumption needs right away, even at the price of stretching things so as to enable them to acquire commodities not provided by domestic production.
2. Contradiction between the higher interests of the nation and those of some private circle or other which, for reasons not pertinent here, undertake to "build castles in Spain" by expatriating their capital and earnings.
3. Contradiction between a spirit--that of options--of the [National] Charter, the revolution, and another--a spurious one--of daily reality, of the love of luxury, of the desire to make a better impression, and so on.

In addition to these general causes are the vicissitudes which for about 10 years now have marked the relations of the Algerian dinar and the French franc.

Until 1969 the parity between the Algerian dinar and the French franc enjoyed a certain degree of stability.

During the year 1969 a devaluation of the French franc with reference to the Algerian dinar resulted in a loss of 12.5 percent for the Algerian migrant converting his francs at the bank.

To protect their savings, Algerian migrants shunned official currency exchange centers and turned to the foreign exchange black market.

At that time one French franc was being exchanged for about 1.25 Algerian dinars [DA].

In 1974 the Algerian Government offered an exchange premium for Algerian migrants in Europe to encourage them to repatriate their earnings.

But the measure did not produce the anticipated effect or perhaps it was too late in coming. The foreign exchange black market being already well established and offering higher rates each year, it was not possible either to quash it or to find an appropriate alternative for it. This prompts us to analyze the negative aspects which we must also identify.

#### Permissive Conditions

It is noted--and our press reports these facts on a regular basis--that our industry suffers from mismanagement.

The items that it produces are insufficient in quantity: There are not enough refrigerators, electric batteries, milk, tomato concentrates, drugs, and so on.

When they exist our products also leave something to be desired from the viewpoint of quality.

All these lacks favor speculation at home and distrust of the Algerian dinar abroad.

Our import policy, because of its terms, delays, and irrationality, acts in the direction of these same disadvantages.

A product classified as necessary to import is generally brought in, but it often happens that it is imported either without its accessories or only once, period.

This problem is very evident in the field of automobiles or capital equipment.

It becomes absurd when it affects fields as vital as public health or the diet of young children.

Logically, a measure is not considered effective unless it meets the requirements of its use.

Unfortunately, this is not always the case as regards our economic policy.

At the time when it was decided to reduce and control the outflow of currencies our economic circuits did not manage to use the large amounts held in Algeria by our citizens.

The accumulation of dinars continued at a growing rate while the products market tended invariably to become poorer and scantier.

In other words, Algeria did not know what to do with its funds.

#### What Is Not Found In Our Country

This considerable supply of money represents, one would say, a tremendous asset for Algeria.

This is so on condition that, instead of being hoarded or peddled, it be saved, that is, reinjected into the economic stream in the form of savings slated for investment.

We learned in the offices of its general manager that the CNEP [Algerian National Savings and Insurance Bank] collected 1.3 billion dinars in 1978 and 2.6 billion dinars in 1979 from the savings of households, its principal clients.

But the share of savings which eludes it--and even more so the leading banks which also collect savings--is proportionally enormous.

According to the estimates of the CNEP, potential savings susceptible to being banked were in the order of 8 billion dinars in 1978 and 10 billion dinars in 1979.

It should be said that the results achieved by the CNEP in the field of savings are very creditable because what are involved are funds whose motivation it is difficult to maintain at a high level when the obvious benefits of such savings are not self-evident.

This motivation is the hope of securing housing.

Now, housing assigned so far in the context of the savings-housing formula has been insignificant when it is compared to aggregate demand.

It should even be feared that savers, despairing of finding housing some day, may start to spend more than they save on a large scale.

Another example: Measures have been taken to compel people to save by subordinating their acquisition of an automobile or other vehicle to their owning a savings book.



In that respect, too, the operation can yield nothing in the long run if the market does not make available a sufficient number of cars in the meantime for the process to remain credible.

To satisfy an increasingly imperious need people can turn to the expedient of buying used cars.

In short, what is involved is to match real monetary supply with consumer goods that are no less real.

A savings policy, such as that pursued by the CNEP, is not a policy of deprivation but rather an articulate organization of consumption in a planned economy.

With a dinar which can buy less and less foreign exchange in Algeria people try to purchase, at twice or three times its value, foreign exchange which on its part makes it possible to secure electrical household appliances not to be found in Algeria or the spare part which is promised for later delivery or prescribed medicines which cannot be located in pharmacies, and so on.

When it comes to staples one is naturally inclined to understand the "legitimacy" of the foreign exchange black market.

In a sense it is the people's way of answering the lack of responsibility of those who perpetuate in the name of who knows what subtleties the scarcity of the commodities most indispensable to life or for getting well.

The experience is a daily one, however, each time that a law is not accompanied by measures facilitating the conditions of its application. It leads to an effect which is precisely the opposite of that expected by the legislator or by the public administration.

An attempt was made to limit the outflow of foreign exchange by setting at a ridiculously small figure the amount allotted prior to an Algerian's leaving on a trip. What followed was a drain, a hemorrhage which it is very difficult to stem today.

Would it not have been better to import a reasonable quantity of the goods clamored for loud and clear and to make them available to the citizen (spare parts, drugs, and so on) instead of this policy of scarcity and control, which in effect controls nothing?

At any rate, we see clearly that people end up securing those commodities whose lack obsesses them. This is so to such an extent that we have acquired a certain reputation in this connection abroad.

### Suggestions for Some Solutions

Migrant Algerians, who were at one time an important source of foreign currency revenues, are now a liability for us since they help to create on our market a rate of inflation which could have been avoided.

Each time that an Algerian tourist collects 1,000 French francs in Paris, Lyons, or Marseilles, a 100 percent devaluation is involved representing 500 Algerian dinars.

The French currency earned by our migrants no longer flows as such into the coffers of the Algerian state but rather impacts on it in the form of an invidious and artificial inflation of the dinar.

The Algerian, who leaves his country with 300 French francs, returns with a bagful of dutiable items which ridiculously exceed the value of the travel allowance made available to him at the start of his trip.

This is so true that there is a joke making the rounds in Algiers which has it that this practice is the best proof that the Algerian dinar is "the strongest currency in the world."

The voice of the people is the voice of God, says the adage.

But let's be more serious.

There is a means to fight the "foreign exchange black market," namely, to reduce its bad effects.

It is possible (the National Assembly can discuss it) to establish an account of convertible currencies available to our migrants to restore their confidence, something which they should never have lost. It is also possible to institute a convertible account by mail. Without having a savings booklet, an interested party can open an account to which he can transfer the amounts that he wishes while being assured of being able to make all the withdrawals that he wants at the time and place of his choice.

This solution is conceivable through the intermediary of the CNEP on condition that it be given prerogatives in this respect.

The migrant-saver who may find himself short of funds could thereby make withdrawals at the place where he has opened his account or, failing a savings booklet, by mail.

This naturally assumes the establishment of a system for the opening of CNEP accounts in areas of dense concentrations of Algerians.

By means of the savings-foreign exchange-priority housing arrangement in the context of the migrant's return to Algeria it is possible to justify the act of saving and thus to remove sizable amounts from the foreign exchange black market.

The CNEP, which has some experience in the field, is entirely in a position to deal with this problem, we were told in the offices of its general manager.

From the establishment of foreign currency savings accounts by opening accounts and effecting transfers by mail in 1971 to 1977, the number of accounts opened reached 1,000.

In July 1977 the CNEP opened offices in customs subdistricts. From this month to November 1977 it managed to open 28,000 savings accounts, a spectacular achievement.

The year 1979 alone which just closed saw the opening of 10,682 accounts for an amount equivalent to 3.5 million Algerian dinars.

These few figures prompt us to wonder about the results which the establishment of a structure for the handling of savings in specific regions in France, Belgium, the German Democratic Republic, or Switzerland would achieve, that is, in those areas where most of our fellow-citizens reside.

Also proposed as a solution is an increase in the allocation of foreign exchange by way of travel allowance which, it seems, has already been discussed in the National Assembly.

Whatever it is, it is time to examine this sore.

2662

CSO: 4400

CREATION OF CIVIL SERVICE CONSIDERED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 10 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Hamid Aberkane: "A Rational Use Framework for Diploma-Holders"]

[Text] The social affairs committee [of the National Assembly] has been examining since 15 March 1980 a bill relating to the establishment of a civil service. The bill, which was submitted to the committee by some 20 deputies, is still at the stage of drafting and discussion. Several entities concerned with civil service--beginning with unions of professionals, some specialists, and finally members of the government--were invited to the general discussion which is likely to continue, according to sources close to the assembly, up to the end of the month. The issue has not been included yet in the working calendar of the forthcoming "spring session" whose opening date has not been set or made public either.

The approval of a government bill by the assembly was first the subject of a discussion in plenary session. Until then all the drafts which the APN [People's National Assembly] had examined led to many speeches or were amended on numerous occasions.

The drafters of the bill in question have thus evidenced themselves to be very reserved when it comes to publishing its provisions, at least in the present form of the bill. Some articles concerning, for example, the duration of civil service status have not been discussed whereas the subject may seem for future cadres graduating from universities or other institutions of higher education to be of primary importance. "The matter is secondary," it is felt in the committee or perhaps--without prejudging what is not in the bill--deputies are sure to approve a period close to what is reasonable.

Another question, this one of more imminence, seems to reflect legitimate political concerns. The bill is silent on the "access of the liberal professions" [to the civil service]. Until now the civil service involved exclusively some types of liberal professions without its helping to solve the problems of cadres which the public sector continues to experience acutely, deserted after completion of the "mandatory period" of 5 years. This aspect of the matter is deemed to be political and, according to the members of



the committee, does not fall under the "assembly's competence." It involves the party's political organs on one hand and on the other, some say, "there are laws bearing on the liberal professions."

The present bill is slated to improve the conditions of the civil service regulated so far by at least 10 inconsistent ordinances in terms of law, duties, or benefits for the subjects to whom they apply. This amalgam of regulations on "public health," the profession of architect or lawyer has prompted the members of the assembly to consider the problem so as, they say, "to harmonize them" and put an end to the discrepancies that exist from one profession to another.

The possible measures for making the law pertaining to the civil service consistent and for its generalization to all individuals graduating from universities and other institutions of higher education reflect a series of other concerns. What is involved is notably a need to make the civil service as beneficial as possible so that it may no longer be "a formality" but rather a rational use framework for the new diploma-holders, that is, their assignment according to objective criteria to priority regions and sectors without neglecting, naturally, personal inclinations and aspirations. At present, for example, the Arabic-speaking diploma-holders experience employment problems and hence the need to "mop up this luxury unemployment," according to the chairman of the social works committee.

It is notorious that the country's underprivileged regions are witnessing a serious drop in the availability of various cadres, particularly in the public administration, education, and in hospitals, deprived of a setting which the law in effect earmarks for access to the liberal professions. This is also the case with jurists and architects. At the university the options of students are therefore not the consequence of "orientation counseling." Hence the presence in the fields of law, medicine, or architecture of a disproportionate number of students that is still growing each year [sic].

The bill does not however appear to be leading to a law slated to project needs. It expresses especially a concern to rationalize the use of cadres, to orient them to priority sectors.

The idea of making the civil service viable is not however perceived without a careful examination of the material conditions of the cadres affected. This question especially has been raised as well as the follow-up of the civil service question which will be entrusted to a specialized committee. The discussion is just beginning in committee. Once it is placed on the agenda of the [assembly's] next "spring session" it will undoubtedly be the subject of many speeches because of the changes and the impact which such a law may

have on the division of labor. One topic, that of "liberal professions," as it is presented in terms of "exploiting property" and "nonexploiting property" by the National Charter, has reportedly been the subject of discussions in the committee for an entire day. The same is likely to be true if the discussion is scheduled for the plenary session.

2662

CSO: 4400

FAHMI VIEWS NORMALIZATION AS DAMAGING TO EGYPTIAN, ARAB SECURITY

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 22 Mar 80 pp 18-19

[Interview With Isma'il Fahmi, Former Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, by Ghassan Bayram; "Fahmi to AL-MUSTAQBAL: Egypt's National Security Is in Danger; Arab National Security Is in Danger; Normalization Must Stop Immediately; Egypt Must Stop Immediately Self-Rule Negotiations and Freeze Normalization of Relations With Israel to Guarantee Palestinian Right; Solution Lies in Internationalized and Internationally Guaranteed Palestinian State Without Army; Concessions Made by Egypt Have Been Natural Result of Separate Negotiation and What Has Happened Constituted Deviation From National Charter Between Leadership and People; Egypt's Security Is Part of Arab World Security and Vice Versa and Peace in Middle East Can Either Be Comprehensive or not Be"]

[Text] Cairo--After a 90-minute conversation, Isma'il Fahmi, the former Egyptian minister of foreign affairs, asked me: Now, what are you going to publish and what are you not going to publish and what are you not going to publish?

I said to the first Egyptian official to oppose President Anway al-Sadat's visit to the occupied Jerusalem and to resign in protest of the visit: I believe that all you have said whets my publishing appetite, unless...

Isma'il Fahmi said with a smile: No unless nor anything else. But don't you people also say "not all that is known is spoken?"

I said: Yes, of course. This statement has become a rule everywhere.

Isma'il Fahmi replied: As long as it is so, then I would like to tell you something. In all that we have said now, there is something that is beneficial to publish now and something that is beneficial to publish at the present time [sic]. Everything is good in its right time.

I said: Is it reasonable on my part not to talk about what you have said regarding the big danger threatening the Egyptian national security and the Arab national security?

He said: Of course not. This is an extremely serious subject that is connected with the future of all of us, to which attention must be drawn and which must be pondered before it is too late.

Isma'il Fahmi added: I am against the failure of the Arab world to fuse in one melting pot. I have always warned and I continue to warn against any intruder whose basic goal is to separate the Arab world from Egypt and vice versa.

I believe that Israel's real goals consist of exerting utmost efforts to exploit the peace slogans with the aim of raising a high wall between Egypt and the Arab world.

This is why, you remember, I devoted a year and a half ago one of my articles in AL-MUSTAQBAL to this issue specifically. It was an article entitled "Israel Swims in Arab Space."

I believe that the Arab world possesses all the prerequisites that enable it to represent a strong military, political and economic unit. This is why we warn against and call for confronting any action leading to the creation of a serious rift in the Arab world because such action is the real enemy of the Arab nation.

Strategically, the concept of any [Arab] state's national security means that this state's national security is definitely and directly connected with the security of the Arab world surrounding it and is fatefully linked with the world that constitutes or forms the main family of this state in particular, regardless of all the political currents or systems of government which disappear in one way or another. What will remain are the Arab peoples, the Arab heritage and the Arab land or, to put it more precisely, the Arab entity in its political, strategic and security concept. To put it in still clearer words, it is my view that there can be no Arab security without Egyptian security and there can be no Egyptian security, of course, in the absence of Arab security or in case Arab security is exposed to danger.

[Question] I want to return to the issue of Egyptian security and Arab security. How can we visualize this danger at present or in the foreseeable future?

[Answer] The danger is obvious, namely that if the security of the Arab states is threatened or is inadequate, then naturally their political decision becomes inadequate and somewhat flawed. All these strategic, security and political affairs are connected with the economy and the natural resources represented by the Arab world. If you add to the local and regional interactions the desperate attempts by the super powers to compete for the centers of influence in the area, the picture becomes clear and the issue becomes one that deserves to be examined thoroughly. What makes the issue more serious are Israel's strategic goals. Israel's main goal is the Arab world's security primarily. What is surprising is that the leaderships and peoples of the Arab world hear repeatedly that Israel gives the first priority to its security



and explains all its political actions and decisions on the basis of the alleged and imaginary Israeli security. Therefore, the Arab world must, in return, pay attention to a complete political entity with its strategic, military and economic security that constitutes ultimately its national security.

[Question] The Arab national security generally and the Egyptian security in particular have, measuring by what you have just said, been violated by al-Sadat's initiative, by the peace treaty and by normalization of relations and exchange of ambassadors to which the initiative has led.

[Answer] I believe that what has been done in regard to the formal procedures of normalization in accordance with the peace treaty and the following phase must be fully separated. The coming phase requires extreme vigilance and utter precision during the future negotiations which will culminate with the codification of the normalization and with imposing the normalization on the people in all spheres. It is evident that the goal behind this is the need to preserve whatever is connected with the Egyptian national security and whatever affects the fateful national interests in all the sectors. This is because when codified and when it moves to the sphere of application, the normalization will have boundless domestic effects on the future of our beloved Egypt and, by necessity, of our Arab nation.

What I am saying does not mean that the official normalization process has been sound because my position toward it is, like that of many others, that the normalization has been unpermissible officially and unacceptable logically and at the popular level. Basically, the Egyptian negotiator's acceptance of the Israeli security theory, as stated at the outset of the treaty, and the termination of the state of war before the Israeli occupation recedes from all the Egyptian and Arab territories, including the Palestinian territories, and before the realization of a comprehensive solution leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state with international borders is a serious concession.

I say that what has been done is unpermissible and cannot be accepted or even imagined. However, it is the natural result of the separate negotiation with Israel and of accepting all its conditions in the form of a series of unilateral concessions, despite the continued Israeli occupation of our lands and despite Israel's continued denial of the rights of an entire people, namely the Palestinian people, and its denial of their right to exist and live peacefully within independent and secure borders which Israel demands for itself. All this is happening and we continue in Egypt to carry out with incomprehensible obstinacy and determination Israel's wishes concerning normalization and other issues.

This is why the factions of the Egyptian people, and of the Arab nation also, are fully excused for being shocked by all that has happened and that is being carried out now, especially since there was between the Egyptian people primarily and the highest level of their leadership a sacred political charter that the peace would be comprehensive Arab and Palestinian peace and that

the normalization with Israel would not take place during the life of this generation. This charter was a great national charter which had been received by the Egyptian people, and the Arab nation behind them, with utter seriousness. The Egyptian people, with all their institutions, had started to prepare themselves for peace on the basis of this concept with all its political, military, economic and cultural meanings and, above all, with its psychological meaning--considering that normalization with Israel cannot be digested after this long conflict and these painful sacrifices. What is more important than all this is that the normalization was to take place only after Israel restored the right to its owners and after its goals and conduct toward its neighbors, including the Palestinian people in their new state, were tested.

This national charter to which I have referred is binding to both the leadership and the people. It did not materialize from nothing but was the outcome of a fundamental conflict between the Arab nation and Israel. The charter was also a sincere reflection of the feelings of the Arab Egyptian family. Consequently, this charter was no ordinary unilateral charter but the fruit of the fusion of the Arab Egyptian conscience. This is why, in my opinion, it is not at all surprising if what has happened is considered, both in Egypt and in the Arab world, a deviation from the national charter and from principled commitment. Therefore, we should not get angry if we encounter a strong reaction at the Egyptian and Arab levels. It is politically unfair and logically unacceptable to throw the blame and the responsibility on the shoulders of the Arab world if it reacts adversely to what has happened and is still happening.

The matter becomes more surprising when we learn that there is nothing in politics or in the international law that makes it a must in the case of the conclusion of a peace treaty between two warring states that peace be established or that the condition for such peace be the normalization of relations, the exchange of ambassadors or the opening of borders. All these are innovations that constitute a serious precedent with nothing like it before.

But when the reason becomes known the surprise disappears. The reason, as Yitzhak Rabin, a former Israeli prime minister, says in his memoirs is that normalization has been a political and strategic goal planned by Israel.

[Question] You call for a reassessment and a reconsideration. Is this possible now?

[Answer] I believe that there is a serious development in the Arab world emanating from the lack of trust between the Arab countries and the Arab leaderships. All efforts must be exerted to re-establish this trust so that movement may start. The effects of this trust factor have become tangible at the popular level of the Arab nation.

I am fully convinced that there are now big question marks in the minds of the Arab peoples regarding their leaderships, both individually and collectively. I have no doubt that this has actually led to the self-isolation of big groups of the Arab public opinion until such time as matters become clear. In other

words, it is also my viewpoint that there is a fundamental flaw in the conduct of the Arab world leaderships. The Arab leaders must exert efforts to regain the confidence of their peoples. This is something that requires time and [the right] approach. However, I advise that it be started quickly.

[Question] It seems that with the limits he has reached, President al-Sadat has left no place for any reassessment, especially at the level of his relations with the Arab leaderships and the level of Egypt's relations with the Arab countries. If there is any possibility for reassessment, where should the starting point be?

[Answer] I believe that the first step begins by our freezing all negotiations with Israel on self-rule. Egypt must take a decisive and final position regarding its insistence on the Palestinian right to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, provided that the new state be internationalized and that its neutrality be guaranteed by the major powers and by the neighboring Arab countries.

Naturally, this Palestinian solution takes the top priority and is not at all separable from the inevitability of Israel's withdrawal from all the Syrian territories. It is also inseparable from Lebanon's complete independence which must be respected within Lebanon's international borders. The pockets created by Israel in southern Lebanon to wrench away Lebanese sovereignty must also be liquidated.

Peace in the Middle East is a single and indivisible peace. It is a complete peace that cannot be divided. The sides to this peace overlap and the principles that apply to one part of the Middle East must also be applied to all the other parts. But the final solution concerning the Palestinian state and the Palestinian people's right is linked partially, both objectively and in terms of time, to Israel's complete withdrawal from the Syrian territories and to guaranteeing Lebanon's borders, sovereignty and independence.

I again say that Egypt must, before all this, freeze the normalization of relations so that this may constitute a major element of pressure on Israel and on the world public opinion insofar as activating matters pertaining to the Palestinian solution is concerned. I believe that the atmosphere is prepared internationally, especially in West Europe, to push matters toward tangible development in the next 2 years.

This requires Egypt to suspend all its negotiations on self-rule with Israel or to change the bases of the negotiations so that instead of self-rule the immediate goal turns into securing the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to establishing their Palestinian state which I am advocating, namely an unarmed state that has no offensive army but has sufficient security forces. As long as this Palestinian entity is guaranteed internationally, it should constitute no source of fear for Israel. The international military guarantee constitutes the biggest and most ideal guarantee for Israel. Why?

You remember that despite Egypt's conclusion of a peace treaty with Israel, the latter--despite all that this treaty and this event mean--has insisted at the same time on acquiring from the United States a written pledge that the United States will guarantee militarily Israel's safety. This means that the peace treaty with Egypt, the termination of the state of war and the opening of borders are things that have not satisfied Israel. So, Israel has resorted to acquiring a binding military guarantee from the United States. If Israel has the right to secure itself with a foreign military guarantee, namely, the United States, then it is natural for the status of the Palestinian state to be secured by a political and military guarantee from the super powers. The guarantee to which I am referring is a two-sided guarantee, in the sense that this international guarantee for the Palestinian state and its entity is also a guarantee at the same time that extends to Israel's existence within borders accepted by the Arab countries.

8494

CSO: 4802



# SADAT STICKS TO HIS POLICIES IN FACE OF GROWING OPPOSITION

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 29 Mar 80 pp 26-28

[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Al-Sadat on 26 May: New Concession; Egyptian Domestic Front at Both Army and Popular Levels Preparing to Confront Government; al-Sadat Brandishes 'Law of Shame' in Face of Opponents and Rejects Advice to Freeze Self-Rule Negotiations Till After U.S. Elections"]

[Text] Cairo--No more than 2 months separate us from the deadline for ending the ongoing self-rule negotiations between Egypt and Israel. The day of 26 May 1980 is the day when the deadline ends. So, will President Anwar al-Sadat sign with Israel the self-rule plan as Begin wants it or will the deadline be reached with failure and will the negotiations be extended for 6 more months?

It is true that this question is raised before many Arab and international circles. However, it is raised in a different manner in the various political and official Egyptian circles which view 25 May as a day which will form a serious turning point, not only in the course of the Middle East crisis and in the international and Arab position toward it but also at the level of the domestic political situation in Egypt.

There is an ongoing argument in Egypt on what al-Sadat can do if we reach 26 May while Israel continues to cling to its inflexible position which refuses to give the Palestinians full self-rule and if it continues to cling to a "united" Jerusalem as its capital, in addition to persisting in the settlement policy.

Through a careful observation of the viewpoints and the predictions made within the framework of this argument, any observer can reach only one result, namely that nobody other than President al-Sadat has any accurate and clear knowledge of what the self-rule negotiations may bring about and whether these negotiations will culminate with signing [an agreement] or with extension.

This lack of knowledge is not confined to the class of Egyptian personalities who now form the domestic opposition to President al-Sadat's regime nor to the officials close to President al-Sadat and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also includes Prime Minister Dr Mustafa Khalil and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr Butrus Ghali.

It is told that one of these personalities who met with Dr Ghali on a certain occasion asked the minister: Where have the negotiations with Israel on self-rule, the Palestinian right and Jerusalem reached and where are we heading: Toward agreement or disagreement?

Dr Ghali said: "The truth is that we don't know where we are heading exactly in the self-rule negotiations. What I know is that we are at a deadend. How will it be opened, I don't know. I expect developments in the current situation that will lead to changes in the positions between now and 25 May."

It is also told in the Egyptian capital that Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Mustafa Khalil has no more or clearer information than that of Dr Butrus Ghali. However, Dr Khalil asserts in his private meetings that Egypt is still maintaining its position toward the Arabism of Jerusalem and toward Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza on the basis of both the land and the people and not on the basis of the self-rule called for by Menachem Begin and his government.

Dr Khalil finds it unlikely that Egypt will sign the self-rule plan as Israel wants it, i.e. the plan for administrative rule under the canopy of Israeli sovereignty and on the basis of maintaining Jerusalem as a united city and as the capital of the State of Israel.

Those who are optimistic on Dr Mustafa Khalil's positions find it unlikely that the Egyptian prime minister will let himself be dragged endlessly with President al-Sadat's positions or dragged to the point of abandoning what Egypt has declared regarding its positions toward self-rule, the Arabism of Jerusalem and the signing of the self-rule plan presented by Israel. These people also say that Dr Khalil's position in such a case may be similar to that of Ibrahim Kamil, the former minister of foreign affairs, who succinctly submitted his resignation in protest of the signing of the two Camp David accords.

These people further add that even though Dr Khalil prefers not to talk about his staying or his resigning, he seems in his private meetings inflexible insofar as the currently declared Egyptian position is concerned and asserts that Egypt should make no concessions regarding the Arabism of Jerusalem and the full Palestinian self-rule because this is the minimum beyond which no concessions should be made.

#### Concessions Confirmed by Carter

If Dr Mustafa Khalil has begun to form a small axis in the ongoing discussions concerning Egypt's position at the end of the current phase of the self-rule negotiations, this is because there are informed Egyptian political sources possessing enough information and facts to make them assert that President al-Sadat will sign the self-rule plan as Israel wants it and that he may wait until 26 May to agree to sign in response to new U.S. pressures urging him to sign in an endeavor on the part of U.S. President Carter to save his election position and to reassure Israel and the U.S. Jews of the credibility

of his position that rejects the creation of a Palestinian state and to prove to them that it is not true that he has given some Arab leaders pledges to agree to the creation of this new state after being re-elected to the presidency.

These sources are aware of several indications that make them realize that President al-Sadat is still leaving the door open for the possibilities of signing the self-rule plan wanted by Israel. Following are some of the most important of these indicators:

First indicator: President al-Sadat's rejection of the many proposals and wishes expressed to him to make an initial decision freezing the decisions for normalization with Israel and to stop at the limit of exchanging ambassadors with Israel in order to preserve Egypt's dignity in the eyes of the Arab world and to assert that Egypt has not abandoned the Palestinian right and Jerusalem finally so that Egypt may continue to hold something with which to exert pressure in case the intransigence in the Israeli position persists.

These attempts to persuade President al-Sadat to take this decision intensified in the wake of the Israeli reaction to the Security Council resolution on the construction of settlements and in the wake of the assertions made by these reactions to the effect that Jerusalem is Israeli and the capital of Israel, that the settlement policy will continue and that the West Bank and Gaza are Israeli lands.

President al-Sadat has been told that continuing the negotiations under the canopy of the self-rule negotiations [sic] means primarily continued concessions in favor of Israel with nothing in return and without waiting for any U.S. position to exert pressure on Israel during this election period which has compelled President Carter to back down on the U.S. vote on the U.N. Security Council resolution calling on Israel to remove the settlements and viewing these settlements as illegal.

President al-Sadat has been advised that the best way out for the Egyptian policy at present is for Egypt to decide to freeze the normalization of relations procedures until after the U.S. elections and that if it is difficult to freeze the self-rule negotiations, then at least they should also be postponed till after the U.S. elections when it becomes possible to find out if there is any hope in the U.S. position.

Second indicator: The displeasures and annoyance displayed by President al-Sadat toward the tour made by French President Giscard d'Estaing in a number of the Arab area's countries and the statements that the French President made in support of the Palestinian people's right to determine their future and set up their state.

Whereas some Egyptian sources have said that President al-Sadat's displeasure has been due to the fact the French President visited the area without passing by Egypt, thus following the Arab line that works and calls for isolating

Egypt at the Arab level, and because this French action means diminishing Egypt's role in the Middle East crisis, other Egyptian sources have said that President al-Sadat's annoyance is due to the French President's statements which later came to form a European position that constitutes some sort of oneupmanship against the Egyptian position and that, consequently, curtail President al-Sadat's freedom of movement insofar as the self-rule negotiations and their results are concerned. To put it more clearly, such a French position creates for President al-Sadat new troubles that make his antagonists and opponents say: Considering that France and other European countries have supported the creation of an independent Palestinian state, should Egypt, the major Arab and Muslim state, abandon this demand and accept what is very much less?

Third indicator: This indicator emerged clearly in a session held by the Egyptian People's Assembly on 1 March 1980 and during which it discussed the Arabism of Jerusalem and Egypt's position toward the creation of a Palestinian state. The discussions in this session took place in light of the statements made by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin rejecting the Palestinian state and saying that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel forever.

A number of deputies belonging to the Socialist Labor Party, the only opposition party or so-called official opposition in the assembly, demanded that the People's Assembly issue a statement reaffirming the Arabism of Jerusalem, asserting that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are Palestinian Arab lands and underlining the Palestinian people's right to determine their future.

It seems that the official instructions were to reject the issuance of such statements by the People's Assembly because the government is the authority that always determines the positions as long as the People's Assembly has approved the peace treaty and the normalization of relations with Israel.

Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, the Socialist Labor Party chairman, said that "it would have behooved Egypt not to let the Egyptian ambassador present his credentials in Jerusalem so that this may not be considered tantamount to an official recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel."

The minister of state for People's Assembly affairs told Ibrahim Shukri in reply: "The position of the government and of the National Party toward Jerusalem is clear. However, it is the tradition for ambassadors to present their credentials at the residence of the head of the state to which they are accredited." This reply by the minister of state angered a number of the assembly members who demanded that the People's Assembly issue a statement reaffirming Egypt's position toward Jerusalem because what had happened implies a tacit Egyptian recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

The aforementioned assembly members said that when Begin's government declares that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel forever and the Bank and the Strip are Israeli lands and when the Israeli Knesset agrees with them, it becomes Egypt's duty to adopt a decisive position toward such declarations because continuation of the negotiations under the shadow of such clear declarations is unjustifiable.



## Doubts Cast on Camp David

The session ended without the issuance of the statement demanded by some assembly members regarding the Arabism of Jerusalem and the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. In the wake of this session, Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, the Socialist Labor Party chairman, published an article in AL-SHA'B, his party's organ, in which he cast doubts on whether Camp David has decided to settle the Palestinian problem in order to establish a lasting and just peace in the Middle East. Shukri said in the article: "Whoever reads last week's papers after announcement of the Security Council resolution on the illegality of the establishment of settlements in the Arab territories and Jerusalem and whoever reads the reactions published in the wake of this resolution in Israel, the United States or Cairo must ask: Is it true that an agreement was reached at Camp David to settle the Palestinian problem so as to establish lasting peace in the Middle East? Can what is happening at present lead to an agreement on the 25th of next May or on any other date?"

Addressing President al-Sadat, Shukri said: "The situation requires decision. It is not enough for our position to be clear and it is not enough for us to repeat our words about our clear goal, our straight intentions and our eagerness to establish the Palestinian self-rule and to realize the right of the Palestinians to determine their future. It is not enough for us to repeat our words about the Arabism of Jerusalem and about our adherence to this Arabism. These repeated statements are bearing no fruit at a time when Israel is marching forward and realizing all it wants to realize, such as gaining full recognition, establishing its embassy in Cairo and keeping the media busy with the daily activities of his excellency the ambassador here and there and busy with the consecutive steps to accelerate all the normalization steps when there is no sign of any progress in the self-rule negotiations."

Shukri asked: "Till when will this lax Egyptian position persist and to what extent can this silence over Israel's provocation be maintained? We demand that the government take a decisive position by stopping all talk about completing the normalization steps and about entering into new rounds of negotiation similar to the current negotiations that are revolving in a vicious circle."

Shukri urged the need for full linkage between the normalization and progress in the negotiations to establish the Palestinian self-rule on the one hand and further normalization steps on the other. He said: "As it stands now, the situation leaves the impression that what concerns us primarily is to normalize the relations between Egypt and Israel, regardless of any action taken by Israel to torpedo the basis of the accords, whether in regard to establishing a real peace or establishing the Palestinian self-rule. We must disperse this impression with a decisive stance because clarification is no longer enough." The Socialist Labor Party chairman concluded by saying: "The party is compelled to reconsider its previous positions approving the peace treaties with Israel..."

## Opponents Increasing

Considering that this has become the position of the Socialist Labor Party, the only official opposition party in the People's Assembly, what is the position of the other sectors of the Egyptian people, such as the politicians, student unions, labor unions, professional unions and so forth which expressed from the outset their open and public opposition to the Camp David accords and to the subsequent steps with Israel?

Informed people in Cairo say that the new phenomenon causing concern to President al-Sadat these days is the expanding circle of open and public opposition to him personally and to his initiatives toward Israel and that he now fears that this opposition will spread to the army, especially among the ranks of the young junior officers.

Whispers are increasing these days in the Egyptian capital about official measures taken among the army ranks and officers to transfer and dismiss [officers] and to impose stricter restrictions for fear of intensification of the dissatisfaction and opposition wave in the army to the extent where such opposition may proceed side by side with the wave of political, unionist and student opposition that is active these days.

There are active endeavors at present to strengthen the nucleus of the new newly born National Front in Egypt which includes the various groups of the people opposed to al-Sadat's regime and to his Arab, Israeli and domestic policies and to develop this front to the level that enables it to stand strongly in the face of the regime.

There are in the Egyptian capital political assessments which say that if the conditions continue in their present course and under the prevalent climates, then there is no doubt that President al-Sadat will face within one year at the most boundless domestic troubles that may threaten his regime in its entirety.

Those making these assessments say that President al-Sadat and his regime face an extremely serious turning point at present that puts the president face to face with two options only:

First, make a quick reassessment of his positions and initiatives toward Israel and exert efforts to follow a new Arab policy that will reduce somewhat the sharp Arab isolation from which Egypt and the Egyptian people have begun to suffer politically, economically and nationally. President al-Sadat will be thus able to check the intensification, growth, size and strength of the domestic opposition, if not split it.

Second, continue his present policy in all domestic, Israeli and Arab spheres. He will have thus opted for the approach of confrontation against the political and non-political forces opposing him and angered by his policies.

So far, it seems that al-Sadat does not wish to abandon his policies in any way. He is proceeding on the basis of the second option and this has made him prepare himself for this confrontation whose most prominent weapon will be what the president calls the "law of shame."

President al-Sadat has instructed the officials concerned in his National Democratic Party to speed up completion of the law of shame to present it to the People's Assembly for approval.

For this purpose, President al-Sadat spent several days in the first half of this month in series of daily meetings of his party's political bureau which were devoted for:

First, making a comprehensive evaluation of the domestic political situation, of the opposition's movements at the various levels and of the contacts and moves made by the various sides of the opposition with the aim of organizing the ranks of this opposition.

Second, fully studying the draft "law of shame" to enable the People's Assembly to approve it within a short period.

These meetings were held by al-Sadat's party to block the path in the face of the questions wondering whether al-Sadat will again totally wipe out the few remaining public liberties through the ratification and implementation of the so-called law of shame.

The Egyptian domestic opposition does not hide its fears from the promulgation of such law which will give al-Sadat the ability to strike any opposition standing in his way.

During a long session I have had with a retired, or voluntarily retired, Egyptian politician, I asked: How can you explain to me briefly what the law of shame is?

He answered: The law of shame is a new special power which the ruling authority will assume or you can say that it is a sword which will continue to be held over the neck of whoever says no.

This retired Egyptian personality added: Tomorrow you may be walking down the street and your looks may not please al-Sadat or those below him in power, so they can arrest you on the charge of undermining Egypt's and the regime's reputation abroad. Have you understood?

I said: Yes, I have understood.

Before concluding my conversation with this retired Egyptian personality, I asked this question: To what previous situation can you liken the present situation in Egypt?

He answered: I will tell you this anecdote. When King Faruq was about to step on board the ship while leaving Egypt for the last time, he looked at those around him and said: I am very happy now because from now on I will know what is happening around me. I have spent all my life not knowing what was happening around me. Do you think President al-Sadat knows what is happening around him now?

8494

CSO: 4802



## ANALYSIS OF EGYPTIAN OPPOSITION

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 17 Mar 80 pp 9-12

[Article by Mahmud al-Maraghi: "The Opposition! A Week of Press Vituperation Began With Opinion on Normalization; How Can Agreement Be Reached on Minimal Set of Principles Between Majority and Opposition"]

[Excerpts] Suddenly "the opposition" has become a cause celebre, the talk of the hour, and the subject of concern in the papers! Four articles in four newspapers and magazines have appeared on 4 consecutive days about this issue! The occasion was not the creation of a party opposing the government. Nor was it the abolition or paralyzation of a party. It was something more modest than that, namely the expression of opinion on the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel. The situation became interesting, because, in the midst of villification which took readers by surprise, a good idea came up, worthy of debate.

## The Situation

The story begins with a written invitation, sent to all newspapers by Mamta Nassar, member of the People's Assembly and currently a lawyer, to all newspapers. He said that a group of national forces would be holding a press conference to oppose normalization and to call for a boycott. His office would be open to everyone except Israelis.

The chief editor asked me to attend the conference, although another colleague from ROSE AL-YUSUF was to be present, because "the matter deserves attention, and the press' job is to tell the reader what is happening."

At the press conference, I was surprised by the unusual interest.

There were journalists from Egypt and from abroad, television and other cameras, and several senior Egyptian journalists and photographers. There was heated debate and concern for what the opposition would say! I said [to myself]: This is a good sign. Perhaps the matter is serious enough for us not to be divided into government and opposition. All opinions were being aired impulsively, because, in the final analysis, there is an Egyptian side and an Israeli side. [Maybe] there were loyalists and opponents of the Egyptian side on one hand, and loyalists and opponents for the Israeli side on the other.

But the next morning, and every morning for a whole week, reports of the conference were nowhere to be seen. The national press was obliged to remain silent, and only ROSE AL-YUSUF broke the silence.

Suddenly, interest surfaced in all the papers. Not one daily paper failed to seize the opportunity. Everyone began to express opinion on the press conferences held to explain normalization.

They began to analyze, characterize and criticize views which the readers were hearing for the first time! One [journalist] said very briefly: "These are voices of slaves--insolent voices raised against their land, their country and their flag." He ended his statement with the roar of a lion: "Oh, for shame!"

Another [journalist] presented an excessively elaborate account of the opposition in Egypt, from the twenties until normalization. He called for a polite and objective debate and expressed surprise at the raising of the Palestinian flag on some buildings. Maybe he thought that there was any Egyptian who opposed raising the Palestinian flag! He refused to publish details of what took place at one conference, because "there were lies and fabrications which would displease the readers." Since he was anxious not to offend the reader, he was content to just make comments and to suppress the facts!

As for a third colleague, he surpassed everyone else. He sensed a conspiracy and counseled against it. He wrote: "Press conferences on behalf of the Soviet army!" At first I thought I was looking at the foreign press, with reports of Palestine to follow. Or maybe it was the page of lawsuits and incidents, where police reports, prosecution investigations and court sentences appear. But I soon realized it was just a political article!

The writer of this "political" article refers to "some people engaged in politics and some merchants of religion who discard their national identity and raise their voices in slogans imported directly from Moscow." He says that it is not surprising that they are "against peace and against the peaceful Egyptian people. What is surprising is that they claim to have lost freedom, despite the fact that they are talking at a press conference." He attacks the Marxists and non-Marxists, and wonders again about "merchants of religion" who oppose Camp David, but do not talk about Afghanistan!"

The same journalist then switches from commentator into a "news correspondent" who reports on conferences and meetings held in Cairo in the past few days. He stresses that they were held by those who "derive their views from Radio Moscow broadcasts of the same day," i.e., that there is a hot-line between those who call for the boycott of Israel and the Soviet Union. It is a unique line, because it is "on the air" to be heard by all those who wish to hear it!

Reports on opponents of normalization go this far, and yet, strangely enough, the minister of the interior makes no move. His forces do not step out to arrest those who are working on behalf of the Soviets and those who are receiving instructions by radio every day!

### The Stage

The stage of operations was not set for this strange, unique dialogue. The stage was set for something else. Normalization was arriving as one link in the chain of the peace accords, which had received vast acceptance and limited opposition. Normalization was coming. Popular, party and parliamentary debate had preceded it. In parliament, many told the government to "slow down." The People's Assembly, in reply to this year's government message, requested step by step, slow progress. That was the simplest possible reply to Israel's actions after the signing of the accords. It was unimaginable that Egypt would negotiate autonomy while [the Jews] were building settlements and stealing the Palestinian homeland piece by piece. This was said by the loyalists as well as by members of the opposition. When the moment of normalization came, it was characterized by reservations of the majority, rejection by the opposition, and a sense of emotion on the part of the ordinary man in the street who fought for a period of 30 years, and lost so much in the war.

The stage was set to allow support or opposition, support of the Camp David agreement, or opposition to the Israeli attitude without rejection of other interests subject to negotiation—"interests [serving Israel] in exchange for land and a cause." That was the idea [of holding the conferences]. Nevertheless, our journalists were intent on covering up the views of others, if not attacking them. They left no one [unscathed], but named names.

The Labor Party, the Rally [Tajammu'] Party, independents both within and outside the People's Assembly, and some elements of the religious movements are all guilty of seeking advice from the Soviets and obtaining instructions over the air!

### A More Reasonable View

In the midst of this pile of vituperation, there was a more reasonable view--an article in a major daily newspaper under the headline, "Egyptian Democracy and the Normalization of Relations." The writer described what happened as evidence of democracy. He maintained a cautious style and concluded that we need "agreement on a minimal set of principles to regulate dealings between the majority and the minority." He concluded that we are in need of both sides agreeing to a formula which would guarantee democratic progress on fundamental issues.

In the middle of this stormy scene, one sees the beginning of disagreement about some details, which have a strong connection with fundamentals.

The Labor Party raised the Palestinian flag, as I understand it, not in opposition to the Egyptian government, but only in opposition to an Israeli flag. It wants [the Palestinian] flag "to be the sole one." They raised the flag as an expression of solidarity on the basic issue, which the government itself says is "a cornerstone."

Also, the appeal for a boycott adopted by the Labor Party and the Rally Party, was not merely to ward off economic dangers, but to express, at the same time, complete rejection of Israeli behavior. It seeks to warn Israelis that continued opposition to Palestinian rights would be unprofitable, and that raising the Israeli flag in Cairo, while there is Israeli occupied land, could not be a source of satisfaction.

Moreover, in adopting a resolution not to establish guild relations with the Israelis, the Journalists Guild did not seek to deny Egyptian society's right to know the truth about what was happening inside Israel. The need for correct knowledge is self-evident. At the same time, it is a political, professional and moral obligation. It is knowledge which is served even by Palestinian newspapers whose writers live in exile and endeavor to learn of what is happening in the occupied territory. The important thing is that knowledge [of Israeli-Arab affairs] should not be at the expense of knowledge of some 20 Arab nations that might close their doors to an Egyptian journalist whose passport carries an Israeli visa! It is also not right to sacrifice one type of knowledge for more important knowledge, such as what is happening in Egyptian society itself. The Egyptian journalist's duty is to report to the reader on events in his country. Once he has done that, he can look across the border.

The [reasonable] newspaper referred to earlier calls for "an agreement on minimal principles between the government and the opposition, between the party of the majority and the rest of the political forces that are on the scene."

In this respect, the appeal is a serious and responsible one. Ultimately, whether we agree or disagree with it, it is an attempt to build bridges connecting us with democracy, not to blow them up, and to try to start a dialogue, instead of engaging in vituperation. For this reason [public] debate is mandatory.

#### The Players and the Rules of the Game

Before we get into the proper rules of the game with regard to arriving at a common denominator, let us define the characters of the players, or the opposition forces of which we speak.

To begin with, we should say that the opposition is not united.



--There are public personalities who do not comment at all on political matters unless a major, national event occurs. At that time, they emerge from their political isolation and express their views, after which they withdraw again from the scene.

--There are personalities independent of parties, but who are always engaged in politics, through writings in the papers, positions taken in the People's Assembly, or speeches at meetings and conferences.

--Then there are the parties with their well-known charted courses.

Officially, there are three opposition parties, of which two participate in parliament. The third party does not. There is the Labor Party, or the "incompatible partner." It participates in adopting resolutions, by virtue of its possessing a membership which gives it more than 30 seats in the People's Assembly. It is escalating its disagreement day by day. There is the Liberal Party, a previous leader of the opposition, which sometimes declares agreement and sometimes disagreement to merge with the majority party. It did not take political positions in the past, but it has begun to express views opposing the method of normalization. Its newspaper is escalating its criticism of governmental agencies. It has also begun to enter the broad-based national dialogue. Then comes the Rally Party. People read about its conferences, but do not know where they are held. It is known from a major daily newspaper's report that the Rally urged the people to commit arson and sabotage against stores and companies which deal with Israel, and published their names and addresses. Readers were subsequently surprised to see the owners of these companies publish paid advertisements in the papers telling the readers that they were dealing with Israel. That was a sample of methods of dealings between some newspapers and the opposition.

The map of the opposition also includes a miscellaneous variety of religious and secular doctrines. Their proponents either affiliate themselves with existing political factions, or vacillate between left, right and center. These do not oppose peace, but view it from a different angle.

Such Is the Political Map—Who Do We Mean By the Opposition?

According to the [reasonable] daily paper we referred to, it is a good sign that all elements of the opposition lead us to believe that they agree on the importance of a public debate and of a common denominator for universal agreement.

National necessities make it mandatory [to reach agreement]. Egypt is going through unusual political and economic circumstances. Egypt is facing challenges which place the government in a serious predicament, in view of the enormity of the challenges.

Therefore, the door of salvation is a broad national dialogue, in which all opinions can be expressed. I do not think that a party of the majority could be content with just looking at its own face in the mirror, and with only

listening to its own voice on the air. Nor do I think that an opposition party, can be indefinitely excluded from expressing its views, except in a very limited way.

Therefore, a [minimal] agreement is necessary, and a public dialogue is necessary.

The question is: what types of agreement do we mean? There are two types of minimal agreement: the type which bears on matters of procedure, i.e., the issue of democracy; and the type which bears on the remaining issues, such as the nationalist issue, the economic issue and the social issue.

When the issue of a minimal agreement is raised today, the two sides react as expected. Members of the majority say: "We will not [seek such agreement]. We possess the votes and we can make the decisions. Why should we listen to anything we do not like to hear?" On this other hand, members of the opposition say: "It is too late!"

If we were to accept these two reactions, we could say that we face a closed one-way street. On the other hand, if we were to totally ignore both viewpoints, and say that agreement is easy to reach, we would be engaging in wishful thinking.

The proper course [for both sides to follow] lies somewhere between these two positions. Let us begin with an issue which should not be in dispute, the issue of a dialogue and the means of pursuing it, i.e., the issue of democracy and participation in making decisions. It is the basic issue which can make consideration of other issues meaningful. Let us ask: How can we carry on a dialogue? How can opinion find its natural outlet? How can ideas interact so that the opposition and the loyalists can form an integrated system in which the loyalist can benefit from the opposition?

The matter requires efforts from both sides. Perhaps both sides deserve blame in this regard. In any event, the matter ought to be looked at as one of obligations--obligations assumed by the government, or the ruling majority, and obligations assumed by the opposition.

The obligations of the opposition begin with recognition of the importance of being truthful and the importance of basing opinion on correct information. Without correct information, opinion cannot mature, and without mature opinion, a sound position cannot exist. The opposition has great need to verify its information, because it is more subject to attack and embarrassment, and because its function is to express opinion, not to make material achievement--the exclusive job of the executive authority.

An indisputable point.

A second obligation of the opposition must abide by is democratic practices. The government has the right to pursue a course of action, and, therefore, can go either right or wrong. It is the duty of the opposition not to lurk in ambush. The important thing is not to catch the errors, it is to accept or reject general policy. Errors are not always "crimes," and achievements do not always have to be ignored. Policies are not persons and it is policies which we should always be concerned with. A third self-evident point is that the opposition must act within the framework of legality.

However, the same general restraints, or most of them, must also be adhered to by the other side. The matter of [correct] information is primarily the obligation of the majority, because it is the one which controls all the information. We say that positions must be taken on the basis of correct information, so that public opinion may be able to understand and [evaluate]. Does this not create an obligation for agencies and organizations that select and process the information, before it creates an obligation for those whose function is to debate or criticize?

The public frequently complains about information problems, and not because the opposition is giving the public erroneous information. In many cases, the views of the opposition do not even reach the public. The public complains because certain information is concealed, and certain information is fragmentary or distorted. The press conferences which were the object of excitement, and which one newspaper described as evidence of democracy, were not reported in the daily press. Reports on debates of the People's Assembly refer to replies by ministers and members of the majority to statements which are not published or are reported very briefly. As to the replies, they take up two or three columns. Furthermore, the press abroad treats the accused as innocent until proven guilty. But the Egyptian press, or most of it, treats the accused as guilty until proven innocent. Thus, it can attack him [while his case is in court].

The reader senses all of this. He certainly does not blame the opposition, because the opposition does not control any of it.

Another issue is the behavior of the loyalists in dealing with views of members of the opposition. We hold that members of the opposition are not entitled to accuse the government without evidence. However, we also say that the government does not have the right to accuse the opposition in the same fashion.

If we are to make demands on the opposition, we should make greater demands on government supporters, because they are the strong side, control the information media and possess all the advantages of power.

The majority's obligation to respect the minority cannot cure [all ills]. The right remedy for the situation is that all should possess instruments of free expression. When the political party law was amended to discard the condition requiring [a minimum of] 20 members of the Assembly to establish

a party, that was a good democratic action. But when a similar restriction was imposed, requiring [a minimum of] 10 members of the Assembly in order to found a newspaper, it was a move to silence the parties that did not enter the elections, parties which did not succeed in the elections, or new parties. What this amounts to is that the legislators decreed that a party could be formed, but that it would not have the right to communicate with the masses. The legislator also decreed in effect that a party could have popular support and be represented in parliament without necessarily being able to communicate with the electorate through a newspaper explaining its principles. Thus, the law contains a provision that the founding of a newspaper is more momentous than the founding of a party.

#### Good Neighbors

Irrespective of anything else, the call for a dialogue is necessary, and the idea of commitment to agreement on a minimal set of principles is a good one. However, success of these depends on conviction on the part of everyone that [executive] action can go right and can go wrong, and that the burden of the executive [branch of government] is a very heavy one. [On the other hand], it is self-evident that political activity is directed by a human brain. Because it is "human," it can accept or reject. Acceptance is not necessarily "goodness," and rejection is not necessarily "spiteful."

Egypt can accomplish [harmony], and deserves it. The elements are present. We support the slogan of democracy. The constitution endorses it. Allowing multiplicity of parties could turn the slogan into a reality. What else do we need [to move on]?

7005

CSO: 4802



# ANALYSIS OF FREEDOM OF PRESS IN EGYPT

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 14 Mar 80 pp 72-73

[Interview with Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus by Mahmud al-Tukhi: "Our Press Does Not Please the Regime; Our Press Is the Regime!"]

[Text] Out of bureaucratic caution, he asked for a prior list of questions, because he no longer speaks extemporaneously. That was during the first meeting in his office at AL-AHRAM. In the second meeting, Ihsan was a newsmen, not an official, perhaps because he was at home among his papers and things. Or perhaps it was because his presence among his old books and collections of ROSE AL-YUSUF allowed him a greater degree of openness, since he became more of the old spokesman for his mother. His silvery hair outlined his handsome face like a halo of dignity and compassion, very much like the halo of heroes about whom we read in a number of [his] books. Ihsan began to pace the spacious study in his home, between a painting of his wife and another huge painting done by the artist Janal Kamil, depicting a man crucified over his [resources]. This was the interview:

[Question] What is your understanding, Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus the journalist, of freedom of the press? Is freedom of the press in fact followed in Egypt?

[Answer] I have previously expressed an opinion about the situation which most people did not understand. It was that freedom of the press does not mean freedom of thought. You are always free to have your opinion, but freedom of the press is freedom of publication. You might be free to have your opinion, but you are not free to publish your opinion. Therefore, the distinction must be made between freedom of the press and freedom of opinion. Freedom of the press in my view depends firstly on freedom of journalistic capital.

[Question] Professor Ihsan, you have equated freedom of thought with freedom of expressing opinion, and freedom of the press with freedom to publish opinion. However, publication here is considered the most important means of expressing opinion. Therefore, is there not a difference between the two freedoms?

[Answer] Of course, but you can express opinion in a coffee house or in a secret pamphlet, while the press is a completely other means. The latter is the freedom to publish, and is, again, freedom of journalistic capital. If we assume, for example, that a newspaper's capital is Marxist communist capital, then it is free to publish communist opinion. If the owner of the capital is a Wafdist or other party member, then it would be free to express its respective partisan views. What I want to say is that if freedom of journalistic capital is achieved, then freedom of the press is achieved. Without freedom of capital, there is no freedom of the press. Perhaps, some have said, control of owners of capital over their papers is limited by freedom of the press. The reply here is that the variety of capitalists and the variety of journalistic directions guarantee a climate suitable for freedom of the press. But if the capital becomes concentrated, that is if all papers become subject to a single source of capital or to a single owner of capital, then a single direction develops, such as in Russia where all the newspapers are the property of the state, as the owner of capital. That is the case in most of the Arab states.

Laws pertaining to publication are a different matter. For example, journalistic capital in Kuwait is free, but there are laws prohibiting any source of capital from attacking the existing Kuwaiti regime. Even in this situation, despite freedom of capital, the limitation on freedom of the press remains present.

[Question] The second part of the question remains; is freedom of the press followed in Egypt?

[Answer] Of course not. All the newspapers are subject to a single source of capital, which is the state's capital. The one who owns the newspapers in Egypt is the state. Therefore, no matter how separate the papers are in their operation, the capital remains one. They say that 52 percent of the capital is owned by the Socialist Union and the remainder by the workers. The fact is clear that the capital is public or State capital. Since the capital is not free, freedom of the press does not exist. It is true that some groups, such as the Moslem Brotherhood, have been allowed to publish a magazine. Therefore, it is different from the rest of the press, because it has a different source of capital. Even the opposition press in Egypt is state-assisted. Its capital is also state capital, on the basis that it is one of the public rights.

[Question] In that case, by simple comparison, it is manifest that the Egyptian press, like the Russian, is not free.

[Answer] Absolutely. The Egyptian press is not free. There is not an editor-in-chief who has the right of independent individuality. That is absurd; he is an official. The state appoints chief editors; therefore, the appointee is completely bound to whoever appoints him. Now, in that case, can he deviate from the state's opinion? However, there are relative differences. Undoubtedly, the Egyptian press now has more freedom than during

the days of Nasser. Why? Because the state today wants it that way. In the past, the State wanted it the other way. No matter the degree of freedom existing today, maybe, freedoms are granted, not practiced as a right. The state permits you to be free only to a specific extent, or in a specific direction. These freedoms are granted freedoms, not true freedoms.

[Question] Where do Egyptian press reforms stand today?

[Answer] We have often explained the press situation in Egypt. All reforms are the same. We have said that the press is the property of the state. Accordingly, any reform can amount to no more than governmental reform!

[Question] A mere matter of form?

[Answer] A mere matter of worthless form.

[Question] What do you think about the debates which have occurred about press freedoms and practices in Egypt?

[Answer] Extensive and diverse debates [have taken place]. Most people agreed with my opinion that freedom of the press is freedom to publish newspapers, i.e., freedom of journalistic capital. Despite this, it has become clear that all these debates will lead to nothing. The next laws will not change the current press situation. They are only form and appearance, no more.

[Question] How will normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel affect the Egyptian press?

[Answer] The biggest effect on the Egyptian press will be from the standpoint of advertising, because the biggest advertising companies, before the Jewish emigration from Egypt, were owned by Jews. Practically all the papers were [dependent on] advertisements of companies controlled by Jews. When I say Jews, I do not mean only the Jews of Israel, but rather the Jews of the whole world. When relations between Egypt and Israel are normalized, the Jews of the world will come to work in the Egyptian press. The opening conducive to their complete control will be advertising, which is considered to be the press' main source of revenue. Naturally, the press will be incapable of attacking its sources of income.

[Question] The method of shaming one [by feeding him]?

[Answer] Absolutely. The Egyptian press before the revolution was dependent on advertising companies which Jews controlled. Their tendencies were moderate, to the extent that the Egyptian press at the time acknowledged Zionism. For example, Taha Husayn worked on a magazine published by Jews. It was the magazine AL-KATIB. In my view, this is the principal danger. Of course, there will be some kind of control, or an attempt at intellectual and cultural domination. All this will happen, but that does not mean that Egyptian culture will be lost. No, it will just be engaged in a strife to assert itself. [But who knows] which side will prevail?

[Question] The Egyptian press was influential in Arab countries, or rather it was in the forefront of newspapers and magazines published in the Arab world. What are the causes of the Egyptian press' slippage and its fall from the top?

[Answer] The reason is self-evident and clear. The Egyptian press has lost its freedom. It lost its freedom when journalistic capital lost its freedom. When the writer no longer knew why he was writing, the press collapsed. For example, ROSE AL-YUSUF, after the revolution, was no longer able to engage in political attacks as it did before the revolution, because of intense control and pressure even before it was nationalized. Intense censorship was imposed on the Egyptian press from the beginning of the revolution. This debased its values. The result was that the Lebanese press replaced the Egyptian press in terms of the extent of circulation throughout the Arab world, because the Lebanese press enjoyed absolute freedom. When the Lebanese press followed suit [in losing its freedom], the press of Kuwait moved ahead for the same reason. Therefore, freedom is what achieves or does not achieve wide circulation.

[Question] Professor Ihsan, as a senior journalist who believes in freedom of the press and its importance, do you approve of the ban on the entry of rejectionist and opposition newspapers into Egypt?

[Answer] I do not believe that newspapers of opposing opinion are hostile papers or possess hostile opinion. The issue is that [there can be] two differing opinions. Therefore, I must be allowed to read the opposition newspapers, or papers that have another viewpoint, because I consider myself stronger than they are. It is important to me to confront the different or opposing view, so that I may be able to refute or respond to, it and win over the masses of readers.

[Question] Then, you do not approve of the ban on entry of opposing thought into Egypt?

[Answer] Of course not. I am against the ban, except in the matter of opinion incompatible with the basic principles of the state, such as opinions which stir up sectarian conflicts and which turn [newspapers] into something more like tracts. As for opinions published in opposing Arab newspapers, I would never approve of banning them. However, the situation now is not that the Arab press is banned in Egypt, but rather that the Egyptian press is banned in all Arab markets.

[Question] We must ask this question. How has the Egyptian press been affected by the Arab boycott, and has this effect been confined to the material aspect?

[Answer] First, you must be aware that the Egyptian press basically depends on the Egyptian people and on Egyptian readers, because the number of Egyptian readers equals the number of readers in all the Arab countries



combined. This is the reason why the Lebanese or Arabs came to Egypt in the past, when they wanted to publish a newspaper or magazine. Internal circulation in Egypt was quite enough to cover expenses. There are 42 million of us, of which some 10 percent read. This number is the equivalent of all the readers in the Arab Nation. The Arab boycott has had no direct effect. Egyptian newspapers still have the highest circulation. AKHBAR AL-YAWM, whose circulation I promoted to 1,030,000, is a good example of this. What we have lost is the power of influence and contact. For example, the Arab reader cannot now read Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus. I used to write for the newspaper AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, but now I am prevented from writing for it.

[Question] Professor Ihsan, you are a long time practitioner of the art of journalism under different and greatly varying forms of government, and your mother was owner of a major publishing house. Do you approve of the Socialist Union or the regime owning the press, or would you prefer the press to be independent and transformed into organizations in which the workers could have a share?

[Answer] First, I would like to inform you that I am an opinion-maker who advocated the idea of nationalization of the press. Rather, the decision to nationalize the Egyptian press, which was issued in 1961, used four lines from an article of mine published the same week. We had reached a stage where everything was being nationalized. The press had been left [free] in appearance only, without nationalization, in order to safeguard a false illusion of freedom and democracy. Thus, it could be said that we had a free, unnationalized press. However, the censorship imposed upon every newspaper was very strict, to such a degree that I proposed that the only solution was to nationalize the press or, as I put it, to reorganize the press. However, what in fact happened was nationalization. After nationalization, I stayed on as chairman of the board of ROSE AL-YUSUF. ROSE AL-YUSUF itself did not change after the decision. Those who changed were those who worked for ROSE AL-YUSUF. The journalists themselves changed from men who respected their work to men who respected their contacts. Here I was thwarted; I could not practice journalism as an official.

[Question] Did you regret your suggestion about nationalization?

[Answer] Of course, [because the press] has turned to what it is today. They say there is freedom of the press, and they make every editor a censor, an official. This is an impossible situation. All journalists in Egypt have become official employees; I am one of them. I have no regret, but I was thwarted and my hopes were dashed. All I want now is for the press to return to private hands, even though it be through stock companies. I really want that now!

[Question] What's your opinion of the new generation of story writers and novelists, if there is a new generation? What is the restriction against equal opportunity for young writers to publish?

[Answer] The problem of an old and a new generation is an old one which has always existed. I remember that in my youth I published an article in ROSE AL-YUSUF under the headline "Open the Doors." In it, I attacked all older writers of the time, such as al-Hakim, al-'Aqqad, Taha Husayn, even Muhammad al-Tab'i, demanding my right to equal opportunity. However, it became clear to me from personal experience later that man can assert himself by himself. But in the past, there was freedom, freedom to publish and freedom to think. As for the new generation today, it is going through the most difficult conditions of freedom. There is something I want to say to the young: Literature, the press and the arts definitely need them. The world cannot get along with only one generation. Impossible! The need for the new generation is a fact in spite of what any one says. And I believe that the struggle is proceeding within them--within the soul of the new generation.

[Question] Do you think that university education in the field of journalism of the media has infused into our journalism and our media new writers or any special influences especially as our newspapers and magazines are still filled [robots and weak personalities]?

[Answer] I believe that journalism and media are like the arts and letters in that we must learn their fundamentals. But this can only be attained through practice. Even the top graduates of media colleges, unless they in fact practice journalism, excel in the practice, and discover themselves on the strength of it, get no benefit or use from education. The university certificate is a birth certificate. As for practice, it is the real test. It is life itself. Many of the graduates of journalism and media colleges are not journalists, and will never be journalists. It is a talent, a science and a pursuit.

[Question] Newspapers and magazines vary in format but the content is the same. Do you think that the Egyptian press is just for one reader?

[Answer] As I told you, the state owns journalistic capital. Accordingly, there is no difference among newspapers and magazines in terms of political direction and identity. There are differences only in journalistic form and personality.

[Question] Professor Ihsan, I mean by one reader, the regime. Is the purpose of our press only to please the regime?

[Answer] Our press does not please the regime; our press is the regime. The press is a part of the state, as President Sadat said when he declared the press to be the fourth estate.

[Question] Has Egyptian cinema and television presented Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus faithfully?

[Answer] No, it has not portrayed Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus the writer, but rather some aspects of Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus' thinking. There are films that are fairly close to myself, in scenario and dialogue. But this is the nature of Egyptian cinema; films are something completely different from the true story.

[Question] The previous question leads us to ask this question. As a contemporary and participant in Egyptian motion pictures, what are the reasons for the cinema's crisis and hardship?

[Answer] The crisis of the Egyptian cinema is the crisis of the press, the crisis of the theater, and the crisis of all aspects of art in Egypt. It is controlled by the state. Egyptian cinema began to weaken and to lose its power of appeal and influence after the state took control of it. In short, everyone became an employee, following the ways and means of employees. Egyptian cinema have slumped. But in spite of that, other Arab motion picture industries have not been able to replace it. Nevertheless, the cinema will only regain its power when it is liberated from the state.

[Question] Would you express this as an appeal from Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus to the state to refrain from controlling thought?

[Answer] Of course. The state must leave the freedom of Egyptian thought alone.

7005

CSO: 4802

INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, RELATIONS WITH U.S., ARABS DISCUSSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 10-16 Mar 80 pp 44, 45

[Interview with Dr 'Ali Reza Nowbari, Governor of the Central Bank of Iran by Randah Taqi al-Din; in London—date not given: "Governor of Iran's Central Bank says: 'Inflation in Iran is Growing and Worrying'"]

[Text] Dr 'Ali Reza Nowbari, governor of the Central Bank of Iran, is, at 32, a prominent economist and a close associate of President Bamsadr. A graduate of the polytechnic, Dr Nowbari is a candidate for the position for minister of oil in the new Iranian cabinet or for a senior position in it. AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI interviewed him in London where he was attending the recent OPEC meeting.

[Question] It seems that the OPEC ministers are unanimous in supporting the special report on a long-term strategy for OPEC. How can there be unanimity on this issue when differences continue over short-term issues?

[Answer] It is easier to agree on a long-term strategy than to agree on short-term issues. Each country has particular problems and political conditions on the short term which might impede a comprehensive agreement.

[Question] What are those issues?

[Answer] We all agree that oil is a depletable commodity and that we must preserve it as much as we can, as we were doing in the past. We believe that we should preserve our oil resources for a period of more than 50 years. Therefore, there is a pressing need for large investments in the field of research to develop new sources of energy as well as investments in the fields of development and exchange of technology.

[Question] It has been recently reported that Iran expects France to play an important role with regard to the problem of the frozen Iranian assets in American banks in Europe and that Iran has asked France to try to solve this problem. Is that true?



[Answer] We have not asked the French government anything that we have not asked of other governments. We have asked all the European governments to be honest with themselves and with us and force the American banks to release our deposits, because American banks in Europe are, legally speaking, European banks subject to the laws of the host country. The verdict made by Mrs (Rozes), the judge, confirmed to us that we are right. The problem of deposits in Citibank has thus been solved. But they [European governments] say officially the opposite of what they tell us privately, because they are under the pressure of the American government and Cyrus Vance. We have to depend on their judicial system and fight our case in their courts. This is what we have done and are still doing. Since we have not lost a great deal of money and we have adequate reserves that far exceed our needs, we will not make more efforts than we are making now in this regard. If the problem had a greater impact on us, we probably would have exerted greater efforts.

America is the Loser

[Question] How much are your reserves?

[Answer] More than \$14 billion. This is more than we need, and it is a growing sum. Therefore, we do not need to increase political pressure on other governments with regard to our deposits, especially since we are aware that the big loser on the long and short terms is the American government as well as the world banking system and the American banks.

[Question] There are rumors to the effect that the present strength of the French franc is due to the transfer of large Iranian deposits to France.

[Answer] This may be true. We do have deposits in France too. What we try to do is to distribute our assets and deposits according to how friendly our political relations are with the different countries concerned.

[Question] It has also been reported that Iran used Algerian banks in Algeria to transfer its deposits. Is this true?

[Answer] Such rumors are for the benefit of the United States which spreads them to force us to confirm or deny them. After our confirmation or denial it would resort to its own tactics to harm the countries which do not follow its policy. Actually, danger has (disappeared) now because America has failed to persuade Europe to apply economic sanctions against us.

[Question] What is the long-term financial policy Iran is following to avoid such measures against it in the future?

[Answer] Iran's long-term is to make the international financial system free of American control. We say this clearly to Mr Carter and his Treasury Minister Miller. We are now conducting our financial affairs in a manner

which is completely different from the one practiced under the shah. We are determined to do our best to make our system independent.

### Changing the Past

[Question] You are one of the closest associates of President Banisadr, and it seems that you will be called upon to play an important role in Iranian politics alongside the president. Perhaps you can explain to us what are some of the most important domestic economic problems which will face Banisadr's new government.

[Answer] Our problem at present is definitely to activate our economy. We want to change the economic and social system of the past. We believe that the success of the revolution and its aims will depend on a complete alteration of the economic system. We are now creating new models which would prevent the exploitation of the individual. Therefore, we have to reduce and limit the large impact of bureaucracy on the army or on the civil system. We have, therefore, to change the nature of economic activities and practices which did not serve Iran's independence in the past. The previous economic system depended on importation and the (pooling) and use of local industries. This policy suited the multinational companies. We are now trying to reduce this dependence and we are gradually seeking to move forward. I say gradually because the present level of unemployment in our country makes it difficult for us to close down any factory. We are channeling enormous amounts of money to the countryside in order to encourage agriculture. Sometimes we offer interest-free funds or funds at very low interests (one or two percent) for various agricultural projects. Next year's budget will have large appropriations for agriculture, especially for those agricultural projects and plans designed for the development of villages and the building of roads in the countryside.

We are also encouraging small factories and companies which help reduce unemployment and which absorb part of the new labor force which appears in Iran annually at the rate of one million new workers a year. As for inflation, it has not reached high levels since the revolution. Our figures show that inflation has not exceeded 15 or 20 percent. We feel, however, that inflation might increase at the present, and this concerns us. The reason for our concern is that we are careful not to import everything as was the case during the reign of the shah, but to develop national industry. For example, during the reign of the shah, the government appropriated \$1 billion a year to support and help efforts to import meat. Our policy now is to develop and increase the production of meat nationally.

[Question] It seems that Iran has withdrawn its share in (Eurodef). Can you comment on that?

[Answer] I am not an expert on this matter. Your question should be addressed to Mr Ghotbzadeh.

[Question] Do you encourage Arab investments in your country now?

[Answer] No, we are not in need of them. But we would like to undertake joint ventures with Arab states to bolster our economic relations with them. One of the things that I emphasized at the present OPEC meeting was that the benefits of our oil should be absorbed in our countries and by our economies. We are ready to carry out joint ventures and such Arab countries as Libya, Algeria and Kuwait have expressed readiness to cooperate with us. For example, such ventures as those of desalination and agricultural development in Khuzestan might also be suitable for Kuwait. Kuwait, for example, is advanced in the field of chemical fertilizers, and we hope to cooperate with it in this field.

[Question] What is the role of the central bank in Iran's economy today?

[Answer] The role of the central bank is very important, especially since banks have been nationalized and bank managers are now appointed by the government. The role of the central bank in Iran has thus become more important than the ordinary role which a central bank plays in the capitalist economic system. As I have said earlier, our role now is to energize and develop our economy, and we are rechanneling funds to areas which were neglected under the shah. On the international level, we seek to change the world financial system. In Iran, we seek to re-target some of the people's money toward production.

9254

CSO: 4902

# RESISTANCE FRONT BACKS IRAN

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 15 Apr 80 p 10

[Article: "The Resistance Front: Any Attack on Iran Is an Attack on the Resistance Front"]

[Text] The fourth conference of the heads of the member countries of the Arab "Resistance Front" opened on 13 April 1980 in Tripoli, capital of Libya, with the participation of the heads of the nations of Algeria, Syria, Libya, South Yemen and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

According to an Algerian News Agency report, Chadli Bendjedid, president of the Republic of Algeria, Hafiz al-Asad, president of the Syrian Arab Republic, and Yasir 'Arafat, president of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, came to Tripoli on Saturday and sat down to a discussion with Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, president of Libya, in a private session behind closed doors.

Informed sources in Tripoli state that among the issues placed on the agenda of the conference of the heads of the countries belonging to the front are ones concerning the Iranian revolution, especially the issue of the American boycott of Iran. Meanwhile it has been stated that Algeria and Libya have decided that in the event America's economic and hostile measures against Iran become intensified, these two countries might deprive America of their oil and gas. Meanwhile the Resistance Front has declared that any attack on Iran will mean an attack on the countries belonging to the Resistance Front.

The latest reports received from the conference state that in a telegram addressed to the heads of the Resistance Front states, 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, president of North Yemen, stressed that the Yemen Arab Republic will be in full agreement with all decisions reached by the conference. Meanwhile 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih declared his inclination to have his country join the front.



## A Brief History of the Resistance Front

The Resistance Front was formed in December 1978 to oppose the treasonous steps of Anwar al-Sadat, president of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and his visit to Israel. The Republic of South Yemen was part of it but Iraq after a short while ceased to be a member of the Resistance Front.

This front is opposed to any kind of view which accepts the conduct of peaceful negotiations with Israel and American intervention. It has constantly invited Arabs to join this front but most, though announcing that they were opposed to al-Sadat's measures, refrained from joining the front.

Iraq, which could have been a very effective and useful member of the front, especially from the military standpoint, drew away from the front with arguments fashioned after the children of Israel. One can consider Iraq's position as proof of its regime's adherence to America and Zionism, since Iraq is a country bordering on Syria and, in times of need, can hasten to the aid of that country's armed forces at utmost speed and warn Israel away from savage attacks on the region.

Except for Iraq, the position of the countries belonging to this front vis-a-vis the Islamic revolution of Iran has always been favorable. The Palestinians have always been on the side of the Iranian revolution, Algeria has proved its friendly stand, Syria, on every occasion which has arisen, has drawn close to the Islamic revolution of Iran, and Libya is also trying to establish its relations with Iran on a better footing.

The Republic of South Yemen, which at the present time has no diplomatic relations of any kind with Iran, is constantly trying to have such relations established. Salim Rubay', the president of the Republic of South Yemen, always stressed the need for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Iran. It should not be forgotten that he sent a special emissary to Iran to draw the attention of Iranian officials, in order to carry out negotiations with Iranian officials on reopening relations, but news of such negotiations has not yet been published and the results of the Republic of South Yemen's initiatives to establish relations with the Islamic revolution of Iran have not been announced. However, what can be stated with certainty is that there are abundant efforts at the present time to this end.

The members of the Resistance Front have stressed numerous times that they are prepared to provide all possible kinds of assistance to the Islamic revolution of Iran.

11887

CSO: 4906

# KURDISH LEADERS OFFER PEACEFUL SOLUTION

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 20 Apr 80 p 10

[Interview with Sheykh Ezzoddin Hoseyni by Sattar Erfani]

[Excerpt] This part of the series of reports and exclusive KEYHAN interviews was obtained from Kordestan (Mahabad) in an exclusive interview with Sheykh Ezzoddin Hoseyni. In previous sections, a partial report from the Kordestan area and an interview with Abdorrahman Qasemlu, secretary general of the Democratic Party of Kordestan, were published. KEYHAN hopes that by reproducing the problems of Kordestan through the eyes of the political and religious leaders of this region, a step will have been taken toward a greater understanding of the conditions and situations current in Kordestan by the heroic people of Iran.

Question: What is your opinion on the Ba'thist government of Iraq and what position have you taken on the current struggle?

Answer: Regarding the Ba'thist government of Iraq, and the Kurdish People's Committee which is made up of the Democratic Party of Kordestan, the Guerrilla Partisans Organization, the Kumala and my office, we have issued a declaration and I have announced my view regarding the Ba'thist government. We condemn any aggression made against Iranian soil, whatever country it may be from, and we will protect the unity and independence of the country with our nails and our teeth. We feel ourselves to be Iranian alongside the people of Iran and basically, in our view, one cannot think of a Kordestan separate from Iran. We first think of Iran, and then, in the context of that, we think about Kordestan; any attack, from whomever it may be, we condemn and consider improper and just as we condemn the government of Iran for attacking Iranian people, so do we condemn attacks by foreign countries against the borders of Iran.

Question: What is your view regarding the emam's Nowruz message? What opinion do you have regarding one point in that, namely "We are fighting against international Communism as against Western imperialism?"

Answer: The emam's message contained many things. (At this point some people of the community were with us and Sheykh Ezzoddin Hoseyni, the tape recorder was shut off, and then, after consultation with Sheykh Ezzoddin Hoseyni, they asked for our press card and stated, "First you should have shown us the questions so you could raise questions which are of use." )

Question: What is your view regarding the disarming of the groups, which Mr Bani Sadr has raised?

#### Disarmament

Answer: Our view is that raising the disarming of groups is an issue which Mr Bani Sadr has raised in order to deceive public opinion. Basically people have arms essentially for self-defense; if the Kurdish people did not have arms, the guards, the army and the provocateurs would have crushed them and no more question by the name of the Kurdish question would have remained. In his Nowruz message, and also on the anniversary of the Islamic Republic, Mr Bani Sadr announced, first stated, "Come let us embrace one another and resolve the question in peace and good will, by political means, and if attention is given to the Kurdish people's demand, which is for autonomy, no question by the name of the question of disarmament will remain." Mr Bani Sadr orders the army "Do not take your boots off until you have disarmed everyone," in order to sow dissension among the political groups and the Kurdish people. This action of disarmament is a vain matter. Basically, Mr Bani Sadr does not seem to have much knowledge of Kordestan; he considers the political groups separate from the Kurdish people and considers the Kurdish people separate from the political groups. He is unmindful of the fact that the political groups have risen from within the Kurdish people, speak for and are the voice of the people, and are the brothers, sisters and mothers of the people. Essentially there is no difference between the political groups and the Kurdish people. When Mr Bani Sadr imagines that political groups are an armed body which is governing in Kordestan by force of arms, this is a mistake, and Mr Bani Sadr does not want to perceive the situation. Under no circumstances will the people of Kordestan lay down arms. The Kurdish people have always defended the people of Iran and we strictly reject this plan and consider it a plot which Mr Bani Sadr is raising in the period of his presidency.

Question: What is your view regarding the turnover of the army, taking account of the difference of views among groups in this regard?

Answer: The groups do not have differences of views with one another.

Question: We know that the Democratic Pesh Merga have been escorting the army during turnovers but we see that the Kumala and the People's Guerrillas have different views and are accusing the Democratic Party of going along.

Answer: Basically the issue of turnover is one with which the Council of Representatives of the Kurdish People agreed after an incident. If there is a change in Kordestan all political organizations must be involved, and once all the organizations and the Council of Representatives are involved, they will accept it. The subject they informed me about today is that 800 soldiers are trying to go to Mahabad with 20 tanks to replace 130 people. We, the political groups and the Council of Representatives of the Kurdish people, are all agreed on accepting the replacement of 130 people with 130 other people, but these 800 people are in no way acceptable. Sometimes a minor difference will appear among groups but the government wants to make it seem big. Among the Pesh Merga of Kordestan there is basically no dispute. You can see in Kamiran and other places that there is basically no dispute and all the Pesh Merga are fighting side by side against the aggressors, and all are together, are cooperating with one another even in one fortress.

Question: Are the six principles of the Democratic Party the object of support; if not, what reforms are you proposing?

The Six-Point Plan Is Not Acceptable

Answer: The Council of Representatives of the Kurdish People rejected the six-point plan on the first day and does not officially recognize it, accepting only that 26-point plan which was given to the government by the Council of Representatives of the Kurdish People, including the Democratic Party. We will make that the basis of negotiation and the foundation of negotiation.

Question: If this plan is the object of acceptance by the government, and the Democratic Party accepts it, what will your position be?

Answer: Basically, the government has no function except to sow dissension, getting close to some groups and crushing others. I think that if every group, every collection of people and every organization negotiates separately with the government it will be deceived. Basically the government does not want to resolve the matter. We cannot say that one of these organizations is a brother and a friend and another one is an enemy, since everyone has one objective, everyone is Kurdish, everyone accepts the Council of Representatives of the Kurdish People, and the Council of Representatives of the Kurdish People has brought out weapons and given support. This 26-point plan is the demand of the Council of Representatives of the Kurdish People has basically presented a spokesman who is from the Democratic Party of Kordestan itself, namely Dr Abdorrahman Qasemlu, the secretary general of the Democratic Party of Kordestan. If negotiations are with the Council of Representatives of the Kurdish People, basically, since the issue which must be presented had previously been prepared and the spokesman is from the Democratic Party and the other organizations are just present in the council, the government can just negotiate with them and we have no dispute over the subject of autonomy. For the government to say that such-and-such an organization, for



instance, enter into the subject of elections and postpone them in the Ostan of Kordestan or in the Ostan of West Azarbayjan, for example and for this reason turn the Kurdish people into two groups. We consider this to be sowing dissension, because if it really has good will in this 5-month period in which a special commission has been going back and forth, why hasn't it raised a serious issue? Why haven't the people who have been banished and the prisoners who are just in government prisons and were to have been released--why hasn't work yet been done? The guards who are not native were to have been removed from Kordestan but they are still present. For example, there was a month's sanctuary in Sanandaj until the government finally removed them. The government does not respect public opinion. We have never seen any good will from the government. Yesterday we received word that a feudalism was cooperating with the army. So far they have taken 20-odd people and handed them over to the government, and Mr Bani Sadr says, "We have no relations with the feudalists," although throughout this period the Islamic Republic has been in contact with people who call themselves Mojaheds, not feudalists, reactionary elements and superstitious religious personages, just for money and to sell themselves, and give no attention to the Kurdish people. We are amazed that Savak agents who previously were Savak agents are closer to the government. Our Kurdish people have seen no good will from this government. But we are always ready to negotiate.

11887

CSO: 4906

## BRIEFS

**ARMY TO PURGE UNIVERSITIES--**The declaration by the Tehran Staff to Coordinate Education and Organize the 20-Million-Man Army has published this Staff to Coordinate Education and Organize the 20-Million-Man Army communique: "In the name of God, the all-merciful and most compassionate: Our liberated nation has fully realized that the only way toward basic struggle against imperialism is to follow the revolutionary and unaccommodating path of emam. What has shaken the superpowers during these seminal moments in the history of man is the power not of arms but of faith, which holds the abrogation of all forms of satanic and power-hungry force to be foremost among its activities. Truly it is Islam which is desicating the roots of imperialism and throwing it into the abyss of destruction. If our universities truly are moving along an axis of anti-imperialist subjects they must realize that one can bear this important burden only by grasping the rope of God firmly and by moving along the straight path of Islam and the emam; therefore, any kind of intellectual or practical deviation will cast us from this straight path into the influence of one superpower or the other and will still the breeze of independence which has been blowing over our land. Come, beloved students and faculty members, so that we, with a basic change in the content of the educational system, in accordance with genuine Islamic teachings, may guarantee the true independence of the educational centers and turn the university into a true fortress of anti-imperialist struggles. Come so that we may purify this holy place of the filth of the presence of the parasites which are connected to the East or the West and imbue the basis of education with conditions of purification. Come so that we may place the university at the service of God and the people by sweeping away Western and Eastern culture and build a strong fortress for nurturing man. The educated members of the 20-Million-Man army, who always consider following the emam's line to be the only way to attain victory, are prepared, in following the plan of the president and the Revolutionary Council which has also been supported by the emam of the nation, and to rush as soon as possible to the help of you, the committed, the responsible, the operational staffs of dependent groups or bands which are lacking popular bases from the educational centers, by going into your midst. It is clear that this action can ultimately become a basic transformation in changing the educational system and, following that, a constant effort in the field of deepening the genuine culture of Islam in educational areas will be intensely supported. /Text/ /Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 22 Apr 80 p 12/ 11887

## PROSPECTS OF SUMMIT MEETING IN WASHINGTON DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv HATZOFEH in Hebrew 9 Apr 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Warning Against High Expectations from The Washington Talks"]

[Text] The Egyptian president is now in Washington, holding talks with President Carter and his advisers. The government is to hold a meeting on 9 April to discuss Prime Minister Begin's upcoming trip to Washington. According to all indications there will be a three way summit meeting, Camp David style, after Carter's separate meetings with Begin and Sadat.

Both separate meetings and the expected summit meeting are designed to effect meaningful progress in the negotiations for autonomy for Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, whose target date is 26 May. The meetings are held after 10 months of discussing the issue on a ministerial and working group level. Differences of opinion, which are big to begin with, deepened further when Egyptian President Sadat demanded to go beyond the Camp David accords. If no unforeseen developments take place, it cannot be assumed that the autonomy talks will be completed by 26 May. It will be a great accomplishment if some of the stumbling blocks, laid on the road to an agreement, are removed. The American administration warned, on 8 April, against overly high expectations of "a real breakthrough" in the summit talks, and expressed its hope that "something substantial" may be accomplished. Egypt's president, on the other hand, said, on arriving in Washington, that he does expect a breakthrough in the stalemate.

According to reports by Egyptian correspondents it does not seem likely that Sadat will make it easy to settle the differences. According to these correspondents Sadat will stress to Carter, among other things, that Egypt rejects any proposal which refers to united Jerusalem and recognizes the annexation of the eastern part of the city. The autonomous council of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip should, according to him, take over all responsibilities now under the jurisdiction of the military authorities. All settlement efforts have to cease. These Egyptian demands are diametrically opposed to Israel's basic positions and their approval will enhance the possibility of a PLO state in Judea and Samaria.

A few days ago there were reports in Egyptian newspapers regarding a "political bomb" which Sadat plans on bringing up. There are signs that by this "bomb" Sadat refers to an idea that was rumored by various Egyptian sources regarding another Sadat visit to Jerusalem and an appearance before the Knesset where he will present the Palestinian cause as he sees it. President Sadat is well versed in dramatizing political moves and he is exploring the possibility of "addressing the people of Israel." But the background to his 1977 historic visit to Jerusalem is quite different from the situation nowadays with the autonomy talks stalemated as they are. Progress will not be made by dramatic means.

President Sadat's and Prime Minister Begin's talks in Washington are held seven weeks before the target date for concluding the autonomy talks, with deep differences still dividing the two sides on basic issues. In order to achieve real progress, the very issues have to be discussed on the basis of the Camp David accord, without any decrees or pressure. Progress on autonomy will not be achieved by dramatic means such as a Sadat appearance before the Knesset in Jerusalem, but by a three way summit meeting of the United States, Israel and Egypt, where the leaders will examine all possibilities of resolving the stalemate while still adhering to written and signed agreements.

8646

CSO: 4805



## MOTIVES OF WEIZMAN DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Apr 80 p 9

[Article: "Appointment of a Security Committee for The Autonomy Talks To Be Headed by Weizman Seen as an Effort To Keep Him in The Government"]

[Text] There are a number of motives behind recent rumors on Ezer Weizman's impending resignation. One of them, at least, needs some dwelling upon. The establishment of a security committee for the autonomy talks and its makeup. Israel's willingness to establish such a committee and letting Weizman chair it, may weaken his current intent to resign.

Reports published recently on his intention to resign point to his predicament. He is experiencing increasing frustration with being a cabinet member. He cannot agree with its decision on certain issues, and its whole mode of operation is not to his liking. Occasionally he is swept with a desire to abandon it all, to go to the prime minister to hand in his resignation and retire to his new home in Caesarea to write a book on the peace process—from his point of view. But when his anger subsides (and this is true of other cabinet members as well, only the public does not hear about it), Mr Weizman collects himself and soberly looks at the political reality.

A cold examination reveals to Weizman that the government will continue to function even if he resigns. There is no assurance that his big fear—that Ari'el Sharon may be appointed defense minister—will come true. Menachem Begin can fill the post with other people. Whether by taking it upon himself (as he did with the Foreign Ministry) or by offering it to Professor Moshe Erns, or, at worst, to Professor Yiga-el Yadin. Begin is aware of the fact that offering the position to Sharon may dismantle GAHAL and topple the government.

The defense minister also knows that his chances to realize his biggest ambition—to replace Menachem Begin as prime minister—are slim if he is not on the political arena, but sits angrily at home in Caesarea and

unloads his frustrations by writing. It is not at all clear that Caesarea will be for him what Colombay de Les Eglises was for De Gaulle.

#### More Involvement

A sober analysis will dictate to Weizman to refrain from resigning just now, if only because there is no assurance that his resignation will topple the whole government. As long as the government remains in power, the defense minister can fill a central position in it, not only in his specific area of responsibility in the Defense Ministry, but over the whole gamut of relations with Egypt. Weizman, with his aide Avraham Tamir, has had his finger in each aspect of Israeli Egyptian relations. The personal contacts these two people have made with the Egyptian leadership and their presence on each committee, organization or delegation having contacts with Egypt, ensures them considerable, if not crucial, influence in formulating the peace between the two countries.

Weizman, who thinks he has done the most for the peace negotiations, who thinks that he, more than anyone else is keeping the peace—cannot easily give up his positions of influence. Neither can he give up his continued dealing with issues concerning the security system.

Weizman's chances to influence the autonomy talks will very much determine whether or not he will stay in the government. He understands that peace with Egypt is a delicate process, prone to difficulties and changes, and he would like to protect this delicate bud as much as possible. Therefore Weizman wants to be involved with directing the negotiations on autonomy knowing the implications that these contacts may have on the stability of the peace. Today Weizman is associated with the autonomy talks via Maj Gen Tamir, who is one of the most important Israeli delegates in the negotiations with Egypt and the United States. It seems, though, that this does not give Weizman enough weight (just as his membership in the ministerial committee is inconsequential, now that he does not participate in its discussions). He is now looking for a new outlet.

It seems that if Menachem Begin agreed to establish a committee for security matters and appoint Weizman as its chairman, the persisting rumors pertaining to his imminent resignation would subside. Headed by Weizman and Kamal Hasan 'Ali could, perhaps, enable negotiations to take on a direction which may lead to the goal.

It is very interesting that both countries discovered the staunchest support and the greatest enthusiasm for peace in their respective defense systems. Both defense systems are aware of the dangers which threaten the peace if the autonomy talks fail. Naturally, both tend to talk to each other, in order to strengthen the peace.

Egypt would like to establish a military committee which will deal with the security issue of the autonomy. It refers to section 1.2 of the Camp David

accords. The section states that the agreement which will define the authority and responsibility of the autonomy council will also include details concerning internal and external security, and public order. Egypt claims that when Israel agreed to that it agreed to negotiations which will also include security matters.

It is not only formalities which motivate Cairo. By establishing a military committee the Egyptians would like to define Israel's security needs. The next step will apparently be an Egyptian proposal for security arrangements, which, in Egypt's opinion should be adequate for Israel and ought to replace security concepts as Israel knows them. In plain words: whereas Israel maintains that it needs a presence of the IDF in Judea and Samaria, as well as in the Gaza Strip, and that the settlements are crucial for the security of the country, Egypt will claim that demilitarization, UN observers and technical deterrent offer Israel just as much security.

The debate on establishing a military committee is not new. It started in Camp David in November 1978 and continued when President Carter visited in Jerusalem in early March 1979. Israel made it clear that it alone will define its security needs and will not allow anyone to intervene. Since signing the peace agreement the IDF carried out a few actions in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip to ensure minimal vulnerability and interruption of its function for the time when that section of the Camp David accords is implemented, that section being the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and realignment of those forces which will remain in specified areas.

The due date for Israel's commitment is nearing, the commitment to include arrangements on security matters in the autonomy agreement. Up to now the government has rejected Egypt's demand to carry out this section. Weizman's resignation considerations can also be explained against this background. If the government agrees to establish this committee, with Weizman as its chairman, the defense minister will try, via this channel of communication, to neutralize whatever now threatens the negotiations and to enhance the chances of an agreement.

Weizman could use the security committee in a way similar to what he did when he was in charge of the military committee that worked out the details of the Sinai agreement. Just as in 1978 Messrs Weizman and Tamir gave the military committee its overall tone and used it as a vehicle to work out the political aspects of the agreement—so they can now give a new dimension to the security aspects of autonomy. In any event, one can guess that the security committee can give Weizman the fuel needed to give the public new hope about autonomy, just as the military committee enabled him to inspire the public with belief in the chances for peace and its value.

#### Disparity of Opinions

Weizman would therefore like to represent Israel on the security committee. But Menachem Begin is not too anxious to relent. He rejects the whole idea

of a security committee. At most he will agree to a committee which will deal with questions of coordination between Israel and the autonomous council in all that pertains to issues of ensuring internal peace and security in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. It seems, however, that the objection of the prime minister is not only over the principle of establishing a security committee.

Begin is not sure that his and Weizman's positions are identical as to the nature of this committee and the definition of Israel's security in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. In the past Begin heard from his defense minister that settlement (in a new version, but all settlements) are necessary for Israeli security. He therefore hesitates to entrust Weizman with the responsibility of defining security components in Judea and Samaria.

The internal debate (it is more in the background than actually being carried out) on the establishment of the security committee and its make-up explains one of Weizman's predicaments, which was behind the rumors about his intended resignation. The results of Begin's mission to Washington—when the question of the establishment of the security committee will also be discussed—may have direct implications on Weizman's position in negotiations and consequently also on his willingness to stay on in government.

8646

CSO: 4805



## SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN ASSESSED

Tel Aviv HATZOFEN in Hebrew 9 Apr 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Severing Diplomatic Relations and Imposing Economic Sanctions Seen as Means to Pressure Iran into Freeing Hostages"]

[Text] President Carter's resolution on severing diplomatic relations with Iran and calling for economic sanctions against Tehran was received in the United States and Western Europe with a reaction of "too little, too late." But six months of exhausting all diplomatic avenues to free the hostages, who are prisoners of a group of "students" have been to no avail. Now the president decided to stop treating Iran with kid gloves and to take firmer steps, in contrast to his hesitancy up to now.

Carter announced the severing of diplomatic relations with Iran and the imposition of new sanctions. Among the measures announced: a total embargo on export to Iran, the prohibition of entry to the United States by Iranians and the possibility that billions of frozen Iranian dollars be used to cover claims against Iran. In addition Carter announced that there may be "another action if there is a need for it."

A clear hint that there may be another military action if Tehran persists in refusing to free the hostages. In this context it is not unlikely that a naval siege against Tehran be imposed.

The timing of President Carter's decision is probably related to the behavior of Iranian leaders in recent days. After there was a proposal in sight which might have contributed to a solution of the crisis and after the terrorists agreed to hand the hostages over to the Iranian government, the ayatollah Khomeini announced his opposition to the plan. Carter was sharply criticized by various segments because of his hesitancy in dealing with the Iranian crisis. In spite of his success in the primaries the Iranian crisis is hurting his prestige. Since Khomeini and his colleagues are continuing to humiliate him he has decided to take some real action.

True, Carter's decision came too late, but better later than never. As was expected, the Iranian government reacted angrily and with curses. It announced that it would refuse to sell oil to any country that cooperated with the Americans in imposing economic sanctions against it. The sanctions will indeed be tested by the degree of cooperation on the part of other Western countries. The question is whether the Western countries will cooperate with the United States in a meaningful way or whether they will limit themselves to announcements and declarations, with the oil stick being waved in front of them.

8646

CSO: 4805

IRAN SITUATION SEEN AS EVIDENCE OF DETERIORATING SOCIETY

Jerusalem HAMODI'A in Hebrew 12 Mar 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Impotence of a Power"]

[Text] The Iranians are mocking international public opinion. They are disgracing the greatest of the powers, and they are scoffing at the embarrassment of the United Nations Organization. It is not enough that they have been holding the American hostages for more than 4 months, they are also prepared to grate the nerves of the Americans in order to prove the impotence of the United Nations, the organization in which the United States has placed its confidence.

The United Nations commission for investigating the crimes of the Shah did not satisfy the arrogance of the "militants" who are holding the hostages. Those who believed that the Iranians needed a face-saving device have been disappointed. The commission was compelled to leave Iran in disgrace and not before they were demeaned by waiting in vain after they had retraced their steps in the hope to meet with the hostages who were close to release.

The President of the United States who hastily assembled his advisors in order to discuss the preparations for the release was forced to hide his face in shame. Once again Khomeini's Revolutionary Council lost its temper, and the militants who at the beginning enjoyed the protection of the regime also mocked it. One is confused by the political imbroglio which has been created, and no one really knows if Khomeini is behind the kidnappers as they claim or if he is dissociated from them as the foreign minister of Iran claims.

What kind of political society is this? What kind of helplessness or impotence has become dominant in the international arena? For the moment, it seemed to us that in this trouble of a multitude in its helplessness, Israel would find some consolation. However, on second thought, there is no basis for consolation. Israel's existence is threatened.

However, beyond the self-consideration which we have in what is happening in the international arena, there is reason for contemplating the image of

the international society. It is rapidly reverting to periods which it seeks to forget, a period of a tyrannical regime which is confounding the processes of the government and practicing lawlessness.

Everyone has absorbed their disgrace, the United States as a power and the United Nations Organization which sought to place its good offices at the service of the United States. This is truly a frightening expression of a disintegrating society which is deteriorating to the abyss in which prevails a system of living by the sword.

5830

CSO: 4805



# **BEGIN POLICY ON AUTONOMY AND SETTLEMENTS SEEN UNCHANGING**

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Mar 80 p 11

[Article by A. Schweitzer: "Begin--and He Has It Good"]

[Text] While the mood in Israel has not improved, television viewers were able to observe the day before yesterday a prime minister who was completely satisfied and sure of himself and his rightness. There will be those who will evaluate Mr Begin's appearance as a theatrical performance, the success of which is dependent on the taste of the viewer. However, in the terms of reckoning which are characteristic of the prime minister--according to which, there is nothing in between--there is really no basis for worry.

Although President Carter's special representative to the autonomy talks left Israel empty-handed and disappointed, Mr Begin knows that according to this interpretation of the formulations of the accord reached at Camp David, there will be no autonomy because there will not be found any Palestinians who will cooperate in its establishment. Moreover, there is a basis for the theory that even if the other interpretation were accepted, the PLO, and in its wake the local Palestinians, would reject the idea. The negotiations, therefore, are being conducted in vain, a fact which is likely to pain Mr Linowitz. However, in regard to the prime minister, as long as the game is being played in accordance with the rules written at Camp David, his situation and that of his government are completely normal.

## **To Repel the Europeans**

It is true that the practical question now facing President Carter, and as a result also Mr Begin, is how to get by 26 May. This date was set in an exchange of letters attached to the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty as a target date for signing the autonomy agreement. However, that date was also selected by the European countries as the beginning of a process designed to change Security Council Resolution 242 and to include the right of self-determination for the Palestinians in an expanded resolution.

The European process is designed to give France and its partners in the region the status of those who are putting things in order, at the expense

of the United States ( in the aforementioned interview, Mr Begin rejected the view that the Europeans are working in concert with the United States. He heard of it, investigated, and found that it was absurd). The United States and its two partners in the region, Egypt and Israel, are interested in repelling this European attempt. It is evident from this that what is required now is a formulation acceptable to these three. Mr Begin feels, and not unjustly, that in the finalization of the Washington formulation, he has the right of veto—and he will give, if he does give, only the minimum which he can reconcile with his conscience.

The results of the primary elections in New York and Connecticut, although Mr Begin rejects any reference to the internal affairs of the United States, can only strengthen his estimate that the mid-April meeting with Mr Carter will be conducted more or less according to that which is acceptable to the prime minister of Israel. The President, who is under pressure from all sides and is involved in a difficult election campaign, will generally not want to jeopardize himself with the explosion of the peace process which has given him considerable international prestige. Therefore, Mr Begin can depend upon Mr Carter to convince President Sadat not to pose conditions which are unacceptable to Mr Begin before he will agree to an acceptable formulation on the autonomy.

If the effect of this is the strengthening of the American-Egyptian rapport, which was one of the characteristics of the Camp David process, it is apparently not something which bothers the prime minister. In his world outlook which was crystallized before the establishment of the State, the United States is a friend of Israel and its omniscient Jews. On the basis of these two fundamental estimates, which are included in that which was defined previously as a belief that there will always be hope for Israel, there is no significance to the American-Egyptian rapport; it is temporal. In regard to the needs of the hour, for the aforementioned reasons, the prospects are good that Mr Begin will not return from Washington with a great loss.

In the television interview, Mr Begin returned several times to the Anglo-Saxon idea of one not being concerned about crossing a bridge until one comes to it. Therefore, it is impossible to worry him about what will happen after November (if Mr Carter wins the election) or from February 1981 on (if someone else enters the White House). What is seen as a virtual certainty by most observers, Israeli and others, that at that time there will begin an American-Egyptian offensive to drive Israel from Judea and Samaria—whether in accordance with their interpretation of the Camp David accords or after a revision of the accords—does not trouble Mr Begin at this time.

#### Realization of a Dream

The reason is that if the projection does not materialize, so much the better, and if it does, the prime minister still has the option of the worst case: he can resign and go into the election as one who has remained faithful to his belief in an undivided Land of Israel.

This must be known: what appears to a growing number of Israelis as a nightmare--living together with the Kadi of Hebron, Fahd Kawasma and Bassam Shaq'a and their like, to spend IL 100 million for the construction of two buildings in Hebron and billions on the Judaization of several dunams of rocks in Judea and Samaria--is in Mr Begin's eyes the realization of a lifelong dream and to the "practical" Mr Ariel Sharon, a strengthening of Israel's security. And the Israelis and other peoples should not say that this is a surprise: Mr Begin has always said this, and whoever wanted actions, then Dayan's resignation, the appointment of Mr Yitzhaq Shamir as the minister of foreign affairs, and the gradual removal of Ezer Weizman from positions of influence in the government have provided him with proof that the prime minister is prepared to implement and not only to preach.

According to this analysis, it is reasonable to assume that Mr Begin will return from Washington with the news that there is no confrontation and that there is friendship. At home, the processes of settlement will be accelerated so that when the storm occurs, we will have many settlements in the Judean hills and in Samaria or, in the opinion of his opponents, with even more scorched earth than there is today in Israel's foreign relations. It is doubtful if the Liberals in the Likud, even though they see the terrible dangers which Mr Begin's policy threatens to bring, will disturb him, and the same applies to the Democrats on whose behalf Mr Shmuel Tamir assures that Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria will not be removed. After the loyalty oath of Mr Zevulun Hammer, the man who made possible the establishment of the Likud government and who maintains it to this very day, Mr Begin is likely to believe that there is no immediate danger at home to the implementation of his policy.

Although the unexpected is likely to occur and the calculations are likely to be revealed as erroneous, what is certain is that whoever hoped that Mr Begin would be forced to begin withdrawing from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza will be proven wrong. The prime minister refuses to do this willingly--at least this conclusion can properly be drawn from that which he said in the television interview--and he will leave office before this is imposed on him by force. Therefore, and beyond the legalisms, the negotiations for the implementation of the Camp David accords must be conducted by someone else. This is on the condition that the structure of the Israeli-Egyptian peace will not completely collapse even before the change of administration in Israel.

5830

CSO: 4805

## ISRAEL

### CABINET URGED TO DECIDE ON STEPS TO SETTLE JEWS IN HEBRON

Tel Aviv HATZOFEH in Hebrew 16 Mar 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Populating Hebron With Jews"]

[Text] More than a month ago, the government made a basic decision that there is nothing to prevent Jews from living in Hebron as in every other place in the Land of Israel and that the government would decide upon the places to be populated and its timing at a later date. Since that time the government has been asked several times about this matter, however it has postponed its decision on the question of the timing and how this decision can be given a practical content. Despite the fact that the basic decision was agreed upon by all the government ministers, on the question of its practical implementation, there are disagreements among them. There are those who are asking for an immediate decision on practical steps to settle Jews in the Jewish quarter or the establishment of a yeshiva or another institution there, and there are those who are seeking to avoid any action in this direction.

Those who are opposed to the decision to settle Jews in Hebron argue that there is no security need for this and that it is likely to intensify the opposition of the international community to Israel's positions and to disrupt the autonomy talks. There are those among them who claim that the timing is not appropriate and that it is likely to increase the erosion which has taken place in Israel's status in the United States and in Europe.

However, it is not the settlement of Jews in Hebron and not the expropriation of land next to Jerusalem that is causing the erosion. The United States and the countries of western Europe continue to declare their opposition to any Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria, and the well-known decision of the Security Council has even called for the dismantling of the existing settlements. President Carter repeated on Friday that the United States does not support the establishment of new Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria and it regards these settlements as an obstacle to peace.

The opposition in the United States and in Europe to Jewish settlement does not distinguish between a security need and any other need, between Jerusalem and Hebron and other settlements. Every act of settlement since the Six Day



War has been made in timing which was not appropriate in terms of the "international community," and had we waited for the right time, the territories of Judea and Samaria would have been empty of Jews.

Today the Cabinet will devote part of its session to the question of settling Jews in Hebron. Even if the subject is complex, complicated, and controversial, the decision must not be postponed and conclusions must be reached at the earliest possible time both in regard to the principle aspects of the settlement of Jews in Hebron in the near future and the practical aspects of this question. The very abstention from a decision is likely to be interpreted throughout the world as a bowing to pressures, and not only will there not be a cessation of the erosion of Israel's status in the United States and in Europe but it is also likely to encourage in these countries the elements which are hostile to every Jewish settlement activity in the territories of the Land of Israel.

5830

CSO: 4805

## THEATRICALS OF EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT

Tel Aviv HATZOFEH in Hebrew 11 Apr 80 p 2

[Editorial: "President Sadat's Tactics Seen as Necessary for Egyptian Internal Consumption"]

[Text] Egyptian President Sadat likes theatrics in political discussions. He favors summit meetings and an appearance before the Knesset for his internal political needs. Sadat fully understands his own psychology and that of his people. 'Abd al-Nasir always needed hero's laurels in order to survive. Sadat needs publicity and impressive deeds for internal public relations. This is how his meeting with Jimmy Carter in Washington can be viewed, as well as his proposal to appear before the Knesset so he can talk there "convincingly" regarding the autonomy talks.

His proposal to appear before the Knesset was received in Israel rather coolly. The autonomy talks are quite basic and cannot be dealt with theatrical ploys. At first reliable sources said that now it is Prime Minister Begin's turn to appear before the Egyptian parliament, following Sadat's appearance in the Knesset on his first visit. Sadat promised to invite the Israeli prime minister to appear before the Egyptian parliament. But it seems that various fears of a possible reaction prevented him from keeping his promise. Now when the idea of an appearance at the Knesset surfaced, he was reminded that he has never kept his promise. Therefore he announced that he is willing to invite Prime Minister Begin to the Egyptian parliament.

Sadat is one politician known for surprise moves. His first visit to Jerusalem was surprising and dramatic. The Camp David accords were also surprising. Now he is looking for new surprises. But appearing in the Knesset is a repetition, there is nothing new in it. The expulsion of the Russian advisers was also a surprise move that was understood neither by Israel nor by the West.

The problem is that such unexpected surprises may happen even when Sadat decides that he can sever relations with Israel, after all of the Sinai

is returned. He went quite far with his last proposal, but anything is possible.

Therefore, Sadat's surprises should be weighed carefully so they can be understood. There is nothing wrong with the prime minister being invited to Egypt and President Sadat being invited for another visit to the Knesset. It is strange, however, that such a serious proposal was presented to Israel via Member of Knesset Uri Avneri. There are, after all, diplomatic relations between Israel and Egypt.

8646

CSO: 4805

## FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF PEACE TREATY MARKED BY CONCERN FOR FUTURE

Jerusalem HANODI'A in Hebrew 28 Mar 80 p 2

[Editorial: "First Year of Peace"]

[Text] One year after the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was signed, the hearts of the citizens of Israel are not filled with joy. The date passed without note; no one trumpeted in its honor, neither in Cairo nor in Jerusalem. The doubts and the fears for the future which surfaced at the time of the signing remain even while the treaty is being implemented almost faultlessly, and Israel is fulfilling all of its commitments and Egypt also is slowly continuing the normalization of relations between the two countries despite its having been ostracized by its adversaries in the Arab world.

We must not take lightly the stamina which the president of Egypt is demonstrating against the opposition which is being expressed even in Egypt. Decades of fostered hostility are not uprooted with the stroke of a signature on a treaty. Years of adjustment to a new reality are required. This is not created overnight. However, it would be foolish if we ignored the obstacles on the path, the concerns, and the fears.

Even if the autonomy negotiations were proceeding smoothly, there would be room for suspicion and concern in light of the opposition to the plan and the peace treaty. The residents of the territories refuse to cooperate. They recognize the PLO as their representative. One can ponder the mood of the residents not only during these days when people are bristling over the decision to establish several institutions in Hebron. Even without this, the road of the peace treaty has not been a smooth one. The fear that Egypt is likely to return to a state of war after it achieves its objectives and regains the Sinai has not been uprooted. There is no guarantee that Sadat will indeed be able to continue the peace processes even if there is progress towards the concretization of the Palestinian presence of which Egypt speaks.

How much more this is true when there exists a large gap between the positions of the two countries on the main issue and when on the other hand, the government is conducting a policy which is not calculated to



make things easier for Sadat, exemplified by the decision on Hebron. There is a growing doubt if under the existing circumstances, the peace treaty will survive its anticipated tests. There are more than enough reasons which are likely to erode this treaty, and the government's policy is not the most serious one.

The prospect of reaching an agreement in the autonomy negotiations by the target date appears very slim. During the second year the obstacles which will jeopardize the peace process are likely to increase. There is great doubt if the hope of having other Arab countries join in is likely to be realized in the second year of the peace treaty. The erosion is likely to worsen, and at the end of a reverse process, to crumble the foundation which has been established.

In this stage it is difficult to be too optimistic in light of the aggressive arousal of the residents of the territories. Several days ago the PLO promised to renew the terror, this time within the territories. The first indication of the fulfillment of this guarantee appeared yesterday when terrorists attacked Israeli buses which were moving to bring workers. In Hebron Kawasma declared a boycott of the residents of Qiryat Arba. The process of exacerbating the hostility is likely to reach more dangerous stages, and there is no way of knowing the kind of situation in which we will become involved when the army is compelled to demonstrate force in order to put down the citizen and non-citizen rebellion alike.

The future appears to be cloudy; therefore, there is no heartfelt joy. Israel needs considerable Divine assistance in order to extricate itself from the political trouble. The process of the American administration's moving away from us appears at this stage to be certain in spite of Kennedy's win in New York. A second presidential term has unprecedented danger for Israel's interests. The president will be free from fear of the Jewish voter. It can be said that we are moving toward a difficult period both at home and abroad, one in which only the hope for salvation can comfort and calm. One year after the peace treaty, the danger still has not been lessened for Israel.

5830  
CSO: 4805

EUROPE SEEN MOVING INTO ARAB CAMP

Jerusalem HAMODI'A in Hebrew 12 Mar 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Europe Versus Israel"]

[Text] The president of France, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, left no room for doubt as to which direction the wind is blowing in Paris. During his visit to the Arab countries, he made sure to pave his way with declarations which were severely provocative to Israel, and it was not without reason that he earned the praises of the chief of the terrorists, Yasir Arafat. The trouble is that in these days one does not need courage in order to express support for the demand of the Palestinians for recognition of their right to self-determination, as Arafat has stated. This support has become politically fashionable. Therefore, the PLO representative in Paris, not satisfied with the statements of the president of France which were heard in the Middle East, was in a position to demand an invitation to [establish Palestinian] representation as an embassy.

The trouble is that the French president is not a lone voice. The prime minister of Britain hastened to join in the demand of d'Estaing. Other prime ministers in Western Europe, such as the prime minister of Holland, followed suit. Thus, the way toward a decision of the European Market countries to censure Israel and support self-determination for the Palestinians was open. It is only a matter of time. The French responded affirmatively to the request of the Americans to wait until the approaching "target date" so as not to obstruct the autonomy negotiations under way between Egypt and Israel.

The erosion in the European position on the conflict in the region appears to be occurring at a dizzying rate of speed. The initiative to revise Resolution 242 has been frozen at this stage both in the interest of waiting and out of a desire to give the President of the United States another opportunity. The European Parliament is also likely to undertake the establishment of a commission to investigate what is happening in the territories administered by Israel. All of this creates a hard feeling, a feeling that Europe is against Israel with all its implications.

One can innocently inquire as to why Europe has been added to our enemies. It would be foolish to blame the Israeli foreign policy. The Council of Europe has more serious reasons for expressing its identification with the PLO. One need not seek the reason only in the willingness to prove to Washington that it cannot remain alone in the area as the intermediary in the Middle East. There are other reasons which compel the European countries to do the bidding of the oil producers in the Persian Gulf, primarily Saudi Arabia. These reasons do not require an explanation, since their odor wafts to great distances. On this front, Israel remains virtually impotent. No information campaign and no means of persuasion can fill the oil tanks of Europe.

In this reality, even ethical arguments will fall on deaf ears. Europe, which was the valley of death for six million Jews, has been seeking for a long time to free itself from this burden of conscience. Europe, including West Germany, has developed for itself a new political theory. They are prepared to offer international guarantees for Israel's security. They have forgotten the bitter lesson which Israel learned prior to the Six Day War when no guarantee was effective at the time when Nasir decided to close the Straits of Tiran. How then can Israel depend on a guarantee of the five powers when two of them do not even maintain diplomatic relations with her?

In this ugly political reality, Israel must do its political soul-searching. The clear isolation in the international arena, against the background of the significant vote of the United States in the Security Council once again demonstrates that reliance on the friendship of the nations is a reliance on the support of a broken reed. Europe stands opposed to the State of Israel. In the United States new winds are blowing, and Israel can only rely on our Father in Heaven to extricate it from its political and economic troubles which are weighing heavily at this time on the heart of the citizen of Israel.

5830

CSO: 4805

## NEW SPLIT AMONG FACTIONS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ASSESSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 March 80 p 9

[Article by Yehudah Litani: "Fatah Against the Rejectionist Front"]

[Text] It appears that in recent months a new split has been taking place among the various factions on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip--a split which is transforming the relations between the various powers in the occupied territories.

Security forces dealing with the occupied territories have noticed a new split in recent months among the major factions there. This split, in their opinion, is still just gaining strength, but it has already assumed some importance and is changing relations among the powers in the territories a great deal. No longer is it Jordanian sympathizers versus PLO sympathizers on the West Bank; or the Syrian-Egyptian faction versus the pro-Jordanian faction or the pro-PLO faction on the Gaza Strip. The latter, in light of the renewal and strengthening of relations between Jordan and the PLO leaders, are bringing together former pro-Jordanians into a single camp with the supporters of the central faction of the PLO, Fatah (the most moderate strain within the PLO). Opposing them are the members of the "rejectionist front" in the PLO who are in league with the Communist Party on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The security forces believe that the mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Halhul--Bassam Shakka, Karim Halef and Muhammad Milham--are the mayors most closely identified with the rejectionist front in the PLO. The mayor of Hebron, Fahad Kawasma, hovers between the two camps, and Elias Farij, the mayor of Bethlehem and a former Jordanian sympathizer, is now considered part of the new force that came out of the PLO-Fatah's joining with Jordan.

According to the security forces, the confrontation which has developed between the two camps splits up all the politically active factions on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and creates a new division of power.

The rejectionist front on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip appeared after the Bassam Shakka affair, and security forces say that it has the upper



hand. Members of this camp have proven their internal unity and forceful conduct in the face of crises, and have imposed their will on the more moderate factions, namely, the PLO-Fatah camp and the Jordanian sympathizers.

In line with this interpretation, most of the established administration of PLO supporters in the territories come from the rejectionist front. They dominate the central political institution, the Committee for "National Determination" and another important institution, the Board of Higher Education. This situation is in contrast to the situation in existence in the PLO leadership in Beirut where members of the rejectionist front are in the minority as compared with the established majority of Fatah people.

Security forces say that Fatah has been trying in recent months to turn the clock back, and get their people into positions of power in the various institutions. Their main ammunition consists of control over the funds being channeled into the territories in the form of one or another type of support. At present, Fatah is trying as hard as it can to get supporters of the rejectionist front off the Board of Higher Education, so that PLO-Fatah supporters will constitute a majority.

#### The One Who Pays

According to this interpretation, the committee which Jordan and the PLO are both members of is an important tool for the supporters of Jordan and PLO-Fatah in the territories, since all or most of the funds which are passed onto the territories are filtered through this committee. The members of the committee and its followers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, say the security forces, want to apply the principle of "he who pays, has the say." Till now, however, they have not been particularly successful. The ones with the pursestrings, Jordan and Fatah, are exerting financial pressure, and are channeling funds according to criteria of their own choosing. They are not sending them to members of the Committee for National Determination.

Recently, however, the mayors who follow the rejectionist front have started to complain about the fact that funds for West Bank towns are being transferred from the joint committee of PLO-Jordan to the various towns according to old criteria which were in force before 1967 in West Bank towns and were in accord with oil royalties. Representatives of all the towns have asked, therefore, to go to Rabat-Amman to receive the funds directly from the members of the joint committee.

One of the mayors who is considered to belong to the PLO-Fatah-Jordan front told, on his most recent return from Rabat-Amman, that the first time that Bassam Shakka went outside the boundaries of the West Bank after the dramatic episode of which he was the central figure, the Jordanians treated him like anyone else much to the satisfaction of those opposing him. In contrast to this account, another mayor described that at the time of the meeting of the representatives of the Arab towns in Doha, the capitol of Qatar, Bassam Shakka was recieved with royal honors and with vigorous applause much to the dismay of the Jordan-Fatah supporters who were present at the meeting.

According to the security forces, the appointment of the attorney, Anwar Nuseiba, to the position of Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Jordanian electric company in East Jerusalem was very disturbing to the rejectionist front members headed by the mayor of Ramallah, Karim Halef, who is a member of the Board of Directors. Anwar Nuseiba, who served in the past in a number of positions in the Jordanian government, began as a minister for refugee matters, then became Defense Minister and ended as Jordanian ambassador to Britain. At the time, this last post was considered one of the choicest in the Jordanian government service. Since 1967, he has been considered to be one of the leaders of the pro-Jordanian camp in the occupied territories. Security forces say that he has switched his loyalties to the central PLO camp and that he adheres to this group devotedly.

Because of his appointment to the post of Chairman of the Council of Administrators, Karim Halef has not been attending sessions of company management recently. According to the security forces, the cause lies in the fact that Halef is a member of the rejectionist front while Anwar Nuseiba subscribes to the initiative and support of the opposing camp.

#### Ties With Both Camps

Despite all these evaluations by the knowledgeable security forces of what is going on, it is impossible to tell for sure if this power split goes deep or is ephemeral. One mayor of one of the most important towns in the occupied territories whose views are close to the Jordan-Fatah camp confirmed that such a split exists. According to him, public leaders do not admit this openly in order not to intensify the conflict with the Israeli military rule.

Another mayor, however, says that a basic classic split between Jordanian supporters and PLO supporters still exists and that from time to time a coalition of powers like this or some other kind develops on the basis of this fundamental split.

Are there ideological differences between the two "new" camps? If such a division exists, it would seem that the rejectionist front of the PLO is more extreme as far as its attitude toward Israel is concerned. This matter, however, is complex. Within the bounds of what the security forces have called the rejectionist front, members of the Communist Party play a very active role, and the latter recognize the State of Israel and declare publicly that they are not opposed to the 1948 borders.

In the course of internal debates which took place at the most recent Palestinian convention in Damascus last year between Fatah and the rejectionist front, Fatah supported as a first step, the establishment of a "little state" in the occupied territories which, in its early years, would not adopt a hard line towards Israel in order to prove to the world that there is no danger in establishing a Palestinian state. The rejectionist front fought this proposal vigorously. There are, however, some among them who enthusiastically support this direction.

Perhaps this support is only for public display and inwardly they really support the harder line of the rejectionist front within the PLO. Here we are speaking, especially, about the organizations led by George Habash, Ahmed Gebril, and, to some extent, Naif Hawatma's organization. At this point, however, an attempt to label every leader in the occupied territories as either in the PLO-Fatah-Jordan camp or in the rejectionist front within the PLO would be unrealistic. Many of the leaders and personalities in the territories are still straddling the fence, and there are some who are maintaining good relations with both camps. The security forces point to Fahad Kwasma as an example of this.

The process that the security forces are pointing to is actually just emerging. It may come to a stop or change direction or it may stabilize and grow stronger. These forecasts of things to come are, after all, only forecasts.

[caption of picture] Karim Halef (to the right) and Bassam Shakka engage in discussion after the meeting, held in Beit Hanina, of the mayors of Judea and Samaria.

9348

CSO: 4805

POLITICAL REASONS SEEN BEHIND RELAXATION OF IDF REACTION TO TERRORISTS

Tel Aviv HATZOFEH in Hebrew 11 Apr 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Need to Explain IDF Calculations for or against Raids into Lebanon"]

[Text] The IDF retaliatory action in Lebanon is intended to push the terrorists out of the UNIFIL area, where they have entrenched themselves with the help of UN forces, and prove to them that the IDF can enter their territory. The action will raise tension and according to reports the Syrian army has been put on the alert. But positions of the two sides are far apart, and, for the time being, each side is careful not to cross the "red line."

The announcement of the northern commander that the IDF has refrained from hitting the terrorists for the past six months because of political considerations is true. The stir it aroused is understandable since normally an IDF officer says nothing about political matters, even when they have military implications. The announcement of the defense ministry, according to which the major general was requested not to make any political statements and concern himself only with military matters, is not new. But it does not change the fact that recently the IDF avoided hitting the terrorists and foiling their moves because of political consideration. These considerations are definitely related to peace with Egypt. It was the terrorists who broke the relative relaxation. They have been trying to infiltrate all the time, but without success.

The relaxation on the front with the terrorists was misleading. We now have to return to the previous pattern of preventive action which foils the terrorists' moves. It is hard to say that the Air Force bombing in the north has brought us any sympathy. The Arabs showed horror pictures of the refugee camps that were not too pleasant for us. But these actions were part of a warning and foiling system to prevent the terrorists from organizing.



It is better that a military commander tell the truth rather than hide it, because criticism for the terrorists' success is directed at the military. Therefore, the military has to explain itself; it has to say why a military action was not undertaken up to now. It was for political considerations, as is now quite clear.

The penetration of the terrorists to Misgav-'Am requires professional examination as well as new consideration, military and political. It also requires utilization of new and unconventional methods in order to avoid mishaps as happened in Misgav-'Am.

8646

CSO: 4805

## LABOR PARTY CREDIBILITY

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 9 Apr 80 p 9

[Article: "What Qualifies The Labor Party To return to Power?"]

[Text] Even those who do not trust public opinion surveys cannot ignore the change which points to a rise in popularity of the Labor Party. The change has boosted optimism within the party and expectations to return to power. If Likud fails the test on November 1981, or earlier, it will be similar to the Alinment's defeat of 1977, when Likud came to power not because of its ideology, its human resources and unified ranks, but because of the ideological drain on the Labor Party, which had lost public trust in the correctness of its way. Now, if the Labor Party returns to power, it will be primarily because of Likud's failure. If this happens, the prospects for the country are sad indeed.

Surprisingly enough, the Labor Party did not make a point of examining the reasons for its demise following the 1977 defeat. Some attributed it to internal strife and the lack of authoritative leadership. Some pointed to immorality, corruption, etc. These factors undoubtedly contributed to the decline. But they were not the cause, rather, they were the outcome--the symptoms of a deep seated illness which had been lurking within the party for many years. Since this party may return to power, it is only proper to scrutinize what is going on within it and verify if there is anything to justify its claim to retake leadership.

One of the major phenomena in the history of Zionism and the Jewish community in Israel was the role of the Labor Party (formerly MAPAI and Akhdut Ha'Avoda) from 1933 to 1977. The fact made its mark on the political, economic and social structure of the country. Even three years under Likud have not made much of a dent in this structure with the exception of some marginal changes. Moreover, the Labor Party attained its high position not only because of laborers, but by the support and sympathy of many who did not number among its ranks. Many in Israel and abroad identified the Labor Party with the realization of the Zionist ideas.

## An Advanced Bourgeois Society

What, then, is the background for this impressive rise and its rule for so many years? The idea of the rejuvenation of the Jewish people in its land was common to all segments of Zionism. The Labor Party, more than anyone else, was astute enough to correctly set the goals for the realization of the dream. The focal idea in its platform was that of a "working people"—not in the public relations sense of the word, but in its original sense, i.e., the establishment of a society whose members will themselves perform all the necessary chores for a self-sufficient society, or "productivization" of the Jewish people, if we were to use those days' terminology. This was not a slogan but a demand directed at Jewish youth: a demand to immigrate and work. That demand was responded to, as were others.

In those days, when many of Zionism's fathers doubted that it was possible to achieve a generation of Jewish farmers and industrial workers, it was the Labor Party which raised this demand to a Zionist must of the first degree, and thus wrote a brilliant chapter in the history of the building of the country. It also found ways to set out the means to attain this goal. First and most of all it devoted itself to the establishment of Jewish agriculture based on Jewish labor. It did not ignore needs of urban workers, it saw to it that they were organized and had rights, but most efforts were devoted to Jewish farmers and broadening of Jewish settlements.

### Lip Service To The Dream

The Labor Party defined itself as a Zionist Socialist movement. Close scrutiny proves that while its Zionist content was plentiful, its socialist heritage was lacking. The party preferred Zionist ideas to socialist dogmas. Its demand for Jewish labor and the expulsion of foreign workers did not go hand in hand with the socialist idea of international brotherhood. Its refusal to let Arab workers join the Histadtrut also did not fit in with pure socialism. The same is true with preferring farmers to urban workers.

There was also nothing to substantiate its claim that by establishing kibbutzim, communal towns and cooperatives of urban workers, it had established the basis for a socialistic society. As reality proved, these were not the beginnings of a socialistic society, but those of an advanced, bourgeois society. These were enormous projects, especially on the rural scene, which paved the way for political independence and which turned poor and unskilled people to an established middle class.

The history of the Labor Party clearly shows typical stages of the rise, establishment and decline of a social organism, as outlined by British historian Arnold Toynby. The beginning of a movement is with a social or religious call and its main effort then is spreading the word and gaining support. The movement is then headed by a group of people whom Toynby

defines as "a creative minority," a minority that rules by virtue of the magnetism it projects over its environment, which stems from its creative and rejuvenative power. In the next stage the movement creates tools to service it and stabilize its achievements. The more the movement is entrenched, the more its leaders change. The more the institutions become strong and the number of those dependant on them grows, the more they acquire power.

The institutions designed to be a means to an end become the end itself. The end serves as a coverup to justify the means, that of dependence and coercion. Thus the "creative minority" becomes the "ruling minority." In terms taken out of Jewish history this can be compared with the transition from a period of prophesy to that of priesthood. Since any priesthood has inherent in it the seeds of decline, the movement is destined to deteriorate. Remembering its original idea is but lip service to a faded dream.

The more the Labor Party established institutions and organizations of all sorts, the more the priesthood widened and with it the power base. A large audience, thousands of those dependent on these institutions were the "clientele," whose support of the party was, theoretically, assured. When he was general secretary of the Histadrut, Mordechai Namir said about the importance of ruling via institutions (HA'ARETZ 23 Jan 1953); "Kupat Kholim [Health Fund] is the secret of the power of the Labor movement.... If the British Labor Party were to follow the example of the Histadrut and offer its members services like Kupat Kholim, housing, etc., as is done here, it would never have lost power to the Conservatives."

But Kupat Kholim was not the only "secret of power" of the Labor Party and the Histadrut, its executive branch. Many "power secrets" were established and the more institutions it established, the more the party lost track of its content and goal. Everyone was enlisted to widen the ruling framework. The belief in coercion, mixed in with economic tools and state laws, was unabated. But the more tools there were the greater the gap became between those in charge and those in need of the tools. Ideological awareness was replaced by ideological freeze, adherence to the status quo and shirking away from challenges presented by changing circumstances.

#### Fringe Benefits of Power

Thus the Labor Party deteriorated and the "secret of power" failed on election day. When the period of prophesy was over and the period of priesthood took hold it changed from a movement to an institution, from a Labor Party to a party of workers. It did not make any demands of its members, but saw to it that it gave away benefits, so it could control them. It turned from a demanding movement to a paying party.

The result was not late in coming. To a large extent we have ceased to be a working people. Less than 1/3 of all workers are engaged in production



jobs, the lowest percentage in developed countries. The percentage of those employed in services—mostly services financed by taxes—is the highest in the world. Productivity is at its lowest, labor discipline is non-existent and parasitism is rampant. Important industries are dependent on foreign labor. The atmosphere that the Histadrut nurtured is even more serious. The attitude of "I deserve it" has become a social norm. The shirking away from responsibilities is the other side of the coin.

It is not the electoral failure which is the tragedy of the Labor Party. The tragedy is in the fact that the movement which did so much for the "productivization" of the people in Israel lost its power when the process of "de-productivization" reached its peak.

8646

CSO: 4805

DROP IN FOREIGN RESERVE FOR 1980

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 14 Mar 80 p 15

[Article by Shlomo Maoz]

[Text]

Israel's foreign currency reserves will drop by about \$800m. in 1980, the Treasury estimates. The total current deficit is expected to reach \$3b. this year.

By the end of the year, the foreign currency reserves will be about \$2.07b., compared to \$2.97b. at the end of 1979.

The Treasury estimates that the total current deficit will increase by about \$800m., and the state's debt will reach \$18.8b., compared to \$15.8b. (estimated) for the end of 1979.

Exports — goods and services — will come to \$16.4b., and imports, including defence, will total \$18.4b.

Bank of Israel statistics indicate that the national debt at the end of November was \$14.7b., an increase of 14 per cent in the first 11 months of 1979. Considering that the U.S. had an inflation rate of 13.3 per cent for 1979, the increase in Israel's national debt was relatively small in real terms.

According to the central bank, the bulk of the increase in the national debt was in private debts to lenders abroad, without government guarantee. This category rose by 43 per cent, to \$3.8b.

By comparison, the government debt rose by only 8 per cent, to \$10.7b. The private government-guaranteed debt rose by about 8 per cent, to \$670m. About 88 per cent of state debts are in dollars.

CSO: 4820

DESPITE FARMER PROTESTS, 'PRICE SUPPORT OVER,' BUDGET CHIEF DECLARES

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 18 Mar 80 p 8

[Article by David Krivine]

[Text] "The agricultural crisis is of the farmers' own making," says Yisrael Arkin, the Treasury's budget chief.

He was referring to the stormy protest demonstration by the settler community outside the Knesset 12 days ago against the government's policy, or lack of policy, in this area.

"They say we have dismantled subsidies, neglected to fix quotas and that there is no planning. Cutting subsidies, yes," he says, "we told the farmers that the days of price support are over and done with, they must find their earnings in the market.

"But planning continues as before. Quotas exist; the problem is that many of the settlements--including some of the most flourishing ones--have failed to abide by them."

Target output for milk, a product which lies at the heart of the dispute, was fixed at 677m. litres for 1979/80, according to a progress report put out by the Milk Marketing Board on October 31. In the following month subsidies were slashed, and the bottom fell out of the market.

What to do? The settlements were already, Arkin points out, producing more than their allotted share, so it would have been hard to revise the quota downward; but it could at least have been kept frozen.

Instead it was thoughtfully increased by 30m. litres. A new circular from the board, dated February 7, shows the new authorized total as being 707m. litres.

This is more than the market will take; it only requires 630m. litres. The balance has to be exported--at a whacking loss; and the Treasury covers the loss.

It is an expensive business, he says. Cost of the milk product (milk powder, butter, hard cheese) as delivered by Tnuva is IL13.50 per litre of milk used. The export price is a miserable IL3.50, since foreign markets are not clamouring for these supplies. Bridging the gap involves an outlay of public money--to the tune of IL10 per litre.

Why the complaints then? "We pay what we undertook to pay. A village that produces up to the limit of its quota gets a subsidy for the portion it cannot sell, and that is all. We are not going to disburse compensation for milk produced above quota, in defiance of planning instructions."

The figures are there for all to see, in the Milk Board's circulars. Afikim, for example, was originally authorized to produce 2,155,000 litres. The allocation was raised (although there were no buyers for the extra) to 2,360,000 litres. The kibbutz is now producing at the rate of 2,590,000 litres, exceeding its (supplemental) quota by 230,000 litres.

That excess will not be underwritten by the Treasury.

Curiously enough, the settlements, taken altogether, did not overstep even their original quota figure. Many cut their output back, for one reason or another, by more than they were required to.

Others chose to ignore the regulations. Kibbutz Yifat was allowed 3,260,000 litres, then 3,450,000, and is producing 3,975,000. Kinneret is likewise over-producing by 520,000 litres, Gesher by 420,000 litres. In all, the unlicensed surplus will total 15m. litres.

The farmers are producing 670m. litres between them, 40m. more than they can sell. Of that, 25m. will be "exported" at a subsidized price. Cost to the exchequer: IL250m. The remaining 15m. litres, produced above quota, has no takers.

It represents IL150m. or more of lost cash to the settlements. They borrowed money to finance production, now they cannot repay the loans. No wonder they are mad.

Yisrael Arkin is more intimately linked with agriculture than most of his Treasury colleagues. He comes from a family of farmers. Five generations back the Arkins started tilling the soil in the Russian village of Pablevka. That was in 1830.

Avraham Shlomo Arkin settled in Mazkeret in 1883. Exactly 50 years later, in that same village, Yisrael Haim Arkin, the present Director of Budgets, came into the world. He still farms in his spare time. Moreover one of his first jobs in the Budget Division was to handle the financing of (not surprisingly) agriculture, also (as it happens) subsidies.

What of the government's economic policy in general--has it put Israel into a rut? Not altogether.



He says: "The end purpose of our deflationary policy is to improve the balance of payments, right?"

"Now look at the foreign trade statistics for the first two months of 1980. Exports rose by half, to \$950m.

"Focus your gaze particularly on the branches most affected by the slow-down in the home market. Food exports soared by 54 percent. If we take February alone, the increase (compared with February of last year) is 61.5 percent. Shipments of textiles and clothing shot up by 57.6 percent--and in February by 72 percent.

"Incidentally agricultural exports (omitting citrus) show a remarkable growth-rate too, though that is not seriously affected--as yet--by the latest fall in domestic demand.

"Agricultural export sales rose in the two-month period by 71.5 percent, and in February alone by a mind-boggling 80 percent."

All of which suggests, according to Arkin, that long-term objectives are being achieved. Critics thought that the curtailment of demand at home, through the abolition of subsidies, the imposition of a credit squeeze and budget cutting, would result in idle resources and unemployment. The figures tell a different story. Denied further openings in the domestic market, business firms are switching their resources in the right direction, to the dollar-earning export business, says Arkin.

So far, so good. But people fear that inflation may increase further. The budget-cutting that Finance Minister Hurvitz announced has not in fact come off. The Bank of Israel foresees a resurgence of demand. Although some ministerial budgets were trimmed, others have been augmented, and the net result is bigger estimates even than the ones for 1979.

Hurvitz seems to have got hold of the wrong end of the stick. He was supposed to reduce government outlays from last year's IL425b. to IL405b. (at 1979 prices). What happened to that steadfast resolution?

Arkin grins ruefully. "We are holding hard to the ceiling figure of IL405b.--and we shan't spend more." He adds in English (the only foreign-language phrase used in the interview): "We mean it."

But how? It appears that Hurvitz is girding his loins for a new confrontation. Arkin warns: the struggle to get the budget passed is nothing compared with the fight that lies ahead, starting next month.

He pushes another circular forward, this one signed by his Treasury colleague, the Accountant-General. It is addressed to directors-general of all ministries. Subject: "Adjusting Expenditure to Income." The first two sentences read:

"In order to limit the pace of outlays to the inflow of government revenue, please refrain during the period from March 9 to April 30 from making any acquisitions or commissioning any works.

"Departments must refrain from signing contracts or undertaking obligations during that period, whether under the Ordinary or Development Budgets."

The reference is to new acquisitions and new obligations. All that must be postponed. Exceptions may be authorized in special cases by a committee of two: Eitan Raff (the Accountant-General) and Arkin himself.

"What we are trying to do is to save a month of expenditure during the year by postponing whatever can be postponed. Appropriations will be limited to a fixed sum, which will hopefully come during the first six months to around 45 percent of the year's total." (That means a 10 percent drop in the pace of expenditure.)

"Each ministry must report on its anticipated cash flow. We in the Treasury determine how much money will be made available. From that they will deduct fixed expenditures and commitments they have already made. Whatever is left can be used--after April 30--for new commitments, and not an agora more."

It means that ministries--all of them, Arkin stresses (including housing and defense)--will find their allocations eroded during the coming fiscal year. They will get everything the budget allows alright--but within 13 months, not 12, which is another way of saying that during the official budgetary period April 1, 1980 to March 31, 1981, they will receive less than the Budget Law stipulates.

(Arkin stresses that the Budget Law authorizes the expenditure of IL653b.; it does not compel it.)

Will such a slowdown really happen? Are the ministers going to let themselves be short-changed in this way? It is going to be a hard tussle, Arkin is the first to admit.

Hurvitz is trying to regain on the swings what he lost on the roundabouts. He was out-bargained by powerful colleagues (Weizman, Levy) in the first bout of negotiations. He wants to recoup lost ground the second time round, by rationing the release of funds month by month, so as to claw back something like IL10b. in the course of the year.

The two senior officials appointed to be nay-sayers are Raff and Arkin. Will they manage to stand up against ministerial importunities? Will they be able to turn away spokesmen of the military and the social services empty-handed?

Readers wanting to know the answer must await the second installment of this gripping tale, which Arkin should be in a position to deliver, for better or for worse, six months from now.

## JOINT FRG-ISRAEL RESEARCH PROJECTS

## More Nuclear Research

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST (in English) 19 Mar 80 p 6

[Article by Ernie Moyer]

[Text]

West Germany is currently conducting more than 80 joint research projects with Israel, which means that, after the U.S., Israel is the Federal Republic's biggest partner in research.

This is how Dr. Volker Hauff, German Federal Minister for Research and Technology, described the work of his ministry in relation to this country. He was here as a guest of Energy Minister Yitzhak Moda'i, who had invited him some time ago when the two met in Belgrade.

Hauff, who left Israel yesterday, packed into his three-and-a-half day visit a 30-minute interview with Premier Menahem Begin, and talks with Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Histadrut Secretary-General Yeroham Meshel, opposition leader Shimon Peres, and, of course, host Moda'i.

His talks with Moda'i centred on "weg vom Oel," finding ways of getting "away from oil" as a source of energy. They also touched on the fields of bio-technical and medical sciences, hydroculture, material sciences and physics.

Special emphasis will be put on joint research in solar energy and in new technology as it applies to developing countries, the two ministers decided.

At the Weizmann Institute Hauff announced the founding of the Albert Einstein Centre for Theoretical Physics, which his ministry is funding with an annual grant of about DM1.5m. The centre will invite theoretical physicists for long-term research and will organise interdisciplinary workshops.

At Tel Aviv University, Hauff announced a gift of DM200,000 for the Institute for German History, which is directed by Prof. Walter Grab.

Assistance to the Hebrew University was expressed through a grant of DM200,000 for its Chair for Modern German History, currently held by Dr. Moshe Simmerman.

On behalf of his colleague, Education and Science Minister Hans Juergen Schmude, Hauff also announced the creation of a chair at the Hebrew University's Einstein Institute of Mathematics.

In reply to a question about possible tri-lateral scientific cooperation

between West Germany, Egypt and Israel, Hauff said that his government would support any effort aimed at normalising relations. He stressed, however, that no such move has been initiated so far.

Germany's Ministry for Research and Technology developed out of the 1980 Ministry for the Peaceful Exploitation of the Atom. When Volker Hauff took over the ministry in 1973, he became at 37 the Federal Republic's youngest minister.

The ministry today has a budget of about DM6b. It deals with the improvement of the economy through industrial research and the raising of general living standards, something ministry spokesman Thilo Schmidt described as "die Humanisierung der Arbeit," — humanising labour.

To encourage ecological research, the ministry matches every Deutschmark spent in that area by a university or industrial enterprise. Atomic research is de-emphasised today, Schmidt said. Nevertheless, about one third of all research funds go for work in energy sources other than oil.

"If in 1973 the ratio of money

spent on nuclear research compared to non-nuclear research was 80:1, that ratio today has dropped to less than 2:1," he said.

The priorities the ministry stresses are, energy saving; the use of coal; exploitation of energies derived from the sun, wind and geothermal sources.

Solar energy is increasingly used in Germany to heat homes and for the supply of domestic hot water.

Hauff and his party yesterday morning paid a visit to Yad Vashem, where the minister placed a wreath in the Ohel Yisroel memorial hall. German Ambassador Klaus Schuete, who accompanied the visitors, stressed that the visit had not been scheduled originally, but that Hauff had readily agreed to his suggestion to include it.

As it happens, Hauff had been to Yad Vashem before. He spent four weeks here in 1966, shortly after completing his doctorate in economics and social sciences at the Free University of Berlin.

"I spent a week in Eilat then and toured the country. I remember the trip fondly," he said, "because on it I met my future wife, Ursula, who was a member of the same group."

A member of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), Hauff worked in the early 1960s under then Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt and in 1969 was elected to the Bundestag.

#### Grants for Weizmann Institute

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 17 Mar 80 p 2

[Text]

REHOVOT. — Dr. Volker Hauff, West Germany's minister for research and technology, toured the Weizmann Institute of Science yesterday and announced grants to the institute worth approximately \$1.1m.

Hauff is on a four-day official visit to Israel. He has a meeting scheduled today with Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir and will see Prime Minister Menachem Begin tomorrow before departing for Bonn.

The West German minister spent a few minutes at the console of a

new electron microscope donated by his government and saw a DNA molecule.

"That was the first time I actually saw DNA, though I've made many speeches about it," Hauff commented.

The minister also announced German support for the establishment of the Albert Einstein Centre for Theoretical Physics at the institute to provide long-term research periods for physicists.

Hauff also met yesterday with Hilotadrut Secretary-General Yerahm Meshel.

CSO: 4820



DECLINE IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX EVIDENCE OF INFLATION CHECK

Tel Aviv HATZOFEH in Hebrew 16 Mar 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Trend of Restraint and Checking"]

[Text] The rate of increase of the consumer price index in February which amounted to 4.9 percent was lower than most of the early estimates. Although this index does not reflect the price increases of basic food commodities in the beginning of March, this fact was taken into account in these estimates and it is apparent that the increase during this month was the lowest in 8 months.

The fact that this is the third month in which the index has declined must not raise exaggerated delusions, because the way toward a significant limitation of inflation is still fraught with difficulties. However, the consistent decline in the rate of increase of the index attests to the fact that the Treasury's policy of restraint is moving in the right direction, and together with the public's reaction to the various steps, conditions have been created which are checking the inflation process.

The continuation of the process of checking inflation through appropriate compensation to the workers for the price increases is in the joint interest of the government, the Histadrut, and the employers. These efforts must be made through consultation and cooperation. An important step in this direction was taken on Friday with the positive conclusions which were achieved at a meeting among the three parties regarding the updating of the income tax levels, the establishment of a joint commission on the problems of employment, and a framework agreement in the matter of kibbutz labor accords. It is to be hoped that the cooperation will continue for the good of the economy and the good of the workers alike.

5830  
CSO: 4805

NEW WAGE AGREEMENT PRAISED

Jerusalem HAMODI'A in Hebrew 16 Mar 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Positive Agreement"]

[Text] The success of the three parties--the Treasury, the Histadrut, and the employers--in reaching an agreement on Friday on a wage policy to be effective from April offers a certain ray of light, and perhaps it indicates the beginning of an awareness on the part of the policy makers that without coordination it is impossible to extricate the economic wagon from the mire in which it has become bogged down.

Everyone knows that no one has the key to a miracle solution, however to the same extent, it is clear that if the government moves in one direction and the Histadrut in another direction, and also the employers, it is impossible to create a framework for coordinated action. Without this, there is no prospect for industrial calm in which the workers will receive an honorable compensation, however they will also not be dragged after cheap demagoguery, the objectives of which are political-party more than the good of the worker or the good of the State.

It is clear that we must maintain an instrument which protects the workers community from an erosion of their wage standard so that they will be able to endure the price increases the end of which is still not in sight. To the same extent, it is necessary that the representation of the workers see everything not only from the limited corner of what is called "the good of the worker," but instead, they must see the good of the economy in all its aspects. Excessive demands not only damage the employer but ultimately damage the worker himself because in this way the basis from which he can be nourished and achieve even the basic wage is removed.

In such a situation, it is necessary that there be coordination among all the policy makers in the economy, and from this stems the importance of consultation and agreement achieved among the three aforementioned parties. A guarantee of the worker's real income, a guarantee of industrial tranquility, and the avoidance of demands for which there is no source to cover them are likely to make an effective contribution to the dissipation of the storm which is affecting the State, primarily on the wage front.

To this picture must now be added the campaign which the teachers are conducting against the government with considerable fervor. It is possible that here have been mistakes by the government when it is not satisfied with the assurances of the teachers of not engaging in job actions during the course of the current year, but it even demanded of them to make a commitment not to seek wage supplements, something which was not requested of other workers. Now, however, in an atmosphere of goodwill which can be expected to prevail as a result of the agreement among the three parties which we have cited, it is essential that both the government and the teachers make an effort to show goodwill so that the conflict in the schools will be ended.

The government stands today as the first agenda item on this subject of the teachers. It will be required today to make an unequivocal decision that the scope of the disruption in the schools is extremely serious, and at the same time there is ending a veiled threat of Minister of Education Mr Zevlun Hammer that he will be forced to resign if the current situation continues. It is possible that Mr Hammer has become caught up in an exaggerated defense of the teachers, perhaps because he has learned to recognize their problems, but it is possible to agree with him on one thing, that we cannot continue to have a situation in which complete chaos prevails in the educational system.

In addition to the necessity for it to extricate itself from the confusion of the teachers strike, the government must stand aside in what has been requested so that that agreement on the wage front is preserved. It would seem that this is not too much to expect of it, that at least during the period of the Passover holiday, it should avoid price increases and making commodities more expensive so that the agreement can go into effect and take hold in the soil of reality. It is necessary that there be a certain period of quiet. It is possible that financial losses are worthwhile in order to achieve all of this, to bring about a situation in which the public will be extricated from an atmosphere of despair and indifference which have already penetrated it because of the frequent price increases. The cost of subsidizing commodities for a certain period of time is more worthwhile than continuing to depress it with new increases, especially during the days of the holiday when each family's expenses are considerably increased.

However, as was stated, the government is not the only partner to this agreement. The Histadrut must overcome political-party considerations and extreme demands and not make things difficult for the preservation of this agreement which guarantees, as was stated, the preservation of the real wages of the worker. It would be worthwhile for it to consolidate its position in this direction, that a cost-of-living increase will be paid in full four times a year, and the tax levels will be updated on this scope without seeking increases in the basic wage during the period of the agreement. There is no doubt that a period of quiet can bring stability to the economic system of the State.

NEW PAPERS APPEAR IN GAZA, JERUSALEM

First For Gaza

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 6 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Gideon Weigert]

[Text]

A new newspaper, "A-Sharq al-Awsat" (The Middle East) this week made its debut in Gaza. The new paper's publisher-editor, Mohammed Jamil Shawwa, is a cousin of Gaza mayor Rashad Shawwa.

The paper is the first full-sized, six-page newspaper to be published in Gaza since 1967. Although it has a permit to appear daily, it temporarily will be published fortnightly, at a price of 50 new agorot.

The first issue featured on its front page photos of PLO chief Yasser Arafat, mayor Shawwa, Yigal Allon (to whom a third of a column is devoted) and, in the mid-

dle of an obituary, a photo of former PLO chairman Ahmed Shukeiry, who died in Amman last Tuesday.

In his first editorial Shawwa said that there was a positive side to the Camp David agreements, which "admit the legitimate rights of the Palestinians."

Gaza has two other Arab publications, both illustrated monthlies "Akhbar Gaza" (Gaza News) edited by Sheikh Ahmed Abu Sirdana and "Al Ulum" (Sciences) edited by Haj Zuhair el-Rayyis.



## New Arabic Paper

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 12 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Ian Black]

[Text]

The first issue of a new Arabic newspaper will be on sale in East Jerusalem today following agreement by the authorities to grant its publishers a licence. It will be called "Al-Mithak" (The Covenant).

The paper will be published by members of the well-known al-Khatib family of Jerusalem. Ali al-Khatib, who was expelled by the military government in 1975, was formerly editor of the daily "As-Sha'ab."

The paper, whose first issue today will be an experimental one, is expected to devote a good deal of space to local issues. Politically, it will stress the need for Palestinian independence from Arab patrons.

So far the publishers have only been given permission to distribute "Al-Mithak" in East Jerusalem, not the West Bank and the Gaza

Strip. A similar restriction is applied to the left-wing weekly "At-Talia."

Contacts are under way between the publishers and the office of the IDF's coordinator of operations in the administered territories to extend the permit.

Members of the al-Khatib family. The Post has also learned, are attempting to persuade the authorities to allow Ali to return home. He was deported after the translation in the Hebrew press of a strongly-worded article by him in "As-Sha'ab."

The family is now arguing, on the basis of last year's Bassam Shak'a affair, that Ali was the victim of political expulsion designed to satisfy public anger caused by his article, which called for the creation of a "secular, democratic Palestinian state," in place of Israel.

CSO: 4820

## LONDON NOW CENTER FOR ARABIC PRESS

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 18 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Yoel Dar]

[Text]

LONDON. — A new international centre of Arabic journalism has sprung up here over the past five years, offering a wider variety of newspapers, periodicals and underground leaflets to the Arabic reader than was available even in pre-civil war Beirut.

London's large Arab community and the city's popularity with Arab emigré journalists wishing to freely express their opinions, have contributed to the boom.

In spite of their high prices, ranging from the equivalent of £1.5 to £6.5, the newspapers are bought daily by tens of thousands of Arabs who live in, or visit, London.

Two daily newspapers are produced in London, "Al Arab" and "Al Sharq al-Awsat." "Al Arab," founded three years ago, costs £1.5, and relies heavily on reports from international agencies.

"Al Sharq al-Awsat" is bigger and richer. "The international daily newspaper of the Arabs," as editor Jihad Al Khasen calls it, has reporters in many countries. The last journalist to meet the former Afghan leader Hafizullah Amin, only hours before his execution, was an "Al Sharq al-Awsat"

reporter. In the interview, the Afghan leader boasted that the Soviet Union did not intervene in domestic affairs and expressed his gratitude for the economic and military aid it had given his country with no strings attached.

Until recently, prominent Egyptian journalists like Mustafa Amin and Ihsan Abdel Kudus published in "Al Sharq al-Awsat." Mustafa Amin wrote an account of his experiences as a political prisoner under Nasser's regime. Accused of illegal contacts with the Americans, he was released after Sadat succeeded Nasser in 1970.

Amin publishes a daily column in the Egyptian newspaper, "Al Akhbar," founded by him and his brother Ali in 1952. "Al Sharq al-Awsat" reproduced the column until political pressures, a few weeks ago, apparently stopped him from contributing to a newspaper critical of President Anwar Sadat and his policy towards Israel.

Arabic magazines, such as "Ad Dastour" and "Al Sharq Al-Jadid," are also flourishing in London. "Al Sharq Al-Jadid" (The New East) recently published a story about a group of wealthy Arab tourists who spent nearly £200,000 a night in London's nightclubs and

hinted that the Arabs were using the nightclubs as brothels.

"Al Jihad," also published in London, recently described Col. Muammar Gaddafi of Libya as a fool and coward who employs 5,000 Cuban soldiers to safeguard his life. It carries shocking stories about the Libyan authorities' treatment of political prisoners.

For some reason, the Popular Lebanese magazine "Al Hawadess" is printed in London and not in Beirut where its editors live. This technical arrangement perhaps arose because of the Syrian censorship of Lebanese newspapers since 1977.

London's streets also display newspapers that are difficult to obtain in the Arab world, such as "Al Dawa," and "Al Nasser," the organs of the Egyptian and Syrian Moslem Brotherhood.

"Al Nasser" publishes military bulletins about the sect's clashes with the Syrian forces. The leaflets condemn both the Camp David accords and Soviet influence in the region.

## ISRAEL

### BRIEFS

**TOURISM INCOME**--Israel's income from foreign tourism exceeded its import of tourist services by some \$500m. in 1979, statistics gathered by the Bank of Israel's foreign currency examiner show. The final amount will be known only after figures for last December are released. For the year's first 11 months, Israel spent \$251m. on tourist services from abroad, and brought in \$737m. by providing tourism services here. Average income per tourist was \$707, up by 25 percent from 1978, a much bigger increase than the dollar's fall in value. Meanwhile, the hotels association has demanded that the Knesset Finance Committee allocate an additional \$15m. during fiscal 1980 to promote tourism here for the coming year. [Text] [Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 14 Mar 80 p 15]

CSO: 4820

PANEL DISCUSSES CONSUMER AFFAIRS, POLICIES

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 9 Apr 80 p 3

[Article: "Details of Studies Presented at Discussions of Consumer Education Panel; Dr al-'Inani Says, 'Teaching Consumers Good Consumer Habits Is One of Society's Essential Duties for Strengthening Its Savings;' Dr Haddad Says, 'We Are To Focus on Local Production and Reduce Volume of Imports;' Mr 'Azir Says, 'We Are To Pay Attention to Sources of Individual Savings and To Curb Spending for Public Consumption'"]

[Text] Yesterday, at the University of Jordan, his Excellency the Prime Minister 'Abd-al-Hamid Sharaf inaugurated the scientific panel discussion for teaching consumers good consumer habits.

Dr Nasir al-Din al-Asad, president of the University of Jordan made a statement in which he welcomed his excellency the prime minister.

He affirmed the importance of explaining and demonstrating the scientific and practical notion of teaching consumers good consumer habits and the impact which such guidance would have on the course of our development and on our social ideas. Dr al-Asad praised the government's directives in the area of the proposed educational plan, and he praised the meetings that his excellency the prime minister held with educational leaders. He praised the return to the land and the concern with agriculture which he considered to be the mainstay of existence and the unparalleled origin of all things.

The opening of the panel discussion was attended by several ministers, deputy ministers, directors of departments and interested organizations in both the private and the public sectors, and the deans and faculty members of the University of Jordan.

Afterwards the panel discussion began with a study that was prepared by Dr Jawwad al-'Inani, minister of supply and presented for him [by someone else]. Dr al-'Inani's study stated:

"Teaching individual consumers good consumer habits means teaching each consumer to look for the best alternatives among the goods and services



that are available so that he can achieve his maximum needs and wants within the limits of his budget or his disposable income. This means that the consumer is to study the market and to become familiar with the goods and services that are available in this market. He would purchase the goods and services that cost the least in the quantities that he needs. With the income that he saves from this effort, the consumer can purchase other goods, or he can save the funds to purchase other goods in the future. This is what economists call the search for the ideal solution for the consumer. This ideal solution is that which gives the consumer the maximum satisfaction in accordance with his personal priorities and with those restrictions that are imposed upon him such as income and prices."

Dr al-'Inani said, "The consumer has to look for good quality goods at the lowest possible price. This requires that he play with the time factor so that he would purchase a commodity only at the time when he believes that he can balance the good quality of the commodity with its low price."

The study states that [consumer] analysis has so far assumed that the restrictions imposed on consumer spending are income and prices. This is because income determines the level and the volume of spending. Price, however, determines the quantitative distribution of the goods and services that are purchased. But these factors alone may not suffice to explain the volume of an individual's or a society's consumer spending. Other reasons for consumer spending which are not purely economic in nature but are cited by economists as factors affecting the volume and the distribution of consumption must be looked into. Among these factors are:

#### Conspicuous Consumption and the Phenomenon of "Keeping Up with the Joneses:"

These phenomena can be found in all societies. They abound in traditional societies that adopt social values according to which the status of the famous and the wealthy is held in high esteem and their style of life becomes a model to be emulated by the less fortunate. The phenomenon of "keeping up with the Joneses" and that of conspicuous consumption appear clearly in those societies which are experiencing sudden wealth or unexpected surges in the distribution of income. In these societies a new group of wealthy people who are eager to consume is emerging.

#### Expectations:

An individual's or a family's expectations are the result of many and numerous circumstances, but the most important of those are the expectations that an individual or a family has about prices rising in the future. Such an expectation would make it wise for the consumer to prefer making a purchase now rather than in the future.

#### The Redistribution of Income:

In many countries circumstances that are outside the economy appear on the scene and contribute to the redistribution of wealth from those who have been

saving their money to those who are eager to consume. This did actually happen in Jordan when a wave of land speculation occurred and income was redistributed from those who purchase land (those who save money) to those who sell land (those who are eager to consume). It is thus that the principle of making up for [the deprivations of] the past begins to work. Demand for the consumption of luxurious goods increases, and especially when consumption of such goods gives the impression that the consumer has achieved the social status which he has been wishing for.

#### The Dearth of Investment Opportunities:

When opportunities for consumer spending in a society grow at a rate higher than that of the growth of investment opportunities, that society and its individuals are consuming their present and their future. This phenomenon is more evident in those societies where investors favor making a quick profit with little risk or in those societies where the elements of creativity and organization are rare.

#### The Development of the Banking System:

It has been noted in many developing countries that the banking sector leads other sectors and that its way of doing business does stand out. The growth experienced by banks in societies with a high rate of consumption that is tied to a similar expansion in the trade sector is larger and greater than that in other societies. Banking institutions resort to fostering consumer habits by [encouraging] installment buying. The banking and trade sectors cooperate on this matter. The trade sector borrows from the banks almost without any restrictions and looks hard for ways to tempt consumers when there is any opportunity that consumers may respond. The trade sector makes goods available to consumers who purchase them under the impression that these goods are necessary and that they cannot do without them. Banks also give merchants the right to conduct business like banks do when they make loans to consumers and receive payments on these loans through the banks themselves. Banks thus find it very profitable to do business with the merchants.

The study adds that teaching consumers good consumer habits at this stage becomes one of society's essential duties so it can catch its breath [so to speak], strengthen its savings and turn towards production.

The reasons for teaching consumers good consumer habits are: development in Jordan has relied on the capability of the government and those who were active in the private sector to undertake huge investment projects. The public sector, however, has made use of a high rate of borrowing and attracting aid from abroad. It has also increased the volume of its financing from the private sector in the form of taxes and fees. The private sector has benefited from the funds that the state and those working abroad have transferred to finance some of its investments. What is being called for, therefore, is a gathering of larger resources for the investment process and action to strengthen self-reliance in financing and implementing the develop-

ment projects that are being called for. This does not happen unless savings are increased and consumption reduced.

[Another reason for teaching consumers good consumer habits] is also the continuous rise in import prices in the world and the disturbances that have beset world markets, especially with regard to food.

Furthermore, the decline in productivity and the shortage in the number of workers who are required to face the growth and the structure of investment require that productivity be increased and that social values be changed.

This would only come about by steering society away from conspicuous consumption and the erroneous values that such consumption implies. Curbing and steering consumption in this case would not be confined to families and individuals; it would also apply to the government and to its institutions in the context of an organized plan.

This is the truth about the life we must face in Jordan. Ever since the present government proposed this idea of teaching consumers good consumer habits, the following reactions were recorded:

\* There were positive reactions that accepted the idea and tried to interpret it, add to it and formulate policies that can be implemented.

\* There were reactions that stated that teaching consumers good consumer habits cannot take place in a society most of whose members are poor, have limited incomes or can hardly meet the expenses of life. This policy is merely a belt-tightening method.

The answer to this erroneous logic is simple. If our society is importing over 5 million dinars worth of chocolate and confections and millions of dinars worth of clothing, it is not possible that all this is consumed by high income people. [The same] applies to furniture, homes, apartments, parties, perfumes, cosmetics, cigarettes, cigarette lighters, electricity and cars.

There are those who react to the idea of teaching consumers good consumer habits by saying that reducing consumption will reduce the volume of local production. Such a statement, of course, can be refuted because it relies primarily on the idea that the growth (or the doubling) of revenues depends on the volume of consumption. If this point were to be debated to its ultimate conclusion, we would conclude that growth would be faster whenever savings diminish and that if savings were zero, growth would be at a maximum. [We may accept] this as a true proposition if we were short-sighted, but how can we consume goods tomorrow if we were not to save and invest today?

We must, consequently, focus on local production, and we must reduce the volume of imports. We must let the rates of interest rise to their actual level, and we must reduce the government's subsidy of any consumer activity;

such support should rather be diminished. We must reconsider taxes, especially direct taxes so that they would be more just and can be collected better. We must reconsider [our] investment in [our] human resources so that we can prepare the cadres that are lacking and are required for a genuine process of growth that is based on production.

Projects outside the capital are to be supported so that we can make our agricultural resources grow, and conditions of trade exchange between the agricultural sector and the cities are to be allowed to improve in favor of agriculture so that we can strengthen agricultural production and reduce migration from rural areas to the cities where citizens are tempted to consume goods. Citizens are to be given various incentives to invest all their possible resources and to stay away as much as possible from consumption. The media is to be utilized to steer people away from harmful consumer values, and patriotic education, which advocates faith in principles and morals, is to be strengthened. Patriotic education places its priorities on the basis of a more far-sighted and a broader view of things and on advocating all aspects of participation.

Dr Adib Haddad

Dr Adib Haddad, economic adviser to the Jordanian Central Bank presented a study on evaluating the economic policy in Jordan.

The study stated that before one proceeds with plans for economic guidance, one must analyze the existing economic conditions so that, on the one hand, economic policies to guide the factors of production can be formulated and, on the other hand, the danger of monetary inflation which accompanied the implementation of the programs of the 1976-1980 Five-Year Development Plan can be grappled with. Accordingly, we will attempt in this study to evaluate the economic conditions that accompanied the course of the Jordanian economy during the years 1975-1979. We will then present the most important characteristics of the Jordanian economy. These characteristics played a major role in contributing to the adoption of the current economic policies. We will also attempt to analyze the Jordanian economy as the center for future economic policies that are essential to the process of economic development.

Dr Haddad said, "Estimates of local production and of the gross national product which are available at current prices indicated that production rates rose during the period from 1975-1979. The market price of the GNP rose from 420 million dinars in 1975 to 790 million dinars in 1979. This is a monetary rate of growth that exceeded 21 percent per year. The market price of local production also rose to about 635 million dinars in 1979 compared with 280 million dinars in 1975. That is a monetary rate of growth of 30 percent per year.

This growth in the GNP and in local production was the product of different rates of growth that were achieved by all the economic sectors. It is noteworthy that the Jordanian economy is suffering from a decline in the contri-



bution made by the agricultural and industrial commodity production sectors to the GNP. During the years 1975-1979 our national economy was characterized by the fact that it was an economy that generated nonproductive economic activities. The market price of the contribution made by the agricultural sector to local production amounted to approximately 10 percent per year, and that of the industrial sector, to approximately 20 percent. The contribution made by the services sector, which includes the rest of the economic sectors, amounted to approximately 70 percent.

In the area of expenditures made for the national product, total spending for all consumption grew from 371 million dinars in 1975 to about 715 million dinars in 1979. That is an annual rate of growth of about 23 percent. But the rate of growth of spending for private consumption was greater than that of the growth of spending for public consumption. Spending for private consumption grew at a rate of 27 percent per year, compared with 19 percent for spending on public consumption.

Dr Haddad added that the phenomenon of inflation in Jordan which is manifested in the sharp and continuing rise of record cost of living figures, was a modern phenomenon. The rise in the level of prices in the period that preceded the June 1967 War did not exceed 2 percent. But this rate began to increase gradually until it amounted to approximately 5 percent during the period between 1967 and 1972; it rose about 10 percent in the period between 1972 and 1975; and it rose more than 14 percent in the period between 1975 and 1979.

Concerning the monetary situation Dr Haddad said, "The Jordanian economy has achieved a major increase in the total monetary variables that are represented by the nominal money supply. The money supply rose from 219 million dinars in 1975 to 466 million dinars in 1979. That is a rate of growth of over 29 percent. From 1972 to 1975 the money supply rose at an annual rate of 25 percent. It is noteworthy that the rate of growth in the money supply exceeded the rate of growth in the production of goods and services. There is no doubt that the increase in the money supply at rates that are greater than the expansion rates in economic activity leads to an increase in total demand without such increase in demand being accompanied by an increase in national production over the short range. Consequently, this makes the sharp rise in the general level of prices much worse.

The growth of the money supply in the last 5 years is basically due to the increase that occurred in the funds available in foreign accounts. This was reflected in the increasing rise in government spending. These expenditures were made to stimulate economic activities and to implement economic and social development projects. The other factor that had a major influence on the growth of the money supply and on exaggerating the inflationary pressures was represented by the credit terms that were being granted by the banking sector. Had it not been for the measures that were taken by the Central Bank to curb the growth of credit, the backlash of the increase in credit would have been more than what actually happened in the period from 1975 to 1979.

In this context the fiscal condition is characterized by a continued deficit in the state budget. This requires an increased dependence on domestic borrowing by means of issuing public bonds and treasury bonds, on the one hand, and [by accepting] financial assistance to strengthen the treasury, on the other.

Dr Haddad said, "The balance of payments, measured by the balance of ongoing transactions and the activity of non-monetary capital, achieved a savings in all the years of the Five-Year Plan. Savings rose to 30 million dinars in 1979, compared with 12 million dinars in 1975.

The flow of foreign aid and funds transferred by Jordanians working abroad also played a principal role in determining the condition of the balance of payments. Total foreign aid in 1975 amounted to 85 million dinars; it rose to about 300 million dinars in 1979. Funds transferred by Jordanians working abroad rose from 47 million dinars in 1975 to 180 million dinars in 1979.

In spite of the major savings achieved in the Jordanian balance of payments, the Jordanian balance of trade is still suffering from a chronic deficit that goes back to the beginning of 1950. Jordan's exports finance no more than 15 percent of its imports. Jordan is also importing more than two thirds of the goods it consumes. In 1979 the trade deficit amounted to 430 million dinars, compared with a deficit of 182 million dinars in 1975. It is expected that the deficit in the balance of trade will continue to grow until it reaches 490 million dinars in 1980. This is contrary to the deficit anticipated by the Five-Year Plan which was not to exceed 131 million dinars by the end of 1980.

Dr Haddad concludes his study by saying that the aforementioned economic conditions have dictated to our national economy basic phenomena (characteristics) which have coincided and coexisted with it in the formation of its development. These features were able to upset the budgets and the plans that had been made and to disturb the national economy. They have even formed vicious circles which sometimes seem to be difficult to break and to control despite fierce attempts to do so. These phenomena may be summarized as follows:

- \* The productive economic sectors are backward and the control of the non-productive economic sectors on most of the economic activities is increasing.
- \* There is considerable reliance on foreign financial aid which, in turn, depends on harmonious political relations between Jordan and the countries that help it.
- \* There is a chronic deficit in the makeup of the balance of trade, and there are discordant increases for the balance of payments in the other economic sectors.
- \* There is a run-away deficit in the general state budget and an increased dependence on domestic borrowing.

\* There is a sharp rise in the general level of prices that is threatening the course of the economic course in plans that are being made for economic and social development.

The genuine relationship with the phenomenon of economic balance is that the volume of the monetary bloc be absolutely consistent with the volume of the purchasing power, on the one hand, and with the volume of the GNP on the other. However, the aforementioned statistical evidence indicates that there is a lack of homogeneity in this bond in Jordan. We notice that, on the one hand, there is an increase in the money supply and in purchasing power, which is represented by government spending, and that this increase, on the other hand, is not countered by an increase in national production. This situation led to an increase in imports and to a sharp rise in the general level of prices as a result of a short-term increase in total demand which was unaccompanied by a comparable increase in the supply of goods and services. This disrupts the balance between supply and demand, and it means that the continued major increase in government spending for public facilities and economic development affects the money supply and consequently the general level of prices. It is not strange that the implementation of economic development programs on a broad scale in economically growing countries must inevitably be accompanied by monetary inflation. The successful implementation of economic program plans, however, requires that such implementation be made by means of effecting a significant increase in the money supply. Such an increase in the money supply can generate actual production at first, provided that there be coordination between the money supply and the productive sectors of the economy.

Dr Haddad added that the phenomenon of economic balance is also based on being fair to the productive economic sectors in the process of financing their projects. In order for the banks to contribute effectively to the consecutive planning operations, the framework which they use to invest their savings must be altered in a manner that would make it consistent with the productive economic projects. This means that a certain economic sector is not to take possession of more credit than what is estimated for it in the development process. This requires use of accurate statistical data about the production and the financing needs of each sector. It also requires proper control in the use of loans for the purpose intended. This supports what planners have stated about the fact that planning for economic development does not only require increasing the volume of production of the economic sectors, and consequently, the volume of income that is generated therefrom, but it also requires bringing about change in each sector's rates of contribution to the process of generating national revenue in a manner that is consistent with balanced economic growth.

The phenomenon of economic balance and [the process of] guiding the national economy are two sides of the same coin; they cannot be separated from each other. Teaching consumers good consumer habits is also an inseparable part of directing the components of the national revenue such as investment, imports, exports and the revenues of other production factors. Any change that takes place in any one of these components will affect all. This is accordingly



reflected on the process of balancing the growth of the various economic sectors. Accordingly, this debate on teaching consumers good consumer habits must be part of and not a substitute for a universal debate to direct the national economy as a whole.

Mr Wasif 'Azir

Mr Wasif 'Azir director of the retirement fund presented a study about the inflationary trend and how prices can be controlled.

The study stated that a sense of the magnitude or the burden of inflation is due to two matters: the actual effect of inflation on man's standard of living and the general psychological position of people. Mr 'Azir said that talking about the inflation index figures opens the door to much discussion because inflation not only affects individuals, it also affects the other aspects of economic activity in general. Consequently, its effects can have a significant impact on the course of development in general. This is usually reflected in a rise in the cost of projects.

The importance of the latter subject may perhaps assume a deeper significance to our Jordanian economy than that which would be given to it in an advanced industrial economy. In advanced economies individual savings from domestic revenues are converted into a high ratio of investments, whereas the situation in Jordan is considerably different in this area. A high ratio of public and private investments is converted from sources other than those of individual savings. But the measurements that are available to us about inflation, however, focus basically--or more accurately, focus totally--on the effect of inflation on the daily lives of citizens. These measurements do not pay any attention to the effect of inflation on the development process.

Mr 'Azir said, "It may be appropriate here to begin with a brief statement that would define the notion that we are talking about: this is the change in the general level of prices. Let us say that what is intended by this notion is to measure the rate of change that is brought about by price differences, which occur from one period to the next, and by the current monetary value of a specific group of goods and services. Consequently, when it is said that the ratio or the rate of inflation is X percent, what is intended by such a statement is that this ratio represents the effect that that rate of increase in the prices of a group of goods and services, measured in the society's market basket in a period of time, which is the base year, (and there is no flexibility to change) has had on the purchasing power of the currency which purchased this market basket during the base year.

Mr 'Azir says that the preliminary and simple explanation of the figures for change in the cost of living is this: the Jordanian family that used to purchase goods and services of a specific variety in certain quantities in 1975 for 100 dinars had to have 156 dinars to purchase the same quantity of goods and services in 1979. If this family's income did not increase by 56 percent during the period from 1975 to 1979, this means that this family's



standard of living has declined and that it is no longer capable of maintaining the same standard of living that it had in the base year.

The panelists were objectively and positively discussing every study after it was presented. They were trying to make the panel discussion achieve the results for which it was intended.

#### The Panel Resumes Its Meetings

The panel resumed its meetings in the debating hall at the University of Jordan yesterday afternoon under the chairmanship of Mr Salim Mas'dah, the minister of finance. During that session a number of specialists and researchers presented working papers and analytical studies.

The first study that was presented was by Dr Muhammad Bani Hani with the Central Council for Planning. It included a study of the justice of the distribution of burdens and incomes. The study made reference to the method of income distribution in Jordan by making an actual study of the Jordanian economy and analyzing the problem of justice in the distribution of income among the members of society with regard to the nature of such justice, the methods of measuring it and its effects on development, savings and economic growth.

The study also referred to the problem of the extent to which justice can be found in the distribution of income in the Jordanian economy. It [sought to] identify the reasons for the problem and the methods that would treat it in the context of the economic and the social system that is prevailing in Jordan.

The second study that was presented by Dr Haytham al-Hurani of the University of Jordan included an analysis of Jordanian imports and of [the process of] teaching consumers good consumer habits for the purpose of finding out the volume of these imports, the evolution of this import activity and the makeup of these imports, which include consumer goods, intermediary goods and capital goods.

The study referred to establishing a connection between consumer spending and the importation of consumer goods. Statistics cited in this study indicated that the trends for increasing consumption and the rates of growth in imports were high. The rate of consumption was equal to 89.3 percent of the GNP, and this is a high rate that is inconsistent with the needs of economic development. Meanwhile the rate of imports amounted to 84.5 percent of the 1978 GNP.

Imports are also increasing annually at a rate of 21 percent, whereas the GNP is growing at a rate of 8.5 percent.

The makeup of imported goods indicates that consumer goods, which amount to 60 percent of total imports, control imports. Imported consumer goods are growing at a rate of 22 percent per year, and this is creating a chronic trade deficit.

The study called for controlling imported consumer goods and establishing a comprehensive national policy on the subject of consumption.

Dr 'Abdallah Hamarnah of the University of Jordan presented a detailed study about the food crisis in Jordan and the reasons for it. He attributed this crisis to the fact that Jordan was affected by world factors of high prices and increases in the prices of oil, imports and production costs. In addition, the citizens' level of consumer awareness was low, and local food production was inadequate.

The study also advocated that a comprehensive nutrition survey be conducted in Jordan and that a balanced diet plan be established. It advocated making an attempt to change prevailing food habits and modes by means of increasing awareness, providing instruction and developing the local production of food with the cooperation of the Arab countries that import Jordanian foods like vegetables and fruits.

Dr Ahmad Qasim al-Ahmad from the economic department of the Royal Academy of Science also presented a study on the demand for consumer goods. His study indicated that any economic society, regardless of the degree of development it has achieved and the economic and social philosophy it is adopting, must face three economic questions. These are: the question of the distribution of rare resources for the production of capital and consumer goods and services; the question of distributing the national revenue among the members of society; and the question of economic growth, of the level of use and the level of prices.

The study affirmed that pre-planning a family's needs, anticipating the goods that will be needed after a subsequent period and making an effort to distribute income over periods of time so as not to exert any pressure on the family's budget are significant factors in establishing the required guidance that would prevent the occurrence of crises and inspire the consumer with confidence that the commodity that he would demand at any time would be available at a price that is suitable to his income.

After [the panelists and the audience] listened to these studies, there was a general debate on the subjects that were proposed.

8592

CSO: 4802

STEADFASTNESS FRONT'S USE OF OIL WEAPONS DISCUSSED

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 16 Apr 80 pp 1, 19

[Editorial: "Resolutions of the Steadfastness Summit--and Oil"]

[Text] Out of all the resolutions adopted by the Steadfastness Summit in Tripoli, which were good ones whether from the standpoint of forming unified military and political leaderships or calling for defining relations with the United States, let us pause at the resolution which called for the Steadfastness Front to submit to the conference of Arab economy and finance ministers, which will make the preparations for the coming Arab summit conference, "an economic program dealing with the possibilities of using Arab economic might in confronting imperialism and Zionism."

It is known that the conference of Arab ministers will convene in the Jordanian capital this June to prepare a formula for economic cooperation among Arab states, and formats for their integration.

The important thing here is that the Steadfastness Front, which has adopted the principle of resuming the oil embargo as proposed by Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, feels that the use of this weapon will not be beneficial or effective unless it is total, with all Arab states and Arab funds participating.

As important and essential as it is to once again put the oil weapon into the battle, getting Arab unanimity on it, especially from the other Arab petroleum states, is the factor which will give this weapon its effectiveness and advantage.

Therefore, although there have been obstacles which have prevented, or are even now preventing, the use of the oil weapon and the financial and economic weapon in general, keeping it in the realm of possibility, even if it is delayed, is greatly preferable to letting it come all torn to shreds, devoid of effect, or not come at all, for then we would have lost all our weapons.

Therefore, leaving this matter to be discussed at the Arab ministers conference and subsequently the Arab summit in 'Amman will go on record to the benefit of the Steadfastness Front as a sensible, wise, far-sighted program, from the standpoint of preventing the dangers of separation among the Arab forces and maintaining the very strong possibility that this weapon will play its part in full and in an integrated matter, not limited merely to the two oil states in the Steadfastness Front. There is another question, a complementary and decisive one, and that is the real effort to make the Arab military front ready and able, so that the two faces of Arab might--military and oil--will act in harmony, coordination, and concert, bringing us to the anticipated results.

Naturally, in the midst of all this, it must always be remembered that the enemies are faster than we are. They all agree that we, land and resources, are a mat for them, and that we ought to be and remain so. Therefore, the road is clear for them, and they act methodically, calmly and capably, as opposed to what we do, which is aimless, limited, and having no clear road.

Even now, we have not agreed who is the number one enemy, or number two, or number three.

Unfortunately, we are divided, not only on this self-evident subject, but on all our fronts, or what you might call fronts, not to mention inside of us, since to this extent there is, in the heart of each of us, an enemy--one's heart, homeland, religion or oneself. This is absolutely the fiercest, most dangerous enemy, since there is nothing more dreadful than for man to be his own enemy, and therefore for the Arabs to be their own enemy.

But Arab steadfastness still has a definite, well-known front: the north-east front on the one hand, and the petroleum front on the other hand. Therefore, Arab concentration, if desired, can be based on known positions, methods and practices.

That is the question, and that also is steadfastness and reaction.

8559

CSO: 4802



AMIR DISCUSSES ROLE OF PARLIAMENT, EDUCATIONAL POLICY

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 12 Apr 80 p 3

[Article: "His Highness Says, 'I Believe in Responsible Popular Participation; Parliamentary Life Is Aimed At the Nation's Progress, Not At Exploitation'"]

[Text] His Highness the Amir said that parliamentary life is aimed at the nation's progress, not at exploitation or individual or group interests; that the committee to revise the constitution wants to formulate controls so that these defects will not be repeated; and that we are not ready to suspend parliamentary life. His Highness affirmed that there is an educational policy and an integrated educational plan now being studied to increase opportunities and incentives for graduates of scientific divisions, to create qualified personnel to meet the country's needs.

His Highness' statements, made at a meeting with the heads of scientific societies at the university last week, were published by the university magazine AFAQ [Horizons], which comes out today.

His Highness began his talk by saying, "Kuwait does not lack democracy, for there are no barriers between the official and the people, and there is freedom of thought and debate. But we do lack a parliamentary life." His Highness added to the students that, speaking from experience and knowledge, what happened 4 years ago overstepped all the commonly-accepted protocols of parliamentary life, and exploited things remote even from the constitution.

"Parliamentary life is first of all aimed at the nation's progress, not at exploitation or the interests of any individual or group.

"We must speak of Kuwait as a whole. All Kuwaitis are equal, with no discrimination between poor and rich, big and small. Everyone is equal before the law. The sole purpose of the constitutional revision committee is to draw up controls so that these defects are not repeated. Frankly, we are not ready to suspend parliamentary life from time to time. In the

final analysis we want real representation, serious work in the interest of the people, and preservation of this country's entity, independence, progress and development, invaluable things which have not been achieved. As the foremost official in this country, I am one of those who believe in responsible popular participation as an inescapable necessity."

#### **We Welcome Constructive Criticism**

The heads of the scientific societies spoke with His Highness about freedom in all its forms, and His Highness said, "Praise God, in Kuwait freedom is abundant, outstanding, and recognized by all.

"Here we can criticize any official as long as it is done constructively. However, we do not accept one-upmanship, lies, and deceiving the people.

"Our freedom might not be completely open, but we are better off than others. Nevertheless, we will not renounce our existing freedom, in spite of the difficulties it causes for us with some fraternal and friendly states."

#### **Educational Policy and a Complete Educational Plan**

Speaking of educational policy, he affirmed that there is an educational policy and a complete educational plan under study for increasing opportunities and incentives for graduates from scientific divisions, to create qualified personnel to meet the country's various needs and requirements for educated young people. His Highness asked the Kuwaitis to share in constructive criticism of this beloved nation. He affirmed the imminent promulgation of the law regulating the operations of all the other student unions at the university, which he said have occasionally overstepped their functions and interfered in the country's internal matters. This is something we all reject.

With reference to the shortage of professors in some sections of Kuwait University, His Highness said that there will be more coordination in borrowing and employing Doctors of Philosophy, which will achieve the desired goals and serve all the regional universities on the academic level. He also indicated that the Gulf ministers of education are preparing a study on this matter.

#### **Confusion**

His Highness the Amir went on to speak of the weak-spirited ones who spread biased rumors aimed at stirring up confusion among Kuwaitis. He asked the citizens to ascertain the truth of these rumors and consult with the officials about them.

### Sports: It Deserves What Is Spent On It

His Highness said of sports, "It attracts public attention and deserves whatever is spent on it, for it achieves results and publicity coups for this fine country. But this does not explain the shortage of expenditures on other aspects." His Highness, God protect him, promised to look into the matter of social assistance given to students.

### Young People are Kuwait's Hope

His Highness ended his talk with the young people by saying, "You are our hope; you are the bearers of the future. Let us all work in our various positions, as students or officials, for the welfare of our country. This good land needs the arms of the young people, who are its hope and its future."

#559

CSO: 4802

## MODERATE USE OF ELECTRICITY, WATER URGED

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 27 Mar 80 p 6

[Editorial: "Reducing Water and Electricity Consumption Is an Urgent Necessity"]

[Text] From time to time, it might be useful to review some figures, for this will make it easier for us to contemplate them, and will allow us to avoid scattered thoughts and immersion in wandering dreams and desires. Kuwait's present production of liquified gas amounts to 3 million tons a year, with 1.9 million tons being exported. This means that there are 1.1 million tons of liquified gas being consumed locally, a major part of which is known to be consumed by electricity generating stations and water purification plants. Therefore, the continual rise in water and electricity consumption will increase our local consumption of liquified gas, the price of which on world markets has begun to rise monthly, at a time when we consume it at very low prices.

Inasmuch as we know that per capital electricity consumption has increased 18 times in 18 years, and that water consumption has tripled during the same period, we can comprehend the immoderation which has become a feature of our handling of our country's national resource. If we wanted to switch from consuming gas in water and electricity stations to using fuel oil, we would also come face to face with the same problem, for fuel oil prices are continually rising, and its production at Kuwaiti oil refineries is limited. An increase in the fuel oil production capacity to meet local demand would impose huge financial and investment burdens. We must not forget that we have agreed to reduce our oil production to conserve our resource for as long as possible before it runs out. Gas production goes along with oil production, and if oil production is reduced gas production drops. We must also remember that we need gas in order to inject it into the oil fields to give them enough pressure to push the oil in the wells to the surface. Herein lies the importance and role of gas. Are we as citizens convinced of the need to reduce our electricity and water consumption? Can moderation replace extravagance? This is an individual and collective responsibility. We must never forget that in the old days we were content with the light of the moon and a waterskin of water.



# NEW ALIGNMENTS IN LEBANESE POLITICS DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 5 Apr 80 pp 24-25

[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Camille Sham'un: 'Israel Was Behind Attempt to Assassinate Me'; Sham'un Continuing to Seek Dialogue With the Resistance; Discussions Have Begun to Eliminate Syrian-Phalangist Disputes."]

[Text] After emotions and reactions to the attempted assassination of President Camille Sham'un, by means of an electronically [controlled] explosion, had subsided, some intimates asked the former Lebanese president about his views as to who had perpetrated this ambush, in order to hunt him down. President Sham'un looked at his questioners and said: "I believe this time that Israel was behind this attempt."

It is true that President Sham'un did not want to publicly make press statements about this quarter that attempted to kill him. However, the general climate prevailing in his circles and other political and official circles caused him to point an accusing finger at Israel.

Is there something peculiar and strange about this?

Of course; yes, with respect to ordinary people who, according to their spontaneous, intuitive understanding of affairs, would expect that any quarter except Israel would be behind the assassination of Camille Sham'un. However, it is a completely different matter with those who are connected with and knowledgeable about what is going on in the political caldrons these days, in terms of abrupt reversals or projected changes of course and in methods of dealing with existing events and forces on the battlefield, whether in Lebanon or at the Middle East level.

In an effort to pull together all these factors and apparent indicators, it is impossible for any observer to say or believe that the stage in which what appeared to be the controversial relationship in interests between Israel on the one hand and some of the Maronites in Lebanon has come close to or has almost ended, so that a new stage can begin in which, at the level of the Lebanese crisis or the Arab-Israeli struggle, the beginning of incompatibility between the strategic interests of both Israel and the Maronites in Lebanon is appearing.

These are facts which have begun to come to light. As for the thing that these phenomena conceal, that is a matter left to time and developments.

Perhaps the most prominent aspect of the incompatibility, which has begun to appear, is the matter of the Palestinians resettling in Lebanon, in fulfillment of the American-Israeli design, the foundation of which was laid by the Camp David accords and which is beginning to be implemented.

As a result of the military escalation which Israel has recently undertaken in southern Lebanon, it is Israeli artillery this time and not Sa'd Haddad's guns that are shelling certain southern areas, concentrating in fact on Sidon, the southern Capital, and its environs. As a result of this escalation, the political office of the Lebanese Phalange party held a meeting in which this military development in the southern sector and its effect on the Lebanese situation were discussed. The discussion reached a deadlock over the causes of the unusual Israeli shelling of Sidon and its environs.

#### Phalangist Information

The Phalangist discussions made a connection between the Sidon strike and the Israeli shelling of it, as if it were intended to be an attempt at retaliation against this Islamic city, because Israel wants ultimately to make the schemes of resettlement a fait accompli imposed upon the Lebanese scene whether Lebanon wants that or not. This is because activities such as these, which began in Sidon and other southern villages, constitute a danger to the design of imposing resettlement upon the Palestinians.

Phalangist information also indicates that the party's political office has not at the present time found anything more important to do than to strive to counter the schemes of resettlement, as well as the matter regarding the other ally in the Lebanese Front, President Camille Sham'un and his party, which has begun to become fixed in its convictions that one of the most important goals of Israel's war in Lebanon is to impose the resettlement schemes. The Jewish state will not be hesitant to nip in the bud any attempt infringing upon the resettlement plan or anything that constitutes a danger to it or creates imbalances which hamper or delay the considerations imposed on the Camp David framework for resettlement.

There are those who emphasize that the many abrupt changes which have appeared on the Lebanese scene, and which have brought light to bear on the fact that the resettlement plan is the greatest danger for Lebanon, have caused specific local forces to make a comprehensive review of their positions and considerations, aimed at drawing up a new strategy. Among these forces are the Phalange and Liberal (Sham'un) parties. The most prominent expression of the new changes was the lines of communication and dialogue initiated between President Sham'un and the Palestinian Resistance, represented by the biggest organization, Fatah.

Knowledgeable Phalangist sources say that those who are waiting for a Sham'un-'Arafat meeting to take place, so that this dialogue or this new alliance between "yesterday's enemies" (if the expression is correct) can be adopted afterwards, are mistaken, because the relationship at the present time between Sham'un and the Palestinian leadership has gone beyond the formalities of a meeting to the establishment of a firm relationship which has begun to reach the point of coordination and exchange of information.

#### Sham'unist Lines to the Resistance

At this stage, President Aham'un has not stopped at opening lines of communication and cooperation with the Palestinians, but rather, he has been trying for some time to open similar lines between himself and the Syrian capital. Certain friends are being tasked with that, apart from the fact that the lawyer, George Jabbar, who played the role of mediator between the Phalangists and Franjiyah to get the hostages released, was an envoy on one of his visits to Damascus on behalf of President Sham'un himself.

Within the framework of these new changes, the Lebanese Phalangist party has not been more cautious in this area than President Sham'un. If the latter has opened a line with the Palestinians, the contacts and attempts going on now are aimed at opening a new "autostrada" in terms of relations between the Phalangists and the Syrian capital.

The attempts began to take on their serious and official character during the visit which a member of the Lebanese Phalange party's political office, Karim Baqraduni, recently made to Damascus, and the concentrated discussions which he had in this regard with the Syrian foreign minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam.

The fact is that Baqraduni has experience in the subject of Syrian-Phalangist relations. He is the one who oversaw the engineering of these relations in the early Seventies and during the first stage of the Lebanese war. Today, he is carrying out virtually the same role, after his party tasked him with that in accordance with an official decision blessed by the Jumayyal family personally, from Shaykh Pierre to Shaykh Amin to Shaykh Bashir.

Informed Phalangist sources say that the first stage of discussions, which Bawranduni had with Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, was dominated by an atmosphere of complete candor, to such a degree that the conversation dealt directly with defining all the causes of the dispute and, consequently, dealt with determining the positive factors which would aid in rebinding the relations which had been severed, and the problems and difficulties preventing a return to normality. The most prominent of these are the problem of the Israeli role in Lebanon, relations with Israel and, consequently, the dispute between the Phalangists and President Sulayman Franjiyah.

Perhaps It is Best!

Competent Phalange party officials are now busy studying the Syrians' requests, after Damascus had determined what was desired of them as conveyed by lawyer Baqraduni.

The two parties are now convinced that there is no call for haste or rashness, because matters must be studied with all deliberateness, so that the results and convictions will be firm and not subject to change with changing circumstances.

After this Sham'unist shift toward the Palestinians and the Phalangist shift toward the Syrians, there is no doubt that waiting for the latest results of these attempts, their effects on the situation, and whether they will lead to the creation of reversals in all the existing alliances, a matter which is rejected at the present time, has raised the following questions:

First, to what extent will these attempts meet with success in building these new alliances, and to what extent will these alliances be effective in removing the Israeli role from the Lebanese crisis?

Second, to what extent will these attempts constitute a positive factor in pushing the Lebanese crisis toward the solutions desired for it, if not all at once, then at least gradually, step-by-step.

Third, to what extent will success in creating these alliances or conciliations assist in achieving tripartite, Lebanese-Syrian-Palestinian, accord? This is the accord without which Lebanon cannot be extracted from its ordeal, as Lebanese Foreign Minister Fu'ad Butrus has said.

Undoubtedly these Maronite conciliations with Syria and the Palestinians are not completely adequate to remove the difficulties controlling the Lebanese crisis. Such conciliations as these might isolate new negative aspects, unless matters are completed by a Lebanese-Syrian, Lebanese-Palestinian, and Syrian-Palestinian accord, because these accords are the basis for any solution or are the bedrock upon which any solution rests.

The important thing remaining is: has the journey of strategic relations, which have sometimes been mentioned between Israel and some of the Maronites in Lebanon, begun to end or is it continuing? What will it eventually mean?

7005

CSO: 4802



## AMAL MOVEMENT AFFAIRS DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 5 Apr 80 p 4

[Article: "Amal Movement Elects New Leadership Council; Postpones Selection of Chairman Until Position of Sadri Al-Sadr Is Known"]

[Text] The general congress of the Amal movement elected its new leadership council, composed of 24 members, after a lengthy meeting held yesterday in the city of al-Zahara' in Khaldah. The meeting was chaired by the vice chairman of the Higher Shiite Islamic Council, Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din.

With the election of the new council, the movement has established a new organizational form, in which the post of secretary-general has been replaced by the post of chairman of the leadership council. This followed the resignation of its secretary-general, Deputy Husayn al-Husayni.

The conference, attended by more than 200 delegates representing the chiefs of the sectors, regions, political and military cadres, and members of the political bureau, had hoped to elect the chairman of the leadership council as soon as the final answer was received from Sadri al-Sadr, who is presently in Teheran and who got through to al-Zahara' by telephone yesterday. During the course of that conversation, the subject of his nomination as chairman of the leadership council was discussed.

AL-SAFIR has learned that Imam al-Sadr's son has promised to study the matter after being pressed to do so by the movement's general congress. According to information obtained from reliable sources, it is likely that Imam al-Sadr's son will ask to be excused at the present time, until he is able to complete his university studies.

However, in the event of Sadri al-Sadr's yielding to the congress' decision, it would be possible to proclaim him chairman of the leadership council despite the fact that he has not been elected as a member in the new council.

Amal movement sources thought it likely that the general congress would meet again to discuss the following subjects:

- (1) Establishment of a course of action for the leadership council and determination of responsibilities.
- (2) Election of the leadership council's chairman, his deputy and the movement's official spokesman.

Circles close to the Amal movement received the results of the elections with satisfaction. They considered them tantamount to a reply to the interpretation which was made prior to convening the movement's general congress with respect to the existence of disputes and differences of opinion.

They pointed out that "the movement's general congress put an end to the confusion and established a new organizational form through the election of an unified leadership council for all movement affairs. This gives it a thrust to confront the conspiracies which surround Lebanon from Israel and the internal forces striving to divide Lebanon and smash its unity."

Concerning the election of Deputy al-Husayni as a member of the leadership council, his sources said that he was studying the matter, because he had previously, in the statement which he issued last Wednesday night, refused to bear any new leadership responsibility.

#### The Congress' Statement

The following statement was released by the congress yesterday:

"On 4 April, 1980, the general congress of the Amal movement held an emergency session in al-Zahara' to elect the movement's leadership council, following the completion of the previous leadership's term on the third of April.

"As a result of the meeting, attended by members of the regions, committees, council of secretaries and the political bureau, it was decided to stop work on all emergency reorganizations started after the disappearance of His Eminence Imam Musa al-Sadr, and to return to the movement's basic structure.

"A new leadership was elected to pursue its work until the Imam returns or after a full year. This leadership has already assumed its duties. On this occasion, the Amal movement wishes to remind its noble masses, and the Lebanese, Arab and Islamic peoples, that it is firmly tied to the program which His Eminence the Imam, the leader, has pursued. Further, the movement confirms that the salvation of the south and the rescue of Imam al-Sadr and his colleagues are two sides of the same issue. This is its top priority.

"Moreover, the movement wishes to stress the need to only accept information and reports issued by the movement's leadership, in order to ensure that its unity is better protected and kept free from the rumors circulating around it."

Imam al-Sadr's sister made a statement, the text of which follows:

"The legal period for the leadership established in accordance with the emergency reorganization of the Amal movement has ended. The movement's congress has decided to end its work and restore the basic organization. Proposals and nominations have been submitted allowing them interpretations which in fact have no effect. The family of Imam al-Sadr is following the memorable work and organizational procedures, which are lifting the movement to an appropriate level in terms of discipline and consolidation. We pray to God that He will guide the new leadership to excellence and right."

On the other hand, al-Husayni met with Deputy Dr Albert Mansur before noon yesterday and reviewed with him the general situation in the country.

Al-Husayni spoke in front of his visitors about the reasons for his resignation. He said that it had not been sudden, "because last 11 March I decided to finally relinquish my responsibilities in the movement. I conveyed that to the Political Bureau and the movement's sectors, pointing out that the assistant secretary-general, Nabih Bari, would assume the duties of steering the movement."

Al-Husayni indicated to his visitors that "the unfortunate incident between movement elements and Fatah on 12 March had led to postponing the resignation until last Wednesday, i.e., one day before the end of the organizational structure upon which the movement had decided on 30 March 1979. I assumed my duties then in a manner which we could describe as temporary, by virtue of the fact that the return of the movement leader, Imam Musa al-Sadr, would create a new situation for the movement's structure and organization."

Al-Husayni explained that his resignation from responsibility for the movement does not mean abandoning it. "I emphasize now that I will allow myself to intervene in its affairs at any hour that duty calls me and whenever it faces any emergency or any obstacle which may be blocking its course. However, it is impossible for the movement to continue with this organizational imbalance. The congress must decide on a form through which the movement can confront forcefully and decisively the current developments. It is true that we have overcome obstacles and have brought the movement to this level, but during a year and eight months, we have been unable to bring back Imam al-Sadr, nor to solve the problem of the south. Consequently, as a responsible official before public opinion, I can no longer continue in movement responsibility. This is of course not a flight

"from responsibility, but only a reaffirmation that I am always ready to intervene and assist the movement in any way possible."

Al-Husayni thought it unlikely that the general congress would insist upon his return, "because I conveyed to the movement my apology and final decision not to take on responsibility, desiring the selection of an appropriate for Imam al-Sadr's son, Sadri, to head the movement, since he is more entitled to pursue his father's case."

Al-Husayni said: "We must understand that my choice of Sadri is not a question of a legacy. We reject this completely. We reaffirm that the Amal movement is not dependent on any specific persons."

He added: "However, Sadri al-Sadr's taking over responsibility for the movement does not mean that I would shirk from aiding and supporting the movement."

Finally al-Husayni justified his absence from the general congress by saying to his visitors: "I wanted to allow full scope for a free election and an honest selection, free of any interference from me, personally, in this matter. I emphasize that this is the only interpretation of my absence from the general congress."

7005

CSO: 4802



PLANS FOR INTER-ARAB ECONOMIC COOPERATION DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-'AMAL in Arabic 12 Mar 80 p 7

[Interview with Minister of Economy and Trade by Arlette al-Nawwar and Vivian Saliba: "Al-Marhabbi Says in an Interview in Which He Avoided Involvement in Politics, 'We Are Drawing Up a Plan for Economic Cooperation with Syria; There Is a Tendency to Standardize Drug Prices with Damascus and Amman; Security Is Basis for Solving Problem of High Prices; Every Citizen Is an Inspector'"]

[Text] "Every citizen is an inspector" is a new slogan that is being proposed by the minister of economy and health in an interview which AL-'AMAL conducted with him. He refused to talk at length about politics, but he did talk at length about economics and cooperatives. Perhaps this was because the secretary general of the National Confrontation Front was in the mood [to talk about] economics and health more than politics.

Al-Marhabbi affirmed in his interview that there was a tendency to draw up a joint economic plan between Lebanon and Syria and that this plan would be drawn in the context of all the coordination activities between the two countries. The minister of health also proposed a plan to standardize drug prices in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, "especially since cooperation between us is continuing."

Al-Marhabbi began his interview with the subject of President Sarkis's message. He said, "The message that was announced by His Excellency President Ilyas Sarkis and the principles that have been declared express the will of Lebanese citizens and political leaders. This statement was the result of consultations that were recently completed with these leaders, chief among whom was the Chamber of Deputies which represents the legislative authority and includes many political activists. The message includes a political, social and economic outlook, and it defines the features of the course which the regime can pursue in the near and the distant range.

The people, the Chamber of Deputies and the political leaders are being called upon now to rally around the legal authority and to continue on the course of national entente so that the national objectives to which we all aspire can be achieved and so that we can terminate the tragedies that Lebanon has been experiencing during the last 4 years."

He added, "In my opinion the basic principles that were announced were significant. As a minister, I contributed to this document. The principles were the subject of discussion in the Council of Ministers. They represent the essence of our aspirations. There are most certainly some new details, but this will need more work so it can be implemented; such implementation is to come at a later stage."

[Question] With regard to turning the document into constitutional bills or ordinary specific statutes, does the government intend to complete this set of laws?

[Answer] There is an intention to let the democratic game take its natural course and to allow these notions to become translated into bills that would be turned over to the Chamber of Deputies.

#### Political Government

[Question] There are political circles which believe that the post document stage requires the advent of a government that would implement what was stated in the message. Is the present government qualified to translate these items and to implement them?

[Answer] Of course the government can translate the principles because it is a political government, and it has the ability to do that. We are not saying that all the activists can be found in this government, but they are being asked to share responsibilities. We have no objections to this. On the contrary, we welcome those activists who fulfill the public welfare.

The method of participation--expanding the government or forming a new government--is not important. What is important is that implementation be comparable to aspirations. I believe that the government is capable of playing its role fully.

[Question] Since you did take part in the publication of the document, what are the urgent priorities of implementation?

[Answer] The document was clear, and all the principles are integrated and necessary. They are an inseparable part of the document whose implementation is being called for.

Priorities are given to the security plan, to the political solution and then to social questions, in the order of their occurrence in the document.

[Question] With regard to the National Confrontation Front, it is taking positions....

Al Marhabi interrupted the question and said, "Let us leave this question."

[Question] But the front 's opposing the resolutions of the Council of Ministers even though its chief is a member of the government. What is the explanation for this?

[Answer] For example?

[Question] For example, the resolution to mobilize the army.

[Answer] The decision to mobilize the army was clear in the Council of Ministers. It is best to avoid going into this subject.

[Question] Are you thinking of turning the Confrontation Front into a party?

[Answer] As far as principles are concerned, the Confrontation Front is a conciliatory front that believes in national unity, in social justice and in human freedom. The objectives are there and they are being translated into the reality that we are in. In time everything grows.

[Question] There is a militia....

He interrupted the question again [and said], "We are now ministers, and we do not want to speak about other matters."

#### Economic Cooperation

[Question] It has been said that there is a plan for a joint economic project between Lebanon and Syria.

[Answer] Of course. This is within the coordination activities, but we have not yet drawn up a specific plan. The notion of economic cooperation was proposed as a whole, and it is necessary on more than one level because the matters that are of concern to the two countries are numerous and must be coordinated.

[Question] What specifically is the kind of economic cooperation that is being proposed?

[Answer] There is no definitive view on this subject. Coordination and cooperation will be carried out according to the plan whose final form we will draw up soon.

[Question] Is the Joint Lebanese-Syrian Authority qualified at the present time to deal with relations between the two countries in all areas?

[Answer] No. It will be reconsidered, and it will be on a higher level.

[Question] A ministerial level, for example?

[Answer] Maybe.

## The Free Economy

[Question] The articles of entente stated that Lebanon would continue to adopt the course of the free economy. Briefly, to what extent has this course been taken?

[Answer] We have grown accustomed to endorsing the free economy because the nature of the country and the initiatives upon which Lebanon relies are the principal pillars that support economic existence and survival. Hence comes our reliance on a free economy that is guided by the state whose supervision is free, effective, feasible and without chaos. In some cases the state can interfere in some sectors to prevent any imbalance and to fight monopolies and excesses. Hence came our recent plan to fight high prices. We dealt with the subject of imports in this plan, and we decided to establish a major cooperative center. We gave this center a 25 million pound loan so it can import some basic goods and sell them at cost plus a small charge to cover some expenses. It is my opinion that the role of the state lies in its always being a safety valve and in its always being able to monitor and to guide this economy in a manner that safeguards the interests of this country. Along with freedom there must be strict supervision and control of matters so that we do not come to the chaos of freedom.

[Question] What are the broad lines of the plan to reconsider the structure of the Ministry of the Economy?

[Answer] Ever since the Ministry of the Economy was established, it was called the Ministry of National Economy. In time some ministries branched from it. It was therefore inevitable that its structure be reconsidered so it can perform its role fully, and especially after all matters were thrown on its shoulders. This ministry could not ensure all the matters that are required if it is not reorganized and if its structure, and especially its personnel structure, was not reconsidered. This structure was looked into with the other ministries so that there would be no confusion over authorities. We held meetings with the minister of agriculture, with the minister of industry and oil and with the minister of tourism so that the new system would be integrated and ready for the functions that we specifically have in mind for this ministry.

Let me give an example of this. The term, the Ministry of Economy and Trade was replaced by the term, the Ministry of Economy and Supply so that the ministry would monitor supplies for the country. The manpower makeup of the ministry will be reconsidered for the purpose of focusing on the role of the ministry as a monitoring agency and an office for protecting the consumer and for protecting the supply situation in the country because the ministry is ultimately responsible for the result.



## The Security Blanket

[Question] The problem of high prices has been growing worse for the past 3 or 4 months. What are the difficulties that the Ministry of the Economy is suffering from as a result of the problem of high prices and what are the reasons for the aggravation of this problem?

[Answer] The phenomenon of high prices is not new in the country, and the reasons that are making this problem more grave are several. Some of them are foreign and some are internal. The foreign reasons are still in existence such as high prices in the country of origin and the high prices of oil. Inside the country, there is [a lack of] security and the inability of the monitoring agency to play its role effectively. These are among the primary reasons for high prices.

[He added]: We were able to restore vitality to the National Prices Board, and we put into operation the committee that was able to reconsider prices. We were not satisfied with the bills that were presented by the merchants, but we asked our embassies abroad to verify and to endorse these bills. Verification of these bills will be definitive.

We were able to mobilize the special court that began to issue sentences. Any action carried out by the court is of no value if there is no deterrent sentence. We asked the Ministry of Justice to stiffen the punishments and even to imprison [violators] in case of violations.

I believe that manipulation of livelihood matters is absolutely impermissible. No two people in this country will disagree about that. According to the index of prices in the Ministry of Economy the prices of some goods have stabilized. The prices of some goods are rising world-wide and inside the country. We are making an effort to observe these things, and we may come to the stage of controlling them. We have emphasized the establishment of a cooperative center because the state can compete when it has the materials, and it can flood the markets with these materials.

In the question of sugar, for example, when the state dumped sugar on the market, prices fell. I personally encourage the establishment of cooperatives because this is a better way to enable people to purchase [what they need] and fight greed and monopoly.

[Question] Is there no way to check retail merchants other than that of flooding the markets?

[Answer] They can only be checked by competition. This is the method that has been adopted by the Ministry of Economy, and we have actually sensed the difference.

[Question] A large segment of citizens is not buying from the cooperatives, and this may be due to the fact that these cooperatives are not to be found in all the areas.

[Answer] We are trying to reach the point where we can secure the existence of cooperatives in all areas. What is being called for now is the expansion of the cooperative effort. We would thus have achieved our goal.

[Question] Where then is the Consumer Agency?

[Answer] The Consumer Agency exists, and it has major responsibilities. Its capabilities, however, are not what they should be. To a certain extent it does not take action until it has an opportunity to do so in the way of monitoring prices. But these matters are carried out in the context of full coordination among the ministries. Take the questions of gas, for example. If it is the Ministry of Economy that establishes price, it is the Ministry of Industry that procures the gas. Therefore, there must be coordination between the two ministries.

[Question] Will the new structure put together a joint administration, for example, between the Ministry of Economy and the remaining ministries?

[Answer] No. But this is a ministerial measure that we can take. There is a joint committee in the Supreme Economic Council which has representatives from all the ministries; it carries out this function.

### The Price of Fraternity

[Question] Quite frankly, to what extent is the security problem preventing the application of what the ministry aspires to with regard to controlling prices?

[Answer] I have emphasized from the outset that the subject of security does play a major role in this field. I was surprised when some merchants presented data about cost prices plus some expenses in which was included an item pertaining to fraternity. This thing may be right, and therefore, I requested that the matter be looked into carefully. The merchant [meanwhile], refuses to give names, but this is not important. What is important is the remedy. Hence, we see the importance of the role that the subject of security does play.

The subject of security has an effect from another angle. The merchant does not dare to store large quantities of goods because security conditions are not stable. But the Consumer Protection Agency, within the capabilities that are available, has begun operating patrols of gendarmes to supervise inspection. And here everybody is being called upon to facilitate the role of the inspectors and to give them their effective role.

### Every Citizen Is an Inspector

I told the inspectors, "You must take into consideration the fact that the Lebanese citizen is always on your side. As a result every citizen is an inspector, and this is as it should be. We hope that the power of the state and the law will prevail throughout Lebanese territory after the principles of entente are presented.

[Question] And what about the mean time?

[Answer] In the mean time we are asking for everybody's cooperation in the context of the law, and we are asking that the laws be carried out. We are intent on having the Lebanese citizen bear his responsibilities and assist the state. In return, the state will regulate his affairs and look after his interests. Events have had major effects [on people's lives], and we cannot remove these effects in a short time. It is my opinion that citizens are responding.

#### Political Circumstances

[Question] With regard to the exhibition of Lebanese products in Baghdad what is the truth about Iraqi officials' censuring you personally for not attending the Baghdad International Fair late last year?

[Answer] No, no. [And here we must indicate that Minister al-Marhabí was surprised and perplexed]. Quite the contrary! All there is to this matter is that the invitation was sent late, and I was not late to go because of some political circumstances. You know the story(?). I was not able to go to the Conference of Arab Ministers of health in Tunisia recently for that reason also.

[Question] But you were censured by....

[Al-Marhabí interrupted] No. On the contrary. Why censure? We have good relations with Iraq and with all the countries. Is not that right? The exhibition is being held this year, and I would like to make it clear that the Chamber of Commerce and Industry has rectified matters with Iraq under the supervision and with the encouragement of the Ministry of Economy. There are no problems around this subject.

[Question] With regard to the question of wheat and supply, are there new deals with wheat?

[Answer] Wheat is the only principal product which the state provides for the citizen; it is the only product for which it pays enormous subsidies. This is what we call the policy of subsidizing the loaf of bread. As a result the state is incurring losses that amount to approximately 250 or 300 million pounds per year.

As far as new deals are concerned, there is an agreement with Canada that is renewed automatically every year. Bidding from different sources is taking place. These bids are guaranteed in a basic way to preserve the price of a loaf of bread.

Old, and Thank God

[Question] What has the ministry done to check the question of the high prices of [medication] drugs?

[Answer] The story of drugs is also an old problem. Thank God there is nothing new in this country! The first action I took to solve this problem was to suggest that the office of [medication] drugs be placed in operation because it can import the drugs and sell them at cost. It would thereby play the role of a cooperative center.

What is intended from this is for the state to participate in the process of [providing medication] drugs. That is, it is to import the high-priced and essential medicines. So far, social security has been successful in this experiment. The director of social security has assured me that this step has been successful and that it is necessary to continue it. In addition, we also began to set down new price [guidelines] for medicines. These prices are established on scientific and firm bases. We have so far categorized approximately 1,000 varieties. This is the first time in years that this is happening. We will continue issuing prices [for these drugs] until we cover all the varieties. We will strive to enforce these prices and to monitor them so that there would be no opportunity for manipulation.

[Question] Will the office of [medication] drugs import specific varieties?

[Answer] No. There are no specific varieties it will import. It will rather import medication drugs in the light of need as that need is determined by the professional committee of the office of [medication] drugs.

[Question] Will the state take part in aiding the local firms that manufacture medication drugs?

[Answer] We will give them more moral than material encouragement.

[Question] But moral encouragement does not contribute anything!

[Answer] The [pharmaceutical] plants must comply with the Ministry of Health and must offer citizens medication at an acceptable price.

[Question] The laboratories think that reducing customs taxes on primary materials is the aid that must be offered by the state.

[Answer] This question has not been raised.

[Question] What if it were raised and such a suggestion were made?

[Answer] We are inclined to reject an exemption policy, certainly not absolutely, but we must be certain that such an exemption will benefit the citizen. We are therefore careful to reflect upon such matters. We may approve this if the returns of such an exemption are positive.



## Standardizing Prices of Medication Drugs

[Question] A plan to standardize prices of medication drugs in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan has been proposed.

[Answer] I proposed this idea because there is ongoing cooperation among us, especially since medication drugs there are less expensive. Some citizens purchase drugs from Syria, sell them here and make a profit. We therefore saw the necessity of standardizing prices among us. The new ordinance that was suggested to the Prices Committee is similar to the Syrian ordinance.

[Question] What is the ratio of the differences [in prices] between Lebanon and Syria?

[Answer] It varies from 10 and 20 percent to 40 percent. In the case of rare varieties, the difference exceeds 60 percent.

8592

CSO: 4802

## REPRESENTATIVE LAHHUD DEFINES RECOMMENDED DEFENSE POLICY

Beirut AL-NIDA' in Arabic 12 Mar 80 p 3

[Article: "Lahhud Advocates Adoption of Reasons Requiring Defense Law as Items for Defense Policy"]

[Text] Col Fu'ad Lahhud, member of the Chamber of Deputies and chairman of its Defense and Security Committee had advocated that the reasons which are making a defense law necessary be considered items of the defense policy whose confirmation in the Council of Ministers is being called for.

Col Lahhud has again published the aforementioned compelling reasons. He prefaced them with the following statement: "The joint defense and administrative committees had attached the compelling reasons for the defense bill that was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on 23/3/1979. These reasons included the broad lines of the defense policy that must be adopted in Lebanon. I consider these lines to be tantamount to a law that was approved in the chamber when it approved the Defense Law. It is therefore appropriate for the Council of Ministers to adopt its decision with regard to the defense policy on the basis of what has been stated in the compelling reasons."

Col Lahhud distributed the text of the compelling reasons as they were cited in the law. This is the text of those reasons:

### The Compelling Reasons

1. There is no state without an army. The world and history [provide us with] examples. Even Switzerland whose neutrality is accepted has realized that it will not be able to ensure this neutrality unless it establishes a strong army.
2. The validity of this theory has been proven during World War I and World War II when the mighty German armies preferred to go around the Netherlands and Belgium to attack France instead of attempting to penetrate Switzerland, even though [the latter course] would have saved Germany from doubling the distance.

3. With its geographical and political makeup Lebanon is very much like Switzerland. But its neutrality is not guaranteed. Lebanon is being threatened from the outside because it has a hostile country on its borders, and it is being threatened from the inside because of the numerous movements that occasionally blow up a storm over there. It has therefore become imperative that a strong, tightly organized army be built from all its citizens and for all its citizens. This army would be capable of warding off foreign and internal dangers.

4. There is no stronger evidence for our recent predicament: when the army fell, the state fell, and we began looking for an army that would safeguard our existence and our entity.

5. If we want to build a strong, tightly organized army whose second fall we would not fear in the future, we will have to agree on an identity for Lebanon; we will have to determine our defense policy; and, accordingly, we will have to build the army of Lebanon on this basis.

6. It is self evident that Lebanon has no geographical or economic expansionist ambitions that it is trying to achieve by force of arms. Therefore, our defense policy will not be an aggressive policy.

7. But we must make preparations to anticipate the foreign and internal dangers that are imminent, especially since Lebanon has been subjected several times to such dangers that almost brought about its demise because of the absence of a capable army that is prepared to ward off these dangers.

8. On the other hand, we have to do [our] duty to restore the usurped rights of the Palestinians. [We are to do so] in the context of the role that has been agreed to in the Arab League.

9. It is known that Arab League resolutions have not required Lebanon to play any military, aggressive role. In fact, the resolutions asked that Lebanon protect the Lebanese-Israeli border so it would prevent the enemy from surrounding the right side of the eastern front.

10. It is in this context that we have to define the Lebanese Defense policy which is a defensive policy, as the above information indicates, and not an aggressive defense policy.

11. It is the principles which have been stated that help define the defense policy, but there are some detailed considerations that must be taken into account to determine the details of this policy.

The fact that Lebanese territory is limited, on the one hand, and the hilly nature of this land, on the other, require that the following principles be taken into consideration:

1. It is more appropriate to ensure air protection by means of anti-aircraft weapons and not by means of airplanes.

2. Since the enemy will have to control certain principal centers for the purpose of being able to penetrate deep into rugged Lebanese territory, controlling these centers would suffice for opposing such an attack. This requires use of anti-armored weapons more than use of armored cruisers since there are no plains and fields that would suffice for the movement of these units.

3. With regard to what was stated in Articles 1 and 2, preference must be given to the kind of soldier and weapon more than to the number [of soldiers] and the quantity [of weapons]. This would lead us to adopt [the notion of] an army whose backbone would consist of career military personnel. We would equip this army with a small number of advanced weapons that are very effective.

12. After specific and detailed studies it became evident that to guarantee protection for Lebanon eight brigades consisting of 3,500 soldiers were required. Every brigade is to be integrated and equal and is to include all the branches of the armed forces—the infantry, the armored branch, the artillery, etc.—so it can function independently.

If we were to adopt this theory, the total number [of personnel] in the army would be as follows:

28,000 the number in the brigades:  $3,500 \times 8$ .

1,000 the number in the air force and in the navy.

4,000 the number in the private, public and administrative staff.

6,000 the number of new soldiers in training.

Thus the total number of necessary military men is 40,000.

13. Whereas it is necessary to use advanced modern weapons that require a long period of training;

Whereas stopping the enemy at the borders specifically is imperative due to the lack of geographic depth [in Lebanese territory];

And whereas it would be difficult to call quickly a large number of reserve soldiers that are required to mobilize the units so as to enable them to resist the attack at the suitable time;

It is necessary for all these reasons that the vast majority of the army consist of career personnel, and that their ratio must not be less than 60 percent of the large number. The maximum ratio for enlisted men would be 40 percent so that the number would be as follows:

Career military men:  $40,000 \times 60\% = 24,000$

Enlisted men:  $40,000 \times 40\% = 16,000$



[Total] 40,000

14. During peace time 35,000 soldiers may suffice. This can be effected by reducing the number of soldiers in a section, which is the smallest fighting unit, by two elements. This would save 5,000 soldiers for us: 3,000 career soldiers and 2,000 enlisted men. We are to safeguard these elements with the first line of reserve in a matter of hours.

Compulsory service in this bill has been determined to be 2 years.

Since the number of enlisted men is 16,000 less 2,000 = 14,000, it is necessary in this case to enlist 7,000 men every year.

15. Since it is estimated that the young people designated annually for military conscription will be 25,000, in such a case 18,000 must be exempted from service. Approximately 6,000 would be exempted by virtue of the third paragraph of Article 39 of this law, and the remaining 12,000 would be exempted from service in return for an allowance and by lot.

The sums that are furnished to pay allowances are sufficient in a preliminary manner for covering the expenses of the 14,000 enlisted men. Determination of the allowance is made by decree in the Council of Ministers.

What remains to be done then is to ensure appropriations for career military men whose numbers amount to 24,000 - 3,000 = 21,000

16. Since the annual average cost for either an enlisted or a career military man is presently estimated at 15,000 pounds including the maintenance and depreciation of equipment and weapons, the sums that are necessary would be  $21,000 \times 15,000 = 315,000,000$  pounds.

17. This figure has been entered into the 1975 budget to ensure expenses for approximately 21,000 military men. This includes career men and student reserves.

If we consider that national revenue in 1977 will be 10 billion pounds, the ratio allocated for defense from this revenue is almost 3 percent. This is a very small ratio if we compared it with the ratios of all other countries. In Syria, for example, it is 13 percent; in Israel, it is 21 percent; and in the United States, it is 11 percent.

18. The sums that are necessary to ensure the preliminary preparations of equipment and arms which are estimated at 1 billion pounds are to be taken from the aid that was promised by Arab countries.

8519

CSO: 4802

**DRAFT RENT LAW CONDEMNED**

Beirut AL-NIDA' in Arabic 2 Apr 80 p 4

[Article: "National Movement Criticizes Action on Rent Law; Draft Law Holds Dangers Threatening Tenant Stability and Rent; Sound Housing Policy and Just Rent Law Demanded."]

[Text] The social affairs office in the central political bureau of the National Movement has condemned the new attempt to pass the new draft rent law, considering it a powerful sword in the owner's hands over the tenant's neck. A statement issued by the bureau concerning this matter pointed to the hidden dangers which the draft law holds:

- (1) Abandoning the principle of freedom of contracts.
- (2) The percentages of higher increases over the old rent rates and insignificant decreases in the new rates.

The social affairs office demanded that a sound housing policy be established and that the draft rent law guarantee the rights and interests of the overwhelming majority of tenants.

**The Statement**

The text of the statement issued by the central office of social affairs in the National Movement concerning the new draft rent law follows:

"The Lebanese National Movement, conscious of the importance of the housing question, its economic and social dimensions, and the dangers of the new draft rent law and its anticipated repercussions on the development of the general situation, declares that there is a definite need today to demand more than what has been accomplished. The establishment of a comprehensive housing policy should take into account the distinctive peculiarities of Lebanon's housing problem, so as to make the legislation compatible with the various social groups and with the new circumstances brought about by the recent war. This legislation should be in conformity with the requirements of balanced and just economic and social development of the new Lebanon.

The huge outcry among the masses, as a direct reaction to the rent law, drafted by the administrative and justice committee in parliament, is the best proof of the danger which this law contains, resulting from an imbalance created in contractual relations between owner and tenant, since it is devoted to the owner's interests at the expense of the interests of those renters who have fixed incomes and of all the working classes. It is a powerful sword in the hands of the owner over the tenants' necks, as a result of the freedom given to the owner and the unfair conditions imposed upon the tenant.

The Lebanese National Movement, conscious of its obligations toward its masses, must go on record that this draft law is an oppressive expression with respect to tenants, since it was assumed that the greatest consideration would be shown to the overwhelming majority of toiling Lebanese people, especially after more than four years of the Lebanese war, which has smashed the Lebanese economy and made hundreds of thousands of poor people destitute. It pledges to its masses to continue the struggle to abolish this injustice and oppression against tenants.

#### Dangers of the Draft Law

As for the hidden dangers contained in this law, they are recorded as follows:

First, abandonment of the principle of contractual freedom in rental contracts.

The important thing here is that the law takes away rights of the tenant, upon which all emergency rent laws have been based for 40 years. This is his right to legal extension.

The last paragraph of article 10 of this draft law gave the owner the right to request withdrawal of his hiring, after expiration of 15 years from the effective date of this law, and stipulated that 25 years must have passed since the date of the lease, providing that a fair compensation be paid, assessed by the court, varying between eight and 12 [times] the difference between the actual rental rate and the rate of the hiring requested to be withdrawn.

It was also stipulated in article 15 of this law that leases which were written after the effective date of this law would be extended, despite any previous agreement to the contrary, only year by year and only for a maximum period of six years from the date of the beginning of the contract's validity. After expiration of the six years, the tenant is considered to be an illegal occupant of the hiring.

This new principle which has been inserted into the new draft rent law (the principle of cancellation of previous extension for tenants) and the return to the starting point of contractual freedom will lead to issues

of legal status, by means of which the legislature has defended tenants for a long time. The tenant will become the weaker party to the lease. It is the destruction of a firm and long standing policy pursued by the Lebanese legislature which led, through the emergency laws, to the growth of the building sector, during the time preceding the war. This tremendous growth was not without flaws and deficiencies for several reasons. Employment in the building sector was one of the largest of the employment categories, since its share in the national income exceeded half the industrial sector's share.

The manifestations of the housing crisis and its paroxysms before the recent war prove that depending on the law of supply and demand does not present a solution to the housing crisis. This draft law does not take into account the true housing needs of the various social classes. Setting loose contractual freedom between landlord and tenant, in an intense housing stage, in circumstances following the destructive war, and given the restrictions on the building movement, will lead to social disaster which will dearly cost the middle and lower classes.

#### Large Increases and Tiny Reductions

Secondly, concerning the increases and reductions which the new rent law contains.

The new draft rent law subjects the contractual rent rates before its promulgation to increases ranging from 15 to 20 percent for rents in effect before 31/12/1953 up to 31/12/73.

Also, tenants for 1974 have been denied any reduction.

Token reductions have been fixed ranging between 10 percent for profit rent rates for 1975 and 15 percent for profit rates for 1977 up to publication of the draft law itself.

Moreover, article one of the law stipulated that 25 percent of the emergency increase rate be added to the basic rent rates for leases contracted before the effective date, at a basic minimum level of salaries of servants and workers in the private sector. The draft bill must certainly be aimed at achieving the following goals:

(1) To raise the rent rates contracted before the effective date of the law to be comparable with these rates, similar rates, or equal with them. Therefore, it would be possible for the owner, if he wished to withdraw his hiring for any of the reasons cited in article 10 of the law, to pay a very small compensation to the tenant, after the legislature set the computation of this compensation on the basis of difference between the rent rate and the rate of a similar hiring.

(2) To insert a dangerous principle in the draft law, that is to consider the salary which a person (worker or servant) receives as compensation for



his work to be equal to the rent rate which the building yields as income, without its owner doing any work. The equality of work which the person offers in service, resulting in the use of something, and the connection between this service which offers something and that work which the person expends would result in consequences, the least of which is infringement of the person's honor and would cause him to be considered like the building, only offering a service and not an effective citizen in society.

(3) Reabsorption of wage increases given to the poor toiling class, by means of the additional sums which increase the rent rates by 50 percent of the increase in the basic minimum wage. The wealthy class, therefore, will have recovered, at second hand, what it gave out in the first place, and the wage increases will remain hypothetical increases, despite the worker and the servant suffering from rising prices and the high cost of living, while the wealthy class is not greatly affected by this inflation.

The time has come to draw up a comprehensive policy, adopted out of consideration for the current housing needs, as well as future needs. The new draft law does not provide the minimum needs of this policy.

#### Radical Housing Policy Requested

A radical housing policy to meet the increasingly grave crisis following the civil war must be based on principles, the most important being:

(1) Direct and energetic intervention by the state to increase individual credit limits, or city planning aimed at increased supervision over the use of land and at curbing real estate speculation.

(2) Establish housing complexes in the main population areas, establish people's housing through municipalities and major industrial organizations, and construct housing cooperatives.

(3) Establish a national housing fund, to be financed by an escalating tax up to 100 percent of the surplus of real property value, after increasing this surplus by a specified percentage, which the law is to determine in light of economic and social considerations, in addition to other sources of financing for this fund.

(4) Reduce the concentration occurring in the capital and its suburbs and redistribute economic activities within the framework of a comprehensive state policy. Create economic bases to develop new housing areas, in which the opportunity for work would be available, along with subordinate needs, such as communications, social services, education and the general infrastructure.

## A Just Rent Law

Until such a policy as this is completed, any rent law must be helpful in lessening the housing problems faced by the masses, lest they increase in intensity and pervasiveness.

(1) Set aside the theory of contracting for a maximum period of six years, and return to the general regulations, which the Lebanese legislature followed, for provisions of legal extension and which all the emergency rent laws stipulated.

(2) Base double percentages for reductions on rent rates contracted since 1974 up to the effective date of the new law.

The reduction percentages should be as follows:

--20 percent reduction in rates for leases contracted from 1/1/75 to 31/12/75.

--30 percent reduction in rates for leases contracted from 1/1/76 to 31/12/76.

--40 percent reduction in rates for leases contracted from 1/1/77 to 31/12/77.

--50 percent reduction in rates for leases contracted from 1/1/78 to 31/12/78.

--60 percent reduction in rates for leases contracted from 1/1/79 to 31/12/79.

(3) Abolish the owner's rights to withdraw the hiring, after expiration of 15 years upon application of the new law, and 25 years from the start of the tenant's lease, and keep all leases under the protection of the provisions of legal extension.

(4) Subject leases contracted for owners of independent professions to the rights of transfer from their lease to those who practice the independent profession itself at the same basic rates.

(5) Extend the provisions of rent law number 10/74, promulgated on 25 March 1974, provided that implementation of the new law be as of 1/1/1980.

(6) Increase fair compensation which the owner pays to the tenant when legal provisions allow withdrawing the hiring for purposes of its destruction and the construction of a new building. It should fluctuate from 10 to 14 times the difference of the rent rate and the rate of the hiring requested to be withdrawn.

(7) Participation of legal and popular organizations in expressing all views regarding the new draft law in the interests of the working class and popular groups.

(8) The National Movement calls on all those harmed by the new draft rent law to band together in solidarity to affirm these necessary amendments as a minimum.

7005

CSO: 4802

**AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS APPROVED**

Beirut AL-NIDA' in Arabic 12 Mar 80 p 4

[Article: "Series of Agricultural Projects Approved; Awaiting Guarantee of Funds That Are Necessary for Implementation"]

[Text] The Ministry of Agriculture has approved a number of development projects for 1980. These projects are concerned with the development of agricultural and animal production.

These projects were approved in a joint meeting of the Development and Reconstruction Council. It was decided that an effort was to be made to implement these projects and to guarantee the funds necessary for them.

The most important projects that have been approved follow:

**1. The Animal Resources Administration Plan**

A. A helicopter is to be purchased to combat agricultural pests, especially the al-Suni (Eurygaster Intergriceta) insect, which strikes wheat; the (al-Ziyyah) worm which strikes pines, and [beetles] and desert locusts.

B. A plan to modernize the machines for combating diseases and insects [is to be implemented]. The purpose of this plan is to enable every farmer to purchase the spraying pumps that are suitable for carrying out operations to combat diseases and insects at the appropriate times. This would be in the context of the agricultural automation plan.

**2. The Forestry Administration Plan**

Neglected land is to be planted with trees; and tree nurseries are to return to operations to produce trees for timber, to fight forest fires and to curb damages to [herds of] goats.

**3. The Animal Production Office Plan**

On the one hand, [food supply] is to be ensured, especially as it relates to milk and meat production. On the other hand, assistance is to be given to help farmers and growers return to their villages by means of the following:



1. Establishing centers for collecting and processing milk;
2. Assisting in the production of the necessary feed;
3. Distributing pedigreed dairy cows;
4. Distributing milk producing goats, such as Syrian goats and others like them;
5. Assisting in the establishment of cattle pens;
6. Assisting in the establishment of storehouses and granaries for storing feed;
7. Building refrigerators for storing eggs and young chickens and for storing surplus production;
8. Ensuring the training of growers and farmers in the best methods for breeding and protecting animals; and
9. Ensuring sanitary, veterinary care.

#### The Joint Technical Affairs Administration

Agricultural automation in rural areas where such an effort is undertaken is to be universalized in accordance with Law No 85/1977 and with the plan to establish centers for the acquisition of the property that is necessary for this objective.

#### The Fruit Office Plan

The citrus processing centers in Tripoli whose capacity amounts to 10 tons per hour are to be modernized. The present processing line is to be replaced with a new line that is to include an automatic machine for emptying boxes, a sterilization tank, a dryer for drying, a waxing machine and a sizing machine. A center for processing fruits and vegetables is also to be established in the area of al-Biqā' because the area of Shaturah al-Masna' [plant] constitutes the principal line for export. Field boxes for harvesting fruits and special boxes for exporting are also to be secured.

#### The Green Plan

Approximately 20,000 donums in the different provinces are to be reclaimed, and agricultural roads are to be built in accordance with the plans that had been previously prepared for this purpose.

## The Silk Office

A craft project for the manufacturing of silk is to be established. At a later stage, the Development and Reconstruction Council will look into the development and reconstruction projects that were prepared by the Animal Resources Administration of the Ministry of Agriculture. Among these projects is one to strengthen and to reorganize veterinary laboratories and centers of veterinary medicine in all the districts; [and another] to combat parasites and diseases. There is a plan to establish together and to standardize slaughterhouses; there is a plan to establish quarantines along the borders; there is a plan to improve the offspring of the animals; and there is a plan to develop and increase animal resources.

8592

CSO: 4802

# UNT NATIONAL COUNCIL REAFFIRMS WORKERS' DEMANDS

Casablanca L'AVANT-GARDE in French 22 Mar 80 pp 1, 2

[Text] Meeting at Casablanca on Saturday, 15 March, the National Council of the UNT (Moroccan Labor Federation) proceeded to examine the situation in the light of the important report presented by Comrade Mahjoub Ben Seddik. The council made certain decisions in the areas of training and organization, as well as the commemoration of the UNT's 25th anniversary. At the close of the council's proceedings, the National Secretariat made public a communique, the translation of which we publish below.

The UNT National Council met in regular session on 15 March 1980 in Casablanca.

After hearing the report presented by Comrade Mahjoub Ben Seddik, secretary general, and the reports of the various local and regional unions and federations, the National Council discussed the country's current situation. It declared that the problems from which the working class and the masses of the people suffer are being aggravated by the deepening of the economic crisis, which is only the logical consequence of the exercise of options against the people and the policy of enriching the wealthy and impoverishing the poor. The National Council vigorously denounces the serious consequences for the working class which arise out of this situation and which translate into:

- The continuous deterioration of purchasing power, due to the freezing of salaries and the dizzying increase of prices and of taxes on salaries.
- Arbitrary layoffs, abusive shutdowns, rejection of just claims, scoffing at rights, putting past gains into question, introduction of new taxes to make the workers alone support the weight of the crisis.
- The hysterical and criminal campaign launched against the workers and their central trade union organization by opportunist elements, known for their notorious collusion with the vested interests and the privileged, with the unavowed aim of turning the workers away from their true objectives.

Thus, the National Council forcefully denounces the actions of the alliance of owners, authorities and opportunists directed against the working class. Actions characterized by: layoffs, denial of rights and calling past gains in question, repression and opportunist plots against the united trade unions.

It rejects the logic asserting that the economic crisis is due to business cycles when in fact it is profoundly endemic. A logic which sees no contradiction in permitting the owners to take definitive measures at the same time.

The National Council registers, with great satisfaction, the degree of the working class's consciousness and responsibility, which have caused conspiracies by the advocates of division to fail and have proved its attachment to its unity and organization.

It salutes with pride the UMT's fidelity to the principles which have guided its actions for a quarter of a century and its determination to pursue the struggle for radical transformation of the economic, social and political structures, and for progress, social justice and a genuine democracy.

The National Council denounces once more the nonsatisfaction of the just claims presented to the responsible authorities on 8 October 1977, decided during a regular session of the National Council and reiterated by the 6th National Congress, including specifically:

- Revision of salaries on the basis of a minimum monthly salary of 1000 DH.

- Revision of taxes on salaries and their total elimination for low salaries.

- Solution of the problem of housing by adoption of a democratic policy pledging the complete responsibility of the state and owners in the design and construction of housing projects within reach of the workers. While awaiting completion of such projects, the allocation of housing should be broadened and increased.

The National Council considers that the present policy of sedatives and patching up no longer deceives anyone; it rejects the pseudo-dialogues proposed by the responsible authorities, "dialogues" which in fact serve only to strike a new and vain blow at the workers' unity. It again points out that any constructive dialogue should bring together punctually, and in each case, genuine representatives of the workers and the responsible officials directly concerned.

As to the project of a work code, the National Council has defined an attitude based on two principles:



-- Any social legislation should represent progress over existing legislation.

-- Any social legislation worked out in periods of economic crisis can only be unfavorable to the workers.

Proceeding from these principles, the National Council expresses reservations about any attempts in this area which would have no aims but higher prices and demagoguery.

The National Council salutes the struggles engaged in by the working class, throughout the country and in all sectors. It salutes the spirit of abnegation and sacrifice which have characterized these struggles and denounces the pressure and repression to which the workers are subject.

The National Council calls all workers to greater consciousness, responsibility and sense of organization in order that our struggles may be up to the standard of the aspirations of the working class and the masses of the people, and to radical change for which they have not ceased to struggle and which alone can take the country off the road of dependence and put it on that of liberation.

The National Council also calls on the working class to pursue the struggle for consolidating the whole of the national territory and for the recovery of Sebta, Melilla, the Jaffarine Islands and the rocks of Velez and Al Huceima.

Finally, the National Council exhorts all militants--both men and women--to redouble their efforts to strengthen the organization, within the framework of the road traced by the UMT. It calls on the workers to remain vigilant and united in order to bar the way to divisive elements, enemies of the working class, and to pursue a conscientious and responsible struggle until the workers' legitimate claims are achieved and the objectives of the Moroccan working class attained.

5586

CSO: 4400

**FRENCH LABOR DELEGATION VISITS, MEETS WITH UMT LEADERS**

Casablanca L'AVANT-GARDE in French 15 Mar 80 pp 1, 2

[Text] As part of the fraternal relations of cooperation and solidarity between the French Democratic Labor Confederation (CFDT) and the Moroccan Labor Federation (UMT), a confederal delegation from the CFDT, led by Comrade Edmond Maire, secretary general, and composed of Comrades Jacques Chereque, deputy secretary general, responsible official of the international sector, and Abderrahmane Benleazar, confederal secretary, came to Morocco as guests of the UMT.

During its stay, the CFDT delegation had important talks with the UMT National Secretariat, led by its Secretary General Mahjoub Ben Seddik, and major contacts with the trade union directors and militants.

These talks dealt with current problems in the trade union movement, both on the international plane and regionally. The problems of migrant workers and of development were brought up especially. The UMT delegation stressed the positive impact of the action taken by French workers and the CFDT on behalf of immigrant workers in France.

Also, the two delegations exchanged information on French and Moroccan workers' conditions of work and struggle, and on the action they are taking in various contexts for transformation of the political, economic and social structures in favor of the workers. On another topic, the CFDT delegation has been kept informed of the action taken by the UMT and all the Moroccan people for the completion of unity and of national territorial integrity.

The CFDT and UMT delegations agreed to pursue joint planning and to strengthen bilateral cooperation. The CFDT delegation left Morocco on 8 March 1980.

5586

CSO: 4400

COMMISSIONS TO INVESTIGATE MEKNES, KENITRA PRISONERS ESTABLISHED

Casablanca AL BAYANE in French 27 Mar 80 p 1

[Editorial: "A Positive Measure"]

[Text] Our daily AL BAYANE in its Arab-language edition has several times published petitions from prisoners in the Kenitra civil prison, asking penitentiary officials to provide the prisoners with a minimum of medical care.

Moreover, various humanitarian groups and organizations have taken action with the responsible authorities with a view to obtaining some guarantees and rights for political prisoners in the Meknes and Kenitra prisons.

It should be noted that these steps have received a preliminary satisfaction with the announcement that two commissions charged with establishing contact with the political prisoners of Kenitra and Meknes have been formed.

According to information from the Ministry of Justice, the two commissions will have all facilities to visit the political prisoners, to inquire into the conditions of their detention and the state of their health.

It cannot be denied that this is a positive measure, the result of joint or separate actions by several political and humanitarian groups or national trade unions.

Moreover, this measure will certainly have favorable repercussions on the campaigns of infamies and lies carried on abroad about actual conditions prevailing in the country, while it will also give satisfaction to the requests of the political prisoners, who have the right to claim respect for their physical and moral integrity.

But that should not mask the fact that it would be preferable, by far, as the Party of Progress and Socialism assesses it, for the development, strengthening and pursuit of the process of democratization in Morocco, that the political prisoners be freed and the exiles allowed to return to the country.

ALI YATA INTERVIEW FOR 'AFRICA' MAGAZINE

Casablanca AL BAYANE in French 28 Mar 80 pp 1, 3

[Interview with PPS Secretary General Ali Yata by AFRICA magazine: "We Are Working Sincerely for a Normalization Between Morocco and Algeria"]

[Text] The AFRICA review, which appears at Dakar, has just devoted its March issue to an exhaustive coverage of the Moroccan Sahara. It was in this context that our Comrade Ali Yata, secretary general of the PPS [Party of Progress and Socialism], was interviewed; also interviewed were the prime minister, the minister of the A. E. [expansion not known], MM Ahmed Osman, Ahmed Douhi, Ahmed Boutaleb, etc.... This issue on Saharan Morocco also includes communications from MM Abdallah Laroui, Rachid Lazrak, Attilio Gaudio, etc. We are reproducing below the entire interview given to AFRICA by Comrade Ali Yata.

[Question] . . . [beginning missing] to say why the Moroccan Left and your part in particular maintain a position faithful to the regime in the matter of the defense of the Saharan territories?

[Answer] I should like first to say that we, Moroccan progressives and revolutionaries, are very astonished to ascertain that other progressive and revolutionary forces in Africa take a position opposed to the just and legitimate fight that we are leading and have led to wrest a part of our territory from the control of Spanish colonialism.

In our opinion, this position is explained basically by a mistrust of our case, by ignorance of the problems posed and by a lack of sufficient information on the part of those who permit themselves to judge, in a superficial or even flippant manner, this question on which the life and future of a nation of 20 million people depend.



And it must be said on this subject that our Algerian brothers and comrades assume a great responsibility in this bizarre matter. . . .

In fact, our Algerian brothers in combat, who differ with us on this question and who want the establishment of a certain leadership over this part of Africa, are in large part at the origin of the fact that African progressive opinion does not hold the views which are suitable in this affair.

Thus, our Algerian brothers supported the thesis that the claim for return of the Western Sahara to Morocco was a claim of Moroccan monarchist power.

But it is nothing of the sort!

Since the Moroccan Left has been in existence, it has always supported the legitimate Moroccan territorial claim.

As for us Moroccan revolutionaries, who have existed as an organized party for almost 37 years, since the formation of our organization we have put our country's independence and our native land's territorial unity at the head of our claims.

By territorial unity we mean recovery of all parts of our soil which have been under foreign domination, including of course the Rio-de-Oro and the Seqiet-el-Hamra, i.e., what is commonly called the "Spanish Sahara." Since that time, our position has not varied. On the contrary, we have waged an unceasing struggle to bring this just claim to a conclusion. And it must be said that this historic and constant position has never been contested or attacked by any foreign political force, progressive or revolutionary.

On the contrary, we have found, at our sides, our Communist brothers in combat, including those who were the most concerned with this problem, i.e., the Communist Party of Spain, the French Communist Party and also the Italian Communists.

[Question] Then how do you explain that at present the European Communist parties have condemned your position and officially support that of the POLISARIO?

[Answer] Indeed, there was an about-face by some European Communist parties. Only a few years ago the Spanish Communist Party supported us fully. It declared openly and categorically that the territories of the South of Morocco were entirely Moroccan.

How can it be that it admitted the Moroccaness of our Saharan provinces several years ago and that it has stopped recognizing it today?

[Question] It recognized it several years ago?

[Answer] Absolutely. I state this categorically and precisely. This fact is mentioned in documents.

[Questions] You have proofs of it?

[Answer] We have material proofs of the fact that the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] has always recognized the Moroccanness of the provinces of the South until recent years. until its sudden change in favor of the POLISARIO. To be convinced of this, you need only refer to joint declarations of the Moroccan Communist Party and the Spanish Communist Party which were published at the time in the press organs of the two parties.

And it is the same for the French Communist Party; each time the latter spoke of the Western Sahara, it did so in terms favoring Morocco. Furthermore, I will add that the greatest "Africanists" of the French Communist Party--such as Jean Suret-Canale, well-known professor, Jean Dresch, world-reputed geographer, the publicist and specialist of the Arab world Jacques Couland, the sociologist and ethnologist Jacques Coubard--all these men of renown have always considered that the Western Sahara was thoroughly Moroccan. Unfortunately, there is now a change on their part. . . . I think that that is due mainly to calculations of expediency. . . so as not to say opportunist, to political calculations, which led them to change position.

[Question] And concerning your allegiance to the royal power which has so puzzled, indeed shocked, leftist public opinion in Europe?

[Answer] It is not at all a matter of allegiance but of a coordination of efforts and a collaboration in action for the triumph of a just and legitimate national cause.

Liberation of the Western Sahara was our cause as well as that of all patriotic national forces.

To assure its success, it was necessary to seal an alliance among all these forces. This is what we did in associating ourselves with the government's action when it expoused this very cause.

If we had not acted in this way, we would have failed in our mission as revolutionaries and patriots.

I will add that, for us, our behavior conforms absolutely on all points to the spirit and practice of scientific socialism. . . .

And no one up to now has proved the contrary to us!

[Question] A sort of lack of understanding with respect to you has risen from the matter of your attitude toward Algeria, which considers its regime as progressive and socialist.

How do you explain this ideological divorce from Algeria?

[Answer] A complete lack of understanding exists, unfortunately, but on the part of the Algerian Government.

We greatly regret it, but we are not at all responsible for it. We--who have been and remain solidly for the Algerian people's struggle for its national independence, its territorial unity, its social struggle--hoped for reciprocity toward us from the Algerians. It didn't happen! The reasons? They are numerous: Let us first mention the Algerian leaders' desire to make sure of a certain leadership in the region.

Second, the wish of official Algeria to get to the Atlantic Ocean and thus obtain a "window" which it judges indispensable to its economic expansion.

Third, the aspiration to gain control of major layers of phosphates which are missing in its territory but which the subsoil of the Western Sahara contains.

Fourth, the wish to prevent Morocco and Mauritania from having common borders which would facilitate their rapprochement and, consequently, the forming of a Morocco-Mauritania combination.

For all these reasons and for still others, the Algerian government has done everything to prevent Morocco from liberating and recovering its Saharan south.

Life has shown that these calculations were false. It sided with Morocco, whose aspirations and struggle were just.

In fact, an error in judgment was made by the Algerian leaders. Not only did they not take into account the powerful and very deep national sentiment anchored in the masses of the people, but in addition they anticipated a national division of forces on this question, in particular of the opposition to the government.

But, as I said, in this affair nobody could, without condemning himself to total isolation, not take part in the national struggle, because the people were unanimously for reestablishment of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara.

Furthermore, I do not believe in the Algerian leaders' sincerity when they speak of the opinion of the Saharans.

In the first phase, Boumedienne agreed to support us without any question of a referendum (as his speech to the Arab summit in September 1974 attests).

In the second phase, the Algerian Government ventured to have the so-called "Sahraoui Republic" proclaimed and to form a so-called Sahraoui government, without consulting at all the peoples concerned.

This is really the proof that the self-determination to which the leaders proclaim their attachment is only, in fact, for them, a means of leading international public opinion into error.

And still, despite that, we are working sincerely to attain a normalization of the situation between our two countries and to insure their understanding and cooperation, necessary to their development.

For our part, we are disposed to establish a new era of understanding, cooperation, and mutual aid, with a view to resolving the region's problems and proceeding to the building of the Arab Maghreb, which will become indisputably that of the peoples, conforming to the aspirations of the masses and progressive forces.

But that presupposes a scientific and realistic vision of things and taking into consideration the present historic stage which dictates respect for national sovereignty and existing structures, whether we like them or not.

In other terms, a union of the states of the Maghreb as they exist, with respect for their constitutional structure, and with close cooperation between the political forces and the mass organizations at all levels, is above all necessary.

[Question] What do you plan to do about the youth of the POLISARIO?

[Answer] Morocco opens its arms and its frontiers to all its sons. Thus, the Moroccan elements of the POLISARIO have their place in their country, Morocco, whatever their ideological or political leanings. Their duty, we think, is to rejoin the country, to live there and struggle like their Moroccan brothers.

5586  
CSO: 4400



## PERSIAN GULF AREA

### GULF STATES FORM WEAPONS MANUFACTURING GROUP

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 22 Mar 80 p 15

[Article: Arab Gulf Authority for Military Industrialization"]

[Text] Ever since last summer when Egypt tried to establish an Egyptian military industrialization corporation with the funds that were allocated and deposited in Egypt by the three Arab countries that founded the Arab Corporation for Military Industrialization, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been consulting with its partners in the corporation, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, to establish an Arab Military Industrialization Corporation in the Gulf. These consultations were then expanded to include Kuwait and other Arab countries whose identities a prominent Saudi source refused to reveal. The source only said, "The Gulf states have been enthusiastic and have encouraged the establishment of an Arab corporation for military industrialization. They have expressed their willingness to make generous contributions to its capital."

It is known that the Arab Corporation for Military Industrialization included Egypt and was located in Egypt until last summer when the Arab countries that had contributed to it decided to disband this corporation in response to al-Sadat's initiative. But President al-Sadat seized the corporation's property and funds and announced the establishment of a special Egyptian corporation.

Sources in the Gulf told AL-MUSTAQBAL, "The new corporation which the Gulf states intend to establish is proceeding at a quick pace even though there are some superficial differences [of opinion] about the location of the corporation, for example, and the kinds of weapons that it will produce." The source added, however, that there was now an inclination to locate the corporation in Riyadh "because the capabilities of the fraternal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the vastness of its territory as well as its military and material capabilities make it the best place and the most protected and secure place for building the corporation's plants [which will manufacture] heavy equipment, and especially airplanes, missiles and military vessels." But in the other Gulf states which lack space and human capabilities "factories for light weapons and ammunition may be built."

Two important matters that must be agreed upon are still pending, however.

The first is the financing of the corporation whose capital, it is said, will amount to 8 billion dollars--the capital of the disbanded corporation was 1.04 billion dollars.

The second matter pertains to the foreign companies with which cooperation is necessary for the sake of military industrialization.

Regarding the first matter an informed source told AL-MUSTAQBAL that "financing the corporation does not constitute any problem whatsoever because the countries that are currently engaged in consultations to establish the Gulf corporation are financially capable and can cover the amount of the proposed capital." Regarding the second matter, "The British and French companies that had contracted with the old corporation are still working in Egypt. They consider the contracts which they signed with the corporation to be still valid with Egypt. But the question [now] is this: how long will Egypt continue being able to meet its financial obligations to these companies?" And here the source says, "Within the next few months Egypt will not be able to pay its financial obligations to the companies that are working in the Egyptian corporation. This means that these companies must ultimately go to the corporation's former financiers so they can negotiate with them."

In the midst of all these ongoing consultations about the establishment of a new Arab-Gulf corporation for military industrialization, the Gulf states and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in particular are continuing their negotiations with the European countries to purchase or manufacture some military weapons which they need. During the visit that Saudi Crown Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz made to France last summer, Prince Fahd found out that President Giscard d'Estaing welcomed the idea of selling Saudi Arabia the weapons it needs. The French president even told the Saudi crown prince that his country was prepared to subsidize any military industrialization corporation that is established in the Gulf. The source said that Prince Fahd and President d'Estaing looked into a French arms deal that Saudi Arabia wants. This deal included Mirage 2000 airplanes, Crotale missiles and boats equipped with missiles. They also looked into the possibility of Saudi participation in financing the production of the Mirage 4000.

It seems, however, that the Saudi Ministry of Defense has changed its mind about purchasing the Mirage 2000 airplane because it became evident that its effectiveness was limited since it has only one turbine engine. This feature renders the capabilities of the Mirage 2000 inferior to those of the U.S. F-15 airplane.

With regard to the production of the Mirage 4000 airplane, it seems that Saudi Arabia will not be able to wait for almost 10 years until the first airplane of this kind comes out of its factories. Saudi leadership, therefore, preferred to get from France speedy, lightweight boats that are

equipped with missiles. This is because Saudi Arabia has a long coastline and it needs a naval defense system that is easy to use and can be put into action quickly. This is in addition to the Crotale surface to air missiles and the self-propelled guns.

8592

CSO: 4802

## PERSIAN GULF AFFAIRS

### BRITAIN, FRANCE COMPETE TO SELL ARMS TO GULF STATES

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 17-23 Mar 80 p 29

[Article: "Gulf States Receive Arms Through Competition Between France and Britain"]

[Text] The visit that French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing made to Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Jordan has aroused fears in official British circles. The British are apprehensive about the French obtaining contracts to sell arms to these countries. These fears were articulated in a brief statement made by British sources that the countries of the Gulf area in general were considered "forbidden territory" with regard to British sales.

The competition between France and Britain to export weapons to these countries goes back first to 1967 when the French company (Dasu-Brigee) found out how to promote the superiority of the French Mirage airplanes with the Arabs during the June 1967 War. Kuwait, which had purchased 20 F-1 airplanes, and Abu Dhabi, which had acquired 24 F-5 airplanes, became the first two customers to rush to purchase the French weapon. Then the Sultanate of Oman purchased 12 tactical support Jaguar airplanes that are manufactured by the French (Dasu-Brigee) company in conjunction with the British Aerospace Corporation. But the British suffered a harsh blow when Qatar expressed its preference for the French Alpha Jet airplanes over the British Hawk airplanes which London had made an effort to promote in this area. Britain had gone to considerable expense when it put these airplanes on display last year in the sky of the countries of the Gulf area. These fears also grew as a result of the rumors that have been circulating that Qatar may purchase 30 Mirage F-1 airplanes.

In another area, if French workshops obtained some contracts pertaining to selling naval military ammunition to the countries of the area, the market for French land ammunition in these countries will be encouraging. And here also London was disappointed when Saudi Arabia expressed its preference for the French tank AMX-30 over the British Chieftain tank. Saudi Arabia then purchased the French made (Emile Benhard) armored vehicles, and the United Arab Emirates also purchased 12 vehicles. It



is hence no coincidence that British military officials are visiting the area frequently for the purpose of firming up the traditional ties between London and the various capitals of the area so as to limit the flow of French weapons. Circles of the British Ministry of Defense are not denying their statement that France can sell all kinds of weapons, but that as far as training and preparing crews for the Mirage, the Jaguar or the AMX-30 tanks, Britain remains the preferred agent [for this task].

8592

CSO: 4802

SAUDI OFFICIAL EXPLAINS DECISION NOT TO RENEW U.S. BASE

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 7-13 Apr 80 pp 18-19

[Article by AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI's correspondent in Riyadh: "Talal Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz Reveals the Secrets of the Base in Dhahran"]

[Text] After his appointment as Waldheim's personal representative for UNICEF affairs, Talal Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz reveals the secrets of the base at Dhahran.

"America is exploiting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in order to create bases for itself in the Arabian Gulf area." On 10 March, the secretary general of the UN, Dr Kurt Waldheim, received Prince Talal Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz, who was officially entrusted with his new duties as the secretary general's personal representative for UNICEF affairs. There had been difficulties created by [certain] international groups as an obstacle to the appointment of Prince Talal Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz as the UN secretary general's personal representative for UNICEF affairs. But Dr Kurt Waldheim overcame these difficulties with the aid of a number of Arab diplomats in the UN.

Before going to New York Talal Ibn-'Abd'al-'Aziz held a meeting which included a gathering of his friends, in which he talked about his new duties and about his desire to set up an extensive practical program by means of which he would be able to achieve some of the ideas and plans which he wants to translate into action in the area of general service.

And it was on this occasion, when talking about Arab-American relations, that he chose to disclose an important political secret which [up till then] had remained under the seal of secrecy. It concerns the American base in Dhahran. He said: "At one time we wanted it, and then at another time we abolished it, and now we reject it. But each of these three attitudes has its circumstances which need to be explained before judgment can be rendered."

He was asked why [King] 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the hero who had fought for the sake of the independence of the Arabian Peninsula and had undertaken to

unify it, had agreed to let a foreign government establish a military base in his country. He said: "Let us go back into history a little bit. In order for us to be honest with ourselves, we have to say that every great person has a weak spot and that [King] 'Abd-al-'Aziz's weak spot was the Hashemites! The Hashemites had committed hostile actions against him and had prevented the Najdis, for a period of 6 successive years, from making the pilgrimage [to Mecca]. Their pretext was that they were afraid that a clash would occur between them and other Moslems. These actions were the first thing which motivated 'Abd-al-'Aziz to occupy the Hijaz and to take it away from the Hashemites, who were the allies of the English. When the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with its present borders, was declared, the English set up around it a country ruled by Faysal Ibn-al-Husayn in Iraq, and a country ruled by 'Abdallah Ibn-al-Husayn in Jordan. They also dominated most of the countries, surrounding the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia], which were protectorates, located all along the Arabian Gulf and all the way over to Aden on the Red Sea. He was always worried and afraid of a Hashemite plot or of Hashemite aggression which would be encouraged by the English and supported by them."

"I personally believe that 'Abd-al-'Aziz was excessively worried and wary of the Hashemites. However, this worry and fear was something that robbed 'Abd-al-'Aziz of his sleep, and he felt himself surrounded everywhere by the English and by the friends of the English. Perhaps the king's advisers, or at least some of them, were influential in leading his thinking in this direction."

"When America appeared on the world scene during World War I, proclaiming Wilson's famous principles, and during World War II, when President Roosevelt declared that his country would go to war to give freedom and justice to all peoples, 'Abd-al-'Aziz had great hopes concerning this country which declared that it was fighting imperialism and supporting [the fight against imperialism] as well as supporting the struggle undertaken by smaller nations to achieve their independence and national sovereignty."

"With the intensification of the struggle between Britain and the United States in the Middle East, 'Abd-al-'Aziz thought it only natural that we should support the country that was far away from our country and which had no colonies. [He thought that we should support it] against the country that was surrounding us on all sides and whose armies were camped in a number of Arab countries, and which had usurped part of our territory in al-Buraymi."

"And we should not forget the Palestinian problem. After all, the English were the original cause of this tragedy for the Arabs. And world Zionism did not resort to seeking America's protection until it became clear that the English were unable to continue to guarantee protection to the Zionists."

"It was under these circumstances and for these reasons that 'Abd-al-'Aziz oriented himself toward America and granted them the oil concession instead of granting it to the English. And it was under these same circumstances and for these very same reasons that he gave his approval to the

agreement concerning the Dhahran airport which was made between the government of Saudi Arabia and the United States on 18 June 1951. And perhaps it was these very circumstances and reasons which caused this devout, deeply religious man, a quarter of a century before that, to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union which resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Saudi Arabia. [This was accomplished because of] a letter which 'Abd-al-'Aziz sent to Hakimov, the USSR's envoy in Jiddah, and which was dated 6 Sha'ban 1344 A.H. (19 February 1926)." Then Prince Talal took a sheet of paper out of his dossier and said: "Here is the text of the letter:

'We were honored to receive your Note No. 22, dated 16 February 1926 (3 Sha'ban 1344 A.H.), in which you informed me of the fact that the government of the USSR recognizes the new status quo in the Hijaz and the oath of loyalty taken by the people of the Hijaz to me as King of the Hijaz and Sultan of Najd and its dependencies. For this reason, my government wishes to express its appreciation to the government of the Soviet Union and it wishes to express the fact that it is fully prepared to establish relations with the government and citizens of the USSR as is normally done between friendly nations. May relations between our two governments be based on respect for the independence of the Holy [Moslem] Lands and on other international traditions which are recognized by all nations of the world.'

'And in conclusion, please accept my highest regards.'"

"A few years later King 'Abd-al-'Aziz sent his son and foreign minister, Faysal, on a friendship visit to Moscow in May 1932, as a representative of his government."

"Those were the circumstances which provided the background for 'Abd-al-'Aziz's approval of the American base at the Dhahran airport. In the agreement it is not called a 'base,' but the facilities which are included in the clauses of the agreement are the facilities of a base. The agreement was to be for 5 years, and it was to be renewed automatically unless one of the two parties informed the other, 6 months before the expiration of the treaty, of its desire to modify or cancel it."

#### Circumstances of the Decision to Abolish [the Base]

In answer to a question about the area of the base, he said: "The first article of the agreement reads as follows: 'The phrase "Dhahran airport" in this agreement refers to the area of land located in the Dammam region and which has been established as including land for a distance of 5 miles in all directions [from the airport], thereby constituting a square, the central point of which is the entrance building to the present airport.'"

"American airplanes had the right to use this particular area of land for landing, taking off, refueling, and for other technical services such as maintenance and repair. But as for American military and civilian personnel,



their authority ended at the boundaries of this particular area of land, as was mentioned in Article 13: 'Any crime committed by a member of the American armed forces outside of the area mentioned will be subject to local legislation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.'"

"Let me say frankly that, if it was necessary to make this agreement, then it was also possible to obtain better conditions for Saudi Arabia. The responsibility in this regard was that of the king's advisers, some of whom were not equal to the level of international [politics and] events."

"'Abd-al-'Aziz's belief about the circumstances of his country, his exaggerated fear of the Hashemites, the remoteness of the United States from the Arab world, and British imperialist domination over most parts of the Arab world, especially those areas which surrounded the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, were the factors that made him agree to establish this foreign base or else they forced him to do it."

"When King Sa'ud formed his new government on 18 November 1960 and made me the minister of finance, some princes, intellectuals, and I met in this house of mine in al-(Fakhiriyah). We exchanged opinions about the situation in the Arab world and we also touched upon the subject of the Dhahran agreement. And we agreed that it was necessary to cancel the agreement."

"On the evening of 15 March 1961 I and my brothers 'Abd-al-Muhsin, the minister of the interior at that time, Badr, the minister of communications, and (Fawaz), the [ruling] prince of the Riyadh area, were visiting King Sa'ud. We talked about the Dhahran agreement and told him that there was no longer any justification for this agreement, and that it should be cancelled for the following reasons: 1. The circumstances which called for it in the days of 'Abd-al-'Aziz no longer exist, and the Kingdom is no longer threatened by any danger on the part of the English or the Hashemites. 2. America has not kept the promises that it made to 'Abd-al-'Aziz that it would support the rights of the Arabs in Palestine, and it is still supporting Israel more than ever, giving it military and material aid which is at the expense of the interests of the Arabs. 3. This agreement hurts our reputation both in the Arab world and in the outside [non-Arab] world. It makes people think that we are America's allies. We can no longer tolerate this situation which, without any justification, makes us suffer the consequences of America's mistakes. 4. Nationalist movements in the Arab world are engaging in a political struggle with the United States because of the Palestine problem and because of our obvious right to Palestine. And our position should be harmonious with [these nationalist movements]."

"After hearing this, King Sa'ud agreed and said: 'If you feel that it is necessary to cancel the agreement, then let us cancel it.'"

"Then we asked him: 'And should this be done now?'"

"He said: 'Yes. Write a communique to that effect and I will sign it immediately.'"

"Without waiting for a cabinet meeting to be held, and in an effort to gain time in order to avoid any interventions or complications, we wrote a communique, issued by the king, which cancelled the Dhahran agreement and [the king] sealed it with his signature. It was just a little while before supertime, and the radio station was in Jiddah. It broadcasted the news at 2:00 Arab time, which was the time that we went by, and which was approximately equivalent to 8:00 foreign time. After King Sa'ud signed the communique, he said to me: 'Hurry up and give it to the radio station so that they can broadcast it during the news program.'"

Right away I contacted the head of the radio station and dictated the text of the communique to him. Then it was broadcast when the evening news program came on, and it caused great international commotion. I must say that it was a brave step that Sa'ud took, and it was [actually] the second decision of this magnitude that he had taken. The first such decision was the one which he issued in November of 1956 when he stopped the export of Saudi oil to both France and England and cut diplomatic relations with them, after the Tripartite Aggression against Egypt."

"The next day the Saudi foreign ministry sent an official letter to the United States via its ambassador in Jiddah, cancelling the agreement. The American ambassador, (Parker Hart), then got in touch with me and asked me about the reasons which led to the taking of this decision. I replied that the circumstances, which had led to the making of the agreement, no longer existed, and that there was no longer any justification for it. [And I replied that] we were basing this on the principle of [national] sovereignty."

"The American government undertook numerous efforts to convince the Saudi government to change its mind. But the Saudi government's insistence, in the final analysis, forced [the American government] to accept what had been done. Then on 17 April the State Department issued a communique in which it said: 'The Saudi government has demanded that the American government give up the base at Dhahran, and has informed it that it will not agree to renew the agreement made by both parties.' The communique also said that the American government constructed the airport with the approval of the Saudi government, and that this government had not given any reason as to why it had made this decision, 'but it is believed that it is connected with resentment on the part of the Arab countries toward America's friendship with Israel.'"

"In spite of the fact that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had been invited to the Bandung Conference which was held in the spring of 1955, and in which the country was represented by Faysal Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz, before the cancellation of the agreement we were still classified as being in the area of American influence. After the cancellation of the agreement we received a letter from Nehru, Tito, and Nasser which invited us to attend the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in August of 1961.

We were represented there by Ibrahim al-(Swil), who was the foreign minister at that time. The principles that were espoused there were opposition to alliances and foreign military bases, respect for nations' right to self-determination, respect for the sovereignty of nations and the integrity of their territory, striving to liberate countries which were still not independent, and the elimination of imperialism in all its forms."

Then Prince Talal came back to the present-day situation and relationships with America, saying:

"And now the United States is asking Saudi Arabia for either facilities or bases or an American [military] presence, but the Saudi government's answer is that it refuses to grant this and all of us support the government in this decision."

"America wants to exploit the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in order to create bases for itself in the Arabian Gulf area. We condemn this invasion and we are critically examining the dangers that it entails, but at the same time we condemn American attempts to exploit it in pursuit of its own interests in the area without taking our interests into consideration."

"We ask America why it wants these bases. If it answers that it wants to protect us from communism, then we will answer, in turn, that it is only trying to protect itself, and that if communism is a danger which is approaching, then Israel is a [real] present danger which is crouching in our territory and on our backs."

"We have one demand, which is that the Arabs have a right to Palestine. This demand requires all of our thinking and all of our concern. And when this demand has been achieved, and only after it has been achieved, then we will be ready to discuss any subject which is within the scope of the interests of the Arabs and in the Saudi national interest."

9468

CSO: 4802

SAUDIS REJECT ALLIANCES, REEMPHASIZE PALESTINIAN ISSUE

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 1 Mar 80 pp 28-29

[Article by Sulyaman Nimr: "Many Offers, But One Position"]

[Text] Saudi Arabia rejects participation in any foreign alliance and stipulates that the military capability of the Gulf states should be strengthened in order to confront threats!

"While the advance of the Soviet tanks on Kabul and the Soviet Union's subdual of Afghanistan have aroused feelings of anxiety among the states of the Persian Gulf, the attempts of the two Big Powers--and especially the United States--to gain control over the area under the pretext of protecting its stability and security have aroused many more feelings of anxiety because of the implication such attempts have for the transformation of the area into a field of conflict and struggle for influence between Moscow and Washington.

"If the United States or the Western states really want to preserve their interests in receiving a continued flow of oil out of the reach of any Soviet ambitions, then they must endeavor to protect the independence of the area states by enabling them to protect themselves on their own. They can accomplish this by increasing the military capability of these states to confront any threats, and not by maintaining a military presence in the area."

These words, which were spoken to AL-MUSTAQBAL by a Saudi source, sum up what officials in Saudi Arabia have said to the American and Western officials who have made frequent visits to Riyadh and the capitals of the Gulf states during the past few weeks.

The four American officials who visited Riyadh during February brought with them American proposals or offers to defend the Gulf area against what they termed Soviet ambitions in the area. They attempted on the basis of these offers to obtain Saudi approval of the "Carter doctrine for the defense of the Gulf," which seeks to unit the area states in something resembling a military and political alliance with the United States. Nevertheless, Saudi opposition to these offers and the repeated statements



thrust on the American envoys by Saudi officials asserting that the main danger which threatens the area is the continued Israeli occupation of Arab lands and the continued neglect of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, and that if the United States wants to establish relations of true friendship with the Arab states--and in particular the Gulf states--then it must halt its assistance and military and moral support of Israel and cease to act within the framework of the policy of the Camp David agreements--all of this, according to an informed source, caused Brzezinski, the American President's adviser on national security affairs, to come to Riyadh bringing with him a promise from President Carter that within 2 months the United States would offer a new American initiative aimed at producing a settlement to the problem of recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people.

This American promise was clearly effective in diminishing the feelings of distrust which Saudi officials had held toward Washington, especially in the wake of the statements made by Sol Linowitz, the American envoy for the so-called autonomy talks, who visited Riyadh 2 days before Brzezinski early in February. Linowitz's statements asserted that Washington was determined to act within the framework of the Camp David guidelines to produce separate settlements of the Middle East crisis. These guidelines, however, are the agreements which Saudi Crown Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz has repeatedly characterized during his recent interviews as "reflecting unjust intentions and having undoubtedly contributed to the deterioration of the situation in the area to its current state of tension and confusion." Moreover, the officials had felt very sensitive about dealing with the United States because, as one Gulf official told AL-MUSTAQBAL, the problem which some of the so-called 'Arab moderates' see in dealing with America is that America is the state which provides all the military, economic and moral support and aid to Israel, which continues to occupy all the occupied Arab lands and ignore the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."

The feelings of confidence among the officials in the Saudi capital were heightened by the fact that the United States planned to alter its policy on the Middle East problem. This was further confirmed for them by Donald McHenry, the permanent American representative to the United Nations, who hinted in a press conference called in Riyadh during his visit on 12 February at the importance of the Palestinian problem as the main basis for the permanent and just peace settlement which the United States would endeavor to achieve.

In fact, following these developments Western political circles began talking about a British effort to introduce amendments to the famous UN Resolution 242 making the Palestinians a direct side in the crisis--a move to which Israel has declared its strong opposition on more than one occasion.

However, what has attracted the attention of political observers is the statements made by the Saudi crown prince to the French newspaper FIGARO last Saturday. The Saudi leader again asserted that "the fighting and

containment of communism in the area necessitates first of all the achievement of a just and comprehensive solution to the Palestinian problem and the Palestinians, who have been subjected to oppression at the hands of Israel supported by the United States and the West in general."

This statement caused political observers to realize that "something" had happened with regard to the matter of the American promises brought to Riyadh by Brzezinski. In fact, political observers became convinced that Riyadh felt Brzezinski's promises to be empty ones when President Carter stated before the American Jewish Congress last Monday that he "opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Middle East and will never negotiate with the PLO," and that "any discussion of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must take place within the framework of the autonomy negotiations."

However, all this that has happened and is happening with regard to the matter of the peace settlement and the achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian problem has not been able to eclipse the genuine feelings of anxiety which Saudi Arabia has about the direct Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. While Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz has said that the illegal Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is a result of the tension and confusion which plague the area at the present stage due to the continued Israeli occupation and the critical situation created by the Camp David agreement, the Saudi crown prince did not forget to assert in an interview published this week by the American magazine NEWSWEEK that "the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan is part of a Soviet policy of expansion, and the likelihood that Soviet aggression will recur somewhere else cannot be ruled out as long as the Soviets are not confronted with a firm international position and a deterrent."

Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz and the Saudi officials are certainly searching for a deterrent and an international position to oppose the dangers that have been raised by the Soviet intervention. However, Saudi Arabia as well as the rest of the Gulf states do not want this to come about through the sending of Big Power forces into the Gulf area as a result of the granting of facilities or military bases in the area to America, for example, or any other of the Big Powers. This would not serve the stability of the area because of the sensibilities and reactions it would arouse among the peoples of the affected states, which are searching for ways to protect their independence through increasing their own military capability.

Riyadh has endeavored to make the American President's national security affairs adviser understand that Saudi Arabia cannot possibly enter into any form of alliance with powers foreign to the area, and that the response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will not include the establishment of American military bases or the granting of any facilities in the region to American forces. If America really wants to participate in the defense of the security and stability of the states of the area, it must act to strengthen the military capability of the area states themselves, and especially Pakistan.

Informed sources state that Brzezinski exhibited an understanding of the position of the Saudi officials, although he tried to convince them to form a security alliance among the states of the area with the provision that the United States would pledge to support the alliance and provide aid to it.

However, faced with the Saudis' rejection of such an alliance, Brzezinski was forced to investigate the possibility of offering additional military and economic aid to Pakistan surpassing the \$400 million in aid which America had offered previously. When Brzezinski tried to bring up the issue of the Soviet military presence in South Yemen and the need such a presence imposes, according to Brzezinski, for the presence of American forces to monitor any Soviet moves in Aden, the Saudi officials indicated to him that in spite of the uneasiness which the presence of the Soviet forces in Aden does in fact cause, this presence is not a reason to allow the area to be transformed into a field for possible conflicts between Washington and Moscow. They asserted that Saudi Arabia prefers to confront this matter through dialog with the regime in Aden.

However, less than 2 weeks after Brzezinski's departure from Riyadh, Washington announced that the Sultanate of Oman had agreed to give America military facilities within its territory and that 2,800 American troops had headed for the area for this purpose. This move made matters in the area grow confused and complicated once again.

Faced with all this anxiety, Saudi officials--as one such official in Riyadh told AL-MUSTAQBAL--have become even more convinced of their position, which will not change. This position rejects any bases or facilities, calling instead for total Arab solidarity and coordination which will ensure that the dangers threatening the Arab world are countered, whether these dangers lie in the Gulf, on the northern front with Israel, or even in the region of the Arab Maghrib.

Thus, everything that America attempts under the pretext of protecting the area is no more than a cover for its interests and an effort to impose its control on the area. The same applies to the Soviet Union, whose ambitions have become completely clear, especially in the wake of its invasion of Afghanistan.

What strengthens the position of Arab solidarity is the close relations which exist these days among the Arab capitals. Not a week goes by in which Riyadh does not witness the visit of an Arab leader or official.

Therefore, when President Saddam Husayn announced his proposal concerning the "Charter for Arab National Action," Saudi Arabia was the third Arab state--after Jordan and Kuwait--to announce that it deeply welcomed President Saddam Husayn's proposal, feeling that this charter--as a political

observer in Riyadh put it--would solve the problems which stand in the way of Arab solidarity and would constitute a unified Arab policy toward any alliance which is against the higher Arab interest.

Thus, the main topic which Iraqi Vice President 'Izzat Ibrahim discussed during his visit to Riyadh last Monday was, as he said in a press conference, "the Charter for National Action which has been proposed by Iraq preparatory to being put into application and effect by the Arab states."

8591

CSO: 4802



SAUDIS CALL FOR POSITIVE STEPS TO SOLVE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 15 Mar 80 p 25

[Article by Sulayman Nimr: "What Is the European Plan That d'Estaing Carried to Riyadh?"]

[Text] In a statement made at Riyadh Airport last Monday afternoon immediately following the arrival of French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Saudi Foreign Minister Sa'ud Al Faysal said: "Saudi Arabia is satisfied with the new French position which has recognized the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. However, we hope that the French position will become even clearer on this issue, because removing the obscurity surrounding this matter will help us and will serve the genuine efforts to solve the Palestinian problem." The journalists who heard this statement realized that in their talks with the French president, Saudi officials had requested that they receive additional clarifications on the French initiative concerning the Palestinian problem and had made an effort to learn what practical steps will be taken by France and Europe to translate this new and positive position into reality. The same things were stressed by Prince Sa'ud Faysal in an interview with a French radio correspondent a few minutes before the start of the Saudi-French talks. He said: "What we are hoping is that the international community and Europe will, with the leadership of France, take practical steps to implement these decisions rather than merely adopting a position. This is the most important thing."

The French president's second visit to Riyadh—following an earlier visit to the Saudi capital in January 1977—was a "friendly" working visit not restricted by any of the traditional protocol or a formal agenda. The French president sought through this visit to crown the success achieved by his tour through four Gulf states and Jordan with another success in Saudi Arabia, realizing that Riyadh has become the center of influence in the area. After an expression of amicable feelings toward the Saudi monarch, who was released from the hospital just 3 days prior to d'Estaing's arrival, the first question which the French president hastened to ask Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, who met him at the airport, was: "How is the king doing now"? The Saudi crown prince answered him with obvious gratitude: "He is

well and in good health. You can reassure yourself about him, your excellency, when we go to al-Ma'zar Palace to meet his majesty now."

At al-Ma'zar Palace, where the Saudi monarch resides, the French president met with King Khalid ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz. The two leaders talked for 20 minutes, during which the main points of the topics which would be discussed during the talks were set forth.

Afterwards, President Giscard d'Estaing was accompanied by Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz to the guest palace, where an extended working luncheon was held. Present at this luncheon were Foreign Minister Francois-Poncet and the French ambassador to Saudi Arabia for the French side, and Head of the National Guard 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, Minister of Defense and Aviation Sultan ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz and high-ranking Saudi officials for the Saudi side. After the luncheon, the official working discussions began. Two separate meetings were held, each of which lasted over 2 hours. The first of these was a closed meeting between the French president and the Saudi crown prince, while the second meeting took place between French Foreign Minister Francois-Poncet and Saudi Foreign Minister Sa'ud Al Faysal. Shaykh Jamil al-Hajilan, the Saudi ambassador to Paris, also attended the latter meeting.

The two meetings dealt solely with two topics. The first of these was the French-European initiative which is being talked about in light of the recent French position calling for recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The French president provided the Saudi leaders with clarifications of this French position. In a statement to the press after the conclusion of President d'Estaing's visit, Saudi Foreign Minister Sa'ud Al Faysal said: "The clarifications that the French president provided concerning the French position at this stage express the European position that the crux of the Palestinian problem, in this respect, is an insistence on justice in the solution of the problem and concentration on the right of self-determination." Prince Sa'ud Al Faysal added: "I believe that the changes in the position as conveyed by the French president are not unstudied changes, but studied changes. We hope that this will lead to the achievement of peace in the region and the fulfillment of the legitimate demands of the Palestinian people."

After the conclusion of his meeting with the Saudi crown prince, President Giscard d'Estaing said: "During the talks, we reviewed all the current issues about which many questions are being raised throughout the world, and we have been able to achieve a closeness of views, from the standpoint of the concept and the analysis, between the kingdom and France."

President d'Estaing also stated that "the discussions with the Saudi side dealt with the issue of the Israeli occupation." He announced that he would "submit the results of the talks we conducted with the leaders of the area before the European leaders, especially those results which pertain to the issue of peace in the Middle East."

Is there a French-led European initiative to translate these positions into practical measures?

Informed sources disclosed to AL-MUSTAQBAL that the French president explained to the Saudi leaders the details of an initiative being taken by France and the European states pertaining to the achievement of a just and realistic solution to the Palestinian problem. The sources stated that the French position recognizing for the first time the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and acknowledging that the Palestinian problem is the problem of a people rather than a problem of refugees was a preliminary step--which met with complete success--to the European initiative whose implementational measures will take definite form after President d'Estaing conveys the views he heard during his tour through six Arab states to this fellow European leaders. AL-MUSTAQBAL has also learned that the main details of the French-European initiative will include the following points:

First: The amendment of Security Council Resolution 242 to include the following three important articles:

--Recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people including its right to self-determination.

--Recognition of the right of all states in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized borders, and acknowledgement that this right should be guaranteed by the five Big Powers.

--Israeli withdrawal from the lands it occupied in 1967.

Secondly: An effort to conduct peaceful negotiations to achieve a just and permanent solution to the problem in accordance with the Security Council resolution in its amended form, with all sides concerned in the problem to participate in these negotiations, including the Palestine Liberation Organizations, under the supervision of the five Big Powers.

Thirdly: Sounding of the opinion of the Arab states on an effort to achieve a union between the Palestinians and the Jordanians which would have the effect of eliminating the American and Israeli veto on the inclusion of the Palestinians as participants in the peace talks.

The second topic dealt with in the two meetings was the situation in the Persian Gulf area in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. AL-MUSTAQBAL has learned that the Saudi leaders gave their assessment of the French position on the issue of Gulf security, which is the position announced by President d'Estaing during his Gulf tour when he stated: "The responsibility of Gulf security is an international responsibility. The Gulf must remain far from the arena of the international struggle" At the same time, the French president expressed to the Saudi officials during

their discussion of this topic--which did not take up a large amount of time in the talks--France's complete readiness to assist the Gulf states militarily so that they can maintain their security and independence through the strengthening of their military capability. This matter, as well, produced further satisfaction among the leaders of Saudi Arabia.

8591

CSO: 4802



CURRENT WEAPONRY, FUTURE ARMS ACQUISITIONS SURVEYED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI 3-9 Mar 80 pp 34-35

[Article by Tawfiq Naklah Ibrahim: "A New Takeoff, New Equipment and the Imminent Operational Phase"]

[Text] The Saudi Army is the army of the country which has decided to become a significant military power in the area within the next few years and, by virtue of its vast resources, to select the most complex and expensive military equipment in the world.

The Saudi military budget has quadrupled during the last 4 years, and as Saudi Minister of Defense Sultan ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz indicated last month, it will reach roughly \$10.5 billion this year. However, this sum will definitely not be spent haphazardly as past sums were spent. For in its arms purchases, Saudi Arabia has succeeded to a large extent in avoiding the kind of extravagances which characterized the shah of Iran, contenting itself with purchasing only that military equipment which it really needs.

Despite caution, the Saudi armed forces face manifold difficulties in absorbing this equipment, which has swollen in volume during the past 4 years as a result of the effort to increase military potentials. The underlying reasons for this effort are the increase in tension in the Gulf, on the one hand, and a basic rise in oil revenues on the other.

The Saudi military effort has centered on the navy—especially in the area of defense of the coasts and surrounding waters—and on air-to-air, surface-to-air and air-to-surface missiles. And here note should be taken of the importance that the Saudi armed forces attach to diversifying their arms sources by purchasing the weapons they need from the United States and the West European countries.

The Saudi Army numbers 61,500 men (45,000 in the ground forces, 15,000 in the air force and 1,500 in the navy). This figure will not change much during the next 3 years despite a reported plan to double the army's strength, because the Saudi royal family prefers a small and more loyal army to a large army.

The ground forces include 400 AMX-30 medium tanks of French make. These tanks, of the same generation as the German-made Leopard tank, weigh 32 tons and can travel at speeds up to 65 kmh. They are equipped with a 105-mm semi-automatic gun capable of firing either antitank, antipersonnel or illuminating shells. They are also equipped with a 12.7mm machine gun (which can be replaced with a 20mm gun) and a 7.62mm turret-mounted gun.

The Saudi Army owns 75 American-made Chrysler M-47 and M-60 tanks. The old (1940's make), slow (40 kmh) and heavy (44 tons) M-47 tank no longer has combat effectiveness. The M-60 tanks, on the other hand, are modern and heavy vehicles weighing between 56 and 57 tons and capable of speeds up to 48 kmh. They are also well-armed, with either a 105mm gun capable of firing 36 rounds or the XM-162 system which fires 152mm shells and Shillelagh anti-tank missiles. However, two drawbacks of these tanks are their slowness and their inability to fight in hot climates.

In the area of light armor, the ground forces have obtained French-made tanks of the AMX-13 type manufactured by the Creusot-Loire Company. This tank weighs 15 tons, can travel at speeds up to 64 kmh, and is operated by three men using 75mm, 90mm or even 105mm guns. The Saudi ground forces have also obtained 150 of the fast (80.5 kmh) and modern Scorpion tanks equipped with 76mm guns. However, the extremely light weight of this vehicle (7.8 tons) makes it more vulnerable and less adaptable in an armor battle.

#### An Assortment

The Saudis own 200 machine-gun-equipped armored vehicles. The types in their possession include the AML-60 and AML-90 Panhard armored car, which is equipped with a 90mm gun and a 60mm mortar of the Brandt type as well as twin 7.6mm machine guns and a 12.7mm machine gun capable of firing 1,300 rounds; and the AML-HE-60-20, which is equipped with a 60mm mortar with a range of between 600 and 2,600 meters, an automatic 20mm gun and a 7.62mm machine gun. The latter vehicle has a remarkable performance in the sand and can travel at speeds up to 100 kmh for a distance of 600 km.

The light machine-gun-equipped armored cars and APC's are British-made vehicles of the Staghound, Greyhound and Ferrier Scout Car types. There are also American-made APC's of the M-113 type and French-made APC's of the Panhard M-3 type.

In the area of artillery, the Saudi Army owns an assortment of 105mm and 75mm recoilless howitzers. The modernity of the artillery sector and the sizableness of the means at its disposal are clearly indicated by the anti-armor weaponry in service:

French missiles of the SS-2 [as published; probably SS-11] type, which weigh 29 kg, have a range of 3 km, and are capable of penetrating a 600mm armor plate, and additional French missiles of the Harpon type; American-made missiles of the Dragon type, a very up-to-date missile that can be

fired by an infantryman, with the latest model providing night vision up to a range of 1.4 km; and British-made Vigilant missiles for use by infantry.

In the field of air defense, the Saudi Army has antiaircraft guns, British-made Rapier missiles, and American-made Hawk missiles (range of 30 to 11,000 meters, weight of 580 kg and length of 5 meters).

Weapons on order by the ground forces include 200 M-60 tanks, 100 Scorpion tanks, 250 AMX-10 tanks (the new French-made light tank used for reconnaissance missions and equipped with a 105mm gun and a laser system) and 250 APC's.

Later this year, Saudi Arabia is slated to receive missiles of the Shahin type which is derived from the Crotale antiaircraft missile. This type of missile weighs 80 kg, has a range of 10 km and is guided by infrared rays and ground radar. Groups of six Shahin missiles are mounted on AMX-30 tank chassis. The kingdom will also receive six Hawk missile batteries mounted on Dragon (ragons) vehicles equipped with powerful searchlights.

The effectiveness of this missile system will be enhanced by antiaircraft artillery units which will include twin 30mm guns (range of 10 km, capability of 650 rounds per minute, aimed by radar, powered by electricity). A French-Saudi company (Arab Electronics Company) currently in the process of being set up will manufacture the radar units.

The important Saudi orders from France (which include as of yet unconfirmed requests for electronically guided 155mm GIAT [Groupement Industriel des Armements Terrestres] guns) obligate the source of the arms to provide the technical manpower necessary to install the equipment (especially complicated equipment such as the Shahin missiles) and train the crews. The difficulty of the GIAT Company's problem lies in coming up with technicians who are prepared to go to Saudi Arabia and are fluent in English and Arabic. French technical aid is also meeting some difficulties in this area.

Meanwhile, all efforts are now being directed at the navy. This branch of service is made up of only 1,500 men who must defend coastlines of enormous lengths. For in a country of 8 million people, it is difficult to produce enough manpower for all the armed services.

The Saudi Navy presently consists of three large Jaguar-class torpedo boats of German manufacture, a patrol boat, four American-made minesweepers, four landing craft, eight hovercraft and a teaching ship. In 1976, Saudi Arabia concluded a contract with the United States for some 30 boats and frigates. It is expected that from now until 1982, the kingdom will receive some eight frigates equipped with 76mm guns, American-made Harpoon ship-to-ship missiles (each weighting 650 kg with a range of 90 km), and Franco-Italian Oto Melara missiles (with a range of 180 km and weight 770 kg each). The kingdom will also receive four fast boats equipped with the same weapons as the frigates. New Saudi orders from the United States include 18 landing craft and six patrol boats.

Saudi Arabia is preparing to open the largest naval base in the kingdom (King Faysal Base) and put into service an additional base (Jubayl Base) and a school for advanced naval training. At present, senior Saudi naval officers are pursuing their studies in the United States, while thousands of recruits are undergoing training at the school in al-Dammam. All of this effort is aimed at creating a small and fast naval fleet outfitted with the latest missiles and capable of rapid intervention at any point on the Saudi coastline.

The importance of the Saudi Air Force is enormous because of the length of Saudi Arabia's borders (2,417 km). The kingdom has only 137 fighters, the most modern of which are the American F-15's equipped with two 30mm guns. The rest of the aircraft are of the old British Lightning type. For this reason, Saudi Arabia has placed an order for 60 F-15 (Eagle) aircraft made by McDonnell Douglas Company (the value of the contract is \$1.5 billion). These aircraft are the latest interceptor aircraft. They are equipped with Sparrow and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and the latest gun, the M-61. It is expected that Saudi Arabia will be receiving these planes in 1982.

In addition, the kingdom will receive 20 American-made F-5 Tiger II aircraft this year. It has also placed a \$120-million order for the following air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles: 660 Sidewinder missiles (length 2.84 meters, range 15,000 meters); 906 Maverick antitank missiles (guided by means of a small television unit mounted in its nose); and 6,500 shells and missiles of all types.

Saudi Arabia has also ordered additional British-made light attack aircraft of the Strikemaster type. These planes, of which the Saudis already own 30, are equipped with guns and bombs.

In order to transport its military units, Saudi Arabia has four huge C-103 (sic) aircraft manufactured by the American company McDonnell Douglas.

However, the weak point of the Saudi Army lies in its very modernness and affluence. Technical preparation and training are still far from the final stage, and in most cases the Saudi Army has not even reached the operational stage.

The acquisition of new and diversified equipment (the kingdom is trying to obtain Mirage 3's from France) has raised important questions in the area of capabilities for the air force. There are thousands of American and British technicians and a few dozen French personnel on Saudi soil, and this constitutes an alien and foreign presence which could eventually irritate Saudi sensibilities. The Iranian example is proof of that.

On the other hand, what concerns the royal family is ensuring the effectiveness of its military units. For in the Grand Mosque incident, according to informed sources, the troops of the Royal Guard (which numbers 35,000) were not enthusiastic about fighting rebels some of whom belonged to their own tribes. Moreover, the inexperience of these units--along with the rest of the army--in street warfare compelled Saudi officials to request help from Jordanian military specialists. Therefore, now more than ever before, the creation of units to maintain internal security has become a necessity.



## SAUDI ARABIA

### FUTURE OF PETROLEUM MINISTER SEEN AS UNCERTAIN

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 2 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Mustafa Karkuti: "OPEC Sources in London: 'Ahmad Zaki Yamani Expected To Be Dismissed, Sa'ud Al Faysal To Take Over as Oil Minister'"]

[Text] AL-SAFIR has learned from sources within OPEC that America's appeal for the current oil production level in Saudi Arabia to be maintained may lead to the dismissal of Oil Minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani from his post. The sources indicated that a disagreement has recently flared up with Yamani over the position on current production levels, which now amount to 9.5 million barrels a day.

As is generally known, American Energy Secretary Charles Duncan is currently on a visit to Saudi Arabia in an effort to convince officials to accept an American plan calling for the maintenance of current levels so that the United States can use its strategic oil reserves, which amount to 1 billion barrels, until the end of 1989.

It is reported that some Saudi officials have hinted on previous occasions that production needed to be reduced to 8.5 million barrels per day. It is expected that this reduction will begin to be put into effect early in April if the decision is made to go ahead with it.

The OPEC sources expressed their uneasiness about the repercussions that the outcomes of the current talks between Duncan and Saudi officials will have on conditions in the area.

The sources said that if the Saudi Government were to agree to maintain the current level against the wishes of most area states, this would inflict damage on the area and its organizations and would bring about a radical shift in world oil policies.

The sources went on to say that Yamani represents the direction bolstered by the support of Aramco, which is calling for maintenance of the current high production level. The other direction is represented by Foreign Minister Sa'ud al Faysal and PETROMIN President 'Abd-al-Hadi Tahir.

The sources added that the current disagreement is an extension of the previous conflict over the same issue between Aramco and PETROMIN.

Despite the fact that the strongest candidate to succeed Yamani is the president of PETROMIN, the sources expect that Sa'ud al Faysal will take over this post in an acting role long enough for the question of finding a substitute for him in the post of foreign minister to be decided.

The OPEC sources say that the American Government is using the Soviet threat to the area as a pretext in its attempts to persuade Saudi officials, and that it is proposing that Saudi Arabia take part in specifying the ways in which the American reserves would be used in the future. The United States obtained its oil reserves from Iran some time ago.

8591

CSO: 4802

## SAUDI ARABIA

### BRIEFS

SAUDI-IRANIAN RELATIONS--Is there something new in Saudi-Iranian relations and Iraqi-Iranian relations? While harmony may not be on the way, there would appear to be signs of a relaxation. Much can be expected to happen based on two things. The first was embodied in a statement by Iran's ambassador to Saudi Arabia broadcast over Iranian radio. The ambassador said: "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has considerable respect for the Iranian revolution and its great leader, is considered the permanent meeting place for the discussion of certain Islamic problems. Iran's embassy in Jiddah does not have just a diplomatic character but is tantamount to a genuine Islamic mission. In the economic field, the two countries will be able to invest their assets in joint projects and supply the Saudi market with Iranian products." The second thing was embodied in an editorial published by the newspaper AL-THAWRAH, the Baghdad-based organ of the Ba'th Party. This editorial reflects what is clearly the opinion of President Saddam Husaym, and the president may in fact have written--or at least sketched the outlines--of the article. The editorial indicates a willingness on the part of Iraq to eliminate the tension in its relations with Iran provided that Iran renounce once and for all its claim to Bahrain and withdraw from the three islands in the Gulf occupied formerly by the shah. These islands are Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa. [Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 16 Feb 80 p 16] 8591

CSO: 4802

## EDITORIAL CRITICIZES EGYPT'S ATTITUDE

Khartoum SUDANOW in English No 80 p 6

[Editorial: "Time for a Coordinated Arab Strategy"]

[Text]

**T**HE EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS between Egypt and Israel on the 26th of last month demonstrated once again the obduracy of the Egyptian government in its efforts to come to terms with Israel regardless of the Palestinians and the damage to Arab relations. Although the opening of relations between the two former enemies was long expected, still it has filled the Arab people with both sadness and anger. Ever since the peace negotiations with Israel began in September 1978, Egypt has given in on every substantive issue while Tel Aviv has shown no sign of flexibility. The Zionist state continues its illegal policy of building settlements on occupied territory, while at the same time continuing talks on self-rule for the West Bank. In such circumstances, repeated statements from Cairo that Egypt is working for an overall settlement for the Arab cause have a decidedly cracked ring to them. Such negotiations can at best secure limited Egyptian sovereignty for the Sinai at the expense of the rights of the Palestinians.

But the sadness and anger that currently characterise the Arab nation should not be allowed to incapacitate Arab governments and people. Indeed, such feelings should rather strengthen our determination to close ranks to make good the loss of Egypt.

One important step towards this end should be the ending of bilateral disputes between Arab states and the establishment of normal – if not brotherly – relations between former enemies. It is to be regarded as shameful that, as Egypt and Israel come closer together, so many Arab states can offer each other only abuse and hostility.

Nor will it be enough simply to condemn or reject what Egypt is doing; she has shown herself unwilling to listen and to hear of the damage that is being done. What is now necessary is nothing less than an agreed and coherent strategy that – whether by peace or war – will liberate the occupied lands, and within that strategy, make each country contribute according to its means.

Certainly, the opening of an Israeli embassy in Cairo is going to jeopardise Sudan's relations with Egypt. This was made certain last month when President Nimeiri reaffirmed Sudan's adherence to the policy of boycotting Israeli products and those organisations that have dealings with Israel. In the present state of things, these repercussions are likely to be found in the commercial, economic and cultural fields.

Sudan's position towards the separate deal being cooked up between Egypt and Israel was made clear in statements issued last month by the SSU and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coincide with the exchange of ambassadors. The foreign ministry statement described the relations between the peoples of Sudan and Egypt as being beyond doubts, but said that Sudan was grieved to see Egypt normalise relations with Israel while the Palestinian people were still deprived of their rights.



'Sudan believes,' said the official SSU statement, 'that individual and partial solutions can never resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict but, on the contrary, these individual and partial solutions will rather inflame and escalate the conflict to the point of explosion.' A statement from the Sudan Journalists Trade Union denounced 'the hoisting of the Israeli flag under the sky of Egypt'.

But despite the unequivocal nature of these statements, the Egyptian press chose to distort the true message coming out of Sudan. The Cairo daily *Al Akhbar* carried only the statement that the relations between the peoples of Egypt and Sudan 'were beyond doubts', without making any reference to the issue of Palestine. It goes without saying, perhaps, that the distorted handling of the criticism of Egyptian policy reflects the government's concern about the overwhelming opposition to Egypt's unilateral approach towards Israel.

But it is still not too late for Egypt to draw back into the main spring of Arab feeling and call off the bilateral negotiations with Tel Aviv. In the meantime, it is vital that the Arab nation should agree on its strategy and subordinate all the smaller, bilateral disputes to the greater Arab cause.

CSO: 4820

## FORMER MINISTER CRITICIZES GOVERNMENT POLICY

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Mar 80 pp 11-13

[Interview with Mansur Khalid, former foreign minister, by Abdel Moneim Awad el Rayah, date and place not given]

[Text]

*In a controversial interview last November in the Arabic-language weekly, Al Hawadeth, former foreign minister and presidential adviser Mansur Khalid made a strong attack on the Sudanese government, criticising particularly the political organisation and the handling of economic policy.*

*On his return to Khartoum for the SSU National Congress, Mansur Khalid took time out to speak to Associate Editor Abdel Moneim Awad el Rayah and explain his criticisms in more detail*

**ABDEL MONEIM:** *In an interview last year, you said that the economic situation in Sudan was deteriorating, but that the government would not admit it, attributing it to natural misfortune rather than political error. You also charged the regime with corruption and mismanagement and said that this had caused the deterioration. Would you elaborate on these criticisms?*

**MANSUR KHALID:** That the economic situation in the country is deteriorating is an open secret, and this deterioration has not just happened overnight. As a matter of fact, the whole situation was explained in a document prepared for the Council of Ministers by the then finance minister, Mr Sharif el Khatim. This document specified some of the ills, and suggested some remedies, many of which were implemented by Mr Badr

el Din Suleiman when he came into office. The question is, why weren't these decisions taken earlier? If they had been, their impact on both the general population and the government would have been less onerous. But the attitude then was to deny the fact that there was an economic crisis, and there was an attempt to live in a world of make-believe.

I'm pleased to see that Mr Badr el Din put the facts before the people in his statement to the People's Assembly, and one can now see the gravity of the situation.

The crisis was an open secret because one only needed to read the annual reports of the IMF or the World Bank to find out the facts. It is unfortunate that people outside Sudan know more about these facts than people here at home. You can read them in *The Financial Times*, *The Wall Street Journal* and *The Economist*. But none of this is reflected in our own press, and is certainly not found in the statements coming out of officialdom.

When I say there is corruption, I really mean there are corrupt elements and I really think this question is answered by the many statements that the President makes about corruption. And corruption is not confined to grocers and butchers in the market. I'm sure there are elements of corruption in higher institutions and that this corruption has its effect upon the economic situation.

As far as mismanagement is concerned, just look at the commercial enterprises in the public sector - all of them continue to run at a loss despite reports by the various investigating teams, some of whose reports were before the Council of Ministers three years ago.

All this, of course, upsets our priorities and delays some very important projects. For example, there is the Suakin port project, for which DM80 million was made available. This has been sitting for three years without being used, for no good reason except for some haggling which is not justified by either economic or public policy considerations.

*Q: Do you think Sudan's broad economic policy is right? Is it desirable, for example, that we should have a policy based upon large inputs of imported items, like oil, fertilisers and pesticides? Wouldn't smaller-scale development be better?*

A: I believe our economic strategy is the right one. You cannot develop an enormous country like Sudan in any other way than large-scale development projects. It is unfortunate that, for reasons beyond our control, the prices of some imported goods have gone up astronomically.

However, what I believe is wrong with our economic policies is what I described earlier as mismanagement. The battle-plan in the first and second development plans was self-sufficiency - in wheat, sugar and rice. None of that has been achieved. In fact, we are importing more sugar now to supplement domestic consumption than we used to consume in 1973.

The reason is financial mismanagement. We did not follow the priorities laid down in that first plan. We have engaged in a lot of consumer spending based on short-term borrowing, and today we are suffering the impact.

There is also the problem of poor productivity. This is partly caused by mismanagement, but partly by the failure of many of our popular institutions to mobilise people. There is also frustration among the working class arising from the conditions of life and the lack of any remedial action.

*Q: In general terms, what kind of foreign policy should Sudan have?*

A: Our foreign policy should follow the broad principles stipulated in the national charter, in the first programme of action and in the election platforms of the President. But I feel there is something still to be desired in our policy and that is good relations with our neighbours. There have been unnecessary strains over the past two years - I need mention only Ethiopia and Uganda.

Secondly, we have to balance our relations with the superpowers. I'm not one of those who believes we should not enhance our relations with the United States. On the contrary, I think we should. But there is no need for us to be any part of a messianic attack against the other superpower. It is one thing to disagree with the policies of the Soviet Union - we are justified in denouncing the intervention in Afghanistan - but that does not justify taking a messianic approach towards the Soviets.

Since its independence, Sudan has been an active member of the non-aligned group. But, of late, Sudan has been absent from that arena. One example was our absence from Havana. Sudan should have been there to defend the concept of non-alignment.

*Q: You said that Sudan's position on Camp David lacked credibility and that, as a result, its views now attracted little respect - to the extent that we now lived in diplomatic isolation. What brought this about, since you, yourself, once held the position of foreign minister? What remedies would you now propose?*

A: If you look back at the different stands which we have taken on Camp David, you can see the reasons for what I said. There was the President's original statement, which tried to balance the idea of a peaceful settlement against securing the rights of the Palestinians. But, since then, there has been Sudan's position at Baghdad, and then the statement that was signed in Libya between our foreign ministers. It is this confusion that leads to the lack of credibility.

Of course, I wasn't in Sudan throughout this period, but I would have handled the situation differently. Policy has to be based upon a number of considerations: national interest and national security; secondly, your regional obligations; and, thirdly, there is always a moral component. Decisions based on these factors will be principled decisions.

In this particular case, we have to look at factors like our special relations with Egypt, which lead us to take a different position from any other Arab country.

Secondly, our commitment to the cause of Palestine is irreversible. So, if we believe that this policy will not lead to a solution that would restore the rights of the Palestinians and achieve an honourable peace, then we have to stand against it.

But I think our special relationship with Egypt means that we have a special duty to see that she is not isolated. So the action in Baghdad was justified in the sense of putting pressure on Egypt, but not justified in the attempt to quarantine Egypt, for the simple fact that the Arabs without Egypt have less impact in the world.

Sudan's role is to find a formula that accepts a peaceful settlement as its basis. Nobody believes that we can talk in terms of threatening Israel. Resolution 242 affords the best basis for settlement. So, if we agree on the basis, why can't we find a policy that will include Egypt? This is the role of Arab diplomacy, and I'm very happy to note that statements to that effect have recently been made by the President.

*Q: You have charged that some political institutions in the Third World were paper institutions and would become real only if they were allowed to function freely. What do you mean by that? If you include Sudan, wouldn't you agree that, insofar as you were involved in government when many of these institutions were established, you must carry part of the blame?*

*A: I was referring particularly to the one-party system and I said explicitly that the only model that we in Africa had found was the Soviet model. I also said that within that system, which has its own, internal logic, there was a respect for institutions. Indeed, I went so far as to suggest that we can't really say that we have an effective political organisation unless the Central Committee can deal with Khrushchev in the way that the Soviet Central Committee did.*

*In the Third World, unfortunately, the one-party system has become a sort of cabal — a partisan elite — which is controlling things and making decisions on behalf of the people. Despite the democratic rhetoric in our literature, this democracy doesn't really exist. In the higher levels of the party, there is a sort of jamboree, where people come and give their blessings to decisions that have already been taken elsewhere.*

*As for Sudan, we have to differentiate two things. I feel that the rules governing our institutions provide those checks and balances. These checks certainly militate against any sort of assumption of authority by a small cabal. But whether those stipulations in the Constitution are respected is a different matter. So, we have to distinguish between the philosophy and the practice.*

*I feel that in practice there is still a lot to be done. Suffice it to refer to the President's statement last August when he explicitly said that institutions were not respected. If this is so, we have to look at the roots of this. I feel that, in many cases, they are not respected because they don't function. One can understand this because in those institutions that are simply appointed, people don't feel that they have a constituency which would give them, perhaps, more spine. People tend to be less aggressive.*

*So the solution to all this is to democratise more and more, and have more elected positions — more independence for the trade unions, a measure of freedom of expression within the press, and more opportunity for the alternative view.*



*Q: Do you think the present Constitution allows for the creation of effective and strong institutions, or should it be amended to delegate some of the wide powers of the President to lower institutions?*

*A: I have no quarrel with the present articles of the Constitution. The Constitution allows the Assembly to question executive decisions. It also allows the Assembly to ask the President to put to referendum any policy with which it disagrees. It also includes provisions to lodge accusations against the President and to ask for the impeachment or trial of the President.*

*If there is anything missing, it is what I said earlier, that the Assembly members don't feel they represent a strong constituency. We should also look at the rules governing legislation by Presidential decree.*

*We must, in addition, provide for the security of members of the Supreme Court, who have to adjudicate on the constitutionality of legislation, so that they can be removed from office only by the agreement of the Assembly. It is also time for the amendments to the civil rights clauses in the Constitution that were introduced after the events of July, 1976 to be repealed.*

*Q: In a recent book, you argued that one of the characteristics of Third World states was the tendency to idolize the individual who happened to be the head of state. I presume that, since you didn't exclude it, you must have included Sudan. Any comment?*

*A: Sudan is not an exception — and even the President himself is aware of this. The President has spoken against those people who talk of 'Nimeirism' and against those who suggest giving him *carte blanche*. The reason for this, as I said earlier, is that, when you are not sure of your constituency and if you depend for your political existence on the will of the man at the top, unless you have intellectual integrity and*

*moral courage, you tend to compromise on many issues.*

*In situations like this, you always have people ready to prostitute ideas and accept anything. For this reason, you need to have strong institutions and the type of democratisation that will make the individual sure of his base and to allow him to stand up and speak when he has to.*

*Q: How different are the political institutions — including the SSU — since you left the government? What reforms would you propose in these institutions?*

*A: One of the things I was engaged in before I left the political arena in August 1978, was the preparation of a document on the changes that needed to be made in the SSU to make it more democratic and effective. And this included the powers of the different bodies within the organisation — the Politburo, the Central Committee, the National Congress and so on. There was also a lot about the reduction in the size of the SSU, about the economy, trades union liberties, and the press.*

*Unfortunately, that was turned down, and I thought that there was, perhaps, no room for change. I remember in that meeting, my friend Bona Malwal summed it up by saying that if he had been in my place, he would have written that the situation was all milk and honey and that there was nothing to improve.*

*However, two years later, I was surprised at the statements being made, about the size of the Politburo and the Central Committee, the necessity of working through the institutions, SSU finances and so on.*

*There is still a lot to be done: trade union freedoms and freedom of the press. There is also the question of the efficiency of the specialised committees of the Central Committee. These must be strengthened to make the political organisation the real source of power and of ideas. And we must give more muscle to democracy.* ■

## OPPOSITION LEADER URGES NEUTRAL ARAB STAND ON SUDAN

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 17-23 Mar 80 pp 4-7

[Article by Sudanese Opposition Leader Al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi: "Keep Your Hands Off Our Country"]

[Text] Our people had thought that your hands will be a balsam that would cure their festering wounds. They had thought that relations within the Arab nation were relations among peoples and human beings. It never occurred to them that they were relations among regimes--relations of suppression, force and security. Otherwise, what is the difference between those relations and the relations of our nation with Israel and world imperialism? Our people had never thought that they were relations among rulers who establish alliances among themselves to stay in power over the remains of victims and the debris of imprisoned, suppressed and wronged peoples. Our people kept looking for the Arab man in every country, only to find him in chains, his tongue tied, his freedom denied and his ability to help his brother in any Arab country nil. The Arab citizen ponders his recurrent defeats and wonders about their causes. Is it because he is less courageous than an Israeli? Or is it because he is less enthusiastic and motivated about defending his nationalism, essence, and civilization? Why then has his land diminished in size and split into fragments that keep receding until they disappear for good?

The Arab citizen in Sudan and in every part of the Arab homeland is wondering why he is fighting. What is he defending and what does colonialism represent to him? Is he defending his freedom, signity, family, children, women, home and thought—all of which are fair game, whether he won or lost?

Is fighting in defense of the present or is he dying for the sake of the future--a present and future that are grim, bleak, worrisome and that lack all the factors of individual, collective, social, economic and political safety? Is there anything but colonialism and enslavement? Is there a difference between them if they were native or foreign? Do they have a different taste or form depending on their source? If your freedom is denied, your honor is breached, your thought violated, your money squandered,

your backwardness deepened and if you became a victim of injustice, fear, apprehension and death--does it matter then who has wrought all this upon you? Does it matter if it were Carter, or Menachem Begin or Nimeiri? What is the unity of the Arab nation? Is it a unity of rulers and regimes that share in common the experience of suppressing their peoples and share in training, arming and funding teams to assassinate and suppress their peoples? Or is Arab unity one of a health liberal and free nation one part of which would rush to alleviate the pain and suffering of another part in distress--and there's a lot of ugly pain nowadays? Why do Arab rulers sit around a summit or ministerial conference? Is it to discuss their personal security and the security of their regimes and to divide parts? Is it to raise armies and to pay billions for the sake of training and arming thousands of men so as to save one ruler or one regime without asking this ruler: what are you doing to our Arab sons in your country? Why are you plundering the wealth and strength of the people? And what are you doing with the money that we have lavished on you, while our sons in your country are crowding our countries in the millions to escape hunger? There are so many of them that we have to apprehend them, imprison them and deport them back to the valley of hunger and injustice in your country.

Do not they [the other Arab ruling benefactors] bring him [Nimeiri] to account? What has he done with their money, their brethren, sons and their honor? Do not they read the reports of the financial, economic, agricultural, industrial, production and social international organizations? Do not they--the scions of banking and business--ask bankers and businessmen? Do not their sensitive noses smell the odor of bribery, corruption and favoritism--a smell so strong that it can be smelled even by people whose noses are desensitized by colds? Do not they ask their many, many experts about inflation, the black market, high cost of living, the lack of an internal and external balance and the printing of billions of pounds as if they are newspapers and magazines? Are they and the Arab nation worlds apart? As far apart as the distance between the earth and the sky?

Where are the Funds?

What happened to the development funds that they have extended? What happened to the funds they have paid in the way of food and shelter aid? What happened to the funds for armament and the armed forces? What happened to their assistance to mosques, Islamic centers and culture? And where is the funds they have given for internal and external security? Where are the loans, the grants, the aid which have been given without limit or bounds? Do not they ask why are loans not being repaid? Or why at least the installments and interest are not paid? Or why they are accumulating? And why are not they recorded and known--in fact, why are they forgotten? Have not they asked why the costs of projects increase tens of folds--that is if the projects are initiated at all--and continue to increase? Take, for example, the project of Al-Kinana. It is not the only one, nor is it a unique case.

Why do they hire brokers and have them involved in our development-- buying a commodity for ten times its cost and evaluating a project at double its cost--only to have their names appear later in the memoirs of shady women, sex magazines and the minutes of senate and house of representatives committees and commissions of inquiry? Do not they ask their sources--which are many and well-informed--how much do our rulers own now and how much did they own 10 years ago? Do not they know that the palaces of our rulers outmatch their palaces--and they are the owners of oil and white, yellow and black gold, while we and our rulers are people whose assets are camels and sheep? Have not they seen concrete jungles rising up to the skies in our country, and have not they heard that the small rulers in our country build houses that cost millions and furnish them with materials that cost tens of thousands, while the salary of every one of them is only in the hundreds? And even if any one of those were to live as long as Noah did, he would not be able to build even a single room at his salary. Why do you give your money to the fools? And if you have forgotten God's reckoning, have you also forgotten the accounting to the people and to history? Is it because you thought that Nimeiri wants a national reconciliation and national unity? A few days ago he said that he would die for the sake of such reconciliation and unity, but a few days later he called them an act of filth, an exercise in futility, a mirage. For hours, he went on cursing and abusing those who sought reconciliation with him and those who did not as well as those on earth or under it, those who are homeless and are on the wanted list, those who play polo with him and those who said that he was an ayatollah, a hujjat al-Islam, the prophet of the Islamic law and the present and awaited Mahdi. All this because he saw you approving him and approving every defect with a sick, blind or a crossed eye. Then he told you and told us that he will hold elections-- elections whose districts will be determined by him and the voters in which will be registered by him. He will finance these elections with your money, gather up the participants in them with "his army, police and security" forces. He will keep the ballot boxes in his palace, count the votes by himself, then announce the results from his radio and through his newspapers. In short, he will be the voter, the committee, the media and the judiciary--the first and the last, the visible men and the invisible man, the foe and the judge.

Have you heard of any such elections in any period of history? Have storytellers told about them? Do you think that any people would accept such elections, even our people who have become like the Cambodian people--a people that have become extinct and whose race has frozen, whose fertility has stopped and whose skulls and skeletons fill the valleys, the mountains and the forests--a people who have died not only of hunger but also of thirst in a country where it rains 10 months a year? For many years we tried to convince ourselves that your behavior derived from the bond of Islam, but we failed to detect in it any part or letter or content of Islam or the Koran. Then we tried to justify your actions as ones dictated by the ties of kinship, but we could not detect in them even a whiff of kinship. On the contrary, they were actions which severed all ties of kinship.



We tried to ascribe those actions to sheer humanitarian sentiments, but found they devoid of any sign of humanitarianism or even internationalism. Finally, we thought they were actions designed for people whose hearts are in accord, but we found no hearts and no accord. We realized that hearts will not be brought together in accord no matter how much money you lavish and no matter how much you try to emulate the generosity of Hatim al-Ta'i. Al-Ta'i used to feed the hungry, but Nimeiri is overfed and all his diseases are due to obesity. Al-Ta'i used to clothe the naked, but Nimeiri is dressed up in medals and decorations which he had bestowed upon himself, not in battles against Israel but in massacres against the women, children, elderly and unarmed youth of our people.

#### Word of Truth

If Islam, Arabism, unity and nationalism have disappeared in our homeland, has the simple word of truth also disappeared--the word co-religionists say to each other, a stranger says to a native, an atheist to an atheist? Has it disappeared so that there no longer are good people, people who say the word of truth and people who listen to it or heed it? If you, the be all and end all who hold power and possess wealth and weapons, are afraid of one man, is he feared by 150 million Arabs between the ocean and the gulf? Would you accept this for yourselves and for them, God forbid? Then listen and be all ears:

Nimeiri said that he wants reconciliation and national unity. We said welcome, provided that he abolish his socialist union, agree to a multi-party system and terminate his constitution and return to the 1964 constitution. But he disavowed national unity and reconciliation, bared his dictatorship and fascism and became more evil than he was in 1969. He accepts nothing short of people bowing to him and subscribing to his falsehood and the crimes of 11 years of his rule, join his shabby, dirty, single organization which is full of holes and defects and which represents no one but his person and the bunch of mercenaries who have shared his thefts and crimes against our people, land and kith and kin and who, in the presence of the people and history, pay him the allegiance of fools and agree with his defeatist attitude toward the Arab nation, its enemies and traitors. They have then accepted his constitution which was tailored to fit him and which contravenes, in every article, the simplest standards of freedom, justice and democracy. This is unacceptable and impossible to approve. Any one who accepts it would be a traitor to his homeland, nation, Arabism and Islam. Death is better and more fitting than accepting it. It is better to live as a dumb animal than to live with it. With it, the homeland becomes a place for cowards not for honorable men. Accepting it means national humiliation and treason. It means the loss of the land, the people, religion, heritage and civilization and the acceptance of enslavement, thievery, cowardice, disintegration and collapse. Any Sudanese--whether Arab or not, Moslem or non-Moslem, educated or uneducated--cannot face himself or his family with it, let alone face a homeland, a nation and history.

This is a reality. It is a serious statement, not a joke. Anyone who wants to believe can do so, and anyone who wants to disbelieve can do so too. One can go ahead or he can go backwards. The eyes of cowards should remain watchful so that it can watch and observe. This is everyone's view, including those cowards, although they did not have enough courage and heroism to say it publicly. Anyone who thinks that this is a fabrication, a threat or blustering is mistaken and sinful up to his ears, and he will be able to see his error with his own eyes.

#### Those Are Our Demands

For the second time in less than a month and after he has lowered the flags of reconciliation and swallowed all the slogans of national unity, Nimeiri is again saying that he will hold elections. Once again, we say, a thousand welcomes, but on the following conditions:

- (1) That he freeze his socialist union, cancel his constitution and run for elections with the socialist union as his own party only. If he wins the elections, he will march under his banner.
- (2) That a legal and judicial joint committee be set up to determine the voting districts and supervise the elections.
- (3) That the people's armed forces declare their full neutrality with regard to the elections. The police and security forces should also commit themselves to supporting the free opinion of the Sudanese people as determined by the ballots.
- (4) That his information media, of all kinds, maintain full silence toward and during the elections.
- (5) That the forces of the Sudanese popular opposition should assemble, with all their weapons, in certain assembly points to be agreed upon, and that that they should maintain a position of complete neutrality towards and during the elections. They should also commit themselves to respecting and supporting the free opinion of the Sudanese masses as determined by the ballots.
- (6) That a committee be set up by the Arab League and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to oversee the elections and insure their honesty and also to prevent any interference in the election process and any friction between the armed groups during the voting.
- (7) That he and the Sudanese popular opposition should agree to completely submit to the will of the Sudanese people as determined by the elections.

After that, what does he and what do the Arabs and Africans want from us? Nimeiri has said that there is no opposition in Sudan, but this would be

determined by the outcome of free, honest and supervised elections. He said that the opposition does not have a military machinery, and that the entire military capability of the opposition does not exceed the 500 persons who are enjoying his hospitality [presumably meaning being held by the government], and who range from old men in their seventies or above to children of less than 12 years to ill people who cannot move. Why then does he refuse to allow the opposition forces to mass either in or outside Sudan, especially since he is engaged in collective flirtation to renormalize or improve relations with his neighbors and with non-neighbors? If what he says is true, what is his objection then? And how would he be bothered by an opposition that does not have either a popular or military presence, according to him? Would it not be in his interest to demonstrate before his Arab and African brethren and the entire world the opposition's popular and military weakness, its powerlessness and nonexistence, then continue to rule the country, asserting his own popularity and legitimacy in and outside Sudan, proclaiming the feebleness of his opponents and their empty, false and subversive allegations, their betrayal of his "revolution" and victorious march, and their rejection of the prosperity in which his citizens live and claiming that his opponents have missed the boat, that they are ignorant of the march of peoples, history and revolutions? Why does he make all this a subject of allegations and heresies when he can make it as bright and shining as sun light? We promise him, as free and honorable men would promise, that, if he should do that, we would then join the chorus of chanters who shout out such slogans as, Ja'far al-Mansur [Ja'far the victorious] and the inspired and inspiring leader. We would be completely polite and obedient. We would join him in "building" the country in a spirit of regret and repentance. We would accept the practice of appointment and dismissal over the radio. We would hail him and accept his praise and rebuke, his commendation and his derogation, for he is the benefactor and the humiliator, the giver and the taker, and he is the victorious, the conqueror and the high and mighty. We would fight tribalism with him to the extent of accepting gifts of camels from the Al-Kababish tribe. We would join him in doing away with sectarianism to the point of joining the circle of Shaykh Al-Gharqan and swaying in ecstasy with the beat of drums. We would fight reaction with him so that it would not rear its ugly head again. We would fight colonialism with him and accompany the American attache in Cairo to the World War Two American base in Murrah mountain in Darfour, then to Port Sudan to bless the site of the missile base in Sawakin and secure the Arabism and neutrality of the Red Sea. We would then dive into the depths of the Red Sea to reach the treasures of the most ideal rich man, Muhammad 'Abd Rabbuh, in Port Sudan—owner of the gift cases of gold, jewels and diamonds and the man whose name tops the lists of donors who give hundreds of thousands to the friendship-with-Nimeiri cooperative society.

We will go on pilgrimage with him to Jerusalem where we will be blessed when we kiss the blessed grave of Golda Meir. By so doing, we would be cleaning ourselves of the dirt of reaction, partisanship, sectarianism, tribalism and imperialism. We would go with him to the socialist union—that place

of pilgrimage--and feast our eyes on the sight of the bank and receive a spate of cement and iron permits, whereby we can afford to build a grave in Riyadh, a second grave in Madinat al-Mada'in and a third in Al-Manahiyyah, so that we may insure ourselves in our old age against the dangers of poverty, do away with class distinctions and apply socialism. We would join his coops, thus turning our houses into warehouses for the storage of sugar, flour, beans and other goodies. This way we would join our people on the revolutionary bandwagon, maintain progressive discipline in the bakeries and achieve progress in the cars of Siham Bir.

What does he want from us after that? We will do all that so that he may approve of us and we may become part of his free and revolutionary people. We pledge to him, to you and to ourselves that we will do all that so that he may only accept our conditions--no, forgive us--our implorations.

You may or you may not know that the president does not like the word conditions. Please intercede between us, may God give you long lives, and be assured that we are Sudanese patriots and Arab nationalists who would rather go hungry than eat their national and pan-Arab causes. Please intercede between us, and if he accepts our plea and we fail in our pursuit, then rest assured that this will be the last you will hear--or read--from us. And if he should turn us down--and we do not know why he would do that--then will you not excuse us--we the advocates of two causes, a national and a pan-Arab one, the inhabitants of the burned and plundered land, the sons of the hungry and homeless people? He might tell you that this would delay the elections, which are held by a republican decree. His republican decrees, like the verses of the Koran, cannot be delayed and kept waiting. Our plea, however, would not delay his elections. And if it did, it would be only for a few days. He would then tell you that he has begun the process of registering voters. You should know then that the lists of his voters have remained unchanged since 25 May 1969, as if no one has died or awoken from his dream by now. Since the day on which he announced his forthcoming elections, only tens of people have gone to him. But be sure that as soon as he accepts our plea, millions of people will flock to the election centers from all directions (and he will not be able to say) that they are mercenaries like those who rushed to shake his hands in July 1967.

There would not be any delay, therefore. The results will definitely appear before May. But if he should refuse and act haughtily--and I do not know why he would do that--then we will not be surprised or saddened, nor will we despair and run to you crying, asking for help, imploring and calling for your mediation. This would not be characteristic of us, as you know. We are used to carrying the burden of our problems, concerns, conflicts and battles with manly courage and forbearance, even if they became double what they are now. There are those who believe--and we would not deny that--that we get from you full support, gifts and backing. You and we know the facts. How many times have such suspicions brought us troubles and subjected us to all kinds of accusations. Yet we have seen no use or point in denying them. In other words, you know that nothing



(will bother us completely) as much as the man who bothered us for 11 years and whom you have been supporting every hour, every day, every year.

### Be Neutral

Should he refuse our requests, all that we ask of you is to take a neutral stand between us and him for a few months and give us the opportunity to rescue our country, settle our disputes and determine our case. Be assured that this is not our cause alone. It is the key to the Arab cause—its door, window, heart and essence. If you care for the Arab cause, then you have got to care for our cause. This will not cost you anything. All that you have to do is to be neutral. Nothing can be easier than that. If you do not care for the cause of the Sudanese people, then care for the Arab cause. Both are interconnected.

You have all the moral, nationalistic, human and historic justifications. If you do not know the tragedy of the Sudanese people, then leave this question alone. And if you do not know the dimensions of the impact of the tragedy of the pan-Arab cause, then forget it. Just act as mediators and observers. He has talked to you about national reconciliation and unity. We had accepted what he said, but he found it objectionable that our people should have apprehensions and conditions, so he cancelled the entire question of national unity. He is now offering elections, and all that we want is for the elections to be free and honest.

What we are asking is not a heresy, nor is it something impossible and miraculous. It is right, just and reasonable. It concerns an entire people, an entire homeland. If he is confident of his citizens, and if they support him, then what does he have to lose if he were to ask them to express their opinions really and truthfully. If, as he keeps saying, they support him day and night, then he will agree in a minute, for he's so fast in taking the decisions that he wants to take, and he takes them by the hundreds.

If he should refuse, then there can be only one explanation: he is ruling us by force and imposing his tutelage on us forcibly, and he wants to persist in doing so and is challenging the entire world and lying to it that our people support him. He could have said that he is an absolute ruler and not claim that the entire people support him, but he persists in his coercion, falsehood and allegation and we reject this and will resist it.

It was your duty to stand by us, against him. Such an attitude is dictated by your national commitment to us and nationalistic commitment to your nation. But we do not expect this, and therefore we do not ask for it. The Arab nation might be prepared for that, but its regimes are not. The contradiction between the Arab nation and its regimes is a fact, and the Arab nation is apt to remove that contradiction one day. But maybe not now.

Now, however, we ask you for nothing save neutrality between us and him, between an entire people living in your largest country in area and second largest in population and one man. You know that people's agonies and sorrows. The choice then is between a people and a man—it is a clear and simple choice. Where have you heard or read about such a choice? If anyone of you has not read history, then let him know that had it not been for the battles of Arabism, our countries would have become a path and a place for non-Arabs and non-Moslems. And had it not been for the blood of martyrs and the bodies of strugglers, our countries would have become barriers in the face of Arabism and Islam. Our great grandfathers have preserved its Arab and Islamic character with their nails and teeth. They lit in them the fire of the Koran, preserved with blood and fire the Arabic language, warded off the invasions of non-Arabs and colonialists, ignited the Mahdist revolution which shook the empire on which the sun has never set. With swords, they fought the most modern weapons and armies. They died in the hundreds of thousands carrying the Koran in their hands and hearts and on their tongues. They were the first people to fight British, Italian and French colonialism in Africa. They followed their ancestors, the martyrs who fell since the battles of 'Ayn Jalut and Al-Tall al-Kabir. They have never failed to join any battle waged by Arabs and Moslems when they crossed the oceans and reached Mexico. In the name of all that history, they asked you only to take a neutral stand in the battle of right, justice, legitimacy, patriotism and nationalism—a battle each one of you should have joined to fight for their [Sudanese people's] rights.

#### A Peaceful People

We are a peaceful people, a peace-loving and law-abiding people. We do not have a history of massacres and a desire for bloodshed and seditions. Our people are not a people of the gun. Their sons coexist with each other and all of them coexist with other peoples in amity and peace. For 11 years, they have endured what no human being can endure. If your embassies are your eyes and ears in our country, they must have been reporting to you things that cannot occur to any human being. You must notice that our citizens who are now in your country are walking with wandering glances and fearful hearts, a touch of shame on their faces. They have deserted their vast and bountiful land and came to your countries to engage in nonproductive jobs which they have not been used to do and to which they were driven by hunger and humiliation. The faithful are each other's mirrors, and the Arab would protect the honor of another Arab. And a Moslem is he who would resist objectionable acts with all his power.

Not a penny of the money you have spent in Sudan has gone to improving the conditions of any Sudanese man or woman. On the contrary, it has contributed to the deterioration of economic conditions, the dissolution of morals and the loss of honor, honesty and truthfulness—characteristics which have distinguished our poor people and which are all his capital, as you know. Your money has helped create a class which does not exceed a few

hundreds of people. It is an alien class, a morally and practically sick class with sick values. Your money has not generated economic or social development. It did not fully feed a hungry person or educate an ignorant person. It did not cure a sick person. It did not establish an agriculture or an industry. In other words, it does not merit thanks from God or the people. It only increases our foolishness, dependence, corruption and bribery tendencies. This is all that it yields and produces, and it would be better if you withheld it from us and bestowed it on another people, so that it may serve good and useful purposes inside your countries or other countries, including even non-Arab countries whose rulers use acquired money correctly and honestly for the sake of the progress, development and prosperity of their peoples—characteristics which all our rulers lack, deliberately and nonchalantly.

Conditions in our country have reached a state where everything is now sold or purchased, even honor and conscience and entry visas to your countries. How deeper do you want us to stoop? If you do not care for us, do not you care for yourselves? If you do not want to stand by our people, will you take a neutral stand? If you are not enthused about our national cause, are you not aroused by your nationalist questions? If you do not care for our wealth, do not you care for your own wealth?

I am so afraid that you may think that my words are nothing but ink spilled on paper. Tomorrow, when something other than ink is spilled on something other than paper, it will be too late for remorse. If any of you thinks that Nimeiri is a safety belt, then let him know that he is an explosive belt. If any of you thinks that he is the sentry of the region's sea and land, then he should know that Nimeiri is fragile and unaware. If any of you thinks that he is a protective shield against atheism, communism and revolutions, then let him know that Nimeiri would be the first to open the door, light the path and pave the way for them and would welcome them with open arms.

Finally, with a heart that bleeds, nerves that are being torn by sorrow and a soul which is choking, we raise high our voice, hoping that somebody will listen: brethren, keep your hands off our country.

9254

CSO: 4802

## OPPOSITION LEADER URGES ANTI-NIMEIRI ARAB STANCE

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 3-9 Mar 80 pp 9-12

[Article by Sudanese Opposition Leader Al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi: "Arabs, Do Not Support That Butcher"]

[Text] The regime in Sudan is trying to breathe life into its debilitated, emaciated, flabby and infirm body which lacks all means of subsistence. It is convening a conference of its only party—the so-called Sudanese Socialist Union which is not a union, not socialist and—except for a number of Sudanese citizens who have joined it either to serve their interests or out of fear and who accordingly rubberstamp its resolutions—not Sudanese. The resolutions are taken by one individual, not by a party or a grouping, and that individual is Ja'far Nimeiri. He is not the May coup, as we call the movement, or the May revolution, as it is called by a bunch of dreamers who know nothing about the meeting, inception and history of revolutions, Nimeiri represents Nimeirism—a practice which is akin to shahenshahish, Somoza-ism, Genghis Khanism or Tamerlanism or akin to any fascist, individualistic, tribal, oligarchic or sectarian regime in ancient and modern history.

This is a fact that cannot be denied by anyone, not even by the blind, the deaf and dumb or by animals which cannot think or reason and which have no historical or national notions but simply eat, drink, grow and live. We regret all those crude expressions and descriptions, but we live in times in which we cannot but call things by their real names. Our people have lived in a state of injustice and tyranny which we cannot overlook, forget or ignore. This is a national duty which no Sudanese patriot can avoid affirming and re-emphasizing even if he were to commit treason, lose his senses and vision and develop political and social cowardice—in other words, turn into a creature that is merely living.

The so-called Sudanese Socialist Union is being convened at a time when, not to say the least, our independence is threatened, our nationality is eroded, our national, nationalist, economic, moral, living, behavioral, administrative and performance problems are at their worst and our



homeland—in the full sense of entity, heritage, history, civilization and essence—is in jeopardy—indeed, at the brink of demise. For all this and more, anyone who does not rise up to the level of patriotism and nationalism would be a traitor to this homeland and to all the feelings and commitments that a homeland represents. There would be no other adjective to describe such a person. We now have to set down standards and rules and make them clear, unequivocal and devoid of phoney and embellished diplomacy, so that the Sudanese, the Arabs, the Africans and all the free-men of the world know that Sudan and the Sudanese are still there, that there is patriotism and patriots, nationalism and nationalists, freedom and freemen, democracy and democrats. There are no similarities or contradictions in all these terms. The time of civility and tactfulness is gone, and we have gone beyond tribal, familial, sectarian, social and partisan ties and must speak only in the language of right and justice which is also the language of sacrifice and death. Let all know—and let death know too—that he who wants to befriend us on other than those terms does not relate to us neither do we relate to him, that he is deceiving us, himself, the homeland, the Arab nation, Islam, history, heritage and all conciliatory and interest-bound models (sic). All parasites that float on the surface are ugly in their interests, relations, aspirations, innateness, familialism, sectarianism and bestiality. They have to go to hell and stay in their holes. All those who represent the interests of the feudalistic, monopolistic, capitalistic and commercial interests, as well as the defects, cowardice, nonobservance of patriotic duties, self-love and indulgence in a life of opulence which characterize bourgeoisie should know that the time of seriousness has come, that their games are up and that they have to choose either between their homeland or their selfish and individual interests whatever they may be. After that there will be no time to choose or a choice to make. It will be a question of either good or bad. We, as green crescentists, (?) do not believe in compromises. We have spent time and effort to light the way for them and show them the path, but they failed to heed us. There is no time left after that. They have to decide where they stand and they have to bear the full responsibility of their actions from now. They must be sure that this is the basis of the relations between them and the Sudanese people's national movement in and out of Sudan. They have to abide by national ethics and realize that this is the basis on which we will deal with them. The time of hypocrisy is gone. It was bound to go, for the Sudanese people's national movement is heading for serious developments which will have an impact on the people's destiny and it will assume its responsibilities in this regard. The least of its responsibilities is to offer one's self, not just one's dear possessions, for the sake of the motherland and the nation. It will leave behind all agents, intruders, hypocrites, self-seekers, compromisers and cowards and stick with only the free and honorable strugglers, even if they were a small bunch who can be counted on one's fingers.

But let's set all this aside and answer the questions of the envoys and middlemen of the present phase, and let's tell them—and tell their friends among us who hide their true purposes behind a facade—in all honesty,

seriousness and objectivity that the time of civility, forgiveness, loss, emptiness, perplexity and timidity is gone now and should have gone a long time ago.

#### Real Conciliation

(1) Nimeiri calls for national reconciliation and entente. We are a group of people who would not reject a call for reconciliation and unity even if we were in the thick of a raging military battle where men are falling. For it is we who grieve over the death, injury, displacement or suppression of any Sudanese. We are a group of people who would resort to peace if peace were sought by those who vaunt their power and who think only of their impermanent power and forget the power of God, the people and history. We accept the call to unity and entente from a position of courage, strength and belief in our homeland, goals and mission and for the sake of our Sudanese homeland, religion and Arab nation. We welcome that call. As 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib had done, when the Book of God was invoked before him and he was asked to stop the fighting and he went ahead and responded to the call, although he was winning, we also respond positively. We do so not out of weakness, irresolution or an internal, self-inflicted defeat or an external defeat, but out of a desire to preserve the homeland and the nation as both of them--as well as the cause of liberalization--go through extremely critical times.

(2) If Nimeiri is sincere in his call for unity and entente and is not using it for political and propaganda gain or employing it to help him get through a phase or overcome a temporary weakness, he should know the facts about his regime, positions and course. If all those people around him lack the courage to tell him the truth and advise him, or if they are afraid for their lives or interests and are intimidated by his power and tyranny, then he should--if he were honest with himself, his homeland, his people and his nation--realize the real position of his country and nation and become aware of the internal and external dangers facing them and the state of decline in the political, economic, moral, social, administrative and application fields. He should become aware of the swamp of corruption, bribery, favoritism, influence manipulation and the supremacy of the parasitic and microscopic classes which surround him. He should fear God for his own sake and for the sake of his country, nation and history. He should be really courageous as he claims and boasts and should adopt the ethics of unity, reconciliation and national salvation and use them as a code of behavior, not as a slogan, and be true and not false.

(3) If he put himself in the shoes of any one of the 20 million Sudanese and if he displayed even a limited degree of national vision and perception--and even personal farsightedness and the mere instinct of self-preservation--he will surely abdicate power and take off on one of his planes which stand by at a close distance, ready to depart at all times. He would have to take such a step courageously in an attempt to save his country and himself, leaving it for the Sudanese people to decide and act.

(4) Nimeiri should abolish his Socialist Union, not only on the strength of what he knows and we know about the real nature of that organization or about its influence, popularity and course, but also on the strength of the 35 articles which were drawn up less than two months ago. Each one of those articles is a cause for abolishing the Socialist Union. With these articles in mind, it is difficult to imagine how can Nimeiri then manage to call it together, address it and continue to maintain it as a popular--or even an individual--organization, and to imagine, too, how he can face with it an entire people and a whole country--even one village or one person in our land.

(5) Nimeiri should know that his present constitution is simply inelegant rhetoric. It is plagued by his Socialist Union and fraught with articles which sanction his individual authority and blatant violation of the democratic rights of the masses and the principles of separation of powers and an independent judiciary. He should know that it is full of emergency orders against public freedoms and that it does not constitute a fair constitutional or legal basis for a relationship between the people and the ruler. He should, therefore, abolish it and replace it with the previous provisional constitution. Under his present constitution, freedoms cannot be secured, elections cannot be held, justice cannot be established, law cannot prevail, a citizen cannot feel safe about himself and his interests and human dignity cannot be observed or respected.

(6) The London agreement is outdated and outmoded by time. Everything has changed, and so the agreement is no longer suitable for any reconciliation and national unity. Everyone is aware that it is not suitable for any time and place. It is not the Koran, the Bible, the Torah or the Book of Psalms. It has become a document whose veracity has been corrupted. We cannot logically overlook the passage of time. Otherwise, we would be recreating the myths of the consultative council and the legislative assembly. Nimeiri should know that the movement of the masses and the fervor of peoples cannot stand still as days, months and years pass by, when minutes and hours--even seconds--are important to them. He should count on his fingers the changes that have occurred in our country and in the Arab homeland as well as in our region and the world at large. Is he or are we the legendary cavemen who slept as ages passed and changed?

#### Camp David and the Steadfast

(7) Nimeiri must have heard, if not actually learned, that an agreement called the Camp David agreement has been signed between the Egyptian regime and the Zionist enemy and that it constitutes a clear violation of the right of the Arab nation to life, existence and civilization, blows up the Arab nation's central cause--Palestine, perpetuates the Zionist entity, mutilates the rights of the Arab nation and the Palestinian people, deforms our heritage, civilization and essence, and violates the resolutions of the Khartoum conferences with its well-known "no's"--no negotiation, no recognition, no peace, no infringement of the Palestine cause. The Camp



David agreement is nothing but a process of negotiation, peace and recognition. It infringes upon and abandons the central issue of Palestine. The least of our duties as part of the Arab nation is to reject it, to condemn it and to resist it and to apply the minimal resolutions adopted in Baghdad and later at the Tunis summit in which he had participated. We know that those resolutions are minimal and do not measure up to the no's of the Khartoum conference, the aspirations of the Arab nation and the requirements of its responsibilities and tasks, but are simply the minimum that can be obtained. But what is his position even on this minimum? What is the position of the Sudanese people? What about the Arab and Islamic ties?

Rumors are rife and conflicting. Whispers are all over the place. There is a frenzied movement of quick and short trips. A good many people have gotten their holiday suits out of the closets or have bought new ones. Many have paid visits to doctors and cosmetic experts. Others have been cocking their ears trying to pick up the stories of a reconciliation and the distribution of portfolios. Those who try to conceal their greed have come out into the open. The planes are full of power brokers and peoples' mongers. And in their rush, everybody trampled the suffering and sorrows of our people, trampled our people's national, Arab and human tragedy. They ignorantly forgot our march over 11 years in the darkness of the bush and the cruelty of the desert, amidst fear, hunger, suffering, displacement, homelessness, division, the decline of the body and the soul and the absence of relatives, country, friends and society. They closed their eyes to our alienation--the alienation of our soul, thought, identification, culture, history and civilization--and to our imprisonment with those who are not members of our kind, religion, homeland and nation. And in a blind, misguided and misleading act of premeditated intention, they disavowed the the martyrs of our people, whose souls hover around us, turning our life into sleepless nights, misery and anxiety. Our politeness, manners and traditions tempted them to take advantage of us. They misread our politeness and manners as weakness, the mistaken ignorants. They lack the reservoirs of strength, courage, ferocity, belief and creed which fill our hearts and souls. They imagined and believed rumors about sumptuous houses, sleek cars, expensive hotels and business and finance outrages, and they believed that we are happy to have the opposition continue and Nimeiri stay. How vast is their ignorance, insolence and pettiness.

God, the people and history cannot tolerate the spreading of filth and obscenity among the patient and steadfast ones, the embattled victims of sleeplessness and starvation, who went wherever the destiny of the national movement took them. They went with an added sense of satisfaction, patience, steadfastness, conviction and belief. These are people with no homeland, no relatives, no identity and no name, despite the heavy burden that they had to carry for over a decade. Expelled from their homes, they roamed eastward, westward, northward and southward carrying with them their ideas, commitments and national allegiance wherever they settled for a while. And when they moved on again, they carried all these plus their burdens. They



are the protectors and defenders of the cause of the Sudanese people. They do not bargain. They do not change their commitments or their positions. They see in every Sudanese inside and outside the country a father, a brother, a son. And so they would share the concerns and problems of the Sudanese people in this era of homelessness, humiliation, suppression, fear, hunger and the lack of honor and gallantry. The culture of spiritual humiliation, spiritual defeat, and moral and intellectual decline produced by this regime, have deluded people into believing that the Sudanese national movement is a nebulous thing, an inchoate mass. As a result, they raised questions about it and even turned against it. How wrong they are and how extensive is their superficiality and deep is their ignorance of the national movement and peoples' awareness of history in times of void, weightless and the loss of national commitment and nationalist allegiance.

Because of such ignorance, the associates of colonialism thought that they are the only force. The mongers in Islam imagined that they are alone in the field. The internationalists thought that they are the cream of the patriots, and even some of our nationalist friends, God forgive them, thought that they alone are the strugglers. The crowning touch came when Nimeiri strutted and swaggered and began to act as if he were God's deputy on earth, the representative of His Prophet and an eternal and everlasting person.

#### Who Are We?

Let everyone know, if they do not, and let them read history, recall the past and explore the future, and let them place before them the following facts:

--We are the National Movement Party, the representatives of the broad, toiling Sudanese masses made up of workers, farmers, students, professionals, artisans, soldiers, businessmen and intellectuals.

--We are the majority in every city and village, every section, farm, school, factory and barracks. We are the majority in the urban centers, the countryside, the desert and in expatriation.

--We are the guards of the procession of this people and we are the preservers of its national gains and nationalist commitments.

--We are socialist in that we are committed to the cause of the toiling farmers and workers.

--We are Islamic by birth, instinct and creed.

--We are nationalistic by upbringing, commitment, loyalty and history.

--We are liberal and democratic in our thought, struggle and orientation.

--We stand in opposition to this regime since its inception. Our opposition stems from our national vision and pan-Arab conscience. We have not allied ourselves with the regime, neither have we befriended it, placated it or shared [power] with it for one minute—from its inception to this day, and until the end of the world.

--We are against repressive, dictatorial, militaristic and fascist regimes as a matter of principle and not because of some interests, desire to share power, foreign pressures and strategic and tactical calculations.

Who among you has not participated in and made peace with that regime? Read your books and remember your positions. Pause for one hour, it will do the faithful good. Are not we the steadfast, patient and persevering popular opposition? This is a fact that no one denies.

--Let everybody know that we are the overwhelming majority among the masses of the Sudanese people.

--We are the overwhelming majority in the armed and regular forces. Without us, no ruler can survive and no subject can oppose.

--We will do away with this regime and those [word or words missing]. We will remove it whatever the sacrifice and the price might be, and regardless of whether it will take us long or not.

#### Money and Suppression

--In a loud voice and with fluttering banners, we will tell him that he has acted despotically and tyrannically. We have on our side right, the Islamic law, patriotism, nationalism and religion, as well as all the factors that engender revolution among peoples. He has indulged in his haughtiness, turned a deaf ear to advice, committed grave offences and burned the land of our people. We have no excuse to keep quiet. He will bear the responsibility of any destruction and devastation that might befall our homeland. He is the initiator, and his injustice continues.

Our people have no choice but to battle for the sake of their freedom, dignity, humanity and nationalism. Either our people attain them or not. There is no other choice. All our sons must remember that they are the descendents of those heroes who have fought the battles of freedom, unity, Arabism and Islam. They had won victories and suffered defeats and had gone through ups and downs, ebbs and tides. Let them remember that they are the heirs and benefactors of the revolutions with which our history and the history of the Arab and Islamic nation teem. Let every Arab, African and other regime all over the world know that anyone who gives Nimeiri a bag of money, a bit of fuel or some bread or arms would be cutting the insides of the Sudanese people, mutilating them, increasing their agony and suffering, help speeding up their death and demise, standing on the side of the gladiators of peoples and the suckers of their blood, siding with

corruption, assailing and attacking a people who are laying on the ground, rolling in their own blood and pleading for justice. Let them all know that our people will not forget that and will one day respond to it in some fashion.

Let the Arabs know that Nimeiri has ridiculed them, showed disregard for them, trampled their history and belittled their conventions, charters and pacts, and stuck out his tongue to them as well as the tongue of Zionism, imperialism and colonialism. He has demeaned them among other nations and peoples and has even exploited their weakness, fragmentation and divisions. If you do not break off all your economic, political and security relations with him, no one will ever believe your claims of defending the central cause, Arab nationalism and Islam. Even the rocks of the earth will know that you are weak and incapable of even such passive conduct, If you ignored the cause of the Sudanese people, how can they forget the question of Palestine and the issues related to their civilization, existence and nation! And if they cover, weaken and retreat, who will respect them? If they think that they have an excuse with regard to Al-Sadat, Carter and Ben Gurion [sic], who would think that they have an excuse with regard to Nimeiri? Is Nimeiri Jerusalem, the Golans, Sinai or Gaza?

Nimeiri has remembered that he is related to the Hexus, the Romans, the Ptolemies, the Circassians, the Memlukes and the Pharoahs, but he forgot his kinship with Ya'rub and Qahtan. He remembered his kinship with Al-Sadat and forgot the Sudanese people's ties to 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib, Khalid Ibn al-Walid, Saladdin, and Muhammad Ibn 'Abdullah. What about their ties of kinship?

Shame upon us. Shame upon them. What happened to the crowns of kings, the scepters of presidents, the titles of leaders? And where are the radio stations, the slogans—even revolutions? If you cannot stand in the face of Nimeiri and discipline in his person everyone who has deviated from the Arab rank and betrayed Arab unanimity, how can you stand in the face of Menachem Begin?

What a loss to the Arabs and Islam! Your wealth has grown to such levels that it became everyone's target. In the case of Nimeiri, the country's wealth is the target of every traitor. What a loss—our loss and your loss! What a loss to the potentialities of the Arab nation! What a loss to the central and major causes of the Arab nation! Pay the price of treason with your own money, and double your rewards to the traitors. And sit waiting for the stream of traitors, the quitters and the defeated. This is how you thank God for his benefits and reward Him for His bounties. What an ignominious fate and end!

#### **We Are Not Subjects**

Those who think that we are part of his [Nimeiri's] luggage or a bunch of his subjects and followers have misread us and must rethink their views with

awareness and understanding. Our party is a microcosm of the homeland. The homeland is an enlargement of our party. Any weak-kneed person in our ranks who is running after power and prostrating himself before it will meet with the same fate of the regime. Forewarned is forearmed.

You have to know that to play with us and with our cause is to play with fire--a burning and scorching fire. We want nothing but to meet our God any time He chooses. How anxious we are to that meeting, and how urgent is our longing to it. We felt it so close to us during these lean years, and how so close are we to it now! God has given us this long life which is full of danger and excitement. We were not deluded by it as others have been. Our eyes will remain open, steady and fastened on the cause. They will continue to look forward even if you drove into them all your spears.

We have accustomed you to simple, brief and convincing explanations of our cause. We do not beg or plead--we are prevented from doing so by Arab pride and Moslem morals. You have been accustomed to seeing our sons--our degree-carrying sons--sweeping your streets and cleaning your airports. Regrettably, however, you have failed to look into our hearts and discover our pride--a characteristic which has deserted some of you since early Islam and the dawn of Arabism. How terrible it would be if it burst out now and if it exploded and opened up its lodes of blood and fire.

Listen, all of you, and let all those who will bear witness listen too. Correct your watches, hold your breath and wait for the people of heroic acts, the generation of sacrifices, to explode a (armed) people's revolution--a revolution that would burn anything around it, before it and behind it, so that only the scorched, but promising, earth would remain. Then will the land produce children, plants and animals, and the peoples of the region will learn from our poor and exhausted people lessons of history and studies in battles and in doing away with emperors.

Anyone who is standing on the side of the oppressor should feel his head and be aware that it has ripened and ought to be chopped off. We shout at everyone who is sitting on the fence and tell him: son, ride along with us and do not be with the oppressors, with the hypocrites and the irresolute. And you ants, get into your anthills. And you owners of the usurped land, the homeless people and the lost cause--take your hands off our country so that it would not become another Palestine or Lebanon. Will you do that? We hope so.

Last but not least: this talk should be read by anyone who thinks that we reject reconciliation and national unity. It should be read by all those who think that we are running after the so-called and discarded national government. Let the former person throw a stone at us, and then let the others throw at us all the stones that are up their sleeves. And let history, future and the homeland be a fair judge between us.



## REVIEW OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIALIST UNION

Cairo OCTOBER in Arabic 9 Mar 80 pp 24-25

[Article by Usamah Ayyub: "A New Phase Begins in Sisterly Sudan"]

[Text] The Sudanese people--of all hues and orientations--are nowadays casting a new picture of the present and the future, in a milieu of candid debate and democracy pervaded by a spirit of reconciliation for the benefit of Sudan--the homeland and the people.

The various features of the new Sudanese picture are emerging clearly: a mature reading of international political developments and events, a true commitment to Islam, Arabism and Africa, a rare fidelity to Egypt in an act of confrontation of internal problems and a major stride towards transferring central authority to the people in the provinces through a state of unanimous and absolute confidence in the leadership of President Nimeiri.

We the sons and daughters of Sudan have rallied from the far-flung corners of our continental homeland, from its tropical forests, hot deserts, mighty mountains and hills, from the banks of its Nile and other rivers. We have rallied, carrying in our hearts the aspirations, will and determination of our nation. We have rallied to place the homeland above division and factionalism and to face the challenges of building our homeland and our prosperity. We have rallied to show President Nimeiri our steadfast faithfulness and true loyalty in his capacity as the leader of our procession and a symbol of the homeland's prestige and Sudan's pride. We have rallied to declare that there shall be no quarreling, no factionalism, no dissension, no fragmentation and no masters or guardians. We have rallied to reaffirm our commitment to stability and cohesion so that we have been able to face anyone who tries to stir troubles and sedition.

In this spirit, the third national conference of the Sudanese Socialist Union ended its sessions. In this spirit, sisterly Sudan begins a new phase of its history, based on the picture of the future as done by the brethren in the south--a picture in which they tried to rearrange the Sudanese house from the inside and its relations with the outside world.

The new phase coincides with a very important oil strike which will assure Sudan self-sufficiency and eventually make it an exporting state. The strike was announced by Nimeiri last week.

Although the "Sudanese house" is vast and the Sudanese people are a polyglot of races, religions, languages, customs and traditions, this people are held together by the common thread of Sudanese nationalism and allegiance to the undivided Sudanese homeland, a homeland which is above everything else Islamic, Arab and African.

The debates which took place this month among the representatives of the Sudanese people at the national conference of the Socialist Union were a splendid experiment in democracy and open dialogue for the benefit of the homeland. This is undoubtedly one of the aspects which are common between Sudan and its northern sister, Egypt.

During the debate of political affairs, the conferees displayed an outpouring of emotions toward Egypt and its people who are linked to the Sudanese people by very special relations. This was responsible for the resolution on Egypt—one of the conference's final resolutions—which states that the national conference of the Socialist Union lauds the joint accomplishment achieved by the Sudanese people and the brotherly Egyptian people in all fields, in furtherance of the special relations which have held the two peoples together since the dawn of history.

Following the normalization of relations and the exchange of ambassadors between Egypt and Israel, the Sudanese foreign ministry issued a statement saying that although Sudan did not approve of that, it wants these special historical relations with Egypt to continue. The statement also emphasized the congruence between the government's official position and the political position of the people as expressed in the conference.

#### A Sudanese Reading of Foreign Policy

With regard to the political aspect of the Sudanese people's outlook towards the present and the future, the national conference of the Sudanese Socialist Union condemned the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan and demanded that the invading forces withdraw. The fifth statement of the conference explained that Sudan is aware of its special responsibility and basic role as the point of contiguity between the Arab and African resolutions. On the other hand, the debates acknowledged Sudan's firm position of supporting the Palestinian people's efforts to regain their rights and establish an independent state.

On African questions, the national conference of the Sudanese Socialist Union reaffirmed Sudan's support of African liberation movements and hailed the role of Sudan and President Nimeiri in African affairs, especially when President Nimeiri presided over the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and participated in the commission of African mediators which was set up to

intercede in the Western Sahara dispute and which brought about peace and reconciliation among the disputing faction in Chad.

#### A Humane Treatment of African Refugees

The conference also discussed the conditions of refugees from neighboring African countries where disturbances and troubles forced hundreds of thousands of the population to seek refuge in Sudan--mostly from Eritrea. The influx of refugees had had economic, social and security effects on the Sudanese citizens. In discussing those issues, the conferees appealed to the Sudanese people to maintain a spirit of conciliation and tolerance toward the refugees in keeping with ideals and values. The conference also welcomed the establishment of the national committee for the relief of African refugees and called on the Sudanese people to support the efforts of the committee by offering aid and assistance to the refugees. The resolution was motivated by the need to reconcile the humane aspects of the refugees problem with the need to preserve the cohesion and security of the Sudanese people.

#### National Reconciliation and the Islamic Course

The national reconciliation pact which Nimeiri had signed with the majority of the opposition elements in 1977 was at the top of the political and internal issues discussed by the conference. The debates affirmed that the reconciliation process was a crowning of the May Revolution's efforts which was preceded by a purification of the national atmosphere from the elements of division and conflict.

The conferees unanimously acknowledged that Sudanese unity is a strategic goal as a means to security, stability and progress in Sudan, and that the national reconciliation initiative which was taken by Nimeiri and which generated wide response, was a great achievement in the way of reinforcing and strengthening national unity and that it should be resolutely pursued further so as to allow the broadening of the circle of participation in the revolutionary process, in a spirit of "revolutionary tolerance" which would treat the negative aspects of participation regardless of their source.

The conference also unanimously decided to adhere to the Islamic course declared by President Nimeiri as part of the program of his second term. It declared that Islam is the creed which guides the political, executive, legislative, judicial, educational and informational machineries.

On the other hand, the conference condemned the wrong practices which have occurred in recent times--practices of creating groupings and subordinating the public interest to private interests. The conference ruled that leadership and responsible positions should be held by the toughest and most honest men who are more capable of holding such positions than those who

would violate the tenets of their religion, integrity, honor and honesty, so that such wrong practices may be avoided in the future.

There was a consensus that raising the levels of production is the paramount problem in this particular phase of Sudan's history. The conference called on the central committee and the political bureau of the Socialist Union to pay special attention to this question because of its priority. The conference pointed out the seriousness of a widening of the gap between production and importation and between revenues and expenditure. The conferees urged the Sudanese government to confront the problems and to deal with them through major solutions and a sense of national responsibility.

The conferees also called on the government to pay attention to basic environmental projects in the spheres of transportation, energy, and stockpiling and to reform present production projects in the sectors of agriculture and industry.

As to investments, the conferees demanded that they be directed towards securing the food supplies of the Sudanese people and towards focusing on food production. They should also be directed towards the less developed provinces. The conference also called for the encouragement of foreign and national investment as a means of contributing to the realization of the goals set in the political plan which is being implemented. It called too for the rationalization of land and natural resources' exploitation and for the support of people's coops. To achieve taxation justice, the conference demanded that a policy be drawn up which would place the largest burden on the capable groups, support economic and investment activities and prevent (smuggling).

To help build up Sudanese foreign currency resources, the conference emphasized the need to activate and energize the tourist sector. The conference, citing economic necessities, said that the government should review the educational policy and concentrate on technical and vocational training.

Since thirst is an important issue in Sudan, the conference emphasized the need to continue to implement and expand anti-thirst programs, so that such programs may cover all of Sudan and solve this problem for good.

#### Authority Transferred to Six Provinces

A new factor in the Sudanese situation is that central authority in the country was distributed among the provinces through the establishment of provincial rule. The conference endorsed this procedure as a necessary course of action to perpetuate democracy and achieve a greater degree of popular participation and balanced growth in the various provinces of Sudan. To concretize the legitimacy of provincial rule, the national conference decided that provincial rule should be constitutionalized through



writing it into the constitution, provided that it is also decreed that national legislation has precedence over provincial legislation.

The conference agreed to set forth a clear procedure for settling disputes among the provinces through the national authority. It was also agreed that provincial rule should be consistent with the presidential republican system in Sudan.

To deepen the experiment and assure its success, the conference called for a thorough survey of the resources of each province and its ability to develop and grow, so that the road to provincial development is clear.

The conference has also agreed to divide Sudan into six provinces as follows:

One--The Central Province, incorporating the districts of Al-Jazirah, the White Nile and the Blue Nile.

Two--The Northern Province, incorporating the Northern (Al-Shamaliyyah) and Nile districts.

Three--The Eastern Province, incorporating the districts of Kessala and the Red Sea.

Four--The Kordofan Province, incorporating the districts of northern and southern Kordofan.

Five--The Darfour Province, incorporating the districts of northern and southern Darfour.

Six--The Southern Province, which already enjoys self-government.

The conference confirmed that Khartoum will remain the national capital of Sudan.

In the monthly disclosure meeting, the Sudanese president announced the plan which he has drawn up and which the cabinet has approved to transfer authority to the provinces. He said that he will ask the provincial governors within the next weeks to begin preparing their provinces for the forthcoming phase. President Nimeiri's plan also calls for amending the Sudanese constitution to provide for the transfer of power to the provinces.

#### Unanimous Confidence in Nimeiri

In the largest test of confidence, the national conference unanimously elected President Nimeiri as president of the Sudanese Socialist Union, one full term before the date of re-election. After nominating himself, Nimeiri explained that he has decided to do so not to seek a reaffirmation of confidence or to seek re-election, but, as he told the conferees: to

reaffirm your authority and legitimate right to check and review--not only to check and review policies but also to check and review the highest levels of leadership.

Nimeiri said that his decision to re-nominate himself for the chairmanship of the Socialist Union was consistent with the confrontation meetings at which he exposes negative aspects of practice and performance in the state machinery. Observers believe that the unanimous re-election of Nimeiri to the presidency of the Socialist Union confirms that, despite the events led by Communist elements in Sudan recently, Nimeiri enjoys the confidence, love and support of the Sudanese people.

Following his re-election as president of the Socialist Union, Nimeiri declared at the conference that any disagreements among the conferees during the debating and discussion of various Sudanese issues were only legitimate differences in interpretation which were all guided by concern for the good of the homeland. He also said that the consensus reached at the conference was motivated by the belief that unity promotes the glory of Sudan. In his address to the conferees, Nimeiri said: I give you no promises, but I give you a pledge--a pledge to draw inspiration from the people and their will, to preserve their unity with my blood and life and to exert my utmost efforts to promote the people's progress. I give you a pledge to reaffirm the people's sovereignty and preserve their dignity and to mobilize our energies for the sake of the people's prosperity now and in the future.

The brotherly Sudanese people are living a new phase. Our hearts are with them and we pray for their progress and prosperity, out of fidelity to them, they who have been faithful to us.

The conference has unanimously rejected the method of labor strikes, work interruptions, slowdowns and other practices that would harm production. This was a signal by the conference against the strikes organized by Marxist groups in Sudan over the past months.

The association between the newspapers and the Socialist Union involved extensive debates at the conference. The conferees concluded that urgent measures should be taken to codify that association and regulate it by law.

The conference called for a major political push that would propel forward the anti-illiteracy movement, and declared that attention must be paid to the youth sector and to the question of promoting the presence of women in political organization agencies, although Sudanese women have been ahead of women in other countries in gaining the right to representation on the People's Assembly and the Sudanese Socialist Union.

### **Confronting Economic Crises**

The conference also debated, in a democratic vein, the economic conditions in Sudan as they have been influenced by changes in the world economic situation, the continuous increase in the prices of energy and commodities and the concomitant lack of a parallel increase in the prices of exports.

9254

CSO: 4802

## GEZIRA SCHEME BEING RESTRUCTURED

## Problems Noted

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Mar 80 pp 33-36, 42-46

[Text]

*Last month the World Bank agreed to a loan of almost \$30m for the reconstruction of the Gezira scheme. Dr Hassan el Tayeb el Hag, managing director of the Sudan Gezira Board has announced that major changes are needed in the structure of the scheme if it is not to crumble. What has gone wrong with Sudan's most important agricultural producer and exporter? Staff writer Sue Turner visited the Gezira last month and talked to over 40 people, from the managing director to the tenant in the field, to try and discover the answer.*

**T**HE GEZIRA SCHEME has come to be represented in most people's minds by a cliché. 'The largest farm in the world' or 'the backbone of the economy' spring most readily to the lips, but 'one of the most successful experiments in socio-economic development in the Third World' and 'a unique partnership between the state and the individual farmer' do not lag far behind.

The ease with which such phrases can be used to describe the Gezira is unfortunate, as it has tended to obscure the fact that all is not well down on the farm, and has not been so for some time.

The backbone is bending, though it has not yet broken. With falling production and living standards, and with the incidence of disease and illiteracy and of poor housing and sanitation still high, the experiment in development appears to be in danger of failing. And, if the scheme is judged by the drift of young people

away from it and its increasing reliance on hired labour, old men, women and absentees, the benefits of the partnership, too, are being called into question.

In the words of Dr Hassan el Tayeb el Hag, the new managing director of the Sudan Gezira Board (SGB), 'The whole system is beginning to crumble', threatening the future livelihood of all three participants in the scheme — the government, the Board and the tenants.

Shortly after taking up his post last October, Dr Hassan presented a memorandum to the SGB board of directors in which he gave his assessment of the scheme's problems and stressed the necessity of reviewing certain aspects of its structure. Foremost was the working of the administration in the SGB itself, together with its relationship with the central government and the organisation of long-term planning in the scheme.

Another major area of concern was the role of the tenant in the scheme, because, as Dr Hassan told the directors, 'It is through the human problems in the scheme that the future of agricultural production faces its greatest dangers.'

And, though he warned that such problems might be difficult to solve, 'and a scheme as old and large as the Gezira may be resistant to change,' he added that, 'if its future is to be assured, then it becomes all the more necessary that we do not take the easy way out and avoid change.'

Yet in its 55 years of existence, the Gezira has weathered crises potentially



as serious as the one Dr Hassan foresees, with only minor adjustments in its structure apparently thought necessary. Why then do so many of the scheme's members feel, with the managing director, that the Gezira is now at a cross-roads, and that its long-term development depends not only on changes in the relationships within the scheme, but also on a critical assessment of its future role in the economy?

The answer has to be sought in two factors – the spiralling world prices of the last six years, and the programme of intensifying and diversifying cropping patterns adopted in the scheme in 1974. These factors have not only brought extra problems in their wake, but – more importantly – have thrown into a new light the scheme's fundamental problems, which solutions to past crises have tended to by-pass rather than tackle.

The Gezira scheme originated in the British government's desire to prop up the failing Lancashire cotton industry and in its need to find some source of finance for Sudan's administration. A successful pilot cotton project at Taiyba near Wad Medani, from 1910-11, led to the decision, in 1913, to construct the Sennar dam which feeds the irrigation network. This scheme proper began in 1925, after completion of the dam, with 80,000 feddans under irrigation.

It was at this time that the production relationships which still dominate the scheme were laid out, centred on a three-way partnership between the government, the management of the scheme – then a group of companies called the Sudan Plantations Syndicate (SPS) – and the tenants, who were, for the most part, former land owners in the area. Each partner was seen as having certain obligations in the production process, in return for which they received a fixed share in the net cotton profits.

The obligations and returns were decided on the basis of age-old crop sharing arrangements in the Nile valley. Under this system, four-tenths of the crop went to the cultivator, one-tenth to the land-owner, one-tenth to the owner of the water wheel, or *shaduf*, and four-thirtieths to the supplier of seeds and equipment.

'On this basis, the original partnership agreement was drawn up,' explained Mr Omer Abdullah el Kanm, a member of the SGB board of directors, and deputy managing director when he retired in 1967 after almost 40 years working in the scheme. 'It made the government responsible for the construction and maintenance of the dam and main canalisation and for the provision of water, in return for 40 per cent of the profits. Twenty per cent was to go to the management,' he continued, 'who were responsible for the buildings and general administration of the scheme.'

'The tenants, the third partner, were to get 40 per cent in return for cultivating the cotton crop.' The tenants' work includes land preparation, sowing, thinning, weeding, picking and delivery of the cotton to the Board.

The sharing of the profits of production was paralleled by the sharing of certain of the costs of production through the joint account, which is now a central pillar of the production process. The costs entered under the account originally covered only deep ploughing, ginning, the transport of cotton to Port Sudan and such inputs as seeds, pesticides and sacks – all provided through the management. The total was deducted from the gross profits of the scheme to arrive at the net profit divided among the partners.

In the years since the Sennar dam first began providing water to the Gezira, the irrigated area has expanded to cover over two million feddans, including the 900,000 feddans of the Managl extension which was constructed between 1957 and 1962. The scheme now accounts for almost 50 per cent of Sudan's irrigated crop land, and 12 per cent of all agricultural land.

At the same time, the returns to the partners have undergone some revision, though their obligations have remained essentially the same. The main beneficiaries in these changes have been the tenants, largely as a result of pressure from their union, which was founded in 1947.

The tenants' share now stands at 49 per cent, including two per cent used to finance the Tenants' Reserve Fund. This is an equalisation fund, founded in 1935

after the world slump, to subsidise tenants' returns in the event of other such bad years. It is maintained at a maximum level of £25 for every feddan sown under cotton.

The central government's share is 36 per cent, but another two per cent has been allocated to the local government councils in the scheme, as they are not permitted to levy local taxes. The greatest effect of the revisions has, however, been felt by the SGB, which now receives only 10 per cent of the profits, compared with its former 20 per cent.

After nationalisation of the scheme in 1950, a new category was introduced in the profit sharing, when the Act establishing the Board specified, for the first time ever, the management's responsibility for the social development of the scheme. The social development fund which was subsequently formed stood initially at a maximum of £250,000, but was later decreased to two per cent of the profits and is now three per cent. Administered by the social development department of the SGB, it has been used to build clean water resources in the majority of the scheme's official villages, to establish forest plantations and an animal improvement scheme and to run adult literacy classes.

The joint account has grown with the scheme, as an increasing number of tenants' costs have been added to it. Cotton pulling, sowing, first watering, weeding and picking are now covered by cash advances to the tenant, and ploughing and ridging are carried out by the mechanical engineering department of the Board.

The government's policy, after 1950, that social and economic development in the scheme should proceed together, was paralleled by attempts to democratise the administration and place more of the decision-making in tenant hands.

The administration of the Gezira was, and still is, based on the division of the irrigated area into groups and blocks, each under an inspector responsible for seeing that agricultural operations are carried out properly. The scheme is currently divided into 14 groups and 107 blocks.

Under each block inspector are two or three field inspectors who work directly with the tenants, supervising their work

and handing on the instructions which have been passed down from SGB headquarters at Barakat through the group and block inspectors.

It was to reduce this highly centralised and paternalistic administration - which robbed the tenant of any say in the decision-making process - that village councils were introduced in 1952. According to a Board directive at the time, the aim was that: 'The field inspector will gradually shed his role as a direct controller of labour and emerge as a coordinator and advisor.'

The village councils have since been transformed into production councils responsible, 'for the supervision of agricultural work in the field. They are also supposed to prepare the timetables for ploughing, watering and sowing and to make decisions on the eviction of existing tenants and the allocation of new tenancies,' explained Mr Mohamed Abbas Mohamed, tenants' affairs manager in the agricultural department of the SGB.

Production councils also exist at the block and group levels, and with the inclusion of health, irrigation, educational and agricultural specialists, are involved in a more wide-ranging discussion of the production situation in their area, and can pass down orders to the village councils.

Other, more obvious, changes have taken place in the field, with the almost complete disappearance of fallow from the rotation. Managil is now under 100 per cent cropping, and the Gezira, 82 per cent.

'The 50 per cent fallow of the past was considered necessary to maintain soil fertility and structure, and to control pests and diseases,' explained Dr Hamid Burhan, director general of the Agricultural Research Corporation (ARC). With its headquarters in Wad Medani, the ARC works closely with the Board's agricultural staff, advising on crop varieties, rotations and new cropping practices. 'Recent developments in fertilisers and pesticides have enabled us to use less fallow,' Dr Burhan continued, 'and the programme of expansion and diversification naturally followed.'

'We had reached the limits of our horizontal expansion,' explained Dr Nuri el Din Mohamed, agricultural manager of the SGB. 'All we could do was intensify,

within given water limits. The crop rotation has now been expanded to include, wheat, groundnuts, and in some areas, vegetables or rice.

Under this policy, the Gezira has not only retained its position as the biggest producer of cotton in the country – accounting in 1978 for just under 60 per cent of total cotton output and almost 90 per cent of long-staple cotton – it has also emerged as a major producer of other cash crops. It now produces almost 85 per cent of Sudan's wheat, 60 per cent of the groundnuts, and 12 per cent of the *dum*. This has considerably strengthened its position in the heart of the economy.

But impressive though these changes might appear to be, according to Dr Abdel Wahab Abdel Rahim of the University of Khartoum, who has made a close study of the economic history of the scheme, they are in many ways misleading.

'The situation in the scheme has changed considerably since nationalisation but, all in all, the result has been only piecemeal amendments – changes in the distribution of shares, or the cancellation of tenants' debts. This has left unchanged' he continued, 'the fundamental imbalance in the scheme's structure: the nature of the partnership between the government, the Board and the tenants.'

And it is this imbalance that, over the past five years, has become a critical question-mark hanging over the scheme's future. Rising world prices have done more than just create financial problems for the partners; the intensification programme has done more than aggravate water and labour resource problems. These factors are putting the whole structure of the scheme under stress, in which falling yields, and tenant and staff discontent have become symptoms.

As the country's largest single producer of cash crops, the Gezira is also a major consumer of agricultural inputs, particularly in terms of imported equipment and oil-based fertilisers and insecticides. The sheer size of the scheme, coupled with growing tenant problems in obtaining labour, has accelerated the mechanisation of production. Land preparation in all crops is now almost completely mechanised, and for wheat and rice the majority of other operations are also done by machine.

The reduction in fallow area that accompanied the intensification of production in the scheme has necessitated increasing applications of fertilisers. According to Dr Nasr el Din, three applications of urea are now given to the cotton and wheat areas in Managil and two in the Gezira. 'We covered almost 80 per cent of the area under these crops last year,' he added, 'and hope to cover 100 per cent next year.'

Insecticide use has gone up even more, with the number of sprayings in the last 30 years increasing from one to seven. Cotton is a crop notorious for the number of pests it attracts, and growing numbers of sprays are almost inevitable as control of one pest frequently destroys the predators of another. The proliferation of white fly in the scheme, which began in the late 1960's, is one example.

Although insecticides have always been costly, they have not, until the last few years, been the most expensive item in the production costs. This place has usually gone to cotton picking. In the 1966-67 season, for example, insecticides cost £1.6m compared with the £2.4m spent on picking.

But the rises in oil prices have obviously changed this situation radically. Last season's insecticides cost £14.5m compared with the £8.2m allocated for picking, and comprised over 25 per cent of all production costs. And next year, they are expected to cost £25m, an increase of 72.4 per cent.

Other costs have also gone up over the last ten years or so, but not nearly so markedly. The rise in insecticide expenditure between the 1966-67 and 1980-81 seasons will be over 1,400 per cent, of which nearly half will have occurred in just two years. Picking costs in the same period will have increased by 240 per cent.

In fact, over the past 12 years, the level of the joint account – the production costs – has risen from £24 a feddan in 1967 to over £102 per feddan for the season now ending. Some of this is attributable to increases in local costs and the inclusion of new operations under the account, as in 1969, when it jumped by 25 per cent when ridging and cross-ridging were added. But most of the increase is a result of the escalating costs of imported items.



The joint account has also been taking up an increasing percentage of the scheme's gross profits. In 1934 it took

18.6 per cent and in 1966-67, 48.5 per cent. For 1979-80, the figure will be 48 per cent but, as financial controller Mr Abdullah Dabura explained, 'This is only as a result of the new financial arrangements introduced by the government last year, when export duty on cotton was removed and the tenants given an export incentive for the first time.'

Without this change, Mr Dabura estimated that the Board's share of profits would have been just £3.1m, rather than the £6m he currently expects. And the joint account would have then taken over 63 per cent of gross profits.

As Mr Dabura went on to point out, such figures, while bad in themselves, are even more serious if taken together with the low yields in the scheme. 'For example, if you take this season,' he said, 'administrative costs, including staff salaries and transport, came to £14.2 for every feddan under cotton; production costs to £102 a feddan.'

'We usually budget for a yield of around 4 kantars (143kg) a feddan, which would give a total cost of £29.2 a kantar. As a kantar of long-staple Barakat fetches £51 on the market, you are left with just £21.8 profit. That means 57 per cent of your total income is taken up by costs, which is a very bad ratio of costs to profit. And,' he concluded 'it is made worse by the fact that actual yields are usually lower than the budget estimate.'

With prices escalating, yields have suddenly become a major issue, raising questions not only of how long the scheme can survive if its output does not rise, but also of the production relationships between the SGB and its two partners - the government and tenants.

Yields in the Gezira have never been particularly high if compared with potential output. According to Dr Musa Mohamed Musa, Deputy Programmes Director at the ARC, 'A good average farmer should be able to get eight kantars of short staple, or 4.5 kantars of long-staple cotton from one feddan, if he has his inputs organised.' This compares with a yield of between seven and eight kantars on the ARC's demonstration farm. In fact, over the past 30 years, less

than half the yields have been above Dr Musa's estimate, and over a third have been under four kantars a feddan.

A similar difference between potential and actual yields is seen in all other crops. A farmer should 'easily be able to get between 0.7 and 0.8 tons from a feddan of wheat,' said Dr Musa, but actual production has averaged only half of this in the last ten years. Yields of *dura* are lowest of all, with actual yields at 0.4 tons a feddan, less than one third of the possible figure.

But not only are yields low - in cotton and wheat, they are also falling. From an average of 4.7 kantars in the first five years of the seventies, cotton output fell to 3.3 kantars during the second five. Wheat fell from 0.5 to 0.3 tons a feddan in the same period.

This fall in yields has been attributed to a number of causes. One is a decline in soil fertility, particularly since the introduction of the diversification programme in 1974.

Dr Musa does admit that the programme may have caused a fall in yields. 'In 1931, the ARC started a long-term experimental farm, in which we grew all the crops, and followed all the fallows, rotations and practices used in the Gezira, so that we could keep an eye on the long-term effects on soil fertility. Since cropping was intensified, yields on the farm have dropped by 14 to 30 per cent.'

'This was not something we expected,' he added, 'as the fertilisers and insecticides available at the time were adequate to maintain fertility. It is a possibility,' he went on, 'that soil fertility is not at fault. Intensification has necessitated continuous watering. The resulting weed growth and soil compaction are equally likely to be to blame. The decline, does indicate, however,' he added, 'that we may need to look again at rotations and crop practices, particularly with a view to including extra nitrogen in the cycle.'

At the moment only wheat, cotton and rice are fertilised. 'We may have to start adding urea to the *dura* as well,' said Dr Musa, 'and to consider the possibility of including a legume in the rotation. At the moment,' he continued, 'groundnuts are considered to be the leguminous crop. There is nothing wrong with their nitrogen-fixing ability, but the way they



are incorporated into the scheme as a cash crop means that the soil gets little benefit. The plant uses all the nitrogen it fixes to produce the nuts.'

The scheme's spraying policy is another possible cause of falling yields, and the one most favoured by tenants. 'I don't see that it can be anything else,' said Mr Mohi el Din, vice-president of the Tenants' Union, 'when you find that bolls drop even after you have completed all the early operations properly.'

Some, like Mr Yousif el Agib, who works on his father's tenancy, believe that the increasing number of sprayings are encouraging rather than preventing infestation. Others, like Mr Khidr Awad el Karim, from Kareba village near Wad Medani, blame the spraying techniques rather than the sprays themselves. Though a teacher, he has helped his father with the tenancy for many years, and has been supervising it for him for the past two seasons.

'In the sixties you could get 50 kantars of cotton from five feddans, but today you are lucky to get 30 as the bolls become infected and fall just before harvest,' he complained. His father's tenancy is in one of the package-deal areas contracted out by the Board to private spraying companies who provide the planes and insecticides. Like many tenants, Khidr suspects that they are not doing their job properly. 'When the Agricultural Research Corporation was supervising spraying you could be sure that the work was done correctly, but with these companies you never know whether it is insecticide they are spraying or water.'

Agricultural director Mr Nasr el Din Mohamed agrees that results from the companies' areas are not as good as from other areas, 'but the difference is in quality rather than quantity,' he said. 'There are compensation clauses in the contracts if the yield falls below a certain level.' Despite this, the SGB has increased the contracted area from 76,000 feddans in 1977-78 to 200,000 feddans this season.

Since 1966, pest control in the Gezira has been carried out by selective rather than blanket spraying. Entomologists with teams of insect-counting boys tour the fields, and when insect numbers per plant go above a certain level, spraying is ordered. In the package-deal areas, the

companies are supposed to provide their own counting teams, but, according to Khidr, 'There is no continuous supervision, the control teams aren't in the fields.'

Concerned at tenants' complaints and falling quality, the Board has decided to keep a closer eye on the companies in future. 'The package area will be reduced by half next year,' said Mr Nasr el Din, 'and the companies will have to agree to our entomologists inspecting the chemicals they use and their spraying methods, if they want to keep their contract.'

Dr Burhan, director of the ARC, pointed out, though, that the effectiveness of the chemicals used may be impaired by faulty cultivation practices, particularly inadequate watering. 'Most of the sprays are systemic, and only work properly if they are translocated through the plant by proper growth,' he explained.

Improvement of watering practices is one aspect of an integrated pest-control system which the ARC is working on. 'It will enable us to keep the number of sprays down and increase the effectiveness of those that are actually used,' said Dr Burhan. The system is basically a programme of improved cropping practices, from reduction of the sowing period and weed control, to wider plant-spacing and improved picking and cleaning practices.

Both Dr Hassen el Tayeb and Dr Musa would agree with him that improved cropping practices are important, not just for pest control, but for improving yields in general. 'Before we change cropping practices and rotations,' said Dr Musa, 'we should first improve our inputs and practices, as any changes must be linked to the facilities available in the SGB in terms of weed control and land management.'

'It is difficult to judge a system that has never been implemented properly,' said Dr Hassan. 'The agricultural timetable has rarely been observed. We need to stick to it and get weeding and sowing completed on time, and inputs like water and fertiliser provided at the right time and place.'

He has already made a start on this return to the book. This season, wheat sowing was stopped on the date recommended by the ARC, even though it meant a reduction in the acreage. 'And with next season,' said Dr Hassan, 'we

will have all operations completed to timetable.'

But he may find that a hard task, for the failure to carry out the agricultural operations on time or to do them properly, is as much a result of the fundamental problems in the scheme as it is of laziness or shortage of finance.

Finance has, however, at one level, imposed severe constraints. 'Shortage in both local and foreign currency has affected all production operations and services,' Dr Hassan told the directors, citing as an example, the fact that with only 40 per cent of cars working properly, field staff were unable to do their jobs.

'We have had to stand in line for our foreign currency needs,' said financial controller Abdullah Dabura. 'The result has been problems with spare parts and basic agricultural inputs like fertilisers. We not only find difficulty in getting the finance, but subsequent delays at the Bank of Sudan mean they often arrive late in the season.'

He is particularly concerned that the Board's budget is no longer large enough to cover its expenditure. 'Ten per cent of the profit is not enough; we are having to turn to the Bank of Sudan to finance operations in the season.' The Board is allowed to borrow up to £564m from the Bank, 'and at the moment we owe them £560.9m,' he added.

'The result of this,' Dr Hassan said in his memorandum, 'is that the Board is no longer trusted on the local or international markets and has to resort to advance payments to meet its needs.'

In the short term, he hopes that the World Bank loan for the rehabilitation and modernisation of the scheme, agreed to on the 12th of last month, will go some way to alleviating their problems. 'It will be just under \$30m,' said Dr Hassan, 'for the purchase of heavy machinery and spare parts, and for the implementation of the land-levelling programme. We hope that after its ratification this month, we will be able to start buying spare parts, at least, so that we can get equipment into working order for next season.'

'It is particularly important,' said Mr Taha Abdel Gadir, acting chief agricultural engineer, 'in terms of the land-levelling programme, which was originally

scheduled to start last year, but was delayed because of cash problems. Over ten per cent of the Gezira irrigated area is not level, which means we effectively lose ten per cent of our cropping land and waste the same percentage of all inputs, including water.'


But many of the Board's staff feel that the loan will only alleviate some of the symptoms of the ailing Gezira, not attack the causes of the problems. In their eyes, the financial problems are more than just a reflection of low yields or the currency shortage in the country as a whole. They are, rather, a result of the Board's changed status in relation to the central government and the uncertainty over the scheme's role in the economy.

Until 1964, when the finances of the scheme were transferred to the Bank of Sudan, the Board had full control over its revenue, including foreign exchange. 'Today we have to go and beg for everything,' said one senior official.

But most staff feel that the problems in the scheme started when it was put under the Ministry of Agriculture in 1970. It was then, they say, that the Board began to lose control over the decision-making in the scheme.

'Before 1970,' said one senior official, 'our links with the government were directly with the Ministry of Finance. Today we have to go through the agricultural minister. For example,' he went on, 'the wheat prices have not yet been announced, with harvesting due to start any day. In the past we would have gone directly to the Ministry of Finance, ourselves, and got a reply the same day. Now we have to wait for the minister to negotiate for us.'

While Dr Hassan completely denies any direct association between the scheme's problems and the advent of the Ministry of Agriculture, he does feel strongly that the Board's autonomy in making production decisions has been severely eroded over the past twenty years. In fact it is the first problem he raises in his memorandum. 'Although the scheme is supposed to be run according to the 1960 Act, which guaranteed its autonomy, the Board has lost much of its freedom to act. We receive letters from the central government telling us to do this and that as though we were just another government department,' he told the board of directors.



THE GEZIRA SCHEME

'This is a productive scheme,' he told Sudanow last month, 'and I would hate to see crucial production activities jeopardised as a result of the dictates of

central government. The government's actions are schizophrenic. On one side they want us to produce, on the other they want to tie us up with red tape, which prevents us producing. It is time they made up their minds. We need freedom of action and decision to improve the scheme,' he concluded.

The loss of autonomy is seen in more than just an increase in the number of circulars landing on the managing director's desk. In the last ten years the Board's bureaucracy has become top heavy.

'Staff numbers have doubled in that time,' said Mr Dabura, 'and mostly because of increasing paper work.' The expansion in staff is most pronounced in the number of SGB, accountants, who now make up almost one third of its 2,231 professional staff. 'Those in the field have been complaining of complicated financial procedures imposed on them by headquarters,' said Dr Hassan in his memorandum, 'and headquarters staff are complaining of too much work from the centre.'

The time has come, he believes, to make some changes. And he proposes to begin with the internal structure of the Board itself, he feels it needs decentralising and democratising to keep pace with developments, in the scheme over the past ten years.

He has, therefore, on the basis of his memorandum, established a technical committee, chaired by Dr Ali Mohamed el Hasan, vice-chancellor of the University of Gezira, to look into the structure of the administration, which is expected to make its report next month.

One area that should receive careful consideration is staff discontent. 'People have started to leave in large numbers,' said Mr Osman Khir Rawi, secretary-general of the SGB employees and officials trade union. 'They are dissatisfied with both pay and conditions in the Board. At one time it was the best employer, today we are at the bottom of the wages list.

'And the incentives are vanishing as well,' he continued, 'along with the scheme's autonomy. The Ministry of Agriculture now decides who goes for training, even if the scheme has the money. It has cancelled promotions which have been ratified by the Board. If we want to keep staff then salaries must go up and the Board must regain its autonomy.'

'Our problems with pay and incentives are the same as those of the tenants,' said one staff member. 'And you could say that in some ways we are cheating them. We go to the fields and try to persuade farmers to stay, when we would leave ourselves if we had the chance.'

If the Board's future is threatened by discontent among its staff, the future of the whole scheme is threatened by discontent amongst the tenants. 'The tenants are its backbone,' said former deputy managing director Mr Omer el Karim, 'and if their problems are not solved, we will end up with no tenants and no Gezira scheme.'

The process is already well advanced. Young men are unwilling to take over from their fathers, and an increasing proportion of tenants have second jobs outside the scheme. 'How many of them are now women, or old men or absentees,' said Mr Omer el Karim, 'who are unable to do their work properly, let alone improve anything?'

In fact, a tenth of the scheme's 100,000 tenants are now women, and a study by Mr Mukhtar Abbas, an extension officer working in the scheme's oldest block, Taiyba, shows that only 49 per cent of the tenants actually go to the fields, whether to work or supervise. Of the rest, almost 20 per cent are old men over 70 years old, 18 per cent are women and the rest have jobs elsewhere.

At the production level at least, this has had an important effect on yields in the scheme. According to Mr Mukhtar, the yields of the non-farming majority, who rely entirely on hired labour, are one third lower than the four kantars achieved by the farmers.

He sees the lack of interest in farming, particularly among the 12 per cent who have chosen jobs outside the scheme, as a



direct result of falling incomes, particularly in relation to costs and yields. Even the successful tenant is losing out. One in Darwish block, with a yield of 10 kantars a feddan, last year took home only £s224 out of the gross returns of £s540 on his tenancy. The rest went to the joint account.

Between 1951-52 and 1972-73, according to SGB statistics, tenants' incomes from cotton fell by 45 per cent in money terms. The fall in real terms was almost twice as much.

'Speaking as the son of a tenant,' said Dr Hussein Suleiman Adam, a lecturer in agro-meteorology at the University of the Gezira, 'the tenants' problems are economic. They know what to do but they haven't got the money to do it. I see my father, like the majority of tenants, involved in a vicious circle of cash shortages and falling yields.'

'For a start, there is a real labour shortage. And, even if the tenant can find workers,' he continued, 'he doesn't have the money to pay them. For example, where weed infestation is heavy, as in my father's area, weeding costs up to £s300. He can't find that kind of money, so the operations aren't carried out on time, the yields are low, and then there is less cash.'

The tenant's labour problems are inherent in the structure of the scheme. From its start, he was supposed to be a 'peasant' cultivator, relying on family labour. It was calculated that an average family could cultivate 40 feddans, with ten feddans under cotton, ten under *dura* and the rest fallow.

But, the tenants began to hire labour almost at once. This has been ascribed by many people, including SGB staff, to dislike of agricultural work but, as Dr Tony Barnett points out in his book, *The Gezira Scheme: an illusion of development*, it is only for a short period in his life that a man will have, if he is lucky, sufficient sons who are at the right age to help him on the tenancy.

The SGB has attempted to overcome the tenants' labour problems in two ways: by making cash advances and by mechanisation.

Cash advances are made on certain operations in the cotton crop, notably sowing, weeding and picking. This year the total advance was around £s110 on

ten feddans. 'What can you do with that, when weeding alone costs over £s200?' said one tenant. And all the tenants echoed his viewpoint. 'They seem to bear no relation to the market price of labour,' said Khidr el Karim.

Most tenants make up the difference by *sheiling* some of their *dura*, wheat or groundnuts to local merchants. This involves selling the standing crop, often for less than half its true market price, in return for immediate cash. 'I *shell* my groundnuts and *dura* every year,' said Ahmed Mohamed Hassan, who has been a tenant in Darwish block since 1927. 'What else can I do? Every tenant has to *shell* otherwise he loses his crops.'

An alternative often resorted to, particularly with groundnuts, is share-cropping – usually with one of the *fellata* workers who make up the majority of the casual labour force of almost one million living on the scheme. The share-cropper provides all the work, in return for half the crop. This usually results in higher yields, but it can also make it even harder for the tenant to find labour willing to work on the cotton.


Not every tenant is poor, however. A number own lorries, tractors and even combine-harvesters. One or two are millionaires. Their yields are high, but this is not so much because they are better farmers, but because they have access to ready cash.

Some, like Abbas Mohamed Dafallah, from Barakat block, who has been a tenant since the start of the scheme in 1925, own shops, others come from rich families or are able to manipulate kinship relationships. Many are the merchants who deal in *shell* with the other tenants.

'In my village,' said Mr Adam Mohamed Gibril, who has a joint-tenancy with his brother, 'only four or five tenants make a living. They are merchants who *shell* to the rest of us, and they are bleeding us dry.'

'The poor tenants are getting poorer,' said Dr Hussein Adam, 'and there are more of them. There are a few very rich tenants, and the middle range is vanishing. The scheme is being polarised.'

Mechanisation has been the other solution adopted by the SGB. All ploughing operations are mechanised, together with much of the rice and wheat harvesting. And the agricultural engineering



CHANGES IN THE PRODUCTION, AREA AND YIELD OF THE GEZIRA SCHEME

department is now working on the mechanisation of the cross ridging for irrigation. 'We have already finished work on a machine for pulling out cotton stalks,' said acting head of the department, Taha Ahmed Abdel Gadir, 'which will reduce costs by almost half, though at £10,000 for each machine the Board will have to take it over.'

But, as Dr Hassan commented in his memorandum: 'While mechanisation might appear to be in the interest of the tenant, it has its costs, and we have to question how far it will benefit his net returns? Given current yields in the scheme and the large percentage of gross profit already eaten up by the joint account, it may not, at the moment, benefit them very far at all.'

Three other possibilities are also currently under discussion. The first is to increase tenants' income by paying more attention to the production and yields of crops other than cotton and wheat. The second is to encourage higher cotton yields through the introduction of an incentive system.

'If average yields over the scheme go above four kantars,' explained Dr Hassan, 'then tenants exceeding that amount will take an increasingly large share of the net profits until, after eight kantars a feddan, they will take all net profits and none will go to the government or Board.' The Tenants' Union are in agreement with the principle of the system, but are currently negotiating with the Board over the yield levels at which it should be implemented.

The third possibility, and one strongly favoured by Dr Hassan, is for the Board to look into the marketing of tenants' crops. 'At the moment, they are getting only a small percentage of proper market value. Helping them to set up proper networks should therefore be of great benefit.'

But all these suggestions leave the tenant's position in the scheme basically unchanged. His problems have been exacerbated in recent years by those of the other partners. The failure, largely for financial reasons, of the Board to provide inputs on time, and for the government -

in the form of the Ministry of Irrigation — to provide sufficient water because canals have been silted and weeded up, have had considerable adverse effects on his yields.

He is supposed to be a partner in the scheme, but he is the only partner who has no say in the decision-making processes which affect his ability to do his job — to cultivate. A farmer's job is essentially that of a risk-taker and decision-maker, balancing various factors of production. But with the SCB and Ministry of Irrigation providing virtually all inputs, and the Board, through the ARC, telling him when to sow, weed and pick his crops, the tenant is no more than a factor of production himself — labour.

If he neglects his plot, the Board can step in to see the work is done and charge him for it. In the last resort, a tenant can be evicted. But what come-back does the tenant have if the other partners fail to keep their agreement with him?

Board staff will point to the tenant members of the board of directors, to the joint committee between tenants and the agricultural manager, and to the production councils as examples of devolution of decision-making to the tenants. But is this true?

Many tenants say that the members of the Tenants' Union executive who sit on the board and committee do not represent their interests, in the sense that the structure of the executive committee makes it almost inevitable that the majority of its members will be rich tenants. 'You have only got to look at the advances they agree to, to see that they have no cash problems,' complained one tenant, who has been in the scheme for over two decades.

There is also a feeling that, whatever the initial intention, the tenant representatives, like the production councils, have become a means of facilitating the administration of the SCB rather than an opportunity to participate in decision-making.

'Production councils are part of the communications system with the field inspector,' said Mr Haroun Ahmed Karam, who lives in Kareba village. 'They are there to see that yields are raised, and if the production council does not provide the kind of services that will raise yields, then it has failed, even though it is part of us.'

Most tenants would like to see the abolition of the joint account, and its replacement by individual accounts, as in the Rahad scheme. 'It is time it went,' said Ahmed Mohamed el Hassan of Darwish block. 'It is consuming too much of the income, and you can see no difference between tenants who have low yields and those who get high yields.'

They would also like to see the marketing arrangements for cotton changed, so that it is sold directly to the Board. 'In that way you would have some idea of your income, and could budget for the next season better,' said Haroun.

It has often been argued that to give tenants more control over the cotton crop would probably result in no cotton at all being grown, if current tenant attitudes are anything to go by. But this argument neglects the fact that the scheme is structured in such a way as to encourage these attitudes. At the moment, tenants have no say in what is or is not grown; they have no control over inputs, except labour; and they frequently have no idea of costs or returns, except to realise that their income is going down all the time.

'You never know when you go to the block office to collect your cotton receipts, how much will be there,' said Khidr el Karim, 'or even if there will be anything there at all.' Such uncertainty encourages tenants to turn to those crops over which they have, at least, marketing control.

According to Dr Abdel Wahab Abdel Karim, 'As long as the tenants are not included in the administration, or really involved in policy-making, then the scheme's structure will remain unbalanced. The problem is that it has no coherent philosophy. The tripartite agreement should have been developed,' he added, 'into a cooperative, designed especially for the Gezira.'

Mr Omer el Karim agrees with him. 'Tenants have been left out of the planning for too long. I told the Board when I became one of the directors in 1967 that they were ignoring the tenants and placing too much emphasis on cotton and yields. It is shameful,' he continued, 'that after 30 years of nationalisation you can go into villages, in what is the country's most productive and richest area, and still find so much bad housing and sanitation.'

His words highlight a long-standing conflict over the role of the scheme, in which the tenants have been caught up. The conflict began in 1950, when the government, through the nationalisation Act, charged the Board with developing the Gezira into a well-balanced agricultural community, while still holding it responsible for the production of cotton.

Since then, the Board has had to reconcile the demands of social development with those of production, almost always deciding in favour of the latter. Social development, like devolution of decision-making, has tended to become a means of furthering production rather than an end in itself.

'Our job is to solve the problems created by production,' is how one member of the social development department of the SGB described his work. He cited as an example the 7,000 feddans of forest which has been planted to compensate for the fact that all the trees were removed from the Gezira when it was established. 'With the size of the scheme now,' said another, 'there should be at least 10,000 feddans under forest. But, when you ask for more land, you are told that it is needed for production of cash crops.'

Although the department has achieved much in terms of the provision of water, literacy classes, housing construction and aid to tenants' self-help projects, it has always remained somewhat on the periphery of the SGB. Its work does not, for example, appear to be integrated with the work of the other, production-centred, departments.

For example, for the last fifteen years the department has been helping the tenants improve the quality of their livestock, as it was realised in the 1950s that tenants' diets lacked sufficient protein. Since then, it has argued that livestock should become an official part of the scheme, under a mixed farming system, instead of just tolerated to feed on crop residues.

The production departments have now come to an agreement. 'Mixed farming is now generally accepted as a necessary development of the scheme,' said Dr Burhan of the ARC, but this is due to the

need to improve production rather than to develop a balanced agricultural life for the tenant, who not only works, but also lives on the scheme.

'What we need now is a radical change in the scheme,' said Mr Omer el Karim. 'I would like to see the Board reduced to a minimum and mixed farming and co-operative production put in its place. There is too much central control and the tenant has no room for initiative.'

'If I were responsible for planning the future of the scheme,' he went on, 'I would begin with experimental co-operative production in two blocks, one in the Gezira and one in Managil, initially under the supervision of the block and field inspectors. If this was successful, it would be spread to all blocks to cover not only economic but also social development.'

'I have sent my proposals to the board of directors, and am still waiting for them to be discussed,' he concluded. For the time being at least, his plan is likely to remain a utopian dream. The changes proposed by Dr Hassan el Tayeb are centred on improving production under the existing tripartite agreement. An integration of social with economic development is still seen as furthering the end.

And this is likely to remain the case as long as the Gezira remains vital to the well-being of the whole Sudanese economy. Despite its problems, it still accounts for one third of total exports and is an important contributor to gross domestic product, providing one third of the total contribution of the agricultural sector.

'Even now, said one senior SGB official, 'the government consults us about our probable income before making the annual budget.'

Given this it is not surprising that change in the scheme is envisaged only in terms of its existing structure. Many of the Board's staff, in fact, see the future of the scheme lying only in its past, in a return to the 'golden' days before 1970. But, while Dr Hassan would like to see a return to the rule book, he would also agree with Mr Omer el Karim, that in-



sufficient attention has been paid to long-term planning.

'This was a result of the directors' involvement in the routine administration of the scheme when the director and managing director were the same person,' he said. 'Now that the posts have been separated, it is time for them to return to policy-making. Long-term planning is needed very badly at this stage in the scheme's development.'

The most probable direction of the scheme, and the one envisaged by both Dr Hassan and Mr Kisha, deputy managing director for industrial affairs, is its evolution into an agro-industrial complex. Plans are already under way to begin groundnut processing, and the development of integrated vegetable pro-

duction and canning, and mixed farming are also being considered.

But, while this may be a factor in the equation which has a secure and prosperous future for the Gezira as its answer, it is not the only, nor necessarily the most important one. A senior Board official has described the scheme as 'too important to the economy to risk experimenting with', but it is possible that the time has come to take that risk.

If preoccupation with the demands of production is preventing a solution to the fundamental problems of the scheme, then not only is that production, itself, being jeopardised, but the future of the whole scheme, and of the million or more people who depend on it remains in doubt. ■

#### Managing Director Comments

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Mar 80 pp 39-42

[Interview with Dr Hassan el Tayeb el Hag, managing director of Sudan Gezira Board (SGB), by Sue Turner--date and place not given]

**[Text]** Last October, Dr Hassan el Tayeb el Hag, became managing director of the Sudan Gezira Board (SGB), and the man responsible for tackling the many problems which threaten the future of the scheme. He has since made it clear that he sees structural change as central to any solution, beginning with the reform of the Board itself.

Despite the enormity of the task, he was in an optimistic mood last month when he talked to staff writer Sue Turner about his plans to revitalise Sudan's ailing giant. Extracts from their conversation:

**SUDANOW:** Your analysis of the Gezira's many problems, presented in a memorandum to the board of directors last November, indicated the need for wide-ranging structural reforms if the scheme is to be saved from further decay and possible collapse. Your message of change was directed in particular to the SGB administration and has led to considerable uncertainty among its staff. What role do you envisage for the SGB, and how do you see the reconstruction of the scheme being carried out?

**DR HASSAN EL TAYEB:** In my memorandum I was trying to convey two messages. The first was one of security for the employees of the SGB, particularly as regards the continuity of the scheme and the improvement of their conditions. Before I took up my post, rumours were rife that I was about to begin a 'reign of terror', and would be sacking people right and left. This is not my intention and, although justice will be done where necessary, I tried to allay these fears by general consultation before writing the memorandum, by what I said in the memorandum itself, and by my actions since.

For example, we have already managed to get £1m from the government for the construction and improvement of housing and water supplies for all field staff.

My second message was one of hope and determination that the scheme can and will be rebuilt. This reconstruction will have to take place on many fronts, but the first priority must be the reform of the SGB, as the management element. It is the Board that will have to implement subsequent reforms, and any

change in its structure must be meaningful and not just a cosmetic reshuffling of people and posts.

I have, therefore, on the recommendation of the board of directors, set up a technical committee which is now looking into possible solutions, using my memorandum as its working paper.

Secondly, of course, we must improve production. We must ensure that all inputs, including finance, are available at the right time and in the right place. The \$65m loan for the rehabilitation and modernisation of the country's agricultural schemes which has just been negotiated with the World Bank will help us considerably in achieving this. Almost \$30m will come directly to the Gezira for equipment, spare parts and land levelling, and we will also benefit from the \$9.5m allocated to the Ministry of Irrigation and the Earth Moving Corporation.

Thirdly, we must do more than just acknowledge that the tenants are the nucleus of production. We must act to ensure that not only their income, but also their quality of life is improved. The question though, is where to act first. For example, the number of old tenants and the preference of their families to look outside the scheme for work is a serious problem, but it is one needing social research and a long-term solution.

I think, therefore, that our immediate concern must be with those problems which are amenable to simpler solutions. What I am most interested in are the problems of labour and cash shortages and of marketing. Improvements in these areas are a matter of organisation, and would be of more direct benefit to the tenant than just increasing productivity to raise incomes.

It is by attacking on these three fronts — management, productivity and tenants' problems — that I think we will guarantee the survival of the scheme. A fourth element, which must be considered, however, is that of long-term planning. I want to see the Gezira viable for another 50 years at least, and it is time for the board of directors to resume its planning function, not just in terms of the next two or three years, but for decades ahead.

*Q: You have talked of structural reforms, but some of the comments in your memorandum suggest that you feel that the scheme needs a 'kick in the pants' almost as badly; that many of its problems are as much a result of poor discipline and failure to implement regulations as of shortages in finance or inputs.*

*A: It will take some time for the full effects of structural changes to be felt in the scheme. In the meantime, I have adopted as a slogan, 'Discipline, diligence, hard work and the rule of law'.*

The Gezira is a highly-organised agricultural system, based on a strict timetable, and productivity is sensitive to any failure to keep this timetable.

One of the diseases of the scheme in recent years has been that everyone has gone slack — tenants, field staff and headquarters management.

The result has been a series of crises, as rotations begin to overlap and delays in one crop lead to labour and water-supply problems in others. Yields inevitably fall and the whole system has started to crumble.

Regulations were laid down years ago to guarantee and enforce the execution of operations at their specified time. It is a return to these regulations that I want when I call for the 'rule of law'.

There is no substitute for work, it costs us neither local nor foreign currency, so to begin with I have asked that everyone should do his job, on time, with the facilities currently available.

As the cotton season had already started when I took up my post, I began the return to the rule book with the wheat crop. The latest date for sowing wheat should be November 15, but people have regularly gone on sowing beyond that date, although it affects yields and interferes with the cultivation of other crops.

Last year we stopped on time, even though it meant sacrificing 15 per cent of the crop area. I expected the harvest to show the advantages of doing things

properly and, with the crop now ripe, people are already saying that they haven't seen such yields in years.

Next year we are going to do everything by the book, which will help alleviate many of the problems. All we need is determination to get significant improvements in yield.

*Q: But surely, when insisting that people keep to timetables, you must also ensure that they have the necessary inputs? For example, you have already mentioned that tenants face serious cash and labour problems. These must affect their ability to carry out their work properly. Similarly, in your memorandum you pointed out that the mobility which is essential to field staff had been severely curtailed by a 40 per cent shortfall in the necessary transport.*

**A:** The new loan will help us in providing many of the necessary inputs, particularly spare parts. We expect expenditure of the loan to start next month, and we will use the money to purchase stores and spare parts for the coming season. One of the first priorities will be the repair of cars for field staff, so that they can be in the fields where they belong.

As for the tenants, we don't, as the SGB, have the facilities to provide credit beyond the advances we already give on the production of the cotton crop. These advances are not, in any case, supposed to finance all the tenant's production costs. What we are saying to him is: 'Here is an interest-free loan to help you out, but you and your family are also supposed to contribute with your labour'.

It seems to me that many of the tenants feel that they should be given everything. If that is to be the case, why have tenants at all? We could just give the field inspectors the money to go out and hire labour.

Even so, I think we should use our management skills to help tenants overcome this problem – possibly through the organisation of banking facilities,

cooperatives, or even a commercial loan. I have already had talks with the Tenants' Union on this subject, and asked them to think of possible solutions.

And, while our central concern is cotton, and the other crops on the scheme are tenant's crops introduced to supplement his income, I think it is time that the Board began to take an interest in them. I say this for two reasons. Firstly, because improving these crops will improve the tenant's income and therefore his access to cash, and, secondly, because we share the land with him. The good or bad practices carried out on the tenant's crops reflect directly on the cotton.

We have started by buying improved sorghum seed, and we are now discussing the possibility of establishing a centre to provide the tenants with improved groundnut seed.

The obvious solution to the labour problem would be to mechanise. But there are other factors which have to be taken into consideration. Firstly – speaking now as an agricultural engineer – there are certain prerequisites that must be fulfilled before mechanisation can be considered either technically or economically viable. Secondly, although tenants may have problems in getting labour, we have almost a million people settled on the scheme who depend, at least partly on the work. So any further mechanisation must be to complement labour, not replace it.

*Q. There seems to be a tendency among SGB staff to classify tenants as 'good' or 'bad', depending on their cotton yields. But, this judgement often disregards the fact that many of the 'good' tenants are 'good' only because they have access to alternative sources of cash to hire labour when it is needed. Can nothing be done to help the hard-working tenant who is 'bad' only because he is poor?*

**A:** Those who want to be good farmers can be good farmers. Only a small percentage are poor – by which I mean

that they can never make a profit on any crop. And they are poor because they are bad farmers – because they don't know how to, or don't bother

to, do their work properly. There is no reason why a tenant can't make a living and be solvent after his first year.

*Q: You say that a conscientious tenant has every chance of making a living, but the younger generation seems to disagree with you to the extent that it is voting with its feet and looking for work elsewhere. Labour is the backbone of the scheme, but when you go into the fields you see only old men. If you do stumble across a young tenant, his reason for taking up the tenancy is usually that he has 'failed' – that he has insufficient education to get out of agriculture. If the scheme is to have any future, surely you must do something to change these attitudes and make farming a more attractive proposition?*

*A: Firstly, there are plenty of young farmers, but it is true that you don't see them in the fields. The old farmers are there because they have nowhere else to go, while most of the young tenants have other jobs.*

*It is also true, that if farming is seen as 'failure' then we may be getting a new generation of tenants who are the worst kind – who have gone into it for negative rather than positive reasons.*

*But such attitudes are a crucial problem for the country as a whole, not just the Gezira. It is a function of a distorted educational system, that trains people to idealise the government official. The British introduced the system to fulfil a particular need, but we have had 25 years to change it and we have done nothing, or at best very little and half-heartedly.*

*And farming is the one job you can't do half-heartedly, in fact it is a way of life, not a job. I have started talking to the tenants, asking them what their sons are earning in Khartoum and in what conditions they are living, having to pay £30 for a room. Life here is simple. I am trying to evoke a pride in farming and make people aware that quality of life is as important as the salary in one's pocket at the end of the month.*

*In the short term, the only solution I can see is to increase farmers' incomes in the ways I have mentioned – higher yields and better credit and marketing facilities and to work to improve their social conditions. The increasing problems of urban life may also come to our aid in making farming look a better alternative, especially if we ensure that incomes and social conditions are emphasised.*

*Q: In your memorandum you stated that shortages of both local and hard currency had caused problems in the scheme which had been reflected in productivity. What is being done to improve your position?*

*A: I have been talking to the Ministers of Agriculture, Planning and Finance and to the Bank of Sudan. I think now that they understand our position better, and since last September's financial measures, the situation has improved considerably. We are now getting a high priority, and, although, as a major exporter, I would like to have all my foreign exchange earnings, I think that we are now getting our fair share, given the financial circumstances. We have, for example, already managed to finance all our fertiliser, herbicide and sacking needs for next season.*

*Q: It has been suggested that one solution to your foreign exchange problems would be for the scheme to be given a percentage of its export earnings in hard currency as is happening with private exporters.*

*A: No, I wouldn't agree to this. If I can't get all my hard currency requirements I would rather fight for what I need than accept a fixed percentage which I knew would be insufficient.*

*Q: One of the commonest complaints among Board staff is its increasing bureaucracy and decreasing autonomy, particularly since it has been part of the Ministry of Agriculture. And you yourself, have complained that the scheme is treated like another government department rather than as a major producer. What changes would you like to see made in the relationship between the scheme and the central government?*



**A:** To equate increased bureaucracy and lack of autonomy with the Ministry of Agriculture is to misunderstand our relationship with the ministry. I deal with the minister directly, and he is doing things on our behalf. The way I look at it is that we are in good hands, and that it has not increased bureaucracy.

But I did, and still do feel strongly about the autonomy of the scheme. What is at issue is the recognition of the fact that we are producers, and that crucial productive activities should not be jeopardised as a result of the dictates of central government routine.

The architects of the 1960 Act, which gave the scheme its independence were, I am sure, very much aware of this. The Act is still there, but the autonomy is not. It has taken twenty years to erode away, partly as a result of past management ceding their independence rather than accepting their responsibilities, and partly just through default.

Now, I am supposed to be managing director of a productive agricultural scheme, taking vital decisions each day. But if I need foreign exchange I have to go to the Bank of Sudan, if I want to spend more than £50,000 – even on local contracts – I have to go to the Ministry of Finance. I now have to sell my crop through a corporation, and to follow rules and regulations for employees, even where they contradict the SGB statutes.

We may not be able to go back to the '60s, but the more we are involved in the government parcel of rules and red tape, the more we are divorced from the freedom necessary to produce efficiently. The government appears to be trying, as the saying goes, 'to milk its cow and eat it'. It is time for the government to make up its mind. Are we a productive scheme? If we are, then we must be given the freedom to produce, and that includes finance – without money, autonomy is just empty talk. Or, are we just a means of providing employment and social services? If that is the case, then they can reduce us to just another government department.

I would like to see the SGB as a neutral body, charged with the good management of the scheme's resources

for the benefit of all partners and responsible to them if it fails. I would like to be able to reward my employees for good production, and to sack those who can't produce. I would like to see the survival of the fittest.

What you have to remember is that the scheme is still responsible for almost 60 per cent of foreign exchange earnings – and more if you count wheat and groundnuts as import substitutes. It is still the central prop of the economy, and as such it is in everyone's interest that it should be as productive as possible.

**Q:** *You mentioned that you now have to sell your crop through a corporation. Your relationship with the Cotton Public Corporation (CPC) has been a matter of much controversy. Are any changes in that relationship likely to be made?*

**A:** The marketing of cotton is becoming an increasingly specialised activity in a complex world. The dynamics of both the international and local markets pose a number of thorny problems, of which we are aware.

However, the cotton marketing policy is now under review, and various reforms have been suggested. The tenants, for example, would like to see the Corporation as their direct agent and taking a reduced commission. On the other hand, some groups inside the CPC want the Corporation to become direct buyers from the tenants, and to take over the ginning and transport of cotton.

My immediate aim, however, is not to wrangle over shares. The cake may be divided wrongly at the moment but my concern is that we should get as big a cake as possible on the table first, then quarrel over the size of the slices.

**Q:** *In your memorandum you imply that there is one area in which you feel that the Board must have more control – the provision of water. You talk of the unification of the administration of the Board and irrigation procedures, which suggests that you would like to take over the functions currently carried out by the Ministry of Irrigation. Is this true?*

A: We are currently negotiating with the ministry and trying to improve the relations between us. Now that they have the World Bank loan we are hoping that they will be more capable of supplying us with the quantities we need, in the right time and place.

I would like to see a more contractual relationship between the Board and the ministry. At the moment our relationship is that of two government agencies. As such, we have no legal fallback if they fail to provide us with the water we need, and, as a result, the crop is reduced.

I am not interested in empire-building, only with getting the job done properly. We want water. If the ministry can provide it as efficiently as was the case in the past, then we shall be happy.

Q: Finally, you have talked about reform of the scheme under its existing structure of a primary agricultural pro-

ducer centred round long-staple cotton. But how much longer can this structure remain unchanged? What kind of future do you foresee for the Gezira?

A: I am personally for industrialisation. I see it as not only the next, but the only logical step to increase production when we have a fixed area to cultivate.

Our productivity in cotton must soon level out and we have to develop other sources of income based on a more balanced series of alternatives. I would like to see the foundations of a comprehensive agro-industrial development plan laid, that would embrace both industry and marketing, and give animal and vegetable production a more important place in the scheme.

In 20 years time, my hope would be to see the scheme pointed to, not just as the world's biggest farm, but as the most outstanding agro-business complex in the Third World.

CSO: 4820

## ATTITUDES OF SUDANESE PEOPLE RECALLED

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Mar 80 pp 69, 71

[Text]

*With the Unity Day celebrations on the 3rd, Flashback this month goes back 12 years to the time when the civil war had been raging for 13 years, and the Addis Ababa Accord, which would bring it to an end, was still four years in the future. With no apparent solution in sight, public debate on the problem was strong in both press and parliament. In December 1968 the daily El Ray El Am joined in the debate, with an editorial - which provoked many favourable replies from southern leaders - that called for a public examination of social attitudes between the communities in the north and south of the country, and an end to isolationism and the 'Ugly Sudanese'.*

**T**HE UGLY AMERICAN' is a book written by two Americans on their country's involvement in south-east Asia. A best-seller, it was made into a film, and audiences in Khartoum recently had a chance to see it for themselves. The authors criticise, somewhat sarcastically, the conceited behaviour of the American officials sent out to deal with the local people. These officials live in isolated communities, as though they had been sent abroad to re-create the suburban life of Manhattan or Brooklyn.

These attitudes are compared to those of the Russian officials who mix with the local people, attempting to gain their trust and understanding through generosity and helping them in their daily lives. These officials create the impression that their sole mission is to serve the people and learn from them.

There is a lesson here for us; a painful but necessary one. The behaviour of some northern Sudanese in southern Sudan appears to be similar to that of the 'Ugly American'.

The problem in southern Sudan is not wholly a political one. Its political appearance is a result of the way it has been presented. Any analysis based on this presentation will lead to false conclusions, as it neglects fundamental aspects of the problem, which - if not solved - will remain a potential source of destruction for any new system that might be evolved. In my opinion, these fundamental aspects are two: the economic and the social.

Economic, because the problem is actually one of relative backwardness, from which the feeling of injustice has grown, the feeling that there is a developed north and an underdeveloped south. But most countries suffer this problem, among them many developed countries who joined the 'civilised world' a hundred years ago. Czechoslovakia, for example, suffers from this dilemma, as a comparison of its eastern area, Slovakia, with the western areas of Moravia and Bohemia shows. So too does the United Kingdom, if you compare England with Wales or Northern Ireland. The United States has the problem between black and white, Nigeria between its north and south.

But our more serious concern should be that we may well find the feeling of injustice spreading to other parts of the country unless those in authority do something to remedy the situation.

Already, in the west the bases of future expressions of grievance are to be seen in the regional alliances, in the Darfur Progress Front, in the Nuba Mountains Union and in the SUNI organisation.

So, too, in the east, where the large Beja Alliance has won a significant number of seats in all the general elections held since the October 1964 revolution.

But despite this, the economic factor is the easier aspect of the problem to solve. We have the ability to change the situation with some finance and some planning. Developed countries with similar problems have turned to improving and industrialising such backward areas, until they have been able to stand on their own feet. As a result the causes of the feelings of injustice have disappeared, and with them the end of internal disputes between regions. The whole country has been integrated into a single nation.

We have come to understand this side of the problem. Small industries are being established in the south, but if this was accompanied by proper planning, then we would go some way on the path to unity. It is to be hoped therefore, that future governments will continue such efforts to create a well-balanced economy in the different regions of Sudan.

It is the second, the social factor, which will be the most difficult to deal with. The citizens of a nation should be equal in all respects, and there should be strong ties of cooperation and integration linking all.

At the official level, everyone has the same rights and duties, and no southerner has any cause to complain that the state differentiates between him and any other citizen of this country, or that he finds in the laws of Sudan anything which hinders him from improving his conditions, speaking as he pleases or moving where he likes. In short, he enjoys, with all people of Sudan, the basic freedoms and rights ensured by a democratic constitution.

I would like this point to be clear, when I start to talk of the social barriers which stand between the south and north of the country. I do not mean, nor ever could

mean, that the government has any responsibility for them. I do mean, however, that we, as citizens, have a responsibility. Our responsibility derives from the fact, that as members of this large family which is Sudan, we should all work for its welfare. This is particularly true of northerners in the south and southerners in the north.

The first fact which strikes the eye of anyone looking for the roots of the problem in southern Sudan is the isolationism of northerners in the south and southerners in the north. In the southern provinces we find northerners gathering in foreign communities — together in their offices in the morning, at lunch, and for recreation and conversation in the evening. Rarely do these communities attempt to mingle with the people of the south or to establish friendships with them. In the north we find the same situation. Southern citizens establish their own communities, even at the highest educational levels.

Thus, while reading much about the unity of Sudan in the newspapers, and hearing about it in parliament, in these isolationist communities it does not take place, for the sole reason that they meet very rarely with each other.

This, in my opinion is the most complex aspect of the problem. We have the ability to create one state by removing the causes of economic backwardness and finding a political solution which can be written down in the country's permanent constitution. We can even outline its geographical boundaries. All these things are possible because they are based on objective, material criteria.

The fundamental problem, though, is how to change attitudes and create a new national consciousness. Without a new national consciousness, Sudan will remain a divided nation whatever we write in the constitution and however developed the economy. How can we create this new national consciousness?

This dilemma, in my opinion, deserves very serious public discussion. The existing situation is a test of our people's ability to create new solutions and solve



its problems. We have wasted much effort in criticising successive governments for their failures. Now it is time for us to turn and confront the historical challenge facing us, so that we will not be condemned by future generations for inaction and failure.

The concern called for must grow in the heart of every Sudanese. It should be reflected in both individual and general social behaviour. For, as we have said, the new national consciousness cannot be achieved by ministerial decree or by resolution of parliament. It is only by the individual understanding the country's problems, and meeting these problems by changed attitudes and behaviour, that it will be achieved.

If we fail to create this new consciousness, then we will surely deserve the title,

'ugly', and the 'ugly Sudanese', who lives in isolation from his fellow countrymen and his country's difficulties, will be responsible for deepening the problem.

Responsibility also, in my opinion, lies with the intellectuals and educated groups. Those who were supposed to have been only one element in society have become a distinct class. They have separated themselves from society in a shameful and disappointing way.

I have no ready solutions for the creation of a new national consciousness and the destruction of the social barriers between the two halves of the country, but I do hope that open discussion and objective writing will lead to the formulation of an acceptable path to true national unity.

CSO: 4820

END

**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

*3 June '80*

---

*MAK*